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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM 
STATEMENT 
1.1 Background  
Concern about the exclusion of low-income households from the formal banking system in 
the developing countries has a long history. During the 1960s and 1970s, specialized 
subsidized credit institutions and programmes were adopted by national governments in the 
developing countries to deliver subsidized credit to small farmers. Donors and national 
governments provided considerable financial assistance for such interventions with the aim 
of promoting agricultural growth and poverty alleviation. During the 1980s, the subsidized 
agricultural credit programme came under heavy criticism because their performance was 
below expectations in several ways, including the failure to reach poor farmers and provide 
financial services in a sustainable manner (Robinson, 2001; Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; 
Von Pischke, 1983; Adams, 1971). Such credit institutions and programmes were unable to 
expand their outreach and sustain their lending because of poor loan recovery rates 
(Johnson and Rogaly, 1997; Von Pischke, 1983). Moreover, with the introduction of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 1980s, subsidized credit programmes and 
institutions were subject to strong criticism by donors who were the sources of their loan 
portfolios (Johnson and Rogaly, 1997).   
 
The pitfalls of the specialized subsidized credit institutions and programmes have led to a 
search for “innovative” microfinancing services to poor households (including women) in a 
sustainable manner. Microfinance is the provision of financial services, mostly micro-loans 
and saving facilities, to low-income clients, including small farmers, traders, street vendors, 
service providers and artisans (Robinson, 2001; Ledgerwood, 1999), who cannot access 
formal banking services (Wilson, 2003) . The new “innovation” in microfinance is designed 
to avoid the major pitfalls of the subsidized credit interventions by focusing on building 
local and sustainable financial institutions to serve the poor (Ledgerwood, 1999). In the last 
two decades, microfinance institutions have proliferated in many low-income countries 
aiming for poverty alleviation. In Ethiopia, following the global microfinance movement, 
an institutionalised form of microfinance has been promoted after the mid-1990s1 with the 
issuance of a microfinance policy by the Ethiopian government. 
  
Poor people in the developing countries often lack the basic means of production to 
produce food or to generate income for their livelihoods. They are unable to cope with 
different economic shocks caused by drought, flood, illness, etc, since they have few 
options and resource bases to build assets and smooth consumptions (World Bank, 2001). 
In the last two decades, the poverty situation in the developing countries, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa, has been fuelled by the spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which drains 
the resource bases of households and nations. The same thing is true for Ethiopia. During 
2007, nearly one million Ethiopians were estimated to be living with AIDS, while about 
650,000 Ethiopian children became AIDS orphans and about 67,000 Ethiopians died of 
AIDS (WHO and UNAIDS, 2008).   
                                                 
1In the 1970s and 1980s, microcredit interventions were initiated through government and NGO (non-
government organizations) projects and programmes. In 1996, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
issued Proclamation No. 40/1996 to provide a policy framework for the licensing and supervision of 
microfinance business.  
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Microfinance is believed to help poor men and women by expanding incomes, raising 
productivity, reducing risk, and enhancing their ability to smooth consumptions (Robinson, 
2001). Providing microfinance to women has been increasingly applauded as a strategy to 
empower2 women (Microcredit Summit, 1997). The role of microfinance in the fight 
against the HIV/AIDS pandemic has gained special prominence in recent years.  
Microfinance is believed to contribute to the prevention of HIV infections, mitigating its 
impact by enhancing economic independence among HIV/AIDS risk groups (women and 
girls) and providing financial products that suit households affected by the pandemic 
(Lugalla, 2002; Haddad and Gillespie, 2001). In addition, credit groups are viewed as an 
important arena to disseminate information about the HIV virus to microfinance clients 
(Donahue, 2000; Parker et al., 2000).  
 
During the last century, one of the key advances in the development discourse is the 
attention given to women by donor and development policy makers and practitioners. A 
growing number of women are increasingly targeted by microfinance institutions in the 
developing countries (see Daley-Harris, 2007). The assumptions behind targeting women in 
microfinance programmes could be broadly categorized into instrumental and humanitarian 
viewpoints3. In the instrumental approach, women are viewed as a means to achieve 
poverty reduction objectives (see Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; Jackson, 1996). This approach 
recognizes the vital role that rural women play in rural livelihood systems. Improving their 
access to financial services is assumed to enhance their productivity, improve their 
economic power, and consequently improve the well-being of their families. Lending to 
women is also considered safe for lending institutions because women have shown good 
loan repayment records (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; Mayoux 1999). On the other hand, the 
humanitarian perspective acknowledges the higher incidence of poverty and deprivation 
among women and advocates development for women. It is widely recognized that women 
have limited economic opportunities compared to men (Ledgerwood, 1999; Pitt and 
Khandker, 1996). Extending credit to women promotes women’s opportunity for self-
employment activities. Apart from financial services, participation in credit groups is 
considered to be a powerful tool in raising women’s consciousness and self-confidence 
(Hashemi et al., 1996).  It also serves as an entry point to advance women’s social and 
political empowerment (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; Mayoux, 2001b, 1999).  
 
It is generally recognized that targeting women in microfinance may address women’s 
financial constraints or improve their access to financial resources. However, it is 
questioned whether access to microfinance alone can automatically lead to women’s 
empowerment or can address structural gender4 subordination (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). In 
recent years, assessing the impact of development policies and programmes on poverty 
reduction (also women’s empowerment) is increasingly recognized in the development 
process. The existing studies in the field of gender (women) and microfinance tend to be 
scanty and provide seemingly conflicting evidence. In addition, despite the fact that the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic is more likely to affect the businesses of microfinance clients and 
resource allocation patterns within such households, little is known about it.   
 
                                                 
2 A simple definition of empowerment is the ability to make strategic life choices (see Chapter 3, section 3.5 
for details).   
3 Mayoux (1999) discusses the different views in relation to three microfinance paradigms, namely financial 
sustainability, poverty reduction, and women’s empowerment (see Chapter 2, section 2.2).  
4 Gender refers to the social differences between men and women (see Chapter 3, section 3..2 for details). 
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1.2 Formulation of the problem 
Microfinance programmes are acclaimed to achieve both poverty reduction and women’s 
empowerment objectives concomitantly. Global statistics show an impressive figure about 
the proportion of women in microfinance programmes and bear witness to the attention 
given to women. Although it is widely asserted that women’s access to finance may 
transform gender relations or empower women, there is a lack of comprehensive and in-
depth studies. The available literature is scanty, partial, and provides seemingly 
contradictory conclusions. Furthermore, the focus of much of the impact assessment studies 
on microfinance and women’s empowerment (also poverty) concentrate on few areas 
mainly Bangladesh, a pioneer in microfinance.  
 
On the one hand, several studies provide evidence that women’s access to financial services 
improves women’s decision-making and bargaining power within the household (Osmani, 
2007; Pitt et al., 2006; Kabeer, 2001; Hashemi et al., 1996; Pitt and Khandker, 1996). 
Evidence shows that even when women transfer their loans to their husbands, they are more 
likely to be empowered because they are the source of credit to their households (Hashemi 
et al., 1996). On the contrary, others provide evidence that microfinance may perpetuate the 
existing unequal power relations within the household (Rahman, 1999; Goetz and Gupta, 
1996; Montgomery et al., 1996; Ackerly, 1995). Because of the deep-rooted gender 
inequalities in many societies, which govern the distribution and utilization of resources in 
a gendered manner, the gender transformation potential of microfinance services is 
hindered (Johnson, 2005, 2000; Mayoux, 2001a; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Montgomery et 
al., 1996). Others suggest that microfinance may not always be empowering and that its 
effect may be different for different women (Cheston and Kuhn; 2002).  
 
The same is true for Ethiopia, where the microfinance industry is in its early stages and its 
impact on poverty in general and on gender relations in particular are hardly studied. Even 
the few existing assessments do not provide a full account of how intra-household gender 
relations are impacted by women’s participation in microfinance programmes. Studies 
suggest that women’s access to financial services increases women’s earnings and 
contributes to the household food supply and the education of their children (Tsegaye and 
Bediye, 2002). Recent evidence shows that microfinance provided to women improves 
women’s decision-making power within the household in the areas of loan use, farming 
decisions, sales and purchases, and the education of children (Borchgrevink et al, 2005). 
Evidence also shows that microfinance enhances women’s decision-making power within 
the household in the rural areas but not in the urban areas (Tsegaye and Bediye, 2002). 
Another study shows that providing microfinance to urban women increases women’s self-
employment and income generation, while the effect on decision-making and asset 
formation is limited (Padma and Ayele, 2005). Yet another study shows the prevalence of 
women transferring their loan to their husbands (Getaneh, 2005). 
 
Existing research on the impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment (the intra-
household gender relation) leads to conflicting conclusions. This may be due to differences 
in research methodology, scope and focus of the studies (Kabeer, 2001), and the resulting 
emphasis and interpretation of the research findings. It might for instance be possible that 
researchers overlook how microfinance intervention improves one dimension of gender 
relations while undermining another. Secondly, the different programme outcomes in 
different countries may arise from socio-cultural differences. The prevailing gender-based 
divisions and customary practices in different countries and communities may influence 
programme outcomes in different ways. This is because the internal organisation of the 
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household in different societies may have different implications for the management of 
resources, and the extent to which resources are pooled or independently managed (Kabeer 
and Anh, 2000). Different aspects of intra-household relations, such as property rights, the 
labour process, and extra-household resources may also engender cooperation or conflict 
between interdependent household members (Kabeer, 1991). Moreover, not all women may 
simply accept the domination by others, nor may all of them openly confront the unequal 
social order. Different women may employ different covert and overt forms of resistance 
against inequitable allocation outcomes within the household (Agarwal, 1997a). The 
experiences of women in responding to problems and the strategies they adopt could be 
different from place to place as well (Duncan, 1995), which may affect microfinance 
programme outcomes for different women differently. Thirdly, different policies and 
strategies of microfinance institutions may have different implication for women’s 
empowerment. Some microfinance programmes may facilitate the process of women’s 
empowerment, while others may not.   
 
So far, little comparative analysis has been done to understand how variations in 
microfinance programme policies and design features, HIV/AIDS, socio-cultural and 
economic environments may influence microfinance programme outcomes on gender 
relations or women’s empowerment. Moreover, the existing evidence is incomplete and 
needs to be supplemented. For instance, a lot of studies have focused on changes in 
decision-making, but the potential effect of microfinance on the intra-household gender 
division of labour is largely unexplored. 
 
This study intends to provide a comprehensive picture of the potential effects of 
microfinance (aimed at women) on intra-household resource allocation, by focusing on the 
key aspects of gender relations, i.e. the gender division of labour and household decision-
making. It employs a comparative case study approach in order to explore  factors that may 
facilitate or hinder the empowering potential of microfinance provided to women.  
 
The study is conducted as part of the African Women Leaders in Agriculture and 
Environment (AWLAE) programme. The AWLAE programme focuses on the role of 
women in food systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the impact of HIV/AIDS on food and 
livelihood systems in rural Africa. The study will investigate rural women’s involvement in 
economic activities and examine changes that have occurred in the gender division of 
labour and decision-making power within microfinance clients’ households.  
 
1.3 Research objective  
The objective of this study is to investigate if and how microfinance aimed at married 
women may affect the intra-household division of labour and the decision-making power 
within households. The study focuses on married women because they live in conjugal 
relationships with men, which will help us to better understand intra-household power 
dynamics.  
 
Research questions: 
1. Does women’s participation in a microfinance programme affect decision-making 
patterns within households, and, if so, how? 
2. Does women’s participation in microfinance affect intra-household labour divisions 
and responsibilities, and, if so, how? 
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3. Which characteristics of microfinance institutions facilitate or hinder the intra-
household allocation of labour and decision-making power, and how does this 
occur?  
4. How do socio-cultural and economic factors influence the allocation of labour and 
decision-making power within microfinance clients’ households? 
5. How does the HIV /AIDS pandemic affect the allocation of labour within 
microfinance clients’ households? 
 
1.4  Outline of the thesis   
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the literature review on microfinance, intra-
household allocation and HIV/AIDS. The chapter starts with some historical background 
and the development of “innovative” microfinance as a poverty reduction strategy. 
Literature on the rationales for targeting women in the microfinance programme and on the 
impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment are discussed extensively. Before the 
concluding remark, issues surrounding microfinance and HIV/AIDS are briefly discussed.  
 
In Chapter 3, key concepts and theoretical frameworks of the study are presented. After a 
brief introduction, the key concepts used in the research, such as the household, gender, 
household decision-making, and empowerment are discussed. Following the background 
information about the traditional approach in the study of household economics, the 
household models used in this study are discussed, including their applications. At the end 
of the chapter, the components of the study’s framework and the conceptual framework are 
discussed and presented.    
 
Chapter 4 describes the profile of Ethiopia, the study’s regions, the study’s microfinance 
institutions, and the study’s localities. The chapter provides detailed information about 
Ethiopia’s geography, history, ethnicity, religion, demography, socio-economic relations, 
HIV/AIDS, gender relations, and microfinance in Ethiopia. The profiles of the study’s 
regions and the study’s microfinance are discussed. Finally, the study’s localities are 
summarized.   
In Chapter 5, the study’s methodology, the descriptive statistics and the key characteristics 
of the study groups are presented. The research strategy, methodological issues in 
microfinance, the study’s microfinance and location selection procedures, data collection, 
ethical considerations, practical data collection problems and the data entry and analysis are 
discussed extensively. The chapter ends with the presentation of key characteristics of the 
study group and of the descriptive statistics (the explanatory variables) that are used in the 
empirical chapters. 
 
Chapter 6 explores intra-household decision-making on loans and earnings from the loan-
funded enterprises. The chapter describes decision-making arrangements regarding the uses 
of women’s loans and income generated from the loan-funded enterprises. It identifies and 
discusses the factors that determine these dimensions of decision-making within the 
household. Finally, a concluding remark is presented.   
  
Chapter 7 examines intra-household labour allocation to the loan-funded enterprises. 
Couples’ labour allocation to the loan-funded enterprises is discussed. Based on the in-
depth interviews, a detailed account of intra-household task distribution to the loan-funded 
enterprises is presented. The organisation and the distribution of tasks between men and 
women in “gender-specific” and “gender-neutral” loan-funded activities are examined and 
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weighed. The factors that determine intra-household labour allocation are discussed. I will 
briefly discuss labour allocation in relation to death and illness within the household, 
followed by a concluding remark  
 
Chapter 8 focuses on the potential effects of women’s access to microfinance services on 
intra-household resource allocation (labour and income). The chapter analyses the effect of 
women’s access to credit on labour allocation, household farm production and domestic 
activities, and discusses the distributions of workloads between men and women. It also 
examines the possible changes in expenditure responsibilities and other financial decision-
making within the household. The final section provides a concluding remark. 
 
Chapter 9 presents the conclusion and recommendations for policy and further research. 
The chapter begins by summarizing the research problem, the study’s contexts and the 
methodology employed in the study, followed by answering the specific research questions. 
The final section presents recommendations for policy and further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 MICROFINANCE, INTRA-HOUSEHOLD 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND HIV/AIDS: 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Background 
Poverty has been a key challenge facing both the population of developing countries and 
institutions involved to address its causes. The multifaceted nature of poverty has been 
increasingly recognized and its traditional definition (material poverty) has been refined to 
include different forms of deprivations, including powerlessness, vulnerability, and 
exposure to risks (World Bank, 2000; Narayan et al., 1999). According to the World Bank 
(2001), during 1998, about 1.2 billion people in the developing and transitional economies 
lived on less than one United States Dollar (USD) a day. During the same period, income 
poverty was more pronounced among the population of Sub-Saharan African and South 
Asian countries; about 70 percent of the population lived on less than one USD a day 
(World Bank, 2000, cited in World Bank, 2000:23).  
 
The poor people in the developing countries lack productive capital, including access to 
credit to generate or expand their earnings. In response to this, during the last half century, 
delivering affordable financial services to the rural population has been the key poverty 
alleviation strategy in many low-income countries. Global development strategies until the 
1980s have been inspired by the need for capital and technology injections, as well as state 
intervention to promote growth and alleviate poverty in the developing countries. 
Particularly, in the 1960s and 1970s, subsidized agricultural credit institutions and 
programmes have been adopted to promote agricultural production and poverty alleviation 
by national governments with considerable back-up from donors. The main arguments for 
subsidized agricultural credit include: a) farmers have been exploited by local money 
lenders, who charge an exorbitant interest rate; b) farmers need cheap credit to use 
productive inputs; c) low interest rates are justified as an income transfer mechanism and/or 
to compensate policies that are biased in favour of urban dwellers; and d) farmers are too 
poor to save (Adams, 1971). Donors provided considerable financial assistance to the 
implementation of subsidized agricultural credit programmes5 in the low-income countries. 
National governments of low-income countries established specialized farm credit 
institutions (development banks) for the task of distributing subsidized credits in the rural 
areas.    
 
The model of subsidized credit programmes encountered a steady criticism in the wake of 
structural adjustments, as donors’ and development agencies switched attention from state-
based to market development solutions to the problem of underdevelopment (Ledgerwood, 
1999; Johnson and Rogaly, 1996). In addition, the performance of the specialized 
agricultural credit institutions was below expectations in several ways (Moll, 2003). Most 
importantly, poor farmers were unable to benefit from the subsidized credit programmes as 
loans were largely lent to the relatively wealthier farmers (Zeller and Sharma, 1998; Von 
Pischke, 1983; Adams, 1971). This was because poor farmers could not pledge collateral 
                                                 
5 For example, between 1960 and 1969, Latin American countries received support worth approximately $915 
million from three international donors; Agency for International Development (AID), the inter-American 
Development Bank and the World Bank Group (IBRD) (Adams, 1971).  
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(Zeller and Sharma, 1998) but also because, at that time, there was no strategy to target 
poor people. Programmes were highly dependent on donors and governments for their loan 
portfolio requirements, which they lent at subsidized interest rates (Johnson and Rogaly, 
1996). Saving service was neglected because it was assumed that there was little saving 
capacity in rural areas (Yaron et al, 1998; Johnson and Rogaly, 1996; Von Pischke, 1983). 
Besides, there was limited incentive for saving due to fixed low interest rates (Adams, 
1971). The programmes were also characterized by a high loan default. For example, the 
loan recovery rate for one rural finance institution in Latin America was as low as 10-15 
percent (Yaron et al., 1998). Poor loan recovery, coupled with low interest rates on loans, 
limited local savings, and dependency on external financial assistance for a loan portfolio, 
specialized subsidized credit programmes could not sustain their lending and expand 
outreaches (Yaron et al., 1998; Zeller and Sharma, 1998; Johnson and Rogaly, 1996).  
 
In the 1980s, microfinance targeted to the poor has emerged as a potent strategy in poverty 
alleviation in some countries and has rapidly spread in many low-income countries during 
the 1990s. Unlike the traditional subsidized lending, the “innovation” in microfinance 
involves the provision of a broad range of financial services, including microloans, saving, 
microinsurance, and money transfers to low-income people (Robinson, 2001; Ledgerwood, 
1999) who cannot access formal banking services (Wilson, 2003). Microfinance was 
designed to overcome the main pitfalls of the subsidized specialized agricultural credit 
programmes by delivering a wide range of financial services, including savings, using 
social/group collateral, the adoption of interest rates to cover costs, and building a financial 
institution for addressing the financial needs of the rural and urban poor. It is built on 
“innovation” in financial intermediation by reducing costs and risks associated with lending 
to poor people.  
  
The experiences of microfinance institutions, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh,  in 
reaching low-income people, especially women, have roused enthusiasm among policy 
makers and donor agencies about the potential of microfinance in poverty alleviation. 
Beginning in the1990s, microfinance programmes have started to flourish in many 
developing countries, targeting millions of poor people. Donors have been supportive of 
such initiatives. In 1997, the Microcredit Summit, - a forum organized by civil society -, 
launched a campaign to reach 100 million of the world’s poorest families, especially poor 
women. The State of the Microcredit Summit report for 2006 showed that 3,316 
microfinance institutions in the developing countries reached about 93 million of the 
poorest clients, 85 percent of whom were women. The Summit has planned to reach about 
175 million of the worlds poorest clients, particularly women, by the end of 2015 (Daley -
Harris, 2007).  
 
Over the last decade, various studies have been conducted to understand microfinance 
impact on client outreaches and poverty reduction. Although there is a general consensus 
that microfinance programmes generally target poor people (Pitt and Khandker, 1996), 
studies have found that the poorest of the poor remain excluded (Zeller and Sharma, 1998; 
Hulme and Mosley, 1997). With regard to the impact on poverty, several findings suggest 
that a well-managed microfinance programme may positively contribute to economic and 
social achievements of low-income households. Evidence shows that providing 
microfinance to the poor increases household incomes (Buckley, 1996), and expenditure on 
food (Pitt and Khandker, 1998), on education (Hospes et al., 2002; Khandker, 1998; Pitt 
and Khandker, 1996), and on health (Hospes et al., 2002).  Others question whether 
microfinance can have a meaningful impact on household poverty if it focuses on 
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profitability and institutional financial sustainability (Mayoux, 1999; Zeller and Sharma, 
1998; Johnson and Roglay, 1997; Hulme and Mosley, 1996). In their view, microfinance 
institutions may increase the cost of borrowing in order to achieve financial sustainability, 
which will render credit inaccessible for the very poor (Murdoch, 2000).  According to 
Zeller and Sharma (1998), the assumption of alleviating the precarious situation of poor 
individuals/households through the provision of microfinance is underestimating the 
prevailing complex and multifaceted structural constraints e.g. illiteracy, ill-health, lack of 
skills, etc, that poor clients encounter in their lives. Similar debates are accumulating 
regarding the question whether or not microfinance contributes to women’s empowerment.  
This will be the focus of this chapter.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the rationale 
behind targeting women in microfinance interventions. The various justifications for the 
inclusion of women in microfinance programmes are discussed. Section 3 reviews the 
existing studies dealing with the impact of microfinance programmes on women’s 
empowerment. This section also identifies major gaps in the existing literature. Section 4 
discusses the potential effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on microfinance programme 
clients. It also highlights how microfinance programmes may help prevent the transmission 
of HIV or mitigate the impact of AIDS. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
  
The chapter has two main objectives. Firstly, it reviews the main literature regarding the 
impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment. Secondly, based on the analysis of the 
existing literature, it identifies major gaps and discusses how this research addresses the 
gaps.  
 
2.2 Targeting women: the rationale   
Global women’s movements and the United Nations International Women’s Conferences 
conducted since 1975 have been instrumental in bringing the role of women in economic 
development and gender issues to the centre of the global agenda and have influenced 
policies and programmes to direct resources to poor women.  Promoting gender equality 
has become one of the eight goals of the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the 
international communities in 2000. Although there has been some progress over the past 
years, gender disparity in access to resources and opportunities persist in many countries in 
the world (United Nations, 2008; Haussmann, 2007).  
 
In the past few decades, poor women in the developing countries have been at the centre of 
“microfinance innovation”. Growing numbers of women are targeted by microfinance 
institutions in these countries. As indicated earlier, women comprised a considerable 
proportion of the poor clients reached by microfinance institutions in the world (Daley-
Harris, 2007). Targeting poor women in microfinance programmes has been at the centre of 
policymaking, based on the assumption that credit provided to women will have multiple 
effects as well as more development effects than credit provided to men. Through 
improving women’s access to financial services and credit networks, microfinance 
interventions are supposed to contribute to women’s empowerment. Access to financial 
service is believed to give women the opportunity to engage in or expand income-
generating activities, and consequently give them greater economic security and power 
within the household. Moreover, microfinance that fosters group formation is believed to 
increase women’s exposure to new ideas, mutual support networks, and identity beyond the 
household (Mayoux, 2001a).  
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Targeting women in microfinance programmes is the result of different lobbies and kinds of 
support given by different organizations with varying “political perspectives” (Mayoux, 
2001b). For instance, the Microcredit Summit Declaration articulated the various potential 
benefits of lending to women, which include: a) women’s incomes will be spent on their 
families, particularly children, b) women are reliable or trustworthy borrowers, and c) an 
increase in women’s incomes will enhance women’s bargaining position within the 
household (Microcredit Summit, 1997). Similarly, Mayoux (1999, 2001b) systematically 
discussed the rationales for targeting women in microfinance programmes in terms of three 
sometimes competing paradigms, namely a) poverty alleviation, b) financial sustainability, 
and c) feminist empowerment. According to poverty alleviation proponents (a), higher 
poverty among women (especially female-headed households) and the vital role that 
women play in the livelihood system of poor households have been the basic premise to 
realize poverty alleviation objectives (Burjoree et al., 2002; Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; 
Mayoux, 2001b, 1999). The UNDP’s (1995) widely cited estimate suggests that 70 percent 
of the 1.3 billion of the world’s poor are women. It is also widely recognized that women 
have a lower employment/activity rate and earn less than men (World Bank, 2001). On the 
other hand, the emerging empirical evidence on intra-household resource allocation 
demonstrates that poor women use their increased income more often on household 
consumption needs compared to men (Pitt and Khandker, 1996, 1998; Levin et al., 1999; 
Kabeer, 2001). The relatively high prevalence of poverty among women and the evidence 
that supports women’s use of their earnings for the household are often used to justify the 
favouring of women, when a decision must be made on which group to target for micro 
financing.  
 
According to financial sustainability advocates (b), microfinance intermediation should be 
financially viable in order to expand outreach and provide financial services to the poor in a 
continuous way. Hence, cost recovery and profit-making becomes central to this end. In the 
past few decades, women’s better loan repayment records have led to a “collective 
wisdom” that women are more reliable borrowers than men (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002). 
Women are considered more reliable because they perform better in loan repayment 
compared to men (Sharma and Zeller, 1997). In the literature, some plausible reasons are 
forwarded as to why women and men behave differently with regard to loan repayment. 
Sharma and Zeller (1997) note that women may choose a less risky business because of a 
limited experience in market activities or because the cost of a business failure is likely to 
be high for them, due to unequal decision-making within the household.  In addition, it is 
asserted that women may have more incentives for loan repayment than men because they 
want to maintain their access to credit, access to village groups or networks and to other 
facilities provided by microfinance institutions (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). Furthermore, it is 
assumed that women are easier to locate, to work with and to intimidate into loan 
repayment than men (Rahman, 1999; Goetz and Gupta, 1996).  
 
Advocates of the empowerment paradigm (c) justify targeting women in microfinance 
programmes on the basis of equity and human rights. Microfinance, together with other 
complementary services, such as literacy programmes and business and skill training, is 
assumed to lead to women’s economic empowerment, while membership of credit groups is 
seen as an entry point for women’s social, political and legal empowerment. Promoting 
women’s access to finance is then seen a strategy to advance women’s economic and social 
empowerment (Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; Mayoux, 2001b; David and Hulme, 1996).  
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Regardless of the different rationales behind targeting women, advocating women’s access 
to credit may be celebrated as an important advance in the effort to address gender-based 
discrimination. However, given the pervasive gender inequalities and gender-based barriers 
in many traditional societies, access to credit may not be automatically translated into 
empowerment for women. Promoting gender equality requires the levelling of social, legal 
and economic institutional “playing fields” that shape, not only women’s and men’s access 
to resources, but also in a more general sense their socio-economic and political 
opportunity and power (World Bank, 2001). 
 
2.3 Microfinance and Women’s Empowerment 
The previous section has set forth the assumed multiple development effects of lending to 
women, including the effect on women’s empowerment. It is widely assumed that women’s 
access to finance contributes to women’s empowerment. Nevertheless, to date, there has 
been limited conclusive evidence of this and debates are accumulating. The available 
literature focuses on Bangladesh and provides incomplete and seemingly contradictory 
conclusions. The lack of a comprehensive impact assessment that explores the effects of 
microfinance on the different dimensions of empowerment in different socio-cultural 
settings has become increasingly evident. In the following paragraphs, key literature that 
provides positive and negative conclusions about the empowering potential or effects of 
providing microfinance to women is presented, followed by some explanation of the 
opposing research conclusions.   
   
a. Positive research results  
Hashemi, Schuler and Riley (1996) have explored the impact of two microfinance 
programmes6 in Bangladesh on women’s empowerment. They employed both quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies. The study identified a number of indicators for measuring 
women’s empowerment, including women’s mobility, their ability to make small and large 
purchases, their involvement in household decision-making, relative freedom from 
domination, their political and legal awareness, their participation in public protest and 
political campaigns, and their contribution to family support. They found that women’s 
access to credit significantly and positively affected women’s economic contribution to the 
household, asset holdings, purchasing power, and political and legal awareness. This study 
evidenced that credit programmes create opportunity for women to earn an independent 
income, and consequently empower them. However, the probability of empowerment is 8-
12 times higher for women who contributed to family support or were involved in a credit 
group, than for women who neither contributed to family support nor participated in a 
credit programme. The study also found that women’s membership of credit groups had 
contributed to the reduction of violence against women within the household. 
 
Hashemi et al., (1996) have also analyzed intra-household decision-making on loan uses 
and enterprise management. They found a considerable variation in the degree to which 
women control loan use decisions in different villages, which ranged from nil to full 
control. Women appeared to lose control over loans in economically depressed areas where 
there is competition between men and women for scarce economic resources and 
opportunities. The study showed that women’s financial control over loan-funded 
enterprises is significant if loans are invested in women’s traditional home-based income-
generating activities.  
                                                 
6 Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) 
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Hashemi et al., (1996) have concluded that women’s participation in credit programmes 
does indeed contribute to women’s empowerment, whether women borrowers contributed 
their income to their households or not. When a woman brings loan money to the household 
she becomes the source of credit for that household. Nevertheless, the researchers 
suggested that the impact of microfinance is likely to be substantial when credit is used to 
increase women’s income-generating potential and their economic contribution to the 
household.  
 
Pitt and Khandker (1996) have explored the impact of women’s and men’s membership of 
three group-based credit programmes in Bangladesh7 on couples’ labour supply, their 
children’s schooling, expenditure, women’s non-land asset holdings, and fertility. They 
found that access to credit was an important determinant of impact outcomes. They also 
found that impact outcomes differed according to the gender of the loanee. In this study, 
credit provided to women was more likely to improve boys’ school enrolment, expenditure 
on food, investments in women’s non-land assets, and women’s time spent in market 
activities. The study showed that microcredit supplied to women had little effect on girls’ 
school enrolment, except in one programme. The researchers interpreted this finding in 
terms of the “close substitutability” of women’s and girls’ labour in household production 
and self-employment activities. They noted that girls may begin to assume more domestic 
responsibilities within the household as women get involved in market activities due to 
their access to credit. The study also demonstrated the contradictory effects of women’s and 
men’s credit on couples’ labour supply. According to the finding, microcredit provided to 
women tends to increase the time that women spend in market-oriented activities, while 
microcredit supplied to both men and women tends to reduce men’s time spent in market-
oriented activities.  
 
Kabeer (2001, 1998) has conducted a participatory evaluation of the Small Enterprise 
Development Project (SEDP) in Bangladesh. She compared intra-household decision-
making arrangements on loan uses, the running of enterprise and the use of enterprise profit 
within male loanees’ and female loanees’ households. She found that women who accessed 
credit in their own names had considerably more involvement in the loan-related decision-
making (40-90%) within the household compared to women in male loanees’ households' 
(20%). While, the degree of male and female loanees’ influence on loan-related decision-
making vary greatly. In her study, female loanees reported both independent (31-51%) and 
joint decision-making with their husbands (37-65%), while male loanees reported mostly 
independent decision-making (79-88%). Kabeer (2001) identified three groups of women 
loanees who had little say in loan-related decision-making within the household. The first 
group consisted of women who had a small role in household decision-making even before 
getting access to credit. This implies that access to credit gained by women may not always 
transform the existing unequal power relation within the household. The second group 
comprised women with health problems or a disability; their exclusion from loan-related 
decision-making was associated with their inability to undertake loan-related activities and 
responsibilities. The final group consisted of women who handed over their loans to their 
husbands in recognition of their husbands’ responsibility for the collective well-being of the 
household. This shows that women may transfer loans to their husbands or may involve 
their husbands on loan-related decisions, due to interdependence in production and 
                                                 
7 The study used a multipurpose, quasi-experimental survey in 87 villages of 29 sub districts between 1991 
and 1992. About 1,798 households’ samples were included in the study, 1538 of which were target 
households and 260 non-target households. Credit group participants (both men and women) and a control 
group of non-participants were compared from Grameen Bank, BRAC, and RD12.  
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consumption within the household. Kabeer (2001) noted that women heads of households, 
women with entrepreneurial competence, and women who had an extremely conflictual 
marital relationship had independent control over loan-related decisions within the 
household.  
 
Kabeer (2001) found that access to credit had enabled women borrowers to acquire their 
own assets or savings, which consequently contributed to women’s economic autonomy 
and enhanced their fallback position. Furthermore, she pointed at the positive contributions 
of women’s participation in microfinance to girls’ education and women’s self-worth. 
 
On the other hand, Kabeer (2001) also showed that access to finance did not “radically” 
alter the existing gender division of labour within the household. She observed that access 
to credit by women did not alter the range and the type of economic activities that female 
loanees carried out. In her study, female loanees were involved in a limited number of 
economic activities compared to male loanees, and they continued to engage in female 
traditional activities. Kabeer’s evidence also demonstrated an increase in women’s 
workload due to involvement in microfinance-related activities. However, according to 
Kabeer, borrowers did not consider this as negative because of the benefit they acquired 
from their participation.   
 
Holvoet (2005) has assessed and compared the impact of two microfinance programmes8 
on women’s decision-making agency in India. She examined seven areas of decision issues, 
including loan uses, expenditure, money management, kinship and family matters, time and 
task allocation, agricultural business and cottage industry. She identified four types of 
decision-making arrangement i.e., female decision-making, male decision-making, 
bargaining and norm-following, and evaluated how microfinance targeted to males and 
females affect decision-making arrangement within the household. The study found that, 
compared to women in male loanees’ households, women who received loans in their own 
names are more likely to make independent decisions than to follow norms. The evidence 
suggests that channelling credit directly to women is more likely to improve women’s 
authority over loan use decision-making than directing credit to their husbands.   
  
A recent study by Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2006) compared the effects of women’s 
and men’s participation in credit programmes on a range of empowerment indicators9. The 
result demonstrated that microcredit provided to women increases women’s role in 
household decision-making, access to and control over finance and economic resources, 
social networks, and bargaining power vis-à-vis their husbands. In addition, women’s 
participation in credit programmes was found to enhance women’s freedom of mobility and 
their social network, while it improved communication between spouses regarding fertility 
and parental affairs. Conversely, the effects of men’s borrowing was found to be negatively 
associated with women’s empowerment, particularly in the areas of women’s control over 
resources, finance, mobility and network, fertility and parenting matters. Moreover, the 
study revealed that men’s credit programme participation was more likely to intensify 
conflicts among couples over loan uses, while women’s access to credit was more likely to 
reduce money-related conflicts within the household. This research offered a very 
illuminating picture of how credit targeted to men and women may affect intra-household 
                                                 
8 The Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and the Tamil Nadu Women’s Development 
Programme (TNWDP). 
9 This includes decisions related to resources, finance, transaction management, mobility and networks, 
activism, fertility and parenting issues, attitude and husband behaviour, family planning and parenting issues.  
Microfinance, intra-household resource allocation and hiv/aids: literature review 
14 
gender relations in a contradictory manner. The researchers concluded that extending credit 
to women had contributed to women’s empowerment positively, while men’s credit had 
perpetuated or worsened women’s subordinate position within the household.   
 
A recent study by Osmani (2007) examined the impact of women’s borrowing on intra-
household bargaining power in Bangladesh. Osmani used three indicators to determine 
whether participation in a microfinance programme affected a woman’s bargaining power 
within the household. The bargaining indicators used in the study included the amount of 
land owned by women, the value of women’s non-land assets, and women’s judgment of 
how well she would be able to support herself if left alone. The study demonstrated that 
women’s access to microcredit enhances women’s bargaining power by increasing the 
amount of women’s land and non-land assets, and by enhancing women’s ability to 
maintain themselves economically outside marriage. The study also revealed that the effect 
of the credit programme would be stronger if a woman were to engage fully and 
independently in credit-financed activities, without being dependent on men for some of the 
tasks, such as marketing. She noted that socio-cultural factors limit the potential effect of 
microfinance programme outcomes on women’s empowerment/gender relations.  
 
b. Negative research results 
This section reports on studies that have emphasized the negative outcomes of microfinance 
to women, but without totally ruling out the potential positive contributions of microfinance 
to women’s empowerment. Several impact assessment studies, again mostly in Bangladesh, 
came up with conclusions that seemingly contradict findings in the previous subsection.  
 
One of the studies most widely cited in the literature was conducted by Goetz and Gupta 
(1996) in Bangladesh. The study used “managerial control” over loans as an indicator of 
women’s empowerment. They categorized women’s “managerial control” over loans into 
five categories, based on the roles that women played in loan-related productive processes. 
The degree of control ranged from “full control”, a situation where women controlled the 
entire productive process including marketing, to “no involvement”, a situation where 
women had no role in any of the productive process. The study found that slightly more 
than a third (37%) of women loanees had “full” or “significant control” over their loans 
compared to the majority (64%) of women loanees,  who fell into three categories of having 
“partial”, “limited” or “no control” over their loans. The study concluded that there is a 
high degree of loan control by men that may reduce women’s opportunity to earn an 
independent income within the household. They also discussed the possible negative effects 
of women’s loan transfer to men, especially if men are unable or unwilling to provide the 
weekly instalment for loans they have used. According to the researchers, such a scenario 
may compel women to substitute funds from other sources to fulfil their loan repayment 
obligations. In addition, they noted that men’s failure to provide a weekly instalment may 
also lead to an intensification of conflicts and violence against women within the 
household.    
 
Finally, Goetz and Gupta (1996) concluded their study by pointing out the need to address 
women’s gender-related constraints, such as lack of access to the market, productive skills 
and technology, in order to reduce their dependence on men, and consequently increase 
women’s control over loans.    
 
A similar study by Ackerly (1995) explored the pattern of women’s control over loans in 
three microfinance programmes in Bangladesh. She used women’s “knowledge of 
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accounting” as an indicator of empowerment. She assumed that specifically those women 
who had knowledge of input costs of the loan-funded enterprises, its product yield, and its 
profitability are empowered. The study revealed that selling products, keeping accounting 
records, and providing labour to the loan-funded enterprises contribute to women’s 
“knowledge of accounting” or empowerment. The study demonstrated that women’s access 
to the market is the most important pathway through which women can achieve 
empowerment. Ackerly suggested that providing labour to the loan-funded enterprises 
alone may not necessarily promote women’s empowerment. She illustrated that a 
substantial proportion (70-83 percent) of women provided labour to the loan-funded 
enterprises, but the proportion of women who had accounting knowledge varied between 49 
and 62 percent. Thus, if loans are used only to mobilize women’s labour without improving 
women’s access to the market, the outcome of microfinance for women would only result 
in overwork and fatigue for women.  
 
An anthropological study by Rahman (1999) demonstrated how microfinance aimed at 
women may lead to the intensification of violence against women in Bangladesh, due to the 
prevailing gender ideologies that operate within formal and informal institutions. About 70 
percent of women borrowers in his study reported an intensification of violence against 
them. According to Rahman, Grameen Bank officers manipulate men to recruit women for 
loans, and pressurize poor women to repay loans through peer groups. At the household 
level, men exercised power to persuade women to access loans for their own usage. The 
study found that in the majority of the cases (over 70%), the decisions to take a loan and on 
how to use it were made by borrower husbands’ and male guardians. The study uncovered 
the contradictions between Grameen Bank’s “public transcript” of targeting women, i.e. 
women’s economic and social empowerment, and the “hidden transcript” at the field level, 
i.e., high loan recovery.  
 
As shown above, the debate on the impact of microfinance on women was largely fuelled 
by studies in Bangladesh, pioneer in microfinance targeting women. In Africa, there is a 
dearth of information on how microfinance programmes affect gender relations within 
African households. The studies by Mayoux (2001a, 1999) and Johnson (2005) offer 
important insights about the potential impact of microfinance programmes on gender 
relations, but focus on gender barriers that hinder the process of gender transformation 
through microfinance. In Cameroon, Mayoux (2001a) showed that programmes that 
promoting social capital as a means to improve women’s position increase women’s ability 
to negotiate changes within the household. However, women’s ability to expand their 
business and earnings was largely constrained by gender hierarchies that operate at 
household, kinship and community levels. Mayoux also indicated that women’s access to 
microfinance programmes may reinforce women’s expenditure responsibilities and work 
burden within the household.   
 
Johnson (2005) examined how gender relations within and beyond the household may 
facilitate or hinder microfinance programme outcomes on gender relations in Malawi. 
Unlike the studies in Bangladesh, she found that only in about 10-18 percent of the cases 
men were involved in loan use decision-making within the household, suggesting women’s 
loans were used by women or for joint businesses. This means that women had substantial 
control over their loans. The reason is that married women in central Malawi traditionally 
exercise autonomy to undertake small businesses in order to meet their own expenditure 
priorities within the household. Johnson concluded that access to credit indeed increases 
women’s independent income, but various gender constraints (including women’s lack of 
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business skills and experience, lack of access to market networks, and domestic 
obligations) tend to keep women from expanding their business and contributing 
significantly to the household economy.   
 
c. Explaining and reconciling the contradictions 
The literature reviewed above provides a mixed and incomplete picture regarding the 
impact of microfinance to women’s empowerment. On the one hand, there is a consensus 
that extending microfinance to women has the potential to contribute to gender equality or 
women’s empowerment objectives. On the other hand, seemingly contradictory conclusions 
are offered by studies about the impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment. Several 
writers have examined the reasons for the prevailing mixed and seemingly conflicting 
conclusions (see Osmani, 2007; Johnson, 2005; Shetty, 2004; Kabeer, 2001).  In the 
following paragraph, several explanations are forwarded to explain the mixed results in 
relation to the microfinance programme outcomes discussed above.  
 
Contradictory evidence across contexts: some of the findings discussed above provide 
contradictory evidence, even within the studies that claimed empowering effects of 
microfinance on women. For example, Kabeer (2001) reported an increase in girls’ 
education due to women’s involvement in microfinance programmes, but Pitt and 
Khandker (1996) reported the limited effect of women’s borrowing to girls’ education. 
Rahman (1999) found an intensification of violence against women, while Hashemi et al., 
(1996) reported a reduction in violence against women. The study by Hashemi et al,. (1996) 
also observed conflicting evidence regarding women’s control over loans (enterprises). In 
some villages, women fully controlled loan-funded enterprises, while they had no control in 
other villages. As Shetty (2004) noted, “...no reason to doubt the evidence....., but it offers a 
lesson in the complexities of researching so-called lived experiences” (pp 15). This leads to 
the conclusion that microfinance may be empowering in some contexts and not others, for 
various reasons.  
 
Conceptual issues: empowerment is a multidimensional concept and a process that involves 
“enabling factors” and “outcomes” (Malhotra, 2002; Kabeer, 2001). Kabeer (2001) 
differentiated between “process-related” and “outcome-related” changes to explain the 
seemingly conflicting conclusions of studies on microfinance and women.  She defines 
“process-related” changes (such as the decision to take loans, loan and income use, labour 
allocation) as “the hypothesized pathway through which empowerment is believed to 
occur”, and she defines “outcome-related” changes (such as resource ownership, bargaining 
power) as final achievements or a transformation in gender relations10. This means 
“processes” are “enabling factors” for the realization of transformative outcomes in gender 
relations. Most of the positive studies that examined “outcomes” or “achievement” 
indicators concluded that microfinance contributes to women’s empowerment. However, 
studies that focused on “process-related” indicators (such as loan use decision-making, 
increased incomes), reached a conclusion about the limited or the negative effects of 
microfinance on women’s empowerment. Hashemi et al (1996) used both “outcome-
                                                 
10The process captures decisions related to loan access, loan use, loan-funded activities, labour contribution in 
loan-funded activities, the marketing of loan-funded products, accounting control, training, and group 
participation. Outcomes is about enhanced self-worth, an increased (perceived) economic contribution, an 
enhanced role in minor and major decisions, exercise in purchasing power, mobility in the public domain, 
political participation, the reduction of domestic violence, the increase in women’s savings and assets, a 
reduction of gender gaps in well-being and education, greater social inclusion, and self-reliant livelihoods 
(Kabeer, 2001:pp 81).  
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related” and “process-related” indicators of empowerment, and showed that even when 
women loose control over their loans (“process-related”), they can be empowered in the 
other empowerment outcomes. However, they emphasized the importance of the “enabling 
factors” in contributing to other empowerment outcomes. Hence, it is possible to suggest 
that the empowering impact of microfinance on women may vary, depending on the 
empowerment dimension analyzed.  
 
The seemingly conflicting conclusions can also be explained in terms of the difference in 
the judgments of researchers concerning the type of change that is considered as evidence 
of women’s empowerment (Kabeer, 2001). For example, Goetz and Gupta (1996) seemed 
to pay little attention to the “interdependence” and “exchange” in household resource 
allocations, and tended to portray the “empowered” women as having significant and full 
autonomy in loan use decision-making. On the other hand, the positive evaluation by 
Kabeer (2001) overemphasized the concept of “cooperation” or “jointness”, with little 
attention paid to the extent to which women influence decisions in such a cooperative 
arrangement.  As Montgomery et al., (1996) argued, “joint” decision-making may also 
reflect disguised male influence in decision-making.    
 
Methodological issues: conflicting outcomes may also be related to the use of different 
methodologies. This refers, for instance, to which “process-related” proxy indicators have 
been used and whether these indicators measure what they intend to measure or not. In the 
studies of Goetz and Gupta (1996) and Ackerly (1995), it remains unclear to what extent 
women influence household decisions about loan investment, since the researchers mixed 
loan use decisions with implementation or “management” decisions (such as selling, 
buying, or labour involvement) (Kabeer, 2001). In other words, the researchers did not 
directly assess loan use decision-making within the household, and the proxy indicators 
they used may not fully measure what they intend to measure. The positive evaluations by 
Kabeer (2001) and Holvoet (2005), however, did assess directly whether or not women 
have a say over loan use decision-making within the household.   
 
Finally, studies that used qualitative methods (such as Johnson, 2005; Goetz and Gupta, 
1996) paid special attention to gender analysis and were able to identify the potential 
negative consequences of microfinance programmes for gender relations. The positive 
evaluations, on the other hand, were based on statistically significant relationships between 
variables (Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright, 2006; Pitt and Khandker, 1996) and were unable 
to provide a detailed gender analysis of impact. 
 
Limited or partial evidence: only a few studies looked at the gender division of labour. In 
addition, existing studies regarding the effects of women’s access to microfinance on labour 
allocation seemed to be inconclusive. Ackerly (1995), Goetz and Gupta (1996), and Pitt and 
Khandker (1996) suggested that women’s labour supply to loan-funded activities may 
contribute to women’s empowerment. They also found an increase in women’s labour 
supply to loan-funded activities, but the researchers offered different conclusions. Ackerly 
(1995) and Goetz and Gupta (1996) emphasized that labour contributions to the loan-
funded enterprise alone do not necessarily contribute to women’s empowerment unless 
women participate in marketing the loan-funded product. Their finding suggested that 
microfinance may overload women without any substantial change in women’s income or 
their control over their earnings. Yet the evidence is limited. Pitt and Khandker (1996) 
regarded women’s increased time spent in loan-funded enterprises as empowering for 
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women. Yet, they did not investigate whether or not microfinance leads to overwork for 
women. 
Socio-economic and cultural difference: the final point which may explain the conflicting 
conclusion of researchers relates to variation in the socio-economic contexts of study areas. 
Although women in Bangladesh may experience similar socio-economic, cultural and 
religious contexts in its broadest sense, there could be some difference between different 
regions or localities within the country.  Hashemi et al., (1996) showed variation in 
women’s degree of control over loans in different villages in their studies. They also 
highlighted how in some village competition over scarce resources between men and 
women may affect empowerment outcomes at the expense of women.  
 
By contrast, the studies in Africa paint relatively different pictures. Women’s control over 
loans and earnings in the region seemed to be partly facilitated by women’s traditional 
involvement in market-oriented activities and traditional expenditure responsibilities within 
the household. Unlike in Bangladesh, the evidence in Africa suggested that women 
borrowers mostly control their loans and related profits. The difference in microfinance 
programme outcomes in the two regions may be explained in terms of difference in local 
gender systems and economic organisations. On the other hand, similar to women in other 
regions, gender barriers at the household and the societal levels also hinder African women 
from expanding their businesses and incomes. Hence, local contexts of gender relations and 
socio-economic situations may affect microfinance programme outcomes in different 
societies differently (Johnson, 2005).  
 
In most studies, women are treated as a homogenous category while they differ in terms of 
age, class, religion, occupation, marital status, etc. For example, Kabeer (2001) showed that 
female-headed households are more likely to influence loan-related decisions than other 
women. This means that microfinance programmes may have a different effect on different 
women (Osmani, 2007).  
 
2.4 Microfinance and HIV/AIDS pandemic  
As discussed in Chapter one, in the last few decades, the poverty situation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa has been fuelled by the widespread HIV/AIDS pandemic, which drains the resource 
bases of households and nations. It has been increasingly recognized that poor households 
in these countries are hit the hardest by the pandemic, as their resource base is severely 
strained by the loss of adult labour, substantial expenditures for the treatment of AIDS-
affected family members and other related expenses, such as funeral and mourning 
(NAADS11, 2003). Concerns are also emerging about the potential negative economic 
impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on microfinance programme clients’ households’ as 
well as on microfinance institutions. This is apparent, given the fact that most microfinance 
institutions work with low-income households, which have limited resource bases to cope 
with economic shocks, including those caused by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  
 
Illnesses and deaths caused by HIV/AIDS may have different implications for the 
behaviour of clients and their households and, consequently, for resource allocation 
decisions within the household. HIV/AIDS-related deaths, illnesses, medical and funeral 
expenses, caring for sick people and orphans, appear to undermine the economic activities 
                                                 
11 The National Agricultural Advisory Services. 
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of microfinance clients (Barnes, 2003; Parker et al., 2000). This is because loans may be 
diverted from being invested in economic activities to cover HIV/AIDS induced expenses.  
Some studies showed that HIV/AIDS-affected microfinance client households struggle to 
respond to the economic shocks caused by HIV/AIDS by requesting small loans (Parker et 
al, 2000), and consequently changing the types and the volumes of their businesses 
(Donahue et al., 2001). Evidence indicated that illness of family members was one of the 
reasons for female clients to withdraw from credit programmes (Barnes, 2003; Johnson, 
2005). Research also showed that women borrowers had reduced time spent in their 
businesses in order to take care of HIV/AIDS-affected individuals, including sick people 
and orphans (Barnes, 2003). Due to the gendered nature of care both within the household 
and in the community, the HIV/AIDS pandemic may have far-reaching implications for the 
workload and business of female clients. A higher level of client absenteeism in group 
meetings and increasing illness among microfinance programme clients was observed in 
some programmes, which could be partly due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Parker et al, 
2000). In general, HIV/AIDS may endanger the success and sustainability of microfinance 
programmes in terms of poverty alleviation and loan repayment.  
 
On the other hand, the assumption about the potential role of microfinance institutions in 
the prevention and mitigation of the impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is also 
widespread. It is widely mentioned in literature that microfinance interventions have that 
potential in the fight against HIV/AIDS, by providing financial products that suit 
households affected by the pandemic, and by enhancing the economic independence of 
HIV/AIDS risk groups, especially women and girls (Haddad and Gillespie, 2001; Lugalla, 
2002). In addition, the saving and credit group meetings proposed by microfinance clients 
are viewed as an important arena to disseminate information about the virus to clients 
(Donahue, 2000; Parker et al., 2000).   
 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
The literature discussed in this chapter offered some insight into the rationales for targeting 
women in microfinance programmes, and into the potential effects of such programmes on 
women’s empowerment or gender equality. It briefly described the relation between 
microfinance and HIV/AIDS. Several issues have emerged from the literature review 
presented. Firstly, women’s participation in microfinance programmes may not always and 
not automatically lead to women’s empowerment. Secondly, the existing literature on the 
impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment provides conflicting conclusions largely 
due to conceptual and methodological limitations. There was some difference between 
researchers as to what constitutes women’s empowerment, the dimensions of empowerment 
analyzed, and the way it is measured. Thirdly, although the gender division of labour is one 
of the areas that might be affected by women’s borrowing, on this little work has been done 
so far. Finally, there is a lack of comparative studies that assess the impact of microfinance 
on women’s empowerment in various socio-cultural and economic settings. Despite the fact 
that microfinance works mostly in low-income countries where the prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS is high, little is known to date about how the pandemic potentially affects 
gender divisions of labour in microfinance client households. 
 
Hence, drawing some lessons from the literature discussed above, this study attempts to 
incorporate some of the gaps observed in the existing literature.  First, in order to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the possible effects of microfinance on intra-household resource 
allocation, the study focuses on the key aspects of gender relations, namely the gender 
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division of labour and household decision-making. Secondly, the study seeks to explore the 
determinants of intra-household resource allocation (loan use, income use, labour) within 
the household. Thirdly, using a comparative analysis, the study seeks to explain how formal 
and informal institutions may affect programme outcomes in different communities. In the 
fourth place, the study attempts to incorporate the perspectives and the testimonies of 
borrowers, and also employs different data collection techniques. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
21 
CHAPTER 3    CONCEPTS AND THE THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK   
3.1  Introduction 
The literature reviewed in the previous chapter shows that the results of microfinance 
impact assessment studies on women’s empowerment are complex. It has revealed that 
access to microfinance by women does not necessary and automatically transform unequal 
gender relations within the household. It has also demonstrated that the existing studies 
appear to be partly conflictual, due to differences in conceptualizing and interpreting key 
concepts.  Hence, there is a need to clearly define the key concepts in the study.  
 
The study recognizes that women’s participation in microfinance and their ability to 
influence intra-household resource allocation outcomes are inextricably linked to the 
institutional contexts in which their lives and relationships are embedded. This requires 
framing the analysis of intra-household household resource allocation within the wider 
institutional contexts. The conceptual framework is designed to explain the complex and 
dynamic resource allocation arrangements within the household.  
 
This chapter has three main objectives. Firstly, it defines and conceptualizes the main terms 
used in the study, including the household, gender, gender system, household decision-
making, and empowerment. Secondly, it discusses the theoretical approaches of the study, - 
the bargaining household models and their application in the study. Thirdly, it describes the 
conceptual model of the study and explains the various components of the model.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first six sections (3.2 to 3.5) provide operational 
definitions of the key terms used in the study, including the household, gender, household 
decision-making and empowerment. Section 3.6 presents the theoretical approach of the 
study. It begins by discussing the traditional household model, followed by the bargaining 
household models. Section 3.7 discusses the application of the bargaining models in the 
study. The final section discusses the conceptual framework of the study. At the end of the 
chapter, the diagram of the conceptual framework of the study is presented. 
   
3.2 The household 
The household has been the focal point of analysis in development policy and planning. It 
has been largely conceptualized as a basic unity of society involved in production, 
consumption and reproduction. Traditionally, the household is perceived as an 
undifferentiated unit (McGough, 1984). However, anthropological studies on kinship and 
family systems and feminist critics of the household have demonstrated that there are wide 
cultural variations and dynamics in household arrangements (Moore, 1988; Whitehead, 
1984; Harris, 1984; Goody, 1973). The types of household tend to diverge broadly across 
cultures, ranging from nuclear families in the West to the complex extended family systems 
in much of Africa and South Asia (Mayoux, 2004). Moreover, the structures, compositions 
and boundaries of the household are subject to constant restructuring, due to various 
internal and external factors (Moser, 1993). 
Various definitions are offered in the literature to conceptualize the term household. For 
example, according to the Ethiopian Central Statistics Authority (2004:10), the household 
constitutes “... a person or group of persons, irrespective of whether related or not who 
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normally live together in the same housing unit or group of housing units and who have 
common cooking arrangements”. This definition describes the household mainly in terms 
of common residence and cooking arrangements. This conceptualization is silent about 
other functions of the household, such as resource management. Part of the reason could be 
that the definition is used for the purpose of a large-scale survey and census. Pennartz and 
Niehof (1999) define the household as a social unit that pools income from various sources 
to ensure individual and collective basic needs and well-being. They recognize the co-
existence of individual and collective interests within the household and assume that 
household members pool their incomes to address individual and collective needs. Pennartz 
and Niehof (1999) stress the production and consumption functions of the household, with 
little emphasis on the different power hierarchies within the unit.   
  
Rudie (1995:228) provides a broader conceptualization of the household, “as small units in 
which primarily familial loyalties have to come to terms with some requirements for 
efficient resource management […] [These] are fields of interaction in which deep-seated 
features of the gender system are reproduced through social practices that seem particularly 
resistant to analytical penetration”. From this definition, three important attributes and 
functions of the household can be drawn: family-based loyalty, resource management and 
gender socialization. Rudie recognizes that the household is primarily a family-based 
institution where members somehow collaborate for efficient resource management. It is 
increasingly recognized that the household is an important site for the construction of 
gender identities, gender roles and relations (Rudie, 1995; Brydone and Chant, 1989; 
Harris, 1984).  
 
The study departs from an all-inclusive definition of the household, which is a family-based 
co-residential socio-economic unit where members organize production, consumption and 
resource allocation decisions individually and/or collectively to address their individual 
and/or collective needs, and where gender identities are constructed and reproduced. This 
definition permits the inclusion of the different forms and structures of households, such as 
monogamy, polygamy, women-headed, nuclear, or extended. It also helps to capture the 
possible (co-)existence of autonomy, interdependence and subordination exhibited in intra-
household relationships and interactions.    
 
3.3 Gender 
Jackson and Scott (2002:1) have offered a broader conceptualization of the term gender, 
which is: “…a hierarchical division between women and men embedded in both social 
institutions and social practices”. Gender as a sociological concept captures the social 
construction of masculinity and femininity and explains the systematic social ordering of 
relationships between men and women in social institutions. It is “produced, reproduced, 
negotiated and sustained through everyday human interaction” (Jackson and Scott ,2002). 
Gender intersects with other social divisions such as class, ethnicity, race, etc (Jackson and 
Scott, 2002; Moore, 1988).   
 
Despite diverse cultural conceptions and differences, gender relations in many societies are 
characterized by inequality and tend to be hierarchical, with women being subordinate to 
men. The categorization of all areas of life into male and female and the related hierarchical 
distinctions are referred to as the “gender system" (Duncan, 1995). In different societies, 
culturally specific and socially valued gender norms and ideologies often define the 
gendered division of labour, entitlements and rights, which is summarized in so-called 
Chapter 3 
23 
place- and time-specific gender contracts (Baernds, 1994). A gender ideology refers to the 
socio-culturally determined and sanctioned norms in a given society, which systematize 
gender hierarchies and relations. Accordingly, women and men in different societies have 
different (also sometimes overlapping) roles and responsibilities within their households 
and within the wider communities. Men and women often have different degrees of access 
to and control over resources and decision-making power over the matters that affect their 
individual and family life as well as society at large.  The gender divisions are also shaped 
by various factors, including socio-economic, political, legal, and religious factors and can 
also be constructed, reproduced and transformed due to changes regarding these factors 
(Baerends, 1994).  
 
The gender division of labour (often called the sexual division of labour) is one aspect of 
the gender system exhibited in every society. Mackintosh (1981) provides a simple 
definition of the gender division of labour: a division of labour along gender lines.  A 
broader definition is offered by Whitehead (1981:95): “by the sexual division of labour is 
meant not merely a list of men’s jobs and women’s jobs, nor indeed a set of cultural values 
about the suitability of various activities to the gender categories, but rather a system of 
allocating the labour of the sexes to activities, and highly importantly, a system of 
distributing the products of these activities”. This definition allows a deeper analysis and 
understanding of the gender divisions, beyond the surface of assigning tasks to the sexes. It 
includes the systematic distribution of work between men and women, and the distribution 
of the fruits of their labour. Similarly, Razavi and Miller (1995) have noted that the gender 
division of labour does not only determine the different activities that are undertaken by 
men and women, but also entails the complex and dynamic system of cooperation and 
exchange that is potentially conflictual. Anthropological studies in the developing countries 
have shown that the gender division of labour within the household involves different forms 
of exchange and reciprocity (Guyer, 1984; Jones, 1983).  
 
The gender division of labour has long been an interest to feminists in their analysis of 
women’s subordination in societies. Rosaldo (1974) has used the term “domestic-public 
divide” to explain the ‘universal’ subordination of women. According to Rosaldo, women 
are primarily engaged in the domestic sphere due to their role as ‘mothers’, while men work 
in the public domain. She has asserted that “...the domestic orientation of woman is felt to 
be a critical factor in understanding her social position” (p 24). Rosaldo (1974) has 
suggested that the abolition of the gender-based domestic division of labour is the main 
pathway through which women gain power and status. Moreover, women’s status is 
determined by their access to resources, the condition of their work, and the distribution of 
the product of their labour (Leacock, 1978 cited in Moore, 1988). Mackintosh (1981) has 
offered some explanation on how the gender division of labour may explain women’s 
economic subordination. She has noted that in the industrial sector, women are often 
segregated in low-paying jobs with poor working conditions, while in a similar vein, in 
household-based activities women get a meagre share of the benefits, despite their 
important contributions. This may partly explain women’s economic dependency on male 
family income earners.  
 
The division of tasks between the sexes is characterized by inequalities because, in most 
traditional societies, women perform the great bulk of physically demanding domestic 
chores, while they are also engaged in production outside the household (Benería and Sen, 
1982). Women’s exclusive responsibility for domestic activities tends to restrict their 
mobility to take up outside employment or to engage in cash-earning activities (Benería and 
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Sen, 1982; Mackintosh, 1981). Even when women take employment outside the domestic 
sphere, they are often responsible for the bulk of domestic work (Bock, 2004). The gender 
division of domestic labour is often perceived as unchangeable because it is considered 
‘natural’ (Baerneds, 1994). Boserup (1970) has noted that the limited change observed in 
the division of labour between the sexes, particularly in the domestic sphere, seems to 
reinforce the assumption that such divisions are inalterable. Women’s association with the 
domestic domain is deeply entrenched in gender ideologies (Kabeer, 1999).  
 
Still, there is temporal and spatial variation in the gender division of labour (Moser, 1993; 
Macintosh, 1984). Various researchers have contended the universalized conception of the 
gender division of labour by illustrating the prevailing cultural variations in the 
organization of labour in different societies (Guyer, 1980; Boserup, 1970). Boserup (1970) 
has documented the roles and the extent of agricultural labour contributions of men and 
women in selected counties in Asia and Africa. She has suggested that the organization of 
labour between the sexes is shaped by the demographic factors and the types of farming 
systems (also technology) in these regions. Her finding have shown that in the sparely 
populated regions where shifting cultivation was practiced (Africa), women had a more 
significant labour input in farming than their husbands, while the opposite was the case in 
the densely populated regions (Asia) where plough cultivation was used.  
 
Following Cloud (1985), the gender division of labour in agriculture depends on the types 
of crop under cultivation, the types of activities (sex-typing of activities e.g. men do the 
ploughing, women the transplanting), and the type of crop field (female-managed, male- 
managed, etc). Men and women may share and perform identical tasks on the same crop, 
mostly when activities are labour-intensive and require labour input from both men and 
women. In female-managed farming systems, men have a limited role in farming, due 
either to their temporary (out-migration) or their regular absence (which is the case in de 
jure female-headed households). 
 
In order to elucidate the multifaceted nature of women’s work in low-income households, 
Moser (1989) has formulated the “triple role model”. She has divided women’s work into 
productive work, reproductive work, and community managing work. Productive work 
involves tasks performed by households to produce goods and services (farming, trading, 
handicrafts, etc) for their own consumption and for marketing, while reproductive work 
refers to work (such as childcare, cooking, cleaning, fetching water, caring for the sick, etc) 
undertaken within households for the maintenance of household members and labour 
power. Community managing refers to the communal activities performed by different 
households for communal benefits. This formulation is crucial to make women’s work 
more visible, including work done in the productive sphere, which is traditionally 
conceived as men’s exclusive domain, and also to appreciate the potential workloads of 
women.   
 
Bock (2004) provides a framework to analyze women’s employment in three distinct but 
interrelated elements at the structural level (the organization of the labour market), the 
cultural level (gender ideology about women’s and men’s work, e.g., the assignment of 
domestic work to women), and the individual level (education, age, etc). The framework 
helps to understand how men and women do not spontaneously allocate their labour to 
different activities. Their choice may be restricted or facilitated by various factors at the 
structural, cultural and individual level.  
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3.4 Household decision-making  
Decision-making is an everyday activity that households and their members undertake in 
different areas of their individual and collective lives. It is a dynamic process of social 
relations without a beginning and an end (Wilk, 1989). Decisions are made among various 
alternative choices, and power is exercised when there is more than one individual who is 
directly or indirectly affected by the respective decision-making outcomes. Blood and Wolf 
(1960) define power between married couple as the potential ability of one partner to 
influence the behaviour of the other in the decision-making arena of family life. This ability 
to influence allows a partner with power to pursue his/her own desire against the will of the 
other, even when disagreement is explicit (Falbo and Peplaus, 1980, cited in Engle, 1990).  
 
Olson and Cromwell (1975) have discussed the notion of the family power structure in the 
light of its multiple dimensions. They have identified three domains of power, namely the 
bases of power, the power process, and the power outcome. The bases of power refers to 
the sources of power, mainly resources (income, education, etc) owned by individuals 
which are used to enhance their ability to influence family power outcomes. The family 
power process refers to the interaction techniques (such as discussion, persuasion, 
assertiveness, negotiation, coercion, etc) that are used by actors to pursue their goals. 
Finally, the family power outcome refers to who ultimately wins or makes the final 
decision. This framework may provide some insight into how individual control over socio-
economic resources may determine intra-household decision-making outcomes. Yet, it 
overlooks the ideological factors which may serve as a power base for individuals to 
influence intra-household decision-making outcomes. Households do not make resource 
allocation decisions in a vacuum, but in a wider institutional environment (such as the 
socio-cultural environment) which shapes decision-making outcomes (World Bank, 2001). 
In many traditional societies, social norms play a significant role in structuring power 
relations on the bases of age and sex (Katz, 1997). Social norms, values and practices may 
perpetuate asymmetric power relations through preventing conflicts and making individuals 
accept the existing social order as given and beneficial to all (Kabeer, 1999).   
 
3.5 Empowerment  
The term empowerment is widely used in the development literature and has been the 
subject of intellectual contention. As already discussed in Chapter 2, one of the reasons for 
potentially or seemingly conflictual research conclusions resides in the way the concept of 
empowerment was understood and measured.  Hence, it is necessary to have a workable 
definition of empowerment and identify its key attributes. In the literature, the term 
empowerment is differently defined by individuals and organizations. In the following 
paragraph, some of these definitions are summarized. 
 
Kabeer (1999:437) defines empowerment as “… the expansion in people’s ability to make 
strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them”. She 
conceptualizes empowerment as a process of change from a state of suppression to an 
enhanced agency. Agency refers to the ability to define on 
e’s goals and act upon them (Kabeer,1999)  
 
Narayan (2002:5) defines empowerment as “the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor 
people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions 
that affect their lives”. This definition applies to women as well as other socially 
Concepts and the theoretical framework   
26 
disadvantaged groups. Two groups of actors are central in the definition of poor people: the 
powerless group and powerful institutions that affect the situation of the poor. An 
institution can be defined as the “humanly defined constrain 
ts that shape human interactions” (North, 1990:3). The major institutions in societies may 
be either formal or informal, including the market, civil society organisations, the state, and 
the household. The notion of empowerment is understood in the light of the unequal 
institutional relations that impede poor people’s as sets and ability to act on issues that 
affect their lives.  
 
CIDA (1999:pn12) defines empowerment as “people, - men and women -, taking control 
over their lives: setting their own agendas, gaining skills, building self-confidence, solving 
problems, and developing self-reliance”.  This definition emphasizes the result of 
empowerment, i.e. individual achievements. An empowered individual is portrayed as a 
person who can set his or her own agenda, is skilful and confident, can solve problems and 
is self-reliant.  
 
Reeves and Baden (2000:3) provide a slightly different notion of empowerment: “a 
‘bottom-up’ process of transforming gender power relations, through individuals or groups 
developing awareness of women’s subordination and building their capacity to challenge 
it”. They further explain that there is a need for external interventions focused on women 
(such as awareness raising and capacity building) to facilitate the empowerment process. 
This definition is specific to gender power relations. It regards women as the key players to 
bring about their empowerment.     
Common to all the above definitions is the concept of power/control and choices, which is 
used to describe individuals’ ability to influence the direction of their lives. Empowerment 
is also understood as a process of transformation from a situation of being controlled and 
having limited choices, to having more freedom and options.  There is a more or less 
common understanding in the definitions of the need to build or expand poor people’s 
(women’s) capacities and opportunities to challenge the unequal social order.    
 
Narayan’s (2002) notion of empowerment is all-inclusive, because it describes poor 
people’s powerlessness in the context of wider institutional constraints. The definition 
recognizes that there is a need to enhance poor people’s assets and capabilities to challenge 
the unequal institutional relations that disadvantage them. Hence, following Narayan 
(2002), women’s empowerment is conceptualized in this study as the process of expanding 
women’s assets and capabilities to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and 
hold accountable institutions that affect their lives. Women’s empowerment in this context 
does not imply reversing the existing power relations to the opposite, so that women take 
control over all matters that were formerly controlled by men (Lakow, 2006). Rather, it 
implies a transformation of the unequal power relationship into an “egalitarian” 
relationship, so that women make a strategic life choice in matters affecting their life and 
that of their families (together with their husbands). 
 
                                                 
12 Page note available 
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3.6 The Unitary and Collective Household Models    
3.6.1 The unitary household model  
During the last decades, the study of household economics has become part of mainstream 
economics. Traditionally, the household is viewed as a homogeneous unit which maximizes 
a “single” utility function subject to a budget constraint, a time constraint, and a production 
function for home-produced goods (Becker, 1965). Inherent in this approach is the 
assumption that household members pool their resources (such as their income, capital, 
labour, land) to maximize their “joint” utility. The head of the household, who is often 
assumed to be a man, is conceived as an “altruist” responsible for the allocation of 
“household” resources. He determines the total consumption of his household members. He 
is expected to obtain his utility not only from the goods and services he consumes, but also 
from the increased utility of other household members (Becker, 1981). The model is often 
referred to as the unitary model, because it assumes that there is a “single” preference and 
decision-maker within the household. It is also referred to as the “common preference” 
model, the “altruism” model, and the “benevolent dictator” model (Haddad et al., 1997). 
This is based on the conception that household members either “share common 
preferences”, or  that “a single decision maker act[s] for the good of household members”, 
or that “a single dictator subordinate[s] the interests of other household members” (Sen, 
1990). Although it is reasonable to assume the existence of interdependent utility and 
cooperation within households, to assume intra-household relations between members to be 
conflict-free and equally beneficial to all household members can be misleading (Kabeer, 
2001).  
 
The other key feature of the unitary household model is the assumption that resource 
allocation within the household solely depends on total household income and exogenous 
variables, such as, wage, and price. An increase in household resources is assumed to have 
the same effect on intra-household distribution, regardless of who received the resource. 
This is because resources are assumed to be “pooled” in order to address the “collective” 
needs of household members. Such aggregation becomes problematic unless household 
members have identical preferences and act the same way (Sen, 1983).  In the unitary 
household model, welfare is defined at the aggregate or household level, not at the 
individual level (Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992). However, as Sen vividly puts it, 
“…having no notion of personal well-being - only of family welfare - raises some 
disturbing questions. Living and dying, illness and health, and joys and sufferings happen 
to persons...” (1983:329). The widespread gender disparity in educational, health, and 
employment outcomes in many low-income societies (Hausmann, 2006;World Bank, 2001; 
UNDP, 1995) is suggestive of a variation in intra-household resource allocations outcomes 
across gender. 
 
Katz (1991) has identified the two prominent assumptions in the unitary approach related to 
labour and income allocation decisions that are particularly interesting to feminist analysis. 
The first relates to the assumption that the household allocates members’ labour in order to 
maximize a “joint” household utility. The household is assumed to deploy its labour force 
while taking into account available opportunities and efficiency principles, including wage, 
prices, technology, land, and family labour endowments (Becker, 1965). The assumption is 
that the household allocates its members’ labour where the rewards are highest for its utility 
maximization objective. This assumption becomes problematic for various reasons. First, 
an exclusive focus on comparative advantage principles tends to disregard the structural 
gender- and age-specific labour divisions and expectations in many societies (Katz, 1991). 
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Evidence in the developing countries has demonstrated that gender ideology influence the 
way household members allocate their labour among various activities (Hossain et al., 
2004; Cain et al., 1982). In addition, gender roles in many traditional societies are rigidly 
defined, resulting in an imperfect substitution between women’s and men’s labour across 
different activities, regardless of market factors (Ellis, 1993). Secondly, as it is assumed in 
the unitary model, a given household labour allocation outcome may not be necessarily 
beneficial to all household members (Katz, 1991; Rosenzweig, 1990). The prevailing social 
norms in many traditional societies often accord men a higher status, enabling them to 
enjoy greater leisure (Ellis, 1993; Kopman, 1991).  
 
Katz’s (1991) second critique of the unitary household model is related to household 
expenditure and consumption (income) decisions. According to the assumptions in the 
unitary household model, income allocation outcomes within the household are determined 
by the total household income and not by who obtains or brings home the income. This 
means that a household member’s consumption of a given resource is determined by the 
total household income, because the income is assumed to be “pooled” in pursuit of a 
“joint” household goal. The approach does not allow for analyzing gender-based 
differences in income control and allocation outcomes. Household members may not 
necessarily pool their incomes to satisfy the collective needs of their members. Ample 
evidence in the developing countries contradicts the income pooling hypothesis and has 
shown the existence of gender-specific spheres of responsibility for income generation and 
expenditure within the household (LeMay-Boucher, 2007; Koopman, 1991; Thomas, 1990; 
Guyer, 1984).     
 
The criticism of the unitary household model has given impetus to several collective 
approaches to household decision-making that recognize the possible existence of 
individual preferences and different decision-making units within the household. Several 
variants of the collective models are proposed in the literature. We focus on two strands of 
collective household models, namely cooperative (divorce-threat) bargaining and non-
cooperative (separate-sphere) bargaining models. This is because the combination of the 
two approaches may provide a better framework to analyze household decision-making 
arrangements in a situation where couples who have an interest to cooperate encounter 
conflicting situations.   
 
3.6.2 The cooperative bargaining household model  
Manser and Brown (1980) have developed the cooperative bargaining household model to 
analyze marriage and household resource allocation decisions. Their model provides a 
means to understand how two individuals with conflicting interests who are thinking about 
marrying or those who have already married reconcile their differences. According to this 
model, marriage and resource allocation decisions involve bargaining, with each individual 
comparing the utility he/she acquires from marriage with remaining single or getting 
divorced: the bargaining solution. Individuals may decide  to live together in marriage if the 
gain derived from marriage is more beneficial than remaining single, or they may choose to 
remain single (or get divorced) if the maximum utility that they would obtain outside 
marriage is higher than the utility (to be) obtained within marriage.  
 
The cooperative bargaining household model is based on two main assumptions. First, it 
recognizes that individual household members may have distinct tastes and preferences that 
cannot be necessarily merged into a “single” or “common” household utility. The 
bargaining problem arises from such conflicting preferences. The second assumption is that 
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household resource allocation outcomes do not only depend on the total family resources, 
but also on who retains control over important resources within the household13. According 
to this model, in a conflict situation, the spouse with a better and attractive economic 
alternative outside marriage influence household decision-making outcomes in pursuit of 
his/her goal. Such a person may use a threat of divorce to influence intra-household 
resource allocation because he/she has a better “fall-back position” in case of a marriage 
breakdown. On the other hand, a person with a relatively weak “fall-back” position may 
choose to comply and cooperate with the other party because staying in the marriage 
provides him/her with a better utility than divorce. This entails that both stay within the 
marriage as long as they maximize their utilities within it; they prefer divorce if the benefit 
derived from divorce (their outside option) is more attractive than staying married. Several 
empirical studies in the developing countries have demonstrated that resource allocation 
within the household varies systematically, depending on individual resource ownership 
(Pitt et al., 2006; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 1999; Pitt and Khandker, 1996, 1998;  
Hashemi et al., 1996; Doss, 1996; Thomas, 1990). For example, Doss (1996) found in 
Ghana that the relative assets owned by women positively affect household expenditures on 
food and education of children, while it is negatively associated with men’s traditional 
expenditures such as alcohol and recreation. As described in Chapter 2, a microfinance 
impact assessment study in Bangladesh by Pitt et al (2006) has shown that microfinance 
provided to women enhances women’s bargaining power within the household vis-à-vis 
men, while microfinance provided to men reduces the likelihood of women’s 
empowerment. Evidence reported for Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ethiopia and South Africa by 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999) also indicates that assets controlled by women have a 
positive and significant effect on the education and clothing of children. In Ethiopia, 
Fatchaps and Quisumbing (2002) have found as well that women who brought more land 
and livestock at the time of marriage or through inheritance have more say in decisions 
concerning land rental and the selling of livestock. 
 
The cooperative-bargaining household model has made a great contribution to the 
understanding of the household as “black-box”, by recognizing the different preferences 
and multi-decision-making units within the household. However, it has been criticized for 
its exclusive focus on economic resources and opportunity as a source of individual 
bargaining power. Several writers have argued that intra-household resource allocation is 
too complex to be explained only on economic grounds (Sen, 1990; Folber, 1997; Agarwal, 
1997b). In many societies, social norms tend to mediate in the bargaining process and 
reduce women’s bargaining power compared to that of men (Folber, 1997, Katz, 1997; 
Agarwal, 1997b). Moreover, the model is criticized for treating individuals in a household 
symmetrically with respect to their rights and abilities to enter into the bargaining process 
(“voice”), and for disregarding the possibilities of differences in socio-economically 
constructed opportunities and alternatives faced by different household members (“exit” 
option) (Katz, 1997). In different societies, men and women may have a different ability to 
enter into a bargaining process and to exercise their power. This means that although 
bargaining outcomes may not always be the result of an explicit negotiation between the 
negotiating parties, it could be the result of inherent differences in the bargaining power of 
                                                 
13 McElroy (1990, 1997) has identified various economic opportunities and resources, including 
employability, family wealth, the re-marriage market, etc, rules governing marriage and divorce, public and 
private resources available to divorced men and women, to measure women’s and men’s economic capability 
to maintain themselves in case of divorce. “She refers to such opportunities and resources as “Extra-
household Environment Parameters” (EEPs). 
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individuals (Agarwal, 1997b). Several social factors may also hinder individuals from using 
their available “exit” options (Katz, 1997) and, as a result, individuals may be compelled to 
accept the legitimacy of any decision made by others. In addition to economic variables, 
gender differences in roles (including perceptions) and opportunities may significantly 
affect men’s and women’s bargaining power within the household (Katz, 1992; Sen, 1990). 
For example, women’s frequent pregnancies, child-rearing responsibilities, and gender 
disparity in education may weaken women’s break-down position (Sen, 1990). This means 
that gender biases regarding access to resources and opportunity may significantly 
undermine a woman’s economic options outside marriage, and may consequently limit her 
bargaining power.  
 
The other limitation of the cooperative bargaining household model is that it considers 
divorce as the only solution to solve conflicting interests within marriage. Although, 
divorce may be the final option in a conflictual marital relationship, it cannot be assumed to 
be the only solution (Lundberg and Pollak, 1997). Especially in everyday interactions and 
small household decisions, couples may not use a threat of divorce to influence intra-
household resource allocation outcomes (McElroy, 1997). Furthermore, divorce may not 
serve as a credible threat when it involves costly and time-consuming procedures 
(Lundberg and Pollak, 1997), and when there is divorce restriction (Pollak, 2003). Hence, 
the bargaining model does not provide a mechanism through which married couples 
resolve their day-to-day conflict of interests over “trivial” matters and/or in a context where 
divorce involves “huge” cost and time-consuming procedures.  
 
3.6.3 The non-cooperative bargaining model: separate-sphere   
The non-cooperative14 household model is proposed as a utility maximization strategy 
within an existing marriage, in which each spouse views the other spouse’s action as given 
(Chen and Woolye, 2001; Lundeberg and Pollak, 1997; Katz, 1997). The main theoretical 
underpinning of the non-cooperative bargaining model is the assumption that household 
members are restricted to self-enforcing contracts instead of abiding by a bargaining rule, 
which is implicit in the cooperative bargaining model (Pollak 2006; Chen and Woolye, 
2001; Katz, 1997). It is referred to as non-cooperative because the degree of coordination 
required within marriage is assumed to be limited (or largely non-cooperative). 
 
The separate-sphere household model is one strand of the non-cooperative bargaining 
household model developed by Lundeberg and Pollak (1993). It is based on Cournot-
Nash’s framework, which assumes that individuals make resource allocation decisions 
(regarding, for instance, labour and income) to maximize their own utility while taking their 
partner’s action into account as given. The model has been developed to analyze intra-
household resource allocation in a less cooperative marriage, or when divorce involves a 
considerable transaction cost (Lundeberg and Pollak,1993). . The main theoretical 
foundation of the separate-sphere bargaining household model is the assumption that a 
non-cooperative equilibrium, which is defined in terms of a traditional gender division of 
roles and responsibilities, serves as a utility maximizing strategy within an existing 
marriage. This means that each marriage partner makes independent decisions in their 
respective gender-specific spheres to maximize their own utility, subject to their own 
resource constraints (Lundeberg and Pollak,1993). The model assumes that there is a 
certain level of interdependence within a non-cooperative marriage, particularly with regard 
                                                 
14 In the literature three main variants of non-cooperative household models are proposed including Cournot-
Nash, alternating offer (Ariel and Rubenstein, 1982) and Principal-Agent. 
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to the consumption of public household goods (such as meals) and services (child care).  
Couples are not expected to explicitly bargain or negotiate to make decisions and to make 
their voluntary contributions to the household. Rather, they are assumed to follow the 
socially sanctioned gender division of labour (Lundberg and Pollak, 1997, 1993), and may 
make a reciprocal claim on each others resources (Haddad et al., 1997).  
 
The separate-sphere household model assumes that intra-household resource allocation 
outcomes may vary, not only on the total household income, but may also depending on 
who earned a certain income within the household. Using the separate-sphere model, 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Lundberg et al., (1996) analyzed the allocation effects of 
child allowance schemes in two parents’ families in Britain. Both studies showed that child 
allowance schemes paid either to the mother or to the father can have different 
distributional effects. The finding suggested that the spouse who received the cash transfer 
determines how the cash is spent. This is in contrast to the cooperative bargaining model, 
which assumes that such allocation is determined by an individual’s relative resource 
control, irrespective of who received the cash transfer. A recent study from Benin by 
LeMay-Boucher (2007) also indicates that an increase in a woman’s income determines her 
private and public good consumption in favour of her preferences. 
   
The main difference between the cooperative household model and the non-cooperative 
household model is to the specification of the threat points, and their distributional 
outcomes. In the former, divorce serves as a threat point, while in the latter, it is a non-
cooperative arrangement based on traditional gender roles and expectations. In the 
cooperative household model, intra-household resource allocation outcomes are assumed to 
vary, depending on individual control over important resources and opportunities, which 
allow the person to economically maintain himself/herself outside marriage. In the non-
cooperative model, on the other hand, the person who earned a particular income is 
assumed to influence resource allocation outcomes in favour of his/her preference.  
 
The separate-sphere model is useful to analyze household decision-making in a context 
where men and women undertake in separate economic spheres and allocate resources in 
their respective, gendered expenditure domains, or in a highly non-cooperative marriage. It 
may also be appropriate in a day-to-day trivial household decision-making. But it may not 
be appropriate to analyze conflicts of interests that may arise in a cooperative marriage, 
where production and resource allocation are organized at the corporate or household level. 
Hence, a combination of the cooperative and the non-cooperative bargaining models may 
provide a better analytical framework to understand intra-household resource allocation. 
This will be discussed briefly in the following section. 
 
3.7 Application of the cooperative and the non-cooperative bargaining 
household models 
The interaction between household members can be characterized as a complex set of social 
relations involving sharing, caring, affection, negotiation and conflict. As a result, studying 
household decision-making behaviour cannot be easy and straightforward. As  has been 
observed in the previous discussions, none of the existing household decision-making 
models can fully capture the complex and dynamic realities embedded in household 
relationships and interactions. Although the unitary household model recognizes some 
aspects of caring and affection between married couples, it entirely ignores individual 
preferences and the prevailing gender hierarchies. The alternative cooperative bargaining 
Concepts and the theoretical framework   
32 
model is formulated to resolve the conflicts of interests within the household on the basis of 
economic principles, ignoring the gender divisions of roles and responsibilities that may 
influence household decision-making. The cooperative bargaining model insulates itself 
from the existing conjugal realities by considering divorce as the sole alternative if the 
bargaining between spouses fails. If spouses disagree on a certain matter, the conflict of 
interests may not necessarily be resolved through divorce, but also through non-cooperative 
arrangements within marriage or other ways, such as violence or the threat of violence 
(Lundberg and Pollak, 1997), lobbying with friends and relatives, decreasing collaboration, 
revenge, coercion, etc. The non-cooperative model not only complements but also 
addresses some of the shortcomings of the cooperative bargaining model, by recognizing 
the importance of gender divisions of roles and responsibilities in shaping intra-household 
resource allocations. This is necessary in  contexts where households organize their work in 
joint family enterprises and/or in separate gender economies that provide individual 
autonomy. It is also because intra-household relation is characterized by the simultaneous 
existence of cooperation and conflict, interdependence and autonomy (Carter and Katz, 
1997).  
 
Various commentators have suggested that a single household model may not fully capture 
the complex intra-household resource allocation arrangements in different cultures 
(Alderman et al., 1997; Katz, 1997). In addition, household resource allocation 
arrangements can take different forms, depending on the types of decision issues under 
question (Gebreselassie et al., 2007). Some decisions may require interaction and 
negotiation among household members who hold different degrees of influence on the 
bargaining outcome. For example, whether a woman should remain a member of a credit 
group or not, what to do with the loan money, or decision-making on loan-related earnings, 
may require some negotiation between couples. On the other hand, one spouse may make 
independent decisions on certain matters without the knowledge of the other spouse, or in a 
non-cooperative way, because local customs may assign different roles to men and women. 
For example, men and women may spend their incomes in their traditional expenditure 
domains. Therefore, the combination of cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining 
approaches may offer a better framework to capture both the material and ideological 
factors that interact to determine intra-household allocation decisions.  
 
The conceptual framework   
This study seeks to analyze the potential effects of women’s access to microfinance 
services on intra-household labour allocation and decision-making. The study places intra-
household resource allocation in wider institutional contexts, and explores how different 
institutional factors facilitate or hinder the empowering potential of microfinance 
programmes. 
   
Figure 3.1 presents the conceptual framework of the study. The framework keeps the 
household as the main unit of analysis, but it recognizes the different preferences, roles, 
resources, power, opportunities and benefits different household members have or 
experience within the unit. The framework indicates that women’s access to credit may 
increase women’s bargaining power and consequently affect intra-household resource 
allocation outcomes, but the link may not be as automatic as it is often assumed to be. This 
is because various institutional factors come into play to facilitate or hinder the process of 
women’s empowerment. The conceptual framework includes four interrelated components: 
women’s access to credit, women’s bargaining power, the institutional context and intra-
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household resource allocation outcomes. In the following paragraph, the components of the 
models are discussed.  
Access to microfinance services: this is the first component of the model and describes 
microfinance-related services and opportunities available to women. Microcredit and 
saving facilities are the major services provided by microfinance institutions to low-income 
women. Supplying credit to a woman may expand her opportunity to engage in gainful self-
employment and/or joint household enterprises. The availability of saving facilities may 
improve a woman’s savings. In addition, group lending approaches used by microfinance 
programmes may provide an opportunity for a woman to be a member of credit society. 
These services and opportunities may positively affect a woman’s bargaining position 
within the household. This link will be explained in more detail in the subsequent 
paragraph.  
  
Women’s bargaining position is the key component of the model.  It refers to a woman’s 
ability to influence resource allocation outcomes within the household. The fundamental 
assumption is that microfinance may enhance women’s bargaining power in intra-
household resource allocation, both in cooperative and non-cooperative arrangements. As 
proposed by the cooperative bargaining model, control over important economic resources 
may be a source of power for a person, since it represents that person’s “fall-back” position. 
In this study, such a “fall-back” position represents not only the threat of divorce, but also 
the threat of refusing to bring in loans (dropping out of credit groups). By targeting women 
for microfinance services, microfinance programmes may improve a woman’s access to 
and control over economic opportunities and resources. This may strengthen a woman’s 
“fall-back” position or enhance her traditional roles, and consequently improve her 
bargaining position in household resource allocation. 
 
Microfinance programmes may improve a woman’s bargaining position within the 
household in three significant ways. Firstly, if a microfinance institution targets the female 
member of the household exclusively (or with priority) with its credit service, this woman 
may have a strong bargaining power regarding the use of the loan funds and the associated 
income. If loans are given to a woman to finance an independent income-generating 
activity, it is possible that she may use the loan in her independent enterprise, allocate her 
labour and control associated earnings. But also if a loan is designed for household 
enterprises, a woman may participate in “joint” decision-making with her husband within 
the household. When a couple encounters conflicting interests in connection with loan-
related resource allocation (such as the loan fund, income, labour), a woman may use her 
credit access right to influence decision-making outcomes in her favour. She may refuse to 
bring a loan to the household if her preference is not taken into account.   
 
Secondly, a woman’s access to credit may expand her opportunity to engage in gainful self-
employment activities, and it may improve her income, assets, savings, and contribution to 
the household, and strengthen her social capital as well. These may in turn strengthen her 
bargaining position within the household. A woman’s access to credit may also strengthen 
her separate spheres of economic activities and decision-making, particularly if her loans 
are invested in her traditional economic domains.   
 
Thirdly, microfinance-related exposure and credit group activities may increase a woman’s 
awareness about her rights, and build her self-confidence to make her voice heard in the 
household decision-making process. Reeves and Baden (2000) have noted that increasing 
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women’s awareness and building their capacity will enable them to challenge their gender 
subordination individually or collectively.  
The above points describe the possible pathways through which microfinance can improve 
women’s bargaining position within the household. However, access to microfinance may 
not automatically advance women’s bargaining position within the household. The reason 
is that various institutional constraints may intervene in this process, either to facilitate or to 
impede the potential of microfinance to enhance a woman’s bargaining position within the 
household. This will be discussed in detail in the following paragraph.   
 
Institutional contexts: institutions are created by human beings to give structure to human 
interactions. Institutional constraints can be either formal, such as law, rules, regulations 
and implementation processes or informal, such as social conventions and codes of 
behaviour (Narayan, 2002). Both formal and informal institutions may facilitate or 
constrain a woman’s bargaining position within the household, and consequently shape 
intra-household resource allocation outcomes. Institutional contexts such as socio-cultural, 
economic and microfinance strategies are assumed to influence women’s bargaining 
position within the household, and consequently affect intra-household allocations 
outcomes (mainly regarding loans, income and labour).  
 
In this study, social-culturally constructed determinants of women’s bargaining power 
include their education, age, religion, forms of marriage, and local gender norms. Education 
increases knowledge and self-confidence and enhances a woman’s bargaining position 
within the household. A woman’s life cycle, – old age, seniority (related to women in a 
polygamous household) -, may offer a woman authority to determine the way in which 
loans, earnings and labour are allocated within the household. Being young or junior, 
inexperienced and possibly with small children may decrease a woman’s voice in intra-
household resource allocation. Social norms (including gender, religion) may ascribe and/or 
proscribe the roles that men and women assume within and beyond the household. Social 
norms tend to determine the socially appropriate tasks and roles for individuals on the bases 
of gender and age. For example, the traditional gender division of labour in a society may 
prohibit women’s involvement in the traditionally male-dominated economic spheres. In 
many traditional societies, women are responsible for domestic works, including caring for 
sick individuals. A woman’s domestic responsibilities may be expands when households 
experience chronic sickness, such as those related to HIV/AIDS.  This situation may reduce 
a woman’s capacity to generate independent earnings, which is necessary for her to sustain 
her bargaining power.   
 
The economic context captures, among others, women’s land rights within the household. 
In line with the cooperative bargaining model, a woman’s land right15 is expected to give 
her a strong bargaining position within the household. A woman who has a right over 
household plots, independently or jointly with her husband, is more likely to have a better 
bargaining position within the household. The economic structure of a given society may 
also facilitate or hinder men’s and women’s opportunities and time allocation patterns. 
 
Microfinance institutions may have different strategies and features that may either 
facilitate or hinder gender transformation processes. The type of loan product or the type of 
economic activity for which a loan is earmarked, targeting strategies (such as individual 
loans or household loans, or a signatory requirement from spouses) and credit group-related 
                                                 
15 See Chapter 4 on how individuals acquire land in Ethiopia.  
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activities may enhance or limit women’s bargaining position within the household. For 
example, if credit is given for a woman’s independent income-generating activities, it is 
more likely that she retains control over the income from her enterprises than when a loan 
is given to a woman for household level- or traditionally male-dominated enterprises. 
Orientation programmes and credit group-related meetings and interactions may raise 
women’s consciousness about their rights, and then improve women’s bargaining position 
within the household.  
 
Intra-household resource allocation outcomes: this is the last component of the model. It 
explains whether and how access to credit may potentially transform or reinforce gender 
inequalities within the household. It specifically focuses on household labour allocation, 
income expenditure roles and decision-making within the household. In relation to labour, 
attention is paid to the allocation of labour in crop production, domestic activities and 
leisure, and the relative workload of men and women. In relation to incomes, the focus is on 
men’s and women’s expenditure roles, and women’s economic independence within the 
household. The last issue is related to other household decisions, namely to the selling of 
grain and livestock, the education of children, and clothing.  
 
Microfinance may enhance women’s say in household resource allocation by increasing 
women’s bargaining power. For example, a woman may invest her labour in economic 
activities that provide an income that is under her control. An increase in a woman’s 
income may enhance her bargaining power. As a result, she may withdraw labour from 
other economic or/and domestic activities and participate in household decision-making. 
On the other hand, a strong gender norm may limit a woman’s ability to expand her 
business and earnings. In addition, loan-induced economic participation may intensify 
women’s and girl’s work burden.  
  
 
                                                                            
Figure 3. 1 The conceptual framework of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4  COUNTRY PROFILE, THE STUDY’S AREAS 
AND THE STUDY’S MICROFINANCE 
INSTITUTIONS 
4.1 Geography  
The Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is located between 3 and 15 degrees north latitude 
and 33 and 48 degrees east longitude in the Horn of Africa, at the crossroads between 
Africa and the Middle East . The country is bordered by Eritrea in the north, Djibouti and 
Somalia in the East, Kenya in the South, and Sudan in the West (Figure 4.1). Ethiopia has 
an estimated surface area of 1.1 million square kilometres. The country’s topography is 
characterized by a considerable highland complex of mountains, and by dissected plateaus 
divided by the Great Rift Valley running from the northeast to the south ,surrounded by 
lowlands, steppes, and semi-desert. The elevation in the country ranges from 110 meters 
below sea level in the Afar Danakil Depression to 4620 meters above sea level at Mount 
Ras Dashen. The climatic condition of the country also varies with the topography; the 
temperature can be as high as 47 degrees Celsius in the Afar Depression and as low as 10 
degrees Celsius in the Ethiopian highlands.  
 
In Ethiopia, the annual rainfall varies greatly, between 95 mm and 2231mm (IFPRI and 
CSA16, 2006). There are two major rainy seasons; the long rain (Kiremt), which occurs 
roughly between June and September, while the short rain (Belg) occurs between March 
and May. Except for some areas in the northwest, most parts of the country experience both 
the Kiremt and Belg rains. The western Ethiopian highlands have a relatively high rainfall, 
averaging more than 1,200mm annually. With the loss of elevation, the amount of rainfall 
declines, especially towards eastern Ethiopia. As a result, most lowland parts of Afar and 
Somali are unsuitable for agricultural production (IFPRI17 and CSA, 2006).  
 
4.2 History, Ethnicity, Religion and Demography 
Ethiopia is one of the oldest nations in the world, with a long history of human origin and 
civilization. “Dinknesh” or “Lucy”, one of the earliest (3.5 million years) and complete 
humanoids, was discovered in Ethiopia. The country is also the oldest independent country 
in Africa.   
 
According to the 2007 Census, Ethiopia is inhibited by more than 80 ethnic groups, of 
which the Oromo and the Amhara ethnic groups comprise 34.5 percent and 26.9 percent, 
respectively. The same Census demonstrated that 43.5 percent and 33.9 percent of the 
Ethiopian population are Orthodox Christians and Muslims, respectively. Protestants and 
other, traditional religion followers comprise 18.6 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively 
(PCC18, 2008).  
 
Since the beginning of 1990s, Ethiopia follows federal system of government organized 
around ethnic groups, and is divided into nine administrative regional states and two city 
administrations, namely Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromiya, Somalia, Benishangul-Gumuz, 
                                                 
16 Central Statistics Agency  
17 International Institute of Food Policy Research Institute  
18 Population Census Commission. 
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the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR), Gambella and Harari, 
and two city administrations, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa Administrative Council. This 
study was conducted in two Administrative Regions, namely the Amhara National Regional 
State and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Regional State.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1 Map of Ethiopia, the research regions and districts. 
 
Ethiopia is the third populous country in Africa. According to the 2007 Ethiopia’s 
Population and Housing Census, the country’s population counted about 73.9 million 
(49.5% women), with an annual growth rate of 2.6 percent (PCC 2008:10-11). Between the 
first (1984) and the third (2007) census, the Ethiopian population grew by over 85 percent 
or by 34 million people. According to the UN/DESA19 Population Division (2008) 
projection, the Ethiopian population will be more than doubled by 2040, with an average 
annual growth rate of between 1.48 percent and 2.59 percent. About 45 percent of the 
Ethiopian population was below 15 years of age, and about 51.9 percent was in the age 
group of 15 to 64. The population over 64 years of age was less than 3.2 percent (PCC, 
2008). Such an age structure is typical for the developing countries and reflects high 
fertility and adult mortality rates. This kind of age distribution also reflects a high 
                                                 
19 The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
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dependency ratio20. In Ethiopia, every 100 persons at an economically productive age (aged 
15 to 64) are responsible to take care of themselves and an additional 92 persons (aged 
under 15 and over 65). Ethiopia has one of the highest fertility rates, 5.4 births per woman. 
Between 1990s and 2005, the fertility rate declined by one child, while the use of 
contraceptives among women rose to 15 percent from 5 percent during the 1990s (CSA and 
ORC Macro, 2006). 
 
The majority (83%) of the Ethiopian population lives in the rural areas, where agriculture is 
the main source of livelihood (CSA, 2008).  Nearly a quarter of Ethiopian households are 
headed by women. The proportion of female heads of household is relatively higher (39%) 
in the urban areas compared with the rural areas (20%), (CSA, 2004a). In 2005, about 12 
percent of the married women in Ethiopia lived in a polygamous union. Between 2000 and 
2005, the proportion of married women in a polygamous union has declined by 3 percent. 
Polygamy is more prevalent among rural women, older women, uneducated and poor 
women (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). 
  
4.3 Socio-economic Development   
a. The Economy   
Ethiopia is largely an agrarian country, where agriculture accounts for nearly half of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and generates 90 percent of the export earnings 
(MoFED21, 2007). For example, in 2005, coffee and sesame seeds contributed 48 percent 
and 20 percent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings, respectively (World Bank, 
2008). In recent years, pulses (legumes) and flower exports have become the other 
important sources of foreign exchange earnings for the country (MoFED, 2007). During 
2005, the agriculture sector employed about 80 percent of the total labour force in the 
country (84.3% men and 75.5 % women) (CSA, 2006). Although agriculture is vital to 
Ethiopia’s economy, progress in the sector has been very slow or nearly stagnant over the 
decades. As indicated in Table 4.1, the average annual agricultural growth rate increased 
from nearly zero percent (0.1%) in the 1980s to 2.3 percent in the 1990s and to 3.3 percent 
during the period between 2000 and 2005 (World Bank, 2008). However, agriculture 
continues to be the backbone of the Ethiopian economy. The manufacturing or the industry 
sector in Ethiopia is in its infancy stage and its contribution to the economy is insignificant. 
However, the current trend in its growth is encouraging. During 2006/07, the sector 
accounted for 13.4 percent of the GDP, with an annual growth rate of 11 percent. The 
service sector contributed slightly more than 40 percent to the country’s GDP with an 
annual growth rate of 13.5 percent (MoFED, 2007).  
 
Despite some progress in recent years, the overall performance of the Ethiopian economy 
over the past forty years has shown mixed results. During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
country’s GDP average annual growth rate was limited to 2.1 and 2.2 percent, respectively. 
Between 2000/01 and 2006/07, the average annual growth rate was 5.8 percent, which was 
a significant progress. During the turn of 2000, the annual performance of the economy was 
mixed. For example, during 2001/02 and 2002/03, the GDP annual growth rates had fallen 
to 1.6 percent and a negative 2.2 percent, respectively. During the four consecutive years 
following the decline, the country’s GDP grew annually by more than 10 percent (MoFED, 
                                                 
20 The dependency ratio refers to the proportion between the population assumed to be not economically 
productive (the total population aged 0-14 years and those aged 65 years and above) and the proportion 
assumed to be economically productive (the population at a working age, aged 15 to 64 years). 
21 The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.  
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2007; World Bank, 2008). A recent report by the World Bank (2008) categorized Ethiopia 
among the countries with a sustained and diversified economic growth. 
 
Several factors have contributed to the poor performance of the Ethiopian economy over 
the past decades. These include famines, political instability, internal and external conflicts 
and war, weather-related shocks, backwardness of the agricultural and environmental 
protection practices, unfavourable policies, and deterioration in terms of trade. The impact 
of the weather on the Ethiopian economy is enormous. The country’s economy is highly 
dependent on a rain-fed agriculture sector, which is highly vulnerable to weather-related 
shocks. For example, in 2002/03, both the agricultural and the country’s GDP annual 
growth rates were negative due to insufficient rains, while during 2003/2004, favourable 
rainfall conditions and a supply of agricultural inputs increased the agricultural production 
and also increased the GDP annual growth rate (MoFED, 2007).  
 
Table 4.1 Macroeconomic trends over the past 30 years, 1980-2007.  
Sources: Data related to the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000-2005, World Bank (2008) 
              Data related to 2001 – 2007, MoFED (2007) 
 
According to the World Development Report for 2008 (World Bank, 2007:334), Ethiopia is 
one of the low-income counties in the world with an estimated Gross National Income per 
capita of US$ 180. The depth and the scope of poverty in Ethiopia are enormous. 
Addressing the multiple dimensions22 of poverty has become the key development 
challenge facing the Ethiopian government and its people. Over the past decade, poverty 
reduction and its ultimate elimination has been the overriding development agenda of the 
Ethiopian government. The Agricultural Development Led Industrialization Strategy 
(ADLI) continues to be the key approach in poverty reduction and economic growth in the 
country. Developing the agricultural sector has become necessary to ensure national food 
requirements, and to accelerate the growth of the industrial sector through the provision of 
agricultural inputs. In the subsequent paragraphs, the poverty and development trend in the 
country are presented. 
 
b. Poverty 
One dimension of poverty is material deprivation, which is commonly measured by a 
poverty line, - a threshold level of per capita income or consumption below which an 
individual is considered to be poor23. The poverty head count index refers to the proportion 
                                                 
22 Poverty is multi-dimensional and includes income poverty, vulnerability, voicelessness and powerlessness 
(World Bank, 2000).  
 
Sector/Indicator 80s 90s 00-05 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 
GDP growth rate (%) 2.1 2.2 5.8 1.0 -3.3 11.9 10.6 11.6 11.4 
         
0.1 2.3 3.3 -2.1 -11.4 17.3 13.5 10.9 9.4 
Agriculture  
-Growth rate (%) 
-Share agriculture & allied 
activities in GDP (%) 
- - - - - - 47.4 47 46.3 
         
4.5 3.5 6.8 8.3 3.0 10.0 8.1 10.2 11.0 
Industry 
- Growth rate (%) 
- Share in GDP (%) - - - - - - 13.6 13.0 13.4 
         
3.6 4 5 3.6 9.0 14.6 16.7 - - 
Service  
-Growth rate (%) 
-Share to GDP (%) - - - - - - - - 41.5 
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of the population whose economic welfare is below the national poverty line. In 2005, the 
proportion of the Ethiopian population that could not afford to fulfil their basic needs or 
lived below the national poverty line was estimated to be 38.7 percent (39.3% in the rural 
and 35.1 % in the urban areas)24 (Table 4.2). The proportion of the population below the 
national poverty line was higher in the rural areas by 4 percent, compared to the urban 
areas. Between 1995/96 and 2004/05, the proportion of the Ethiopian population living 
below the national poverty line had declined by about 7 percent. A decline of about 8.2 
percent was recorded in the rural areas, where the majority of the Ethiopian population 
resides, while the share of the poor urban population rose by 1.9 percent. This significant 
difference between locations could be partly attributed to the pro-poor government 
interventions in the rural areas, including extension programmes to support the 
marketization of smallholder agriculture, the food security programmes, and the recent 
productive safety net programmes, among others. During 2004/2005, about 27 percent 
(27% for the rural and 26% for the urban areas) of the Ethiopian population was estimated 
to live in extreme poverty (Poverty Severity Index). Between 1995/96 and 2004/05, the 
proportion of poor people who lived in extreme poverty had declined by almost half (48% 
in the rural and 38% in the urban areas) (MoFED, 2006). 
 
Table 4. 2 Trends in Poverty25 in Ethiopia. 
 Indices 
Level  1995/96 1999/00 2004/05 
National     
Poverty Head Count index 0.455 0.442 0.387 
Poverty Severity Index  0.051 0.045 0.027 
Rural     
Head Count index 0.475 0.454 0.393 
Poverty Severity Index  0.053 0.046 0.027 
Urban     
Head Count index 0.332 0.369 0.351 
Poverty Severity Index  0.041 0.039 0.026 
Source: MoFED (2006: 23).  
 
c. Education  
Ethiopia has one of the lowest literacy rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is 37.8 percent 
(Table 4.3). There is also a considerable discrepancy in literacy rate between the sexes and 
between locations. The literacy rate among the male population is nearly double (50 %) that 
of the literacy rate for the female population (27%). Similarly, the literacy rate among the 
urban dwellers is more than twice higher (74 %t) than the literacy rate for the rural 
population (31 %) (CSA, 2004a:23). The proportion of the literate population is increasing 
from year to year, irrespective of sex and location. 
 
In 2004, the gross and net enrolment ratio at primary level stood at 74.2 percent and 37.8 
percent, respectively. During the same period, the secondary school gross and net 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
24 The level of poverty line used to calculate poverty indices is 1,075 ETB at 1995/1996 national average 
constant prices, based on the cost of 2,200 kilocalorie per day per adult and essential non-food items. 
 
25 Total poverty refers to an aggregate measure of poverty that captures both the food and non-food 
requirements. 
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enrolment ratio was estimated to be 23.1 percent and 14.5 percent, respectively (Table 4.3). 
This data indicates that about a fourth of primary school age children and over three-fourth 
of secondary school age Ethiopian children are outside the purview of the education 
system. There is a gender disparity, particularly in the gross enrolment ratio, in favour of 
male children. The primary school gross enrolment ratio for male and female children was 
about 80 percent and 68 percent, respectively. At the secondary level, the gross enrolment 
ratio for male and female children were 28 percent and 18 percent, respectively. There is 
also a huge discrepancy between the urban and the rural areas with regard to both the gross 
and net enrolment ratio at primary and secondary school levels, in favour of the former. The 
huge disparity in primary gross enrolment between the urban and the rural population could 
be partly explained in terms of a difference in the accessibility of schools. For example, in 
the urban areas, less than 2 percent of households travel 5 or more kilometres to reach the 
nearest primary schools, while in the rural areas, about 30 percent of households have to 
travel 5 or more kilometres to reach the nearest primary school (CSA, 2004a:25).   
 
In recent years, Ethiopia has registered considerable progress in the gross enrolment ratio, 
particularly at primary school level. The proportion of school age children enrolled in 
primary school in the rural areas increased from 28 percent in 1996 to 68 percent in 2004 
(CSA, 2004a). This could be partly attributed to the expansion of schools in the rural areas 
and is also due to an increase in the public awareness about the education of children, 
particularly girls.   
 
Table 4. 3 Literacy and school enrolment year 2004.   
Description Country Rural Urban 
 Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total  Male  Female  Total  
Literacy 49.9 26.6 37.9 43.4 18.7 30.9 86.2 64.4 74.2 
Gross 
Enrolment 
Ratio 
         
Primary level  80.4 67.6 74.2 75.1 59.5 67.6 125.4 125 225.2 
Secondary 
level  
28.3 17.9 23.1 20.2 8.8 14.7 73.7 56.5 64.2 
Net  
Enrolment 
Ratio 
         
Primary level  38.9 36.8 37.8 34.2 31.2 32.8 78.8 75.8 77.2 
Secondary 
level  
16.6 12.4 14.5 10.6 5.9 8.3 50.1 40.1 44.5 
Source:  CSA (2004a:32-35). 
 
d. Health  
Health is an important aspect of human capital, which has a direct bearing on individual 
welfare and productivity. The health care system in Ethiopia is underdeveloped and the 
society has poor health conditions by many standards. Despite some achievement over the 
years, Ethiopia continues to experience high child and maternal mortality, poor health 
coverage, poor sanitation, low life expectancy, etcetera. A recent estimate by the WHO 
(2008) showed that, during 2006, the average life expectancy in Ethiopia was estimated to 
be 56 years (pp 38). The MoH and NHAPCO (2006:45) estimated that, in 2008, AIDS may 
lower the average life expectancy in Ethiopia from 56.9 years to 53.4 years. Similarly, in 
many developing countries, decline in life expectancy is said to be associated with 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and armed conflicts (World Bank, 2008).  
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During 2006/07, the primary public health coverage in the country was estimated to be 87 
percent, while the health service utilization was only 0.32 (MoH, 2006). In Ethiopia, the 
main reasons for the limited use of health facilities include distance to the nearest health 
facilities, the cost of treatment, and the quality of the services. For example, about 38 
percent and 81 percent of the population need to travel 10 kilometres or more to reach the 
nearest clinic and hospital, respectively (CSA, 2004a).  
In Ethiopia, maternal health service is enormously poor in every respect. During 2005, 
nearly three-fourth of the pregnant mothers in the country did not have access to antenatal 
care facilities. Being poor, uneducated, and residing in a rural location are all factors that 
decrease the likelihood that women will have access to antenatal care services. The 
proportion of pregnant women who delivered with the help of skilled health professionals 
was as low as 6 percent, and the percentage of those who received postnatal care was 
limited to 10 percent. The situation is more serious in the rural areas, where the proportion 
of children born in health institutions was limited to 2 percent, 20 times less than in the 
urban area. Most deliveries in the country take place within the home, with little assistance 
from health professionals. The lack of maternal and childcare services in Ethiopia increases 
the incidence of maternal and infant mortality. As already mentioned earlier, Ethiopia has 
the highest fertility rate. The fertility rate is higher among poor, uneducated and rural 
women. During 2005, the contraceptive prevalence rate in the country was 15 percent. Only 
31 percent of the demand for contraceptives was met (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). The 
maternal mortality rate in the country during 2005 was estimated to be 720 deaths per 
100,000 mothers (WHO, 2008).  
 
With regard to child mortality, during 2005, one in thirteen Ethiopian children died before 
celebrating their first year, and one out of eight Ethiopian children do not survive to their 
fifth birthday. Over the years, some progress has been made in relation to infant and under-
five mortality, with infant mortality going down by 19 percent, from 95 deaths per 1000 
live births in 1990 to 75 deaths per 1000 live births in 2005. In addition, under-five child 
mortality decreased by 25 percent, from 165 deaths per 1000 live births to 123 deaths per 
1000 live birth during 2005 (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006).  
 
Although the immunization of children against the six vaccine-preventable diseases26 is 
crucial in minimizing infant and child mortality, only one in five Ethiopian children (12-23 
months old) was fully vaccinated. The proportion of children fully vaccinated increased 
slightly from 14 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2005. Yet, on the other hand, the 
percentage of children who received none of the six basic vaccinations increased from 17 
percent in 2000 to 24 percent in 2005. For almost all types of vaccination, there is a slight 
gender disparity, with a relatively high proportion of male children (23%) being vaccinated 
in comparison to the proportion of female children (18%). Vaccination coverage in the 
urban areas is relatively higher than the coverage in rural areas (CSA and ORC Macro, 
2006). 
 
Child malnutrition is prevalent in Ethiopia. The problem is more pronounced among rural 
children and children with uneducated mothers. About 11 percent, 47 percent and 38 
percent of the children are wasted, stunted and underweight, respectively. Between the year 
2000 and 2005, some achievement was registered: the proportion of children stunted and 
underweight fell by 10 percent and 19 percent, respectively (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006).     
 
                                                 
26 These are tuberculosis, diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, polio, and measles. 
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A lack of safe drinking water and a lack of sanitation are the other problems encountered by 
the majority of the Ethiopian population. During 2004, only 36 percent of Ethiopian 
households had access to a safe drinking water supply. As a result, nearly two-thirds of the 
population uses unsafe sources, such as a river or lake, or an unprotected well or spring. A 
lack of access to safe drinking water was more often observed in the rural areas, where 
about three-fourths of the population get their drinking water from unsafe sources. In 
contrast, an overwhelming majority (92 %) of urban dwellers in the country access safe 
drinking water. Between 1996 and 2004, the proportion of the population that had access to 
safe drinking water almost doubled. With regard to sanitation facilities, more than two-
thirds of households in the country had no access to toilet facilities during 2004. The 
problem was more severe in the rural areas, where nearly 80 percent of households did not 
have any toilet facilities, compared to only 20 percent in the urban areas (CSA, 2004a). 
 
e. Household vulnerability to shocks 
Vulnerability is one of several dimensions of poverty. It refers to the risks and insecurities 
which cause economic, health and other social crises to individuals, households and 
communities. According to CSA (2004a), the major shocks experienced by Ethiopian 
households include famine and drought, deaths and illnesses of household members, and 
crop damage and deaths of animals. There is a significant variation in the types and the 
severity of shocks encountered by rural and urban dwellers in the country. A relatively 
large proportion (41%) of rural households were affected by drought and famine, compared 
to 23 percent of the urban households who were affected by similar shocks. In addition, 
shocks related to crop damage and loss of livestock were experienced by nearly a fifth of 
the rural households, while the proportion of urban households affected by the same shocks 
was limited to 6 percent (CSA (2004a), The rural areas appeared to be far more affected by 
agriculture-related losses than the urban areas because of the high dependency of the rural 
economy on rain-fed agriculture and livestock husbandry.  
 
Although the majority of the Ethiopian households rely on farming for a living, they are 
hardly self-sufficient in crop production. According to the Central Statistics Authority 
Welfare Monitoring Survey 2004, only 2 percent of the rural households in the country 
were self-sufficient in crop production.  For about 26 percent of Ethiopian households, their 
own crop production can only feed the household members for up to 7 to 9 months, while 
for about 39 percent of households their own supply lasted for up to 6 months. About a 
third of the Ethiopian population also experiences food shortage. This period corresponds 
with the periods of drought and a negative agricultural annual growth rate (2002 and 2003), 
and suggests a positive link between a decline in agricultural production and food shortage 
in the country. During 2004, a relatively higher (34%) proportion of the rural households 
experienced food shortage, compared to 15 percent of the urban population. During the 
same period, illnesses and deaths were the most common shocks experienced by over half 
(56%) and a quarter of the urban and the rural population, respectively (CSA2004a), This 
spatial variation can be partly explained by the relatively high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in 
the urban areas, compared to the rural areas. Issues related to HIV/AIDS will be discussed 
in-depth later on in this chapter. 
 
During 2004, food aid, the selling of livestock/products and the selling of other agricultural 
produces were the key coping mechanisms for households affected by drought and famine. 
Households that encountered illnesses and deaths responded to their financial needs by 
selling livestock/products and other agricultural produces, and used their own savings or 
cashes. In Ethiopia, the capacity of the rural and urban households to draw cash during an 
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emergency is very limited.  More than 37 percent of Ethiopian households are unable to 
produce ETB 100 within a week’s time. As a result, the main sources of cash for such 
emergencies are the selling of livestock (40%), the selling of crop (14%), and getting a loan 
from relatives (17%) (CSA,2004a), 
 
f. HIV/AIDS Prevalence, Cause and Impact  
The national HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in Ethiopia27 was often drawn from sentinel 
surveillance, which covers pregnant women attending antenatal care facilities. However, 
the recent Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 2005 (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006) has 
included HIV/AIDS testing for the general reproductive age population (men and women 
between the age of 15 and 59) and provides a better picture of the prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
in Ethiopia. The data collected using this new method is, however, just a one-time 
experience and it does not permit an assessment of the trends and the demographic impacts 
of HIV/AIDS in the country. As a result, the following discussion largely relied on the 
information obtained through sentinel surveillance by the MoH and NHAPCO (2006) and 
the DHS report. To begin with the report of the DHS (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006), the 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among the Ethiopian population aged 15 to 59 was estimated to 
be 1.4 percent. The proportion of HIV infections for the female population (1.9) was double 
the infection rate of the male population (0.9). Similarly, the HIV/AIDS infection rate was 
much higher for the urban population (5.5%) compared to that of the rural population 
(0.7%). The trend in HIV/AIDS prevalence according to the MoH and NHAPCO estimate 
(through sentinel surveillance sites) suggests that, after the identification of the first two 
HIV/AIDS cases in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, the infection rate increased slightly through 
the 1990s, and reached its highest peak of 4.5 percent in 1998, which was stabilized until 
the year 2000, and then started to decline gradually to 3.5 percent in 2005 The HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate was relatively high among the female and the urban population, compared 
to the male and rural population28(MoH and NHAPCO, 2006). 
 
The demographic and health impact of HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia is already huge. By 2007, 
nearly a million (980,000) Ethiopian people (among whom 9% children under the age of 
15) were estimated to be living with AIDS. About 67,000 people (31% of whom were 
children) have died of AIDS, while 650,000 children became AIDS orphans.  The impact of 
AIDS on life expectancy is enormous. During 2005, AIDS was estimated to reduce life 
expectancy at birth by five years (UNAIDS, 2008). 
In Ethiopia, the efforts to prevent and control HIV/AIDS started following the identification 
of the first two HIV/AIDS cases at the end of 1980. In 1987, a national AIDS Control 
Programme Department was established within the Ministry of Health, in order to direct 
and coordinate the implementation of HIV/AIDS programmes  in the country. This was 
followed by the development of the first medium-term programme (1987-91), which 
focused on creating public awareness, the establishment of HIV testing laboratory services, 
HIV/AIDS surveillance, and the training of health workers. In 1991, based on the 
experiences drawn from the first plan, the second medium-term plan (1992-1996) was 
developed, with the aim of preventing the spread of the virus. The plan adopted a multi-
sectoral approach and decentralization of the AIDS/STD prevention and control activities. 
                                                 
27This method is a common practice in many sub-Saharan African countries and not unique for Ethiopia.  
28 HIV/AIDS prevalence rate for female and male population was estimated at 4 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively.  HIV/AIDS infection rate in the urban areas was estimated to be 10.5 percent (11.9 in females 
and 9.1 % in males) while in the rural areas it was estimated at 1.9 percent (2.2% in females and 0.12 % in 
males) (MoH and NHAPCO, 2006).  
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Since then, different governments and NGOs have undertaken prevention activities. In 
1998, the Council of Ministers approved the National HIV/AIDS Policy. The policy aims at 
providing an enabling environment for a multi-sectoral approach for the prevention and 
control of the epidemic. For the coordination, facilitation and implementation of 
programmes and projects, different institutional arrangements have been made at all levels. 
The National HIV/AIDS Council Secretariat (NACS) was established in 2000 and upgraded 
to the HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office (HAPCO) in 2002. In addition, the 
Strategic Framework for the National Responses to HIV/AIDS was prepared and 
implemented for a period of four years (2000-2004). The succeeding four-year strategic 
plan (2005-2008) focused on prevention, care, and support and treatment. The strategic plan 
has been premised on the principles of multi-sectoralism, decentralization, community 
mobilization, ownership, and partnership, and serves as a national framework for all parties 
involved in HIV/AIDS-related interventions.  
  
Various programmes and projects have been implemented by NGOs and the government to 
curb HIV infection, and to mitigate its impact in the country. However, the challenge ahead 
is enormous. For example, comprehensive knowledge29 of HIV/AIDS is still lacking (CSA 
and ORC Macro, 2006). The proportion of HIV-infected people who received antiretroviral 
therapy during 2007 was also estimated to be less than 10 percent (90,000) (UNAIDS, 
2008).  
 
4.4 Gender relations in Ethiopia 
Like in many traditional societies, gender relations in Ethiopia are characterized by 
inequalities between men and women in many aspects of life. A patriarchal social system 
has been dominating for generations, reflecting men’s supremacy in the country’s social, 
cultural, political, and economic rules. The role that men and women play in the domestic 
and public spheres, and the distribution of resources and benefits between them are mostly 
governed by gender norms and rules that are biased in favour of men. However, since 
Ethiopia is a country with diverse cultures and ethnic groups, local gender systems and the 
extent of the inequalities between men and women appear to vary greatly among different 
social groups and localities.  
 
As stated in the previous section, women in Ethiopia are more illiterate and less educated 
than men. Gender disparity is more pronounced as one goes up the higher education ladder. 
More school age girls compared to boys are out of the purview of the education system. 
The proportion of female students at the higher educational institutions is limited to 24 
percent (MoE, 2005). Gender disparity in education is the result of the higher demand for 
girls’ labour at home; long distances to schools, which entails a risk for girls; the practice of 
abduction; early marriage and parents’ biases in favour of boys’ education (MoWA, 2006). 
Since the last decade, the Ethiopian government has taken various measures to narrow the 
gender gaps at all levels of the educational system. Different services and supports, 
including scholarships for girls from poor families, tutorials, guidance, and counselling 
services are provided to keep female students in school and to improve their academic 
performance. The government has introduced a positive discriminatory policy to increase 
the proportion of female students in higher educational institutions (HEIs). As a result, the 
                                                 
29 According to the CSA and ORC Macro (2006), comprehensive knowledge is defined as knowing that: 1) 
people can reduce their chances of getting the AIDS virus by having sex with only one uninfected, faithful 
partner and by using condoms consistently; 2) a healthy-looking person can have the AIDS virus; and 3) HIV 
cannot be transmitted by mosquito bites or by sharing food with a person who has AIDS. 
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share of female students in HEIs increased from 20.2 percent in 1996/97 to 24.4 percent in 
2003/2004 (MoE, 2005).   
 
Women in Ethiopia are more vulnerable to health problems and HIV infections due to 
epidemiological, socio-cultural and economic factors. The female mortality rate of 6.4 
deaths per 1000 people is relatively higher than the male mortality rate of 5.9 per 1000 
people. As discussed in the previous section, women’s special health needs are hardly met. 
Ethiopian women are less likely to seek health consultation compared to Ethiopian men 
(CSA, 2004a). This could be partly because women lack decision-making power regarding 
their health (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is relatively 
higher among the female population compared to the male population. Several factors 
contribute to the prevailing gender disparities in HIV infections in the country. Some of the 
factors include women’s lack of access to resources, information and services (health and 
education), and harmful practices and violence against women and girls (female genital 
mutilation, abduction, widow inheritance, the sharing of wives, and multiple marriage) 
(Miz-Hasab Research Centre, 2005). For example, in 2006, only 16 percent of the women 
aged between 15 and 49 years had comprehensive knowledge about HIV/AIDS, compared 
to 30 percent of the men in the same age group (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006).   
 
In Ethiopia, in every aspect of employment, gender inequality is widespread. Women have 
a relatively higher (7.8%) unemployment ratio compared to men (2.5%). Paid employment 
in the country accounts for only eight percent of the total labour force. As a result, the 
majority of the country’s population is either self-employed (41%) or an unpaid family 
labourer (50%). Men are disproportionately represented in self-employment, while women 
are highly concentrated in unpaid jobs (CSA, 2006). Even when they engage in some kind 
of paid employment, women are more likely to earn less pay than men (CSA and ORC 
Macro, 2006, UNDP, 2006). According to the Human Development Report 2008, women 
in Ethiopia earn less than 40 percent of men’s incomes (UNDP, 2006). Gender segregation 
in economic occupation is also a common phenomenon, with women being 
disproportionately represented in the elementary economic occupations while men are 
concentrated in skilled  occupations (agriculture and fishery). During 2005, half of the 
female population employed in Ethiopia was engaged in a non-skilled occupation, 
compared to a third of the male population. On the other hand, over half (55%) of the male 
population was employed in a skilled occupation, compared to less than a quarter (23%) of 
the female population. Furthermore, the proportion of women in “white-collar” jobs, such 
as jobs in legislation, senior officials’ jobs, and managerial, professional and technician 
positions, is limited to 30 percent.  The concentration of women in elementary and low-
paying occupations could be partly attributed to women’s low level of education and 
training, the traditional attitude towards woman and girls, a lack of female role models, 
women’s limited access to information, and lack of assertiveness (MoWA, 2006). As a 
result, women dominate the informal sector, where they engage in micro-businesses that 
require small capital, unskilled labour, and limited management and bookkeeping. The 
proportion of Ethiopian women in the urban informal sector has been estimated to be 60 
percent (CSA, 2004b).  
  
The existing gender division of domestic labour within Ethiopian households 
disproportionately affects women. Traditionally, women and children (especially girls) are 
responsible for most domestic activities, including fetching water and fuel wood (Admasu, 
et al, 2001; Bekele, 2000). On average, women spend 6-8 hours doing household chores, 
while men spend less than 2 hours doing similar jobs (Aredo, 1999). According to CSA 
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(2004a), about half of the households in the country has access to the nearest water sources 
within one kilometre and more, while about 40 percent of the households has access to 
firewood within a distance of one to four km, and about a quarter of the households within 
a distance of five km and more30. These tasks are becoming increasingly time-consuming 
for women due to environmental degradation (Bekele, 2000).   
 
In Ethiopia, gender disparity is widespread in the access to and control over productive 
resources, such as credit, extension services and land (Tesfaye, 2000; Woldemariam, 2001; 
MoWA, 2006). Only 9 percent and 12 percent of the women in Ethiopia have access to 
agricultural extensions and agricultural credit services (CSA, 2003 cited in MoWA, 2006). 
During 2001, women’s access to microfinance services in the country stood at 38 percent 
(Shiferaw and Amha, 2001). Gender disparity is also prevalent regarding ownership of land 
and livestock. Men exercise more rights over such household resources compared to 
women (Wondimu et al., 1997). In Ethiopia, individuals mostly obtain land use rights (the 
usufruct right) through inheritance, government transfers, and tenancy arrangements. 
Although the 1995 Ethiopian Constitutions and the Rural Land Administration 
Proclamation No 89/1997 grant women equal rights to men regarding “the use, disposal, 
and administration and control of rural land”, this has not been implemented in many 
regions. In 2008, the proportion of Ethiopian women who had a land holding title was 
limited to 18 percent (CSA, 2008b:270). This could be partly because land is usually 
directed to the man who is traditionally the head of the household, on the assumption that 
all household members would benefit equally from such an arrangement.  
 
In Ethiopia, the customary practices governing property distribution upon death and divorce 
are generally in favour of men, and discriminate against women (Schoz and Gomez, 2004; 
WAO31 and World Bank, 1998; Bevan and Pankhurst 1996). Men have better opportunities 
to control household resources within and outside marriage. Nevertheless, there is a wide 
variation in customary practices across different locations (regions) within the country 
regarding the rules of disposition of productive assets (e.g. land and livestock) upon divorce 
and death (inheritance). Studies show that gender-discriminatory customary practices are 
more prevalent in southern Ethiopia and in Muslim-dominated regions (Schoz and Gomez, 
2004), compared to the northern and Christian-dominated regions (Fafchamps and 
Quisumbing, 2002; Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996; WAO and World Bank, 1998). For 
example, a fifth of the widows in Ethiopia are denied their deceased husband’s property. 
The lowest rate of widow property disposition is recorded in the Benishangul-Gumuz (7%) 
and the Amhara (14%) regions, and the highest in the Gambella region (44.3%) and the 
SNNPR (26%) (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). 
 
Ethiopian women and girls are also vulnerable to different kinds of violence against them 
(CSA and ORC Macro, 2006; Kitaw et al, 2003). About 74 percent of the Ethiopian 
females were circumcised (female genital mutilation), while about 8 percent were married 
through abduction. (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). Again, the type and the degree of 
violence vary significantly in different locations, regions and cultural groups. The Somali 
(97%), Afar (92%) and Dire Dawa (92%) regions have the highest proportion of women 
who have undergone circumcision (female genital mutilation), while Gambella (27%) and 
Tigray (29%) have the lowest. The highest proportion of women who were married by 
abduction was registered in the SNNP (13%) and Oromiya (11%) regions, and the lowest in 
                                                 
30 For an overwhelming majority (over 90%) of Ethiopian households firewood collected by households is the 
main source of fuel for cooking, 
31 Women’s Affairs Office.  
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Tigray (1%) and Amhara (2%) (ibid). Early marriage is more prevalent in the north, 
especially in the Amhara and the Tigray regions, compared to other regions (Kitaw et al, 
2003). Most violent practices against women and girls occurring in the country are tolerated 
and accepted on cultural and religious grounds. For instance, a recent survey showed that 
both men and women believe that a husband is justified to beat his wife for some reason32 
(CSA and ORC Macro, 2006).  
Since the early 1990s, the Ethiopian government and its development partners have taken 
different measures in order to address some of the gender imbalances in the country. A 
National Women’s Policy was formulated in 1993, and in 1995, the Ethiopian constitution 
promulgated article 35, which ensured “women’s equal constitutional right with men”. 
Various sectoral policies, laws and guidelines have incorporated gender concerns and 
strategies with the aim of improving the status of women in the country. Recently, in many 
regions the family laws have been revised, and the civil code has been under revision as 
well. To facilitate the implementation and monitoring of women-related policies and 
programmes, women’s Ministries and desks are established at all levels. However, these 
institutions remain too ill-equipped with the necessary financial and human resources to 
generate a significant impact (WAO and World Bank, 1998). Different development 
projects that address the needs of poor women are currently implemented in different parts 
of the country by both governments and NGOs (MoFED, 2007; MoE, 2005; Belshaw and 
Coyle, 2001).  
Recently, a National Action Plan for Gender Equality in Ethiopia33 was formulated and 
incorporated in the country’s key strategic document: Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable 
Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). Its aim is to improve women’s productivity, and 
to increase their participation in both the workforce and the social and political process of 
the country. Various NGOs and donor communities have also been playing a pivotal role in 
addressing women’s needs through various development programmes, for instance with 
regard to credit, family planning, water source development, etcetera. Women’s 
associations and women’s movements are also emerging. In the past years, some 
encouraging results have been registered with regard to girls’ school participation, women’s 
political representation, women’s access to resources, and the repealing of discriminatory 
laws. However, due to the depth of the problem, the country’s low level of development 
and the deep-rooted and pervasive gender norms in society, the gender gap persists in many 
respects.  
 
4.5  Microfinance in Ethiopia  
The history of modern banking in Ethiopia dates back to the turn of the last century (1906), 
during the reign of Emperor Minilik II, with the establishment of the Bank of Abyssinia, 
managed by the British-owned National Bank of Egypt (National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), 
2001). However, access to a secure and formal financial service continues to be a problem 
for the majority of the rural and urban poor. Historically, the major sources of finance for 
the rural and urban poor in Ethiopia is the informal sector, which includes friends and 
relatives, local money lenders, the eqquib, the iddir, traders, etcetera. Relatives, friends, and 
private money lenders are the most important informal sources of finance (Emana et al., 
2005; Dejene and Kibre, 1995, cited in Amha, 2003).  
                                                 
32 The reasons include: if a woman burns food; argues with a husband, goes out without telling her husband; 
neglects the children; and refuses to have sexual relations with her husband. 
33 It is part of the Ethiopian government’s commitment to the Beijing Plan for Action. 
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Emana et al., (2005) have found that only one percent of the households in their studies 
accessed credit from commercial banks. This could be partly because commercial  banks 
are mostly located in the urban centres, where less than 20 percent of the population 
resides. Demeke et al., (1998) have demonstrated that over three-fourth (79%) of the 
districts in Ethiopia did not have a formal bank branch. Access to credit from the formal 
financial institutions is also constrained by the heavy collateral requirements of the banks. 
Historically, the Development Bank of Ethiopia, the former Agriculture and Industrial 
Development Bank of Ethiopia (AIDBE), has been engaged in lending for fertilizer and 
improved seeds through farmers’ cooperatives. The input loan of the then Agricultural and 
Industrial Development Bank of Ethiopia was characterized by a high loan default rate 
(Shiferahu and Amha, 2001) particularly in the early 1990s (Demeke et al., 1998). In 1992, 
the AIDBE was renamed the Development Bank of Ethiopia. The National Bank of 
Ethiopia revised the Rural Credit Policy (1988) in 1992, and raised the lending interest 
rates. In 1994, the commercial Bank of Ethiopia started to deliver rural credit (Demeke et 
al., 1998).  
 
In Ethiopia, providing credit to poor men and women has a recent history.  In 1990, a pilot 
microcredit scheme (in selected urban areas) was initiated and implemented through an 
agreement between the Ethiopian government and the International Development 
Association (IDA). Other major government- and donor-supported credit projects in the 
1990s include the microcredit scheme for microenterprises implemented by the Regional 
Trade and Industry Bureaus, and the fuel wood carriers project of the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs. In recent years, the World Bank, the Italian Cooperation, other donors, 
and the Ethiopian government initiated the “Ethiopian Women’s Development Initiatives 
Project” to finance women microentrepreneurs, and to provide skill training courses and 
organizational capacity building activities to women.  
 
The history of the operation of NGOs in Ethiopia can be traced back to the provision of 
relief services during the Ethiopian famine in the early 1970s. Following the famine, NGOs 
gradually shifted to long-term development work. Microcredit had been one of the key 
development components of NGO poverty alleviation interventions in the country. The 
NGO microcredit programmes in Ethiopia used flexible methodologies that were intended 
to fit the needs of target groups, and introduced innovative approaches, such as organizing 
groups and providing training to support income-generating initiatives to their target 
groups. Nevertheless, in the mid 1990s, following the global microfinance movement, 
various criticisms emerged regarding the role of NGOs in the microfinance service delivery 
in Ethiopia. According to Amha (2003), the microcredit activities implemented in Ethiopia 
prior to the issuance of the country’s microfinance law in 1996 had several limitations. The 
main criticism was that the NGO financial delivery system was not based on sound and 
sustainable financial principles (Amha, 2003, citing ACDI/CEE, 1995). The microcredit 
initiatives had been largely project-oriented, and had not been designed to address the 
financial needs of the poor in a continuous manner. In addition, credit was subsidized with 
a low lending interest rate. The main focus was on microcredit, with little focus on other 
financial services, savings included.  
 
As described in Chapter 1, in 1996, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia issued 
Proclamation No. 40/1996 for the licensing and supervision of microfinance institutions in 
the country. The proclamation has laid the ground for the establishment of microfinance 
institutions in Ethiopia that could play a financial intermediary role to address the various 
financial needs of the rural and urban poor in a sustainable manner. Since then, 
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microfinance has gained particular prominence as a poverty reduction and development 
strategy in Ethiopia. Until 2008, about twenty-seven Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) were 
registered under the National Bank of Ethiopia to deliver financial services to the poor in 
the different parts of the country, of which six MFIs were regionally based institutions, 
initiated and supported by their respective regional governments. By mid-July 2007, about 
twenty-seven microfinance institutions in Ethiopia had over 1.6 million active clients, with 
an outstanding loan balance of over ETB 2.5 billion and a client saving balance of nearly 
ETB one billion. The two regional based MFIs, namely the Amhara Credit and Saving 
Association (ACSI) and the Debit Credit & Savings Institution Share Company (DECSI) 
accounted for over half (55%) of the total active clients of the MFIs in the country, and  
another three regionally based institutions, the Oromiya Credit and Saving Share Company, 
the Omo Microfinance Institution, and the Addis Credit and Saving Institution all together 
comprised over a quarter (28%) of  the total active clients of  the MFIs in Ethiopia (See 
Appendix, 4.1) (AEMFI34, 2008). This shows that the Ethiopian microfinance sector is 
largely dominated by regional microfinance institutions.  
 
Recent data about the proportion of female clients of microfinance institutions in Ethiopia 
are not available. In 2001, women accounted for about 38 percent of the active clients of 
twenty microfinance institutions in Ethiopia. The extent of the proportion of female clients 
ranges from 13 percent in the Oromiya Credit & Savings Institution S.C (OCSSCO), to 92 
percent in the Asser MFI (AEMFI, 2001 cited in Amha, 2003; see Appendix, 4.2).   
 
4.6 The Study’s Regions, Kebeles and MFIs 
This study was conducted in the Amhara National Regional State and the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and People’s Regional State. These regions were selected for the study due to 
their distinct economic, socio-cultural and institutional contexts. The selection procedures 
will be discussed in the next chapter. In the subsequent paragraph, the key features of the 
regions are described.  
 
4.6.1. The Study’s Regions  
a. The Amhara Region 
The Amhara National Regional State is located in the north-western and northern central 
part of Ethiopia. The region shares boundaries with the Tigray Region in the north, the Afar 
Region in the east, the Oromiya Region in the south, the Benishangul-Gumuz Region in the 
south-west, and the country Sudan in the west (Figure 4.1). The region covers an estimated 
area of 159,173 km3. It is subdivided into 11 zonal administrations35, 113 Weredas 
(districts), and 3232 Kebeles (the smallest administrative unit). According to Ethiopia’s 
Housing and Population Census, as of November 2007, the population of the Amhara 
Region was 17.21 million (about half of them women) with an annual growth rate of 1.7 
percent. The region comprised nearly a fourth (23.3%) of the country’s population. About 
87.4 percent of the region’s population lives in the rural areas. An overwhelming majority 
(91.48%) of the region’s population belongs to the Amhara ethnic group. The majority 
(82.5%) of the region’s population are Orthodox Christians, followed by Muslims (17.2 %) 
(PCC, 2008). Marriage in the Amhara region is predominantly monogamous (97%) (CSA 
and ORC Macro, 2006). 
 
                                                 
34 The Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions. 
35This includes North Shoa, North Wollo, South wollo, North Gondar, South Gondar.  
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Agriculture in the region is dominated by small-scale and subsistence holding, and is rarely 
supported by off-farm income-generating activities. During 2004/05, the agricultural sector 
employed the majority (87%) of the economically active population in the region (CSA, 
2007). During 2005, about 92 percent of the men and 68 percent of the women in the 
Amhara Region were engaged in agriculture, respectively. The proportion of households 
that were engaged in sales and the service sector was limited to 3 percent, and it was 
relatively higher for women (15%) than for men (4%) (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). 
During 2004/2005, the Amhara Region had the highest proportion (69%) of the rural 
population generating income from household agricultural enterprises and the lowest 
proportion (4.7%) of rural households obtaining income from household non-agricultural 
enterprises in Ethiopia (CSA, 2007).   
 
The Amhara Region is one of the poorest regions in the country. During 1999/2000, about 
42 percent of its population lived in absolute poverty (MoFED, 2002). During 2003, nearly 
a third of the region’s population had experienced food shortage, and for slightly more than 
a quarter of the households, their own food production could only last for about six months. 
During 2004/2005, the region had the second lowest daily gross caloric intake, which was 
2058, in Ethiopia (CSA, 2007). Child malnutrition is rampant in the region, with nearly 
two-thirds of the children (58%) and nearly half (45%) of the children in the region being 
stunted or underweight, respectively, during 2003 (CSA, 2004a).   
 
The Amhara Region is one of the regions in Ethiopia with the highest HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate. During 2005, the regional HIV prevalence rate was estimated to be 4.5 
percent (5.5% for women and 3.9% for men) (MoH and NHAPCO, 2006). This figure is 
relatively higher than the national average, which is 3.5 percent. Similarly, the urban areas 
in the region had one of highest estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the country: 13 
percent (15.3% for women and 11.7% for men). During the same period, about 48,000 
people in the Amhara Region had died of AIDS.   
 
Women in the Amhara Region play an important role in the region’s economy. During 
2005, about 68 percent of the women were engaged in agriculture, 15 percent in sales and 
services, 12 percent in skilled and unskilled labour, and 4 percent in professional, technical 
and clerical sectors (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). Despite their important role in the 
region’s economy, women are in a disadvantaged position in many ways compared to their 
male counterparts. As indicated earlier, they are disproportionately represented among 
people living with AIDS (MoH and NHAPCO, 2006).The female illiteracy rate is twice as 
high as the male illiteracy rate (CSA, 2004a). The participation of women in the 
agricultural extension service is very limited (Jackson et al, 2000). Only 18 percent of the 
women are the main holder36 of crops and/or livestock in the agricultural households (CSA, 
2008b). Compared to men, women exercise limited independent ownership rights over the 
household plot, livestock, and the family house (Wondimu et al., 1997). Nearly half of the 
women in the region are excluded from the household decision-making process. In 
addition, women and girls in the region are victims of traditional cultural practices, such as 
early marriage (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006; Kitaw et al., 2003). 
 
                                                 
36 According to CSA (2008), “... the holder may be regarded as the person, who with or without the help of 
others, operates land and/or raises livestock in his/or her own rights ..., and,... determines the utilization of  the 
products”.  
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During 1999, the total unmet rural financial demands for the rural poor in the region was 
estimated to be 76 percent. This means that only a fourth of the rural poor in the Amhara 
Region had access to credit services from the formal or commercials banks in 1999 (Renee 
et al, 2000, as cited in Shiferaw and Amha, 2001). Like in many parts of the country, the 
population of the Amhara Region access financial services largely through the informal 
sector. A study has shown that relatives/friends and private money lenders provide credit 
for nearly two-thirds of the poor households, followed by MFIs (27%) and cooperatives 
(8%) (Emana et al,, 2005). Different microfinance institutions operate in the region, 
including the Amhara Saving and Credit Institution (ACSI), one of the study’s MFIs, which 
is the largest institution in Africa.  
  
b. The Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region 
The Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR) is located in the 
southern and south-western part of Ethiopia. The region borders with Kenya to the south, 
Sudan to the southwest, Gambella Regional State to the west, and Oromiya Regional State 
to the north and northeast (Figure 4.1). The region covers an estimated area of 112,343 
square kilometres, subdivided into nine administrative zones. There are more than 45 ethnic 
and cultural groups within the region with their own linguistics and cultural identities, 
which form the basis for the administrative divisions. According to the 2007 Population and 
Housing Census, the total population of the region was estimated to be 15.04 million (about 
half of them women) with an annual growth rate of 2.9 percent, which was the highest in 
the country. The region constituted a fifth (20.4%) of the country’s population. The 
overwhelming majority (90%) of the population in the region lives in the rural areas. Ten 
ethnic groups37 together make up 75 percent of the region’s population. Over half (55%) of 
the region’s population belongs to the Protestant Christian religion, while 20 percent are 
Orthodox Christians, 14 percent Muslims, and 8 percent adheres to traditional and other 
religions(PCC, 2008).  Both monogamous (82%) and polygamous type of marriage are 
practiced in the region (18%) (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006).  
The region, with its diverse agro-ecological zones, has diversified farming systems, in 
which both annual and perennial crops are grown. The region is known for enset38 (enset 
ventricosum or false banana) and cash crops, namely coffee and Kha39t. Household 
agricultural enterprises form the main source of income for 62 percent of the rural 
households, followed by household non-agricultural enterprises (11%). During 2004/2005, 
the SNNPR was among the few regions with the highest percentage (above the national 
average) of rural households earning income from household non-agricultural enterprises 
(CSA, 2007).     
During 1999/2000, poverty in the SNNPR was alarming, with about half of the population 
living in absolute poverty. During 2003, slightly more than a quarter of the region’s 
population experienced food shortages and nearly half of the rural households were unable 
to produce food for more than six months (MoFED, 2002). On the other hand, during 
2004/05, the rural area of the SNNPR had one of the highest daily gross calorie intakes in 
the rural areas in Ethiopia, amounting to 2728 (CSA, 2007). 
  
The SNNPR has one of the lowest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates, namely 2.3 percent (2.6% 
in women and 2% in men). The corresponding percentage for the urban and rural areas was 
                                                 
37 This includes Sidama (11.34%), Welaita (10.71%), Hadiya (8.02%), Gurage (7.52%), Gamo (6.96), 
Keficho (5.43%), Silte (5.36%), Gedo (4.92%), Kembata (3.81%), and Dawro (3.2%). 
38 Enset is an important staple crop in the southern and south-western parts of Ethiopia.  
 
39 Khat A stimulant evergreen shrub derived from Catha edulis 
Country profile, the study’s areas and the study’s microfinance institutions 
54 
estimated to be 10.2 and 1.5 percent, respectively. Moreover, during the same period, an 
estimated 17,885 people have died of AIDS (MoH and NHAPCO, 2006). 
Women in the SNNPR play a significant role in the region’s economy, particularly in the 
sales and service sector. A study has shown that, during 2005, nearly 60 percent of the 
region’ women were employed in the sales and service sector, compared to 5 percent of the 
men. The proportion of women engaged in the agricultural sector, on the other hand, was 
much lower (27.5%) than the proportion of men engaged in the same occupations (89%) 
(CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). During 2003, women comprised about half of the urban 
informal sector operators in the region (CSA, 2004b).  
 
In many areas of life, women in the SNNPR experience disadvantage compared to their 
male counterparts. They are more illiterate, exercise limited decision-making power, and 
earn less income than men (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). The unemployment rate in the 
region appeared to be higher among women compared to men (CSA, 2006; CSA and ORC 
Macro, 2006). Only a fifth of the women in the region had crops and/or livestock holding 
rights within the household (CSA, 2008b). Moreover, women exercised relatively limited 
control over household properties, including livestock, the house and land, compared to 
their husbands (Wondimu et al., 1997). Furthermore, women in the SNNPR appeared to 
exercise limited authority over their own health, large purchases, daily purchases and 
mobility, compared to men in the region, and  women in the Amhara Region (CSA and 
ORC Macro, 2006).  
 
Customary rules governing property distribution during death and divorce appeared to be 
more discriminatory towards women (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002; Bevan and 
Pankhurst, 1996; WAO and World Bank, 1998). For example, as mentioned in section 4.4., 
about 26 percent of the widows in the region did not inherit the property of their deceased 
husbands (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). However, the degree of women’s control over 
household property also appeared to vary greatly among different ethnic groups in the 
region. According to the study by Wondimu et al. (1997), the proportion of women who do 
not own household land tends to vary between 86 percent among the Gurages to 46 percent 
among the Sidama ethnic groups. On the other hand, a relatively larger proportion of 
women in the SNNPR (48%) appeared to exercise a more significant authority over their 
earnings compared to women in other rural-dominated regions (CSA and ORC Macro, 
2006). 
  
Women in the SNNPR are also victims of different violent practices. For example, about 71 
percent and 13 percent of the women in the region were circumcised and married through 
abduction, respectively (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). 
Like in many regions, access to finance continues to be a problem in the SNNPR. During 
1999, the total unmet rural financial demand in the region was estimated to be 68 percent. 
The coverage by the formal financial sector (both MFIs and commercial banks) was limited 
to 32 percent (Renee et al., 2000, as cited in Shiferaw and Amha, 2001). A study in two 
zones in the region showed that over 61 percent of the households accessed credit from 
private money lenders, about 18 percent from relatives/friends, and 9 percent from eqquib. 
The proportion of poor households who accessed credit from MFIs was limited to 9 percent 
(Emana et al., 2005). The Omo Microfinance Institution (OMFI), one of the study’s MFIs, 
is the major microfinance service provider that covers all the zonal administrations of the 
region. 
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c. Key differences between the two studied regions 
Based on the previous section, Table 4.4 summarizes the key cultural, demographic and 
socio-economic differences between the Amhara and SNNP Regions. As indicated in the 
table, the Amhara and SNNP Regions differ in several ways. The majority of the Amhara 
region population belongs to the Amhara ethnic group, while the population of the SNNPR 
is made up of several ethnic groups. The main religion in the former is Orthodox 
Christianity, followed by Islam, while in the latter, it is Protestant Christianity followed by 
Orthodox Christianity and Islam (PCC, 2008). In both regions, marriage is predominantly 
monogamous, but the polygamous marriage is also prevalent in the SNNPR. The majority 
of the population in the Amhara and SNNP Regions lives in the rural areas and generates 
their earnings in the agricultural sector. However, agriculture is relatively diversified in the 
latter region. In addition, a relatively larger proportion of the rural population in the 
SNNPR has earned income from household non-agricultural enterprises in comparison to 
the rural population in the Amhara Region (CSA, 2007).    
 
The Amhara Region and the SNNPR show both similarities and differences regarding the 
gender division of labour in economic activities. In both societies, agriculture is the main 
source of employment for the male population. However, the degree of female participation 
in the agricultural sector in the two regions varies significantly. A relatively higher 
proportion of Amhara women are engaged in the agricultural sector compared to women in 
the SNNPR. Conversely, the proportion of women engaged in the sales and service sector 
appears to be higher for women in the SNNPR compared to women in the Amhara Region 
(CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). 
 
With regard to the position of women, women in the Amhara Region appear to enjoy a 
relatively significant role in household decision-making (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006), and 
ownership over land, livestock and the house, compared to women in the SNNPR 
(Wondimu et al., 1997). Traditionally, Amhara women appear to exercise “equal” rights 
over household property compared to men (Levine, 1965), although they can be 
marginalized in some cases (Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996; Pankrust, 1992). The rules 
governing the property disposition during death and divorce in the Amhara Region grant 
females an equal right to own property with males (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002; 
Bevan and Pankhurst 1996; WAO and World Bank, 1998). For example, the rate of widow 
property disposition in the Amhara Region has been estimated to be 14 percent, which was 
the lowest in the country, while the SNNPR has one of the highest  rates (26%) (CSA and 
ORC Macro, 2006). In addition, the 1997 land re-distribution carried out in the Amhara 
Region has significantly contributed to women exercising an “equal” land-holding right 
compared to men. Meanwhile such a process was underway in the SNNPR at the time of 
the data collection.  
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Table 4. 4 Key differences between the Amhara Region and the SNNRP. 
Sources: S. No. 1-3 (PCC, 2008),   5 (CSA, 2007), 4, 6 and 7a (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006), 7b (Wondimu et 
al., 1997), 7c  (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2002; Bevan and Pankhurst, 1996; WAO and World Bank, 1998) 
and 8 (MoH and NHAPCO, 2006).   
 
4.6.2  The study’s Kebeles40  
a. Mangudo Kebele 
In the Amhara Region, the study was conducted in the Mangudo Kebele, the Moretna Juru 
district, the North Shoa zone (Figure 4.1). The Mangudo Kebele is a rural Kebele located on 
the Debere Berehan-Enewari road, 5-10 kilometres from the district town of Enewari. 
According to the data obtained from the Moretna Juru district administration, the total 
                                                 
40 Secondary information about the study Kebeles was hardly available. As a result, the information presented 
here was mainly obtained through key informants interviews and credit group members.  
S No  Variable  Amhara Region SNNPR 
1  Population of 2007 in 
millions  
 17.21 (87.4% rural ) 15.04 (90% rural) 
2  Major ethnic 
group(s)  
 Amhara (91.2%) Over 45 ethnic groups 
3 Major religion  Orthodox Christian (82.5%) 
and Islam (17%) 
Protestant Christian (55%), 
Orthodox Christian (20%) and Islam 
(14%)  
4 Marriage  
Monogamy 
Polygamy 
  
97% 
3% 
 
82% 
18% 
5  Economy and 
sources of income  
 Dominated by agriculture  
(69%) 
Household non-agricultural 
enterprises (5%) 
Dominated by agriculture (62%)  
Agriculture is diversified and 
includes cash crops (coffee, khat, 
fruits), enset crop. 
Supplemented by household non-
agricultural enterprises (11%)   
6  Male employment:  
Female employment  
 Mainly agriculture (87%) 
Agriculture (68%), followed 
by sales and service sector 
(15%) 
Mainly agriculture (89%) 
Sales and service sector (59%), 
followed by agriculture (28%) 
7  Women’s position: 
Property ownership 
(land, livestock, etc)b 
Household decision-
making  a 
Decisions on 
women’s earnings a 
Prevalence of FGM a 
Prev. of marriage by 
abduction a   
Widow property 
disposition a   
  
“ Joint” ownership with male 
dominance  
 
 Same as above  
“ Joint” decisions, with 
female dominance 
69% 
 
2% 
 
14% 
 
Male dominance with limited 
“joint” ownership  
 
Same as above 
Female dominance with limited 
“joint” decisions 
71% 
 
13%  
 
26% 
 Customary practices c 
governing rules of 
property distribution  
 Grant women more or less 
equal rights compared to men   
Women  are discriminated against  
8 HIV/AIDS 
prevalence  
Regional   
Male  
Female  
  
4.5% 
5.5% 
3.9% 
 
2.3% 
2% 
2.6% 
Chapter 4 
57 
population of the Kebele in 2004 was estimated to be 5,446 (50% females). There were 
about 1468 households, 30 percent of which were headed by women. Amharic is the main 
language spoken in the area. Orthodox Christianity is the main religion and monogamy is 
the main form of marriage practiced in the area.   
 
The main source of livelihood for the population of Mangudo Kebele is mixed crop-
livestock farming. Cereals (such as wheat, teff), pulse (cheek peas, field peas, faba beans, 
grass peas, lentils), and oilseeds (linseed) are the major crops grown in the Kebele. 
Livestock plays an important role in the local economy. The fattening of oxen and sheep 
(also breeding) is commonly practiced by most households in the Kebele.  Livestock is a 
source of draught power, cash income, food, clothing, transportation and fuel. Oxen (also 
horses) are used for ploughing farmlands, and then fattened to generate cash income. The 
population of the district in general and Mangudo Kebele in particular have very limited 
access to non-farm and market opportunities. A few households supplement their income 
through off-farm activities in wage employment, trading and local brewing. The market 
infrastructure in the Moretena Juru district is very limited. Farmers in the area usually sell 
their agricultural produces on the Enewari market, to traders and the Mangudo Kebele 
farmers’ cooperative. In the whole district, there are two weekly main markets, located in 
the towns of Enewari and Juhur. The population of the Mangudo Kebele accesses the 
market in Enewari on foot. Another weekly small market (gullet) is located within the 
Kebele. The livestock market located in Enewari attracts many livestock traders from the 
surrounding districts and from other .regions.   
Agriculture is a joint household economic activity and all household members play an 
important role in the production process. The head of the household (be it male or female) 
often assumes the ultimate responsibility for organizing agricultural activities. Some 
agricultural tasks are allocated to household members across age and gender lines. Men and 
grown-up boys are exclusively responsible for the ploughing, sowing and threshing tasks. 
But women and girls undertake side tasks, including gulgualo (land preparation), preparing 
the line for sowing, and preparing the threshing fields. Irrespective of gender and age, all 
able-bodied household members participate in weeding, harvesting crops, tending livestock, 
feeding animals, etcetera. In order to supplement independent earnings and family earnings, 
women in the area undertake local alcohol brewing. 
 
Like in many other parts of the country, women and girls in the Mangudo Kebele are solely 
responsible for domestic activities, including cooking, food processing, fetching water, 
collecting animal dung, cleaning and washing, etcetera. The gender-based division of 
labour disproportionately affects women, because they have dual responsibilities in both 
agricultural production and the domestic sphere.  
Women in the Mangudo Kebele have a more or less equal role in household decision-
making. The 1997 land redistribution in the area has ensured women’s equal right over land 
allotted to the household. As a result, women have an equal right over the household plot 
during divorce. They are involved in land rental decisions and decision regarding the 
disposal of household property, including crops, animals, etcetera. According to key 
informants, the improvement in women’s land right has contributed to women’s bargaining 
power and their opportunities in the marriage market. According to interviews with key 
informants, knowledge and the division of responsibilities are also important determinants 
of individual decision-making power within households. For example, traditionally, women 
in the area are responsible for milking dairy cows and processing butter. A woman is 
believed to be more knowledgeable about the amount of milk production, age and 
behaviour of a dairy cow than her husband. This seems to provide women with the power to 
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influence decisions concerning dairy products and dairy cows. On the other hand, men tend 
to influence the selling of oxen, since they are responsible for ploughing. In general, men 
are found to be the ultimate decision-makers within married couple households, because 
they are assumed to be responsible for the welfare of their families and are considered more 
knowledgeable than their wives.  
In the study’s Kebele, agriculture is the main sources of income for both men and women. 
In most cases, women earn petty cash income from small-scale poultry production, a diary 
product (butter), the household grain local brewery and selling animal dung, while men 
mostly earn cash income from grain and livestock. Traditionally, women are responsible for 
covering expenses related to food, light, and sanitation. Men, on the other hand, are in 
charge of paying tax, buying fertilizer, clothing, medical fees, and the children’s education. 
In addition, part of men’s income is also spent on personal expenses, such as alcoholic 
drinks, food and prostitution, etcetera.   
 
Women in the Mangudo Kebele have little involvement in the public sphere and community 
leadership, except for some involvement in traditional associations, such as the iddir (the 
funeral and mourning association), the eqquib and mahiber (the religious association), and 
in recent years credit group-related gatherings. ACSI-initiated credit- and saving-related 
gatherings has given women the opportunity to participate in the public sphere and to 
access information beyond financial services. However, in most cases, husbands appeared 
to represent their wives in such gatherings.   
 
The key informant disclosed that the Kebele population is susceptible to the HIV/AIDS 
virus due to men’s engagement in extra-marital affairs in the nearby town. The Kebele is 
close to the town of Enewari, which had an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of about 12 percent 
in 2003 (MOH, 2005). According to key informants, tuberculosis and colds are the major 
causes of death in the area, and given the sexual behaviour of the community, these causes 
might be related to HIV/AIDS. However, the issue was not considered as a serious problem 
and there is a huge silence about the virus. Perhaps this is due to a stigma attached to 
HIV/AIDS. 
  
The Kebele population access credit from formal and informal sources, including local 
money lenders, relatives/friends, the eqquib, the ACSI (Amhara Credit and Saving 
Institution), and service cooperatives (also government projects). According to key 
informants, local money lenders charge a 100 percent annual interest rate on loans. As a 
result, local money lenders are not widely used as a source of credit. The service provided 
by the cooperative is limited to credit in kind (seeds and fertilizer) to members who are 
head of their household. The operation of the ACSI in the Mangudo Kebele will be 
discussed in section 4.3. 
 
b. Dirama-Shershera, Wita and Wolenshu-Aned, Kebeles 
In the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR), the study was 
conducted in three adjacent rural Kebeles, namely Dirama-Shershera, Wita and Wolenshu-
Aned , which are located in the Meskan district, in the Gurage zone (Figure 4.1). The 
Kebeles are located 5-10 km from the capital town of the district, Butajira. According to 
local administrations, during 2004, each Kebele had 3,000 to 3,750 people, organized into 
400 to 500 households. The key informant revealed that the proportion of women in the 
studied areas was relatively higher because of male out-migration in search of economic 
opportunities. For example, in the Dirama Kebele, the proportion of women was estimated 
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to be about 57 percent. At the time of the key informant interviews, about eighty men from 
the Wolenshu 1 Kebele had migrated to other areas.  
 
According to key informants, the studied population belongs to the Gurage ethnic group. 
The different dialects of the Gurage language, including Meskan, Dobe, Woleni and Sodo, 
and the Amharic language are widely spoken in these areas. The majority of the population 
in the studied Kebeles are Muslims, followed by Orthodox Christians. In recent years, the 
number of individuals converted to Protestant Christianity has been growing. The 
distribution or the concentration of religious groups varies greatly between different agro-
ecological zones. More Orthodox Christians are to be found in the enset farming culture, a 
crop grown in moderate and higher altitudes. According to the local officials, the 
Wolenshu-Aned Kebele is an enset-growing area, and the majority of the people living in 
the Kebele are Orthodox Christians. The Muslims, on the other hand, are concentrated in 
the lowlands (Dirama-Shershera and Wita Kebeles), which are maize-, pepper- and khat-
growing areas.  
 
In the Gurage study areas, both monogamous and polygamous forms of marriage are 
practiced. With the exception of the Protestant Christians, both Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians practice polygamy. According to key informants, over the past years, the practice 
of polygamous marriage has been declining. In a polygamous household, all the wives may 
either live in the same compound or in different localities outside the Kebele, in other 
districts or regions.  Although in such a marriage, the man is expected to visit each wife in 
turn and to treat all the wives equally, in most cases he stays with the younger wife.  Some 
women in a polygamous relationship can be depicted as de facto head of the household, 
because they hardly get support or visits from their husbands. They consider themselves as 
married because their husbands did not legally or traditionally divorce them. According to 
the key informants, in the past, inheriting the wife of a deceased brother (a close relative) 
was common practice among Muslims. But nowadays, the practice is nearly abandoned, 
except by those already living in such a relationship.   
 
The major sources of livelihood and income for the majority of the population of these 
Kebeles are agriculture and trade. The agricultural sector was more diversified compared to 
the Mangudo Kebele in the Amhara region. Cereals, legumes, enset, red pepper and chilli, 
fruits, coffee and khat are widely grown, depending on the agro-ecological zone. As already 
stated, maize and enset crops are grown in the lowland and the highland Kebeles, 
respectively, and these crops are staple crops for the population of these respective areas. 
Teff, pepper, coffee, khat and fruits are sources of cash income for most households. 
Livestock is part of the crop farming system: it is a source of both draught power in 
cultivation and organic fertilizer (particularly for enset crops), and provides food and cash 
earnings as well.   
 
Historically, the Gurages are known for their business orientation. They (mostly men) 
migrate to different parts of the country to do business. Both men and women participate in 
trading.   In all three Kebeles, women are increasingly involved in trading to generate an 
independent income. Key informants mentioned two plausible reasons why women 
increasingly engage in trading. They noted that women have little access to household 
resources (cash and agricultural produces) and, as a result, try to generate independent 
earnings through trading. The second reason is related to those women in a polygamous 
union who get little support from their husbands. Because women in a polygamous union 
do not get sufficient support from their husbands, particularly if the husband lives in 
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another area, they engage in trading to supplement their income, which enables them to 
support their families.   
 
The market infrastructure in the Meskan district is relatively developed in terms of the 
availability of the markets, business opportunities and transportation. Traders in the studied 
Kebeles identified about 20 weekly markets located both within the district and in the 
neighbouring districts, which are used by the traders in the studied Kebeles. In addition, 
there is one weekly market located in the Dirama-Shershera Kebele, which is referred to as 
the “women‘s market”. On this market, only women from the surrounding Kebeles conduct 
market transactions. This market is especially important for distant female traders to 
purchase weekly food items and related commodities. In terms of transport facilities, most 
traders travel to market on foot, but there is also public transport and donkey carts to travel 
to some of the markets. Long-distance traders (who have to travel up to 4 hours) usually 
travel on foot, after having loaded their tradable goods on a donkey.  
 
In the studied Kebeles, the rights and obligations of the husband and wife are clearly 
stipulated, and tend to reflect the prevailing hierarchical gender relations within households. 
According to key informants, traditionally, men tend to own and command household 
properties, including land, with the exception of some senior co-wives in the polygamous 
household. In married couples’ households, land is registered in the name of the man, who 
is traditionally and officially the head of the household. When a man takes a second wife, 
he often transfers part of the household land to the name of his senior wife, to enable her 
take care of their common children. There are also female-headed households, mostly 
widows, who have land registered in their name. At the time of this study, the district 
administration was in the process of re-registering household land in the name of both 
husband and wife.  
Traditionally, men exercise significant control over the household production in the studied 
areas, with the exception of subsistence food crops (enset, maize and cabbage), and poultry 
and dairy products. Women often command subsistence food crops, but it is often hardly 
sufficient to cover the annual household food requirements in poor households. In this 
society, a wife is not expected to ask her husband for money to cover domestic expenses. 
She normally generates her own income by engaging in off-farm income-generating 
activities. There are various economic opportunities for women in the studied areas, 
including petty trading, local brewing, poultry, daily labour and handicraft. According to 
the head of the Meskan district Women’s Affairs Office, women’s trading ability is seen as 
an important criterion for marriage. There is a strong economic exchange in the area, even 
between married couples. It is common for a man to sell home-produced crops to his wife 
in wholesale (market price), after which the wife retails it on the market to generate her 
own income. The Equip or the ROSCA (Rotating Saving and Credit Association) are the 
main source of capital for women’s business.  
 
In the studied Kebeles, there is a clear gender-based division of tasks and responsibilities. 
All household members participate in agricultural production, but the scale of their 
involvement varies greatly. Agriculture is generally considered as men’s economic domain, 
despite women’s important contributions and their expertise in enset farming, pepper 
production, and vegetable production. As already mentioned, women are also engaged in 
different income-generating activities, such as trading (maize, pepper, coffee, food and 
drink), local alcohol processing and handicrafts. Some men in the area are involved in 
trading crops (grain and pepper) and cattle. According to the division of labour, trading 
livestock is exclusively left to the men, while butter and cheese trading is left to the women. 
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Poor men and women participate in wage employment. However, the men get a relatively 
higher wage compared to the women41. Men get a higher wage because their work is 
considered more demanding than that of women. 
 
Like on the Amhara location, women on the Gurage location are solely responsible for 
household chores such as child care, food processing and preparation, and fetching water. 
Some tasks, such as water fetching, takes more time due to water scarcity, especially in the 
lowland areas. Enset processing is the other time-consuming activity for women. To 
overcome this problem, groups of women exchange labour and/or hire casual female 
labourers for enset processing.   
 
Although Gurage women have great public exposure and involvement in market activities,, 
their participation in community affairs is limited to informal gatherings, such as the iddir, 
eqquib, and religious networks and, in recent years, credit group-related group meetings. As 
a result, like women on the Amhara location, their involvement in community decision-
making and leadership is very minimal. 
 
Despite the prevalence of male mobility in search of employment, HIV/AIDS was not 
mentioned as a problem by the key informants in these Kebeles. People are also said to be 
aware of the virus.  
 
The source of credit in the studied areas includes private money lenders, the eqquib, 
relatives/friends and the iddir, the OMFI (Omo Microfinance Institution), cooperatives, and 
government projects. As part of agricultural extension programmes, government projects 
provide fertilizer credit (also for livestock fattening). The OMFI is the only microfinance 
institution that provides credit and saving services to the population in the three Kebeles 
through its Meskan district subbranch office.   
 
4.2.3 The studied microfinance institutions  
Table 4.5 summarizes the history, objectives, and target groups of the Amhara Credit and 
Saving Institution (ACSI) and the Omo Microfinance Institution (OMFI).  
 
a. History and objective  
ACSI began its operations in 1995 as a saving and credit scheme for the Organisation for 
the Rehabilitation and Development in Amhara (ORDA), a local NGO operating mainly in 
the Amhara Region42. Following the issuance of microfinance law in Ethiopia in 1996, this 
scheme was developed into ACSI and was licensed in April 1997 to operate microfinance 
services in the Amhara region. The ACSI is owned by the government of the Amhara 
Region and regional NGOs, namely the ORDA, the Amhara Development Association 
(ADA), the Amhara Women Development Association (AWDA), and the Endeavour, 
which has a strong affiliation with the Amhara region’s government.  
 
The ultimate goal of ACSI is poverty alleviation, and its primary mission is to improve the 
economic situation of low-income, productive-poor individuals in the Amhara region 
                                                 
41 The daily wage rate for an adult man is ETB 5-8, while for an adult woman it is ETB 3-5.  
42 The ORDA was formed in 1991 to provide relief food assistance to drought- and war-affected parts of the 
Amhara region. With ORDA’s shift from direct food handouts to involvement in long-term and sustainable 
development, the organisation designed a pilot saving and credit scheme to assist low-income households in 
the region. 
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through increased access to lending and saving services. ACSI gives priority to rural and 
remote communities and to women within these communities. It asserts that women and 
men experience different forms of poverty and deprivation, and that giving credit to women 
will have a significant impact on both household poverty, and women’s bargaining power 
within households. ACSI seeks to maintain cost effectiveness in its service delivery and 
integrates its interventions with government and NGOs working to address food security 
and poverty alleviation in the region. Although ACSI operates in a region where the HIV 
prevalence rate (4.5%) is relatively high compared to the national average (3.5%) (MoH, 
2006), it has not yet explored and prepared to adopt a policy measure to overcome 
HIV/AIDS-related potential challenges in its interventions. Nevertheless, it has been 
actively engaged in a HIV/AIDS prevention campaign through monthly centre meetings for 
clients at the grassroots level.  
 
OMFI was established in 1997 by the initiatives of the government of the Southern 
Nation’s, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR), for the purpose of providing 
microfinancial services to low-income households in the SNNPR. OMFI is mainly owned 
by the SNNPR government and its affiliated development and business organisations, such 
as the SNNPR Development Association and the Wondo Trading Company (OMFI, 
2003a).  
OMFI also aims at poverty alleviation through the provision of sustainable microfinance 
services to the economically active but resource-poor individuals in the region (OMFI, 
2003a). OMFI appreciates the role of women in household food security, and recognizes 
the need to enhance women’s empowerment. In line with this, OMFI has stated in its 
operational policy and procedural manual that it will give special emphasis to women. 
However, no target was set. In its strategic document, OMFI identified the spread of 
HIV/AIDS as a potential threat to loan repayment, and proposed to carry out an impact 
assessment. However, its intention had never been realised until the time of the compilation 
of this report in 2005.     
 
b. Target groups 
ACSI prioritizes its financial services (particularly its credit services) to the most 
disadvantaged areas, groups and individuals in the region. In order to have an impact on 
poverty and food insecurity, it gives priority to food-insecure districts and Kebeles (ACSI, 
2004)43. However, it has gradually expanded its programmes to economically better off 
areas. At household level, only one adult is eligible for ACSI’s loan. ACSI employs various 
strategies to identify its poor target groups. In the rural areas, individuals or households 
with only one or no ox, and those who cannot fulfil their annual food consumption are 
considered as poor. In the urban areas, petty traders and low-income (less than ETB 300 per 
month), salaried individuals are entitled to participate in ACSI credit programme. However, 
in different localities, different poverty indicators may be used to identify low-income 
groups, depending on the local poverty context. ACSI employs a participatory approach in 
its target group selection by involving the Kebele Credit and Saving Committee44 and 
community members to review the economic background of individual loan applicants and 
their social reputation. Gender-focused targeting is another important targeting strategy 
                                                 
43 Food insecurity districts/ Kebeles refer to areas that are unable to meet annual food requirements of their 
population and often are dependent on food aid. 
44 The Kebele Credit and Saving Committee comprises representatives of local administration and 
community-based organisations (a youth association, women’s associations). 
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used by ACSI. Accordingly, as a policy it intends to target 50 percent of its credit services 
to poor women.   
 
OMFI recognizes the increasing credit demand in the SNNPR, but remains incapable of 
expanding its services to all the districts, due to a complex set of problems that include a 
lack of efficiency, a lack of loan-able funds, and a high loan default (OMFI, 2003a). As a 
result, OMFI delivers its credit services to “priority” areas in the SNNPR. Unlike ACSI, 
OMFI did not use poverty or other forms of exclusion (poor areas, geographical isolation) 
as a criterion in the selection of target areas. OMFI targets programme localities based on 
key qualities of an area and its residents, including a good loan repayment history, a good 
working culture within the community, the existence of or potential for diversified 
activities, and a high potential for saving mobilization, which is pivotal for the institution’s 
financial return but has little relevance for poverty. This may suggest that poor remote areas 
are excluded. Nevertheless, in the selection of target individuals or households for its credit 
service, OMFI applies poverty as a criterion both in the rural and the urban areas. OMFI 
defines as rural poor those individuals or households that have one ox and a half hectare of 
farmland or less, and like with ACSI, this criterion is subject to revision, depending on the 
socio-economic context of an area. In the urban informal sector, operators such as petty 
traders, handicrafts and service providers, and low-income civil servants are considered to 
be eligible for OMFI loans. OMFI also employs a participatory approach in the 
identification of low-income individuals and households. The Kebele-level Credit and 
Saving Committee screens loan applicants on the basis of the poverty criteria developed by 
OMFI, which takes account of local contexts. The Committee appraises the individual or 
household income level, based on its knowledge of the applicants and the reports of the 
loan applicants themselves on property ownership conditions. After the Committee has 
screened potential candidates, community members are expected to endorse the selection 
decision.    
 
Programme outreach  
ACSI has shown an impressive outreach and substantial growth in terms of regional 
coverage, the number of clients reached, and the amount of loan disbursed. By the end of 
2005, it covered all eleven zones, all the districts, and 67 percent of the Kebeles in the 
Amhara region through its 174 subbranch offices. By mid-July 2007, the ACSI had more 
than half a million active loan clients, with an outstanding loan balance of about ETB 744 
million and client saving of over 387 million  (AEMFI, 2008). The percentage of women 
clients of the total active clients increased from 33 percent in 1995 to 50 percent in 1998; 
afterwards, it gradually declined, to reach 30 percent in 2003 (ACSI, 2004). 
 
OMFI works in all nine zones and about half (53) of the districts in the SNNPR. By mid-
July 2007, OMFI had 120,000 active credit clients, with a loan outstanding balance of over 
ETB 135.4 million and a client saving of ETB 35 million (AEMFI, 2008). Although there 
has been an increase in its number of active clients between 1998 and mid-2005, the OMFI 
is characterized by a slow rate of expansion and growth rate compared to ACSI. The 
proportion of female clients in the total of active loan clients appears to have been 
fluctuating over the years, reaching its peak (43%) in 2000, followed by a decline in 2001-
2002 to 35 percent, and to 38 percent at the end of 2003 (Appendix 4.3).    
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Table 4.5 ACSI and OMFI: History, Objectives and Target Groups. 
description ACSI OMFI 
Date of establishment/ 
registration 
1995/1997 1997 
Operational region   Amhara Region  SNNPR 
Main objective Poverty alleviation  Poverty alleviation  
Shareholders  Regional Government (25%)  ORDA 
(35%), ADA (20%), AWDA (10%) 
and Endeavour (10%) 
Regional Government (80%), 
SNNPR DA (10%), Wondo Trading 
Co. (9.55) and 2 individuals (.5% 
each) 
Criteria for selection of 
target area   
- food-insecure areas, income-
generating potential, credit history  
- diversified economy ,high potential 
for saving mobilization, accessibility  
target group  
(men and women) 
Rural poor    
 
Urban poor 
Low-income  
salaried individuals  
Others, non-poor 
 
 
Who do not own more than one ox.   
 
Petty traders  
Earning a salary less than ETB 30045 
per month  
Cooperatives,Business operators  
 
 
Who do not own more than one ox / a 
half hectare of land  
Petty traders  
Low-income, not further defined  
 
Micro- and small-scale entrepreneurs 
(MSE) 
Sources: ACSI (2003, 2004) and OMFI (2003a, 2003b).  
 
d. Financial products  
Table 4.6 presents details of financial products delivered by bothACSI and OMFI. They 
both extend loans for low-income households exclusively for investment in economic 
activities. As a result, borrowers are expected to use their loans for the intended economic 
activities, and not for direct consumption purposes. Both institutions deliver two types of 
microloan products for their low-income borrowers46: end-term (agricultural loans) and 
instalment loans,. More than three-fourths of the ACSI’s loan portfolio was invested in 
agriculture-related activities, while the proportion of the ACSI’s loan portfolio invested in 
the off-farm sector was limited to 15 percent (ACSI, 2005). Similarly, a significant 
proportion (65%) of the OMFI loan portfolio was invested in agriculture-related activities. 
Compared to ACSI, a higher proportion (33%) of the OMFI loan portfolio was invested in 
the off-farm sector (OMFI, 2003c). This difference could be partly due to the existence of 
better non-farm economic opportunities in the SNNPR.  
                                                 
45 During July 2007,  one United  States Dollar was  equivalent to ETB 8.65. 
46 Term loans are intended for investments in agricultural activities, including livestock husbandry, poultry, 
beekeeping, the purchase of agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seed, and pesticide), etcetera. Such loans are mostly 
extended before the commencement of the farming season, and its loan repayment schedule often corresponds 
with the harvesting season. The repayment of the principal loan and the interest is made in one instalment at 
the end of the agreed loan term. The instalment loan is designed for microbusiness operators engaged in petty 
trading, manufacturing, and the service sector. Unlike most agricultural investments, non-farm income-
generating activities offer periodic earnings that enable business operators to settle their loans in a number of 
small weekly or monthly instalments. The instalment loan product is usually intended to satisfy the credit 
demands of the urban poor, whose livelihood is based on self-employment in the informal sector. 
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Until 2004, ACSI and OMFI limited their maximum loan size for their low-income 
borrowers to ETB 5000 as per the National Bank Directive No.MFI/05/06, which 
prohibited lending more than this amount. In line with this, ACSI and OMFI’s first-time 
borrowers were eligible to borrow a maximum of ETB 750 and 1000, respectively. These 
amounts, however, were subject to increases through subsequent loans (loan cycles) 
depending on the loan repayment history of the borrower. ACSI charges an 18 percent 
interest rate per annum on end-term and instalment loans, which is calculated on the 
declining loan balance (USAID, 2005). OMFI annually charges 15 percent (flat rate) and 18 
percent (declining rate) interests on instalment and end-term loans, respectively.   
ACSI and OMFI also provide saving facilities to their borrowers, non-borrowers, and 
different institutions. The objectives of the saving schemes are: to create opportunities for 
people to save, to serve as loan guarantee, to increase loan-able funds, and to generate 
profit to be able to cover costs. Compulsory and voluntary savings are the main types of 
saving mobilized by ACSI and OMFI. A compulsory saving is an obligatory saving 
designed for poor borrowers, who get small loans free from material collateral. A voluntary 
saving, on the other hand, is open to any individual and institution.  
 
Both ACSI and OMFI do not ask material collateral from their poor borrowers (end-term 
and microbusiness lending schemes). However, in order to minimize loan repayment risks 
associated with lending to poor borrowers, ACSI and OMFI use various strategies that 
serve as a guarantee for loans. The dominant strategy is a group guarantee in the form of 
social collateral. In the group lending approach, group members assume joint or mutual 
liability for the repayment of their members’ loans.  In order to access loans, loan-eligible 
candidates are required to form a group of 4-5 (ACSI) and 3-5 (OMFI) to assume joint 
liability for loans taken by members. Seven to ten credit groups form another institution 
called a Centre. A Centre is formed to strengthen and monitor joint loan repayment 
responsibility, to facilitate the compulsory saving collection and to provide a forum for 
delivering information to clients in a given locality. Both ACSI and OMFI provide loans to 
all individual group members at the same time, and if a group member fails to repay his/her 
loan, all members in the group will be considered in default and are jointly accountable for 
the repayment of the defaulted loan. The second form of loan guarantee for group loans is 
compulsory saving. Compulsory saving is used if group members fail to fulfil their loan 
repayment obligations.   
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Table 4. 6 The features of main loan products by ACSI and OMFI for the poor. 
Description ACSI OMFI 
Loan product End-term  Instalment End-term Instalment 
Lending 
methodology  
Group  Group  Group  Group  
Interest rate and type 18% 
declining 
balance 
18% declining 
balance 
15% 
flat 
18% 
declining 
balance 
Loan term  9-24 months 3-24 months  1-2 years    24 months   
Repayment schedule  End of 
term/semi-
annual 
Monthly 
 
End of term Monthly 
Up-front saving 
Compulsory savings  
 
5% up-front, 
1% monthly  
3% up-front, 1% 
monthly 
 5% up-front  
 ETB 6 monthly 
5% up-front  
ETB 
6 monthly  
Savings      
Minimum  ETB 150- 
200 
ETB  200  ETB  200 ETB  200 
Maximum  ETB  3000 ETB  5000 ETB  5000 ETB 5000 
Maximum first-time 
loan  
ETB 750 ETB 750 ETB1000 ETB1000 
Predominant loan 
use  
Agriculture  Processing, 
manufacturing 
trade & service  
Agriculture  Business   
% of portfolio  76.67% 15.22% 65% 35% 
Sources: ACSI (2004), USAID (2005) and OMFI (2003b, 2003c). 
 
e.  The ACSI operation in the studied Kebeles47  
The ACSI started its microcredit and saving services in the district and in the Mangudo 
Kebele in 1999. By the end of 2004, the ACSI had about 2,589 (35% women) active loan 
clients in the district. The Mangudo Kebele accounted for about 36 percent of the total 
active female clients in the district. According to ACSI’s field staff and the credit 
committee in the Mangudo Kebele, target groups for ACSI loans were identified based on 
the local definition of poverty, that is, an individual or household with one or no ox. The 
Kebele credit committee reviews first-time individual loan applications based on criteria 
such as the individual’s/household’s resource ownership, health status, past loan history, 
and reputation. The public gets consulted about the proposed candidates for a final decision. 
Then, the ACSI organizes an orientation for loan candidates (and their spouses as well) for 
3-7 days and teaches them about the idea of credit, saving, credit groups, loan terms, and 
the overall functioning of its operation. After the orientation, individuals and households 
are expected to make the final decision whether to join a credit group or not. Those who 
want to continue with the programme form a group of 5-7 individuals, mostly gender-
specific. In order to avoid the possibility of male dominance in a mixed-sex group, women 
are encouraged to form women-only groups. Group discussions have revealed that self-
selected groups set their own criteria in the selection of members, in order to avoid loan 
repayment risks. Groups consider different criteria, including individual health, social 
reputation, acquaintance, and also material ownership. As a result, very poor individuals are 
more likely to be excluded from joining credit groups by “not so poor” individuals. In 
                                                 
47 This information is compiled mainly based on the information obtained from the staff of the microfinance 
institution district level and from credit group members. 
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addition, individual (or adult household members) with observable health problems might 
be excluded from joining credit groups, for fear that such a person (or household) may not 
invest loans in economic enterprises or may be incapable of undertaking economic 
activities.  
The discussions with ACSI field staff and key informants suggest that ACSI used to give 
priority to women, because women in the area do not take the initiative to apply for loans 
for cultural reasons. In some cases, credit officers insist that male loan applicants withdraw 
their application, to be replaced by their wives’ applications (see Appendix 4.4).     
 
All loan applicants in a group are expected to fill in loan application forms indicating the 
size of the loan they want to borrow, and the types of investment for which the loan is 
sought. The credit group reviews each member’s loan application and related capacity to 
replay the loans before it is submitted to the credit committee or ACSI. If group members 
are applying for loans for the first time, they present their loan application to the credit 
committee for further appraisal. At the final stage, credit group members’ present their 
group loan applications to ACSI Enewari branch office. In order to ensure joint 
accountability for loan repayment, the branch office requires first-time married borrowers 
to get the consent of their spouse through their spouse’s signature. It was reported by ACSI 
field staff that men usually do not refuse to sign for their wife’s loans. However, there have 
been incidents in which women declined from signing for their husbands’ loans, when they 
felt that their household did not need credit or when they disagreed with the amount of the 
loan requested by their husbands.   
 
Credit groups do not have special meetings, but they meet at the time of the Centre meeting 
(10-15 credit groups) to collect monthly compulsory savings. ACSI is persistent in 
organizing and facilitating centre meetings. The forum facilitates the timely collection of 
savings, the dissemination of information, the monitoring of clients’ progress, the 
communication with credit group members, etcetera. In addition, the Centre meeting is used 
by ACSI and other government offices to disseminate information on HIV/AIDS, family 
planning, women’s rights, etcetera. Female members from the distant villages rarely attend 
Centre meetings, and as a result, their husbands or children participate in meetings on their 
behalf. In addition, it was also observed during the Centre meetings that women hardly 
participate in discussions. Throughout its operation in the Mangudo Kebele, ACSI’s loans 
were extended for investment in livestock fattening. However, it encourages households to 
use part of their loans for chemical fertilizer.  
 
f.  The OMFI operation in the studied Kebeles  
The OMFI commenced its operation in the Meskan district and in the studied Kebeles in 
1998, and by mid-July, it had 2.005 credit group members, organized in 348 credit groups 
and 40 centres in fifteen Kebeles. During the same period, it had 1068 active clients (26% 
women). The studied Kebeles all together comprised a fourth of the totality of active female 
clients in the district. OMFI provides its credit to both men and women in the study’s 
Kebeles. According to OMFI subbranch office in the district, OMFI has provided its credit 
to microcredit business operators with special priority to poor households and women. 
However, the information obtained from credit groups suggests that Credit Committees in 
all the Kebeles require loan applicants at least to own some resources (land or livestock). 
This is to reduce the possible risk of loan default by poor households. It was found that 
poor people without land and livestock hardly have access to OMFI credit. In addition, the 
Credit Committees also tend to exclude individuals with observable health problems from 
accessing OMFI credit. For OMFI loan, only one individual is eligible per household, with 
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the exception of women in polygamous households. In a polygamous household, it is 
possible that more than one person may have access to credit.  
 
After OMFI has identified its potential loan candidates, it conducts an orientation for its 
loan candidates (and for their spouses, too) for 3-5 days about the idea of credit, saving, 
credit groups, loan terms, and the overall functioning of its operation. After the orientation, 
individuals and households will make the final decision to join credit groups or not, and 
those who want to continue with the programme form a group of 3-5 individuals, mostly 
gender-specific. Like ACSI, OMFI encourages women to form women-only groups. Again, 
the experience on the OMFI locations suggests that credit group membership is mostly 
based on material collateral as opposed to the widely assumed social collateral. Group 
members also consider individual diligence, the character of the spouse (including 
addictions to alcohol and khat), and health as additional criteria in the selection of 
members.  
 
The OMFI’s loan application procedure is similar to that of ACSI. Group members 
comment on individual loan applications and make the final decision. If group members are 
first-time borrowers, they present the filled-in loan application to the Credit Committee for 
endorsement, and finally to OMFI. Like ACSI, OMFI subbranch office requires its first-
time (married) borrowers to get a signature from their spouses. This is done to ensure that 
the husband is equally responsible for the loan repayment.     
 
Credit groups are expected to have a regular, monthly meeting for the collection of 
compulsory savings. Some credit groups meet regularly to collect their monthly 
compulsory savings and to discuss their activities. Others only meet at the moment of loan 
collection, on which they also arrange the collection of compulsory savings. In one of the 
studied Kebeles, borrowers had stopped depositing compulsory savings when weather-
related shocks affected their agricultural earnings and businesses. Although the structure of 
a Centre is in place on the OMFI location, members had stopped meeting for over three 
years prior to this field work in 2004-2005.   
 
Unlike ACSI, OMFI initially extended its loans to men and women in the studied Kebele 
for investment in microbusinesses. However, after its fourth year, it shifted its loan product 
to livestock fattening. According to OMFI staff, this shift was made because of the request 
from borrowers, who complained about the difficulties they experienced with their weekly 
or monthly loan repayments. 
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CHAPTER 5  METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS  
5.1 The Research Strategy  
This research is based on an exploratory case study and designed to gain insight into how 
married women’s access to microfinance services may affect intra-household division of 
labour and decision-making. A case study design is chosen because it allows a holistic 
description and explanation of a given research phenomenon (Merriam, 1988). Yin 
(2003:13) defines case study research as, “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and contexts are not clearly evident”. In addition, case study research 
is used to gain a deeper “insight into one or several objects or processes that are restricted 
in time and space” (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999).  
 
A case study research strategy can be used to explore, describe and explain complex social 
issues in a holistic manner. In evaluative studies, a case study offers a description of the 
contexts of the intervention (Merriam, 1988), and allows the assessment of programme 
outcomes and interpretations from emic48 viewpoints. According to Tellies (1997), one of 
the salient qualities of a case study research strategy is that it gives a voice to the voiceless.  
 
Case study research can be either single-case or multiple-case research. Yin (2003) 
provides different reasons for choosing between these two variants of case study designs. 
He noted that a single case study can be adopted when the case represents a critical test of 
an existing theory, a unique circumstance, a typical case, a revelatory case, and for 
longitudinal purposes. According to Yin (2003), the need for multiple-case studies arises 
from two replication logics, i.e., to predicate similar results or to predict contrasting results 
for predictable reasons. In the former, the objective is literal replication in order to ensure 
the external validity of a study by dealing with more than one case, while in the latter, 
contrasting multiple cases are studied for theoretical replication purposes. A multiple-case 
study design provides important “analytical benefits” compared to a single-case study 
design 
 
An important issue in a case study is defining the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis or 
the “case” can involve an individual, a programme, an institution, a group, or an event. Yin 
(2003) makes a distinction between holistic and embedded case study designs. The former 
involves a single unit of analysis or a single “case”, while an embedded case study design 
involves several subunits ‘embedded’ in the larger unit of analysis. A holistic design is used 
when there is no logical subunit of analysis within the main unit of analysis. The embedded 
design is appropriate in a situation where there are systematic subunits of analysis within 
the main unit of analysis.  
 
A major strength of a case study research strategy is that it permits using multiple sources 
of evidence (Yin, 2003; Merriam, 1988). Woodhouse, (1998:137) describes this as 
triangulation, which means “the use of multiple sources of information to test and modify 
one’s understanding (theory) of a given problem or situation”. The use of multiple sources 
                                                 
48 Emic refers to interpretations of beliefs and behaviours from the perspective of the insiders (the local people 
or the natives). 
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of evidence gives an investigator the opportunity to deal with broad range of issues, 
including historical, attitudinal and behavioural ones, and helps to provide more convincing 
and accurate evidence. In addition, it addresses the potential problem of construct validity 
because of the use of multiple measures for the same phenomenon, in a manner that 
establishes convergent lines of inquiry (Yin, 2003). A case study research strategy also 
involves a triangulation of methods, which is the use of a combination of qualitative data-
generating techniques, such as individual interviews, group interviews, and observation 
(Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999). Qualitative data collection techniques allow the 
unravelling of complex and dynamic social phenomena. According to Merriam (1988:16), 
“qualitative research strives to understand how all the parts work together to form a whole”. 
 
The study recognizes that resource allocation within the household usually takes place 
behind closed doors, and some of the aspects are too private and sensitive to be captured by 
the survey instrument. In addition, the high degrees of variability in intra-household 
resource allocation arrangements in different cultural settings require the use of qualitative 
methods to explore and understand localized concepts, values, believes, and local meanings 
(Gittelsohn and Mookherji, 1997). Katz (1997:12) has proposed the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative analysis to advance intra-household studies. She has noted that 
qualitative methodologies help to richly “describe the institutional features of the allocation 
unit”. The approach permits the unravelling of complex and dynamic social phenomena.  
 
On the other hand, the use of a case study research strategy is often criticized because it 
provides little basis for scientific generalization, as its analysis depends largely on a case 
that is not representative of a population. However, as Yin (2003 :) has put it, “[t]he goal of 
the study should establish the parameters, and then should be applied to all research.  In this 
way, even a single case could be considered acceptable, provided it met the established 
objective”. Yin (2003) has argued that the goal in case study research is to expand and 
generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not statistical generalization. Case study 
research is also used to develop hypotheses that are further analyzed in surveys (Katz, 
1997).  
 
5.2 Methodological issues in microfinance impact assessment  
An important methodological issue that arises in microfinance impact assessment studies is 
the question of how to demonstrate that microfinance interventions have led to change(s). 
According to Hulme (1997:3), an impact assessment study seeks to “...assess the difference 
in the values of key variables between the outcomes on ‘agents’ (e.g. individuals, 
enterprises, households, populations, policymakers, etc) that have experienced an 
intervention, against the values of those variables that would have occurred had there been 
no intervention”. This means that an impact assessment seeks to establish a plausible 
association between an intervention and changes experienced by “agents”. The 
characteristics of the “agents” prior to the intervention and their environments may 
intervene in the process and shape intervention outcomes (Sebstad et al., 1995, cited in 
Hulme, 1997). Then it becomes difficult to prove the impact of an intervention, or to 
conclude whether a given change can be entirely or necessarily attributed to an 
intervention. 
 
In the literature, various research strategies have been adopted to assess the impact of 
microfinance interventions on clients and/or their households. One of the widely used 
research designs is a quasi-experimental research design, which compares programme 
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participants with non-programme participants on key variables that are expected to be 
affected by a given  intervention (for example: income, decision-making) (see Hashemi et 
al., 1996; Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Osmani, 2007). This means that the population that has 
benefited from a given microfinance intervention is compared with the population that has 
not benefited from a similar intervention on common key variables of interests. The non-
programme participants are used as a “control group” in order to simulate the situation that 
would prevail in the lives of borrowers if there had not been a microfinance intervention 
(Hulme, 1997). The “control group” is expected to have similar economic, physical and 
social environments, matching the treatment group or programme participants. This is 
because any structural difference in the contexts of the “control” group and “treatment”  
groups may lead to an overestimation or underestimation of the outcomes of a given 
intervention. In the microfinance literature, various problems are described related to 
selection biases, which include, a) finding a location that matches a treatment group, b) 
discerning the invisible attributes of a treatment group, c)  a control group may be 
“contaminated” or may be in close contact with a control group, and d) fungibility of the 
loan fund -  borrowers may transfer their loans to others or they may use the loan for 
“unintended” purposes (Hulme, 1997:13-14).   Hence, a careful selection of the control 
group is suggested to reduce the possibilities of any distortion that may arise from selection 
biases (Hulme, 1997; Mosley, 1997). The other alternative is to consider the accepted 
“clients- to-be” (pipeline clients)49, who live in the geographic areas of the treatment 
group50 as a “control group”. Accepted “clients-to-be” are assumed to provide a better 
comparison because they reside in the same locality with borrowers, and also because of 
their “motivation” to participate in the credit programme51. However, some of the issues 
related to selection bias discussed above may remain a problem because the two groups are 
more likely to be in close contact, as they share the same locality.  
 
The other impact assessment approach in microfinance is related to qualitative methods of 
data collection. This qualitative method-based impact assessment focuses on the 
interpretation of  the processes involved in participation in a given intervention and, based 
on that, provide information on the most plausible impact outcomes (Hulme and Mosley, 
1996; Barnes and Sebstad, 2000). The approach is considered to be weak in addressing 
problems related to attribution and proving impact (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). 
Nevertheless, interpretations are often based on the perspectives of research groups (Barnes 
and Sebstad, 2000), who are in a better position to judge the impact an intervention has had 
on their lives and relationships.  
 
This study does not claim to provide evidence about the actual impact of microfinance 
interventions on the intra-household division of labour and decision-making, but it seeks to 
provide evidence about the potential effects of microfinance interventions, by analyzing the 
pathways through which an impact is realized and by identifying the institutional contexts 
that may affect impact outcomes. The study employs different strategies to identify the 
potential effects of women’s access to microfinance services on the intra-household 
division of labour and decision-making. Membership duration in the credit programmes is 
                                                 
49 The terms “client- to-be” or pipeline client refers to an individual who is accepted to participate in the credit 
programme but has not yet started participating or receiving financial services. 
50 Other studies have looked at the impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment by comparing females 
within male and female borrower households (such as Kabeer, 2001; Holvoet, 2005). Such an approach has its 
own drawback because credit might be used by individuals other than the borrower within the household. 
51 This strategy also has another limitation, especially when the number of “clients-to-be” in a given area is 
small for the study, compared to the treatment group, and when the research is longitudinal research (Hulme 
and Mosley 1996; Barnes and Sebstad, 2000). 
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used to assess the potential effects of women’s borrowing on intra-household labour 
allocation and decision-making. The assumption is that the size and the number of loans 
that an individual accesses from a microfinance programme usually increases in tandem 
with an increase in the membership duration in the credit group/programme. This means 
that a longer membership duration in the credit programme entails larger sizes of loans, a 
higher number of loans, and more exposure compared to a short membership duration. The 
assumption is that accessing credit for relatively longer years, participation in credit and 
saving groups, and an overall attachment to MFI programmes will increase women’s 
bargaining power within the household. Hence, this distinction between short-time and 
long-time borrowers was intended to capture developments over time. Short-term 
borrowers were used as a “control group”, based on the assumption that microfinance 
programme interventions may not generate a meaningful impact on poor peoples lives in 
general and on gender relations in particular through one or two loans. Experts in the field 
of microfinance have also suggested that microfinance programme outcomes can be best 
captured after three or more years of a programme’s operation (Barnes and Sebsted, 2000). 
Hence, for the survey and in-depth interview data analysis I have used the length of 
membership duration in the credit group/programme to investigate the potential effects of 
microfinance interventions on intra-household labour allocation and decision-making.  
 
Moreover, I intend to provide evidence on the potential impact of microfinance to women 
by placing the testimonies of the in-depth interview participants in the larger institutional 
settings. Borrowers’ self-assessment about the impact, before and after the programme 
intervention, and their personal testimonies are used to establish a plausible association 
between participation in the programme and potential  impact outcomes. This analysis is 
frequently supported by the survey data and the literature (see Kabeer, 1991, 2001). 
Furthermore, the inclusion of different groups such as ex-borrowers, spouses, and 
defaulters in the research is believed to provide an all-inclusive picture of  the potential  
impact of microfinance programmes on gender relations.    
 
5.3 The unit of analysis or the “case”  
This study adopts a multiple case study design and focuses on two main cases. The study is 
limited to two cases because studying more cases requires more resources (time and 
money) beyond the capacity of this research project. Two case study institutions have been 
deliberately selected, taking into account their distinct institutional settings. Contrasting 
cases predict contrasting results and allow for theoretical replication (Yin, 2003).  
 
This study followed an embedded case study design because of the importance of different 
subunits of analysis. The main unit of analysis is the microfinance institution, as the study 
analyzed the potential effects of microfinance interventions on the intra-household gender 
division of labour and decision-making. In addition, there are two subunits of analysis, i.e. 
the individual and the household unit. The study recognizes that men and women may have 
different preferences and decision-making power within the household, which should not 
be aggregated at household level. As a result, individual women clients of the case study 
microfinance institutions and their spouses on the one hand, and their household on the 
other hand constitute the two subunits of analysis. At these levels, the study analyses the 
effects of microfinancing provided to women on intra-household labour allocation and 
decision-making. 
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The selection procedure related to the case study microfinance institutions and the study 
locations are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. The selection of individuals for 
interviews and groups discussions is discussed under the relevant heading.  
 
5.4 Selection of the MFIs and the research locations 
Figure 5.1 displays the selection stages of the case studies’ MFIs and locations. The 
selection process involves four stages. In the first stage, the microfinance institutions and 
the study regions were selected. This was followed by the selection of the research zones 
(province), districts and Kebeles at the second, third and the fourth stages, respectively. At 
every stage, a purposive sampling strategy was employed.   
 
During the first stage, two microfinance institutions were selected among the twenty-two 
microfinance institutions that were operational during September 2004 in the different parts 
of Ethiopia. The criteria used in the selection include:  
• an MFI should be operational in financial services delivery for more than five years. 
This criterion is used because microfinance institutions may have a considerable 
impact on people’s lives over time. This is necessary especially to evaluate the 
potential impact of microfinance programme interventions on intra-household 
gender relations. Microfinance institutions that were established after 1998 were 
excluded;   
• since this project looks into the role of women in rural livelihood, an MFI should be 
operational in rural areas and involve female clients. As a result, programmes that 
focus on the urban areas and those who had relatively small proportions of female 
clients were dropped;  
• to avoid language barriers, only communities speaking the national language 
(Amharic) were considered;  
• the operational areas of the microfinance institutions should be easily accessible or 
should be located not very far from the centre because the research project had 
limited resources (finance and time);  
• to allow for a comparative analysis, each case study institution must represent 
distinct socio-economic and cultural settings.  
Initially, the Amhara Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI) and the Sidama Microfinance 
Institutions (SMFI) were selected based on the above criteria. However, after preliminary 
visits to the SMFI’s operational areas; it was found that most SMFI credit groups were 
inactive due to a high loan default. As a result, the Omo Microfinance Institutions (OMFI), 
which was working in the SMFI’s operational region, was selected. The OMFI was two 
years younger than the SMFI and the ACSI. To date, ACSI and OMFI operate in the 
Amhara region and the Southern Nations and Nationalities Peoples’ Region (SNNRP), 
respectively. Detailed information about ACSI and OMFI, and their respective regions, are 
presented in the previous chapter.  
 
During the second stage, the North Shoa zone was selected amid the ACSI’s operational 
zones and the Gurage zone amid the OMFI’s operational zones. At the time of the selection, 
ACSI and OMFI were operational in 10 and 11 zones/provinces, respectively. The main 
criterion used in the selection of a study zone was physical proximity to the centre or Addis 
Ababa (at less than 200 kilometres distance). This criterion was used for the reason 
mentioned earlier, i.e. resource constraints.   
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During the third stage, the Moretna Juru district form North Shoa (ACSI), and the Meskan 
district from the Gurage zones were selected. During the selection, ACSI and OMFI were 
operational in 20 districts and 7 districts in the North Shoa and the Gurage zones, 
respectively. The following criteria were used in the selection of the research districts: 
• microfinance programmes were operational for five  or more years in the district,  
• the availability of female clients per Kebele; and  
• the accessibility of the districts and its Kebeles during the rainy season. 
 
During the final stage, the research Kebeles were selected on the bases of two criteria, that 
is, the availability of relatively large numbers of active female borrowers in different loan 
cycles (long-time and short-time borrowers52), and the accessibility of the area during the 
rainy season. The availability of long-time and short-time borrowers was used as one 
criterion because the study intended to use short-time borrowers as a “control group” in 
assessing the potential effects of the microfinance programmes. On the basis of the above 
criteria, the Mangudo Kebele was selected from the ACSI’s operational Kebeles in the 
Moretna Juru district.  The same criteria were used to select the research Kebeles in the 
Meskan district (the OMFI location). However, it was not possible to find a single Kebele 
that fulfils the first criterion. As a result, three adjacent Kebeles, namely Dirama-Shershera, 
Wita, and Wolenshu-Aned were selected.   
                                                 
52 In this study, a long-time borrower refers to a borrower who was a member of ACSI or OMFI credit group 
for three years or more at the time of the survey. A short-time borrower refers to a borrower who was a 
member of ACSI or OMFI credit group for one or two years during a similar period. 
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Figure 5. 1  The research MFI and location selection procedure.  
 
5.5 Data collection 
This study used a combination of data collection techniques, including key informant 
interviews, in-depth interviews, a small-scale survey, focus group discussions, and 
secondary data. The data collection involved five major phases: orientation and 
familiarization, key informant interviews, a small-scale population survey, in-depth 
interviews, focus group discussions, and feedback workshops. The secondary data were 
collected throughout the research phase and during the write up. 
 
Figure 5.1 summarizes the data collection techniques, the sources of the data, and the type 
of information collected, while Table 5.1 presents the number of research participants by 
the type of research instruments and the type of microfinance institution. 
 
a. Orientation and familiarization 
This phase was critical for the development of the research proposal. During 2003/2004, a 
reconnaissance visit was made to the potential research regions and microfinance 
institutions to have a better understanding of the problem under study, to identify 
microfinance institutions for the study, and to get a general overview of the study contexts. 
In addition, the study proposal was discussed with key staff members of the MFIs and their 
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permission was obtained for the research. This exercise was useful to clarify concepts 
related to microfinance and to build a rapport with the staffs of MFIs necessary for further 
assistance during the data collection. Furthermore, as an attachment requirement with the 
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), a seminar was organized for ILRI staffs, 
where the proposal was presented and discussed.    
 
During this phase, the researcher got permission and a recommendation letter from the 
officials of the studied microfinance institutions (at different levels) and the district 
government administration offices. This enhanced the confidence of the Kebele officials 
and the study’s population to collaborate with the researcher. 
 
b. Secondary data  
Secondary data were an important source of information to contextualize the study. 
Information about the study’s areas, including their geography, demography, economic 
development, poverty, education, health microfinance, gender issues, HIV/AIDS, etc, were 
obtained from secondary sources. The sources of secondary data include universities, 
research centres, the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency, the World Bank reports, various 
government offices, NGOs, the Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions, 
individual consultancy, and other reports. Secondary information about the study’s 
microfinance institutions was obtained from the microfinance institutions’ reports, strategic 
plans, manuals, credit group documents, loan disbursement books, and a few evaluation 
reports. Compared to OMFI, ACSI had well-written documents that provide detailed 
information about its mission, objectives, strategies, target groups, loan products, as well as 
various statistics.  
 
c. Key informant interview 
Key informants are “expert” informants (Gitelsohn and Mookerji, 1997). It also includes 
individuals who have knowledge of the cultural rules and norms in a society (Bernard, 
2002). The purpose of the key informant interviews was to gather information about the 
research areas regarding household and individual livelihood, the household division of 
labour, household decision-making, sources of finance, HIV/AIDS, vulnerability issues, 
community perceptions, norms and values, microfinance interventions and change over 
time (Appendix 5.1). With the help of an interview guide, various interviews were 
conducted with different individuals for their “distinctive viewpoints or knowledge” 
(Woodhouse, 1998). Key informant interviews were conducted with community elders 
(both men and women), local government staff members, development officers, and MFI 
personnel. A total of 28 key informant interviews (individuals and groups) were conducted 
in connection with ACSI (11 persons) and OMFI (18 persons) (Table 5.1). The number of 
key informants in OMFI was slightly higher because the study was conducted in three 
different Kebeles, while in the case of ACSI it was only one Kebele. During the key 
informant interviews, the researcher took notes, and most interviews were tape recorded. 
The data generated from community elders, development agents and local administration 
officials were used to describe the studied areas, while the information obtained from the 
staff members of the microfinance institutions were used to describe the microfinance 
institutions’ operations in the studied areas. Key informant interviews offered a wider and 
more profound understanding of the contexts in which the study’s microfinance institutions 
and clients operate their businesses. Furthermore, the data obtained guided the formulation 
of the survey questionnaire.  
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d. Survey 
In order to systematically describe the population under study and to provide some 
quantitative evidence, the study incorporated a small-scale survey. The survey 
questionnaire was administered to the study population, who were active clients of ACSI 
and OMFI, and who were also married at the time of the survey. In the study, active clients 
refer to borrowers who took a loan from the microfinance institution during 2004. Due to 
the small number of active clients per study location, a population survey was conducted. It 
is argued that the population survey ensures a considerable degree of validity (Krausz and 
Miller, 1997) because the perspectives and views of “all” the population are likely to be 
included in such surveys, or involve no sampling error.  
 
The list of women clients in the studied areas was collected from the 2004 loan 
disbursement records of the ACSI and OMFI subbranch offices. However, the information 
was not disaggregated by marital status. As a result, in ACSI case, this information was 
identified during centre meetings with the help of borrowers, credit group members and 
centre leaders. In the case of OMFI, local administration officials and members of credit 
groups were consulted to assist in the identification of the marital status of female 
borrowers in their respective localities. This was further cross-checked at the time of the 
data collection. Those who were found unmarried (widow, separated or divorced) were 
dropped from the survey (see Appendix 5.2. for the questionnaire).  
 
Orientation and pre-testing. The research team was composed of the researcher, the 
assistant and one additional data collector.  The researcher, the assistant and the data 
collector were fully engaged in the survey on the ACSI study location, while the researcher 
and the research assistant carried out the survey on the OMFI study location. Both the 
research assistant and the data collector had completed a diploma course and had 
experience in working with non-government organizations and development issues. In 
addition, the research assistant had some field experience in data collection in survey 
research with the ILRI.  
 
The research assistant, who was also the driver of the research team, worked closely with 
the researcher during the key informant interviews and during the presentation of the 
research proposal to ILRI staff members. As a result, he was familiar with the research 
objectives, the research questions and the draft questionnaires long before the actual survey. 
In addition, a one-day orientation was organized for the research assistant and the data 
collector relating to interview procedures and interview rules, and to discuss the survey 
questions. The survey questionnaire was written in English, but a copy was translated in the 
Amharic language as a reference during the survey.  
 
The questionnaire was pre-tested on both the ACSI and OMFI study locations. The main 
purpose of the pre-test was to determine the strengths and the weaknesses of the questions. 
It also served as a learning process for the data collectors. During the pre-test, the 
researcher interviewed a few respondents, while the research assistant and the data collector 
played the role of an observer. Later on, this role was changed and the former became an 
observer while the latter became the interviewer. This was followed by an evaluation of the 
content of the interviews and the process of interviewing in the evening. The pre-testing 
gave the researcher insight into what areas the questionnaires should be revised, and in 
what areas the data collectors should improve. Some of the issues emerging from the pre-
test were: the interview took too long (up to 90 minutes), some questions were repetitive, 
some questions were vague, and the data collectors misunderstood some questions. Finally, 
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based on our experiences from the pre-test, the questionnaire was adjusted and prepared for 
the actual interview.  
 
The survey data collection. In the north (the ACSI study location), the survey data 
collection took place in two phases between 5 and 15 November, 2004, and between 25 and 
27 November, 2004. In the south (the OMFI study location), the survey data collection was 
carried out between 16 and 23 December 2004. Although the data were collected by three 
individuals on the ACSI study location it took a relatively longer time because of the larger 
number (86) of survey respondents compared to those of OMFI (56) (Table 5.1). In 
addition, the experience drawn from the data collection in the north was useful in 
facilitating a smooth data collection process in the south.  
 
In the Mangudo Kebele, we interviewed 86 out of 91 married women who were active 
clients of the ACSI.  In the three adjacent Kebeles, namely Dirama-Shershera, Wita, and 
Wolenshu-Aned, 56 out of 61 married women who were active clients of OMFI were 
interviewed.  It was impossible to interview five women borrowers each from the ACSI and 
MFI study locations, for reasons such as a change of residence (locality), serious sickness, 
women’s temporary absence from the area, and difficulties with regard to the tracing and 
meeting of women.  
 
d. In-depth interview 
An in-depth interview involves a conversation with an individual, with a list of questions to 
be covered during the interview to guide the respondent in an orderly manner (Bernard, 
2002). The flexible nature of the in-depth interview permitted the researcher to explore and 
investigate issues with respondents through probing for clarity, interpretation, and for a 
deeper understanding of meanings. It allowed investigating the factors underpinning 
participants’ responses (Legard et al., 2003). Most importantly, the in-depth interviews 
offered borrowers the opportunity to articulate and evaluate how their lives’ and 
relationships were impacted by access to microfinance services. In addition, the information 
obtained through the in-depth interviews was used to interpret and provide a detailed 
explanation of the statistical findings.   
 
Most microfinance impact assessment studies focus on active loanees and hardly 
incorporate testimonies and opinions of spouses of borrowers. Moreover, aspects such as 
loan defaults and programme dropouts are often left unexplored. In order to provide a full 
picture of the phenomenon under study, this study tried to incorporate the views and the 
testimonies of different individuals. As indicated in Table 5.1, about 24 individuals from 
ACSI and 32 individuals from OMFI were interviewed in-depth. In-depth interview 
participants are broadly grouped into three: active borrowers, spouses, and programme 
dropouts (also loan defaulters). They were selected based on a purposive sampling strategy, 
to ensure the representation of different subgroups.  
The first group consisted of married women, who were active borrowers of the 
microfinance institutions at the time of the study. As mentioned in Section 5.2, active 
borrowers were divided into two groups, depending on the number of years they had been 
accessing credit from the MFIs: short-time and long-time or repeated borrowers. The list of 
short-term and long-term borrowers and their characteristics was obtained from the 
household survey. Individuals for the in-depth interviews were elected based on a purposive 
sampling strategy. First, borrowers who had less than three years experience with the credit 
programme and those with six or more years experience with the credit programme were 
screened. At the second stage, twelve borrowers (six short-term and six long-term 
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borrowers) from both the ACSI and OMFI study locations were selected on the bases of the 
following criteria: age group, forms of marriage (on the OMFI study location), and types of 
loan-funded activities, and household health status. Since most of these variables were 
included in the quantitative analysis, the outcomes of the in-depth interviews were partly 
used to interpret the quantitative findings.  
The second group included in the in-depth interviews consisted of spouses of selected 
short-time and long-time borrowers. Six men from ACSI and seven men from OMFI were 
selected based on some of the criteria used above, such as the wife’s age group, forms of 
marriage (on the OMFI location) and types of loan-funded activities. Men were included in 
this study for two important  reasons. First, it was assumed that the participation of wives in 
microfinance programmes may affect the roles, responsibilities and decision making power 
of husbands. Second, husbands and wives may have different perceptions of change and 
may be affected by the credit programmes differently. As a result, including the spouses 
became imperative to evaluate change from their perspective, too. 
The third group included in the in-depth interviews were programme dropouts (also loan 
defaulters). Programme dropouts were included in the in-depth interviews because they 
may have different stories and experiences to tell. The reasons for loan defaulting and 
quitting participation in microfinance programmes may help to explain some aspects of the 
programme outcomes on intra-household relations. The list of ACSI’s credit group 
dropouts was obtained from the ACSI subbranch office in the district. The list of OMFI 
credit group dropouts was collected from OMFI records by the research assistant, with the 
help of the OMFI credit officer. Because the reason for dropping out of the programme was 
not included in either the ACSI or the OMFI dossiers, credit groups and local credit 
committee members were consulted for more information about credit group dropouts. This 
exercise was tiresome in the south (the OMFI locations) because of the relatively large 
number (182 individuals) of female programme dropouts in the three Kebeles compared to 
18 individuals on the ACSI location. Five credit group dropouts from the ACSI location 
and eleven from the OMFI locations were selected purposively based on the reasons for 
dropping out. Some key reasons included sickness within the household, child care 
responsibility, the workload, no need for a loan, and male out-migration. The last two 
reasons were mentioned only in relation to OMFI. 
The last group included in the in-depth interviews was related to experiences of illness 
(death) within the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households.  One of the objectives of this 
research was to analyze the potential effects of HIV/AIDS on intra-household resource 
allocation among clients’ households. However, it was not easy to identify households 
affected by HIV/AIDS. As a result, two borrowers who experienced either death and/or 
serious health problems within their household within one year during the survey were 
interviewed in-depth. In addition, health problems were included in the selection of the 
short-time and long-time borrowers and also in the in-depth interview guiding questions.  
 
Semi-structured questionnaires were prepared to guide the interview with different groups 
(Appendix 5.3). Most of the in-depth interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. In 
addition, the researcher took notes during every interview.  
 
e. Focus group discussion 
Focus group discussions are an important tool for the collection of qualitative data about 
group experiences, perceptions and attitudes on a defined topic of common interest of a 
homogenous group. Individuals present their own opinions, perspectives and beliefs, which 
are further sharpened and refined through group interactions and discussions (Finch and 
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Lewis, 2003). Focus group discussions were conducted with members of credit groups to 
understand women’s collective stories and experiences in the credit programmes. We 
selected the credit groups of the short-time and long-time borrowers who were included in 
the in-depth interviews.    
 
Guiding question was prepared to facilitate the focus group discussion (see Appendix 5.4). 
The discussion topics included group formation, loan application procedures, rationales for 
targeting women, women’s involvement in livestock marketing, programme effects, etc. 
The information obtained from the group discussions supplemented the findings of the in-
depth interviews. Two focus group discussions with two ACSI credit groups and three 
focus group discussions with the members of four OMFI credit groups were conducted. As 
indicated in Table 5.1, about 7 ACSI borrowers and 13 OMFI borrowers attended the focus 
group discussion. The number of group discussants ranged from three to eight. Except in 
two cases, the small number of individuals during the focus group discussions limited the 
group’s interactions. The information obtained from a credit group supplemented the 
information gathered through the in-depth interviews. 
 
f. Feedback workshop  
At the end of the data collection, a feedback workshop was organized on each study 
location (both of ACSI and OMFI) with selected female research participants, including 
programme dropouts. Twenty women from the ACSI and OMFI study locations each 
attended the debriefing (Table 5.1). The purpose of the workshop was to get feedback from 
the research participants, and to ensure the internal validity of the data (see Yin, 2003). On 
each location, a preliminary report was summarized in the Amharic language and presented 
to the research participants. In addition, debriefing sessions were held at district subbranch 
office level (also the zonal level in the case of ACSI) with the staff members of the study’s 
microfinance institutions, on the preliminary findings and observations of the study. About 
five ACSI staff members and three OMFI staff members attended the debriefing. Some 
feedback was obtained from the research participants and the staff members of the MFIs. 
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Figure 5. 2 Data collection instruments, sources, and the data collected. 
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Table 5. 1 Number of research participants.  
Description ACSI OMFI Total 
Key informants:    
Local community  6 13 19 
Government staff members 3 2 5 
MFI staff members 2 2 4 
     Subtotal key informants 11 17 28 
In-depth interviews    
Active borrowers (women) 12 12 24 
Spouses of active  borrowers 6 7 11 
Loan defaulters  5 11 16 
Health cases  1 2 3 
      Subtotal in-depth interview 24 32 56 
Survey  86 56 142 
Focus group 7 14 21 
Feedback workshop 20 20 40 
Feedback/debriefing session 5 3 8 
Grand total  148 139 295 
 
5.6 Ethical consideration  
The study took into account various potential ethical issues associated with conducting a 
field study. The first important ethical issue in social science research is getting “informed 
consent” from people to be researched (Lipson, 1994; Gilbert, 2001). Every interview and 
discussion was preceded by explaining what the study is for (including the educational 
purpose and the societal importance of the research), and asking the consent of respondents. 
On all studied locations, getting “informed consent” from the prospective informants and 
group discussants was obtained without a problem. Permission was also obtained from 
individuals and groups in order to tape record conversations.  
 
The second ethical consideration is related to ensuring “confidentiality and anonymity” of 
the information gathered (Lipson, 1994). Assurance was given to the research participants 
that the issues and information gathered would not be disclosed to any individual (including 
their spouses) or organisation. As a result, informants were willing to talk about issues such 
as loan-related marital conflicts, clandestine savings, and loan use for consumption, etc. 
Anonymity was also ensured in the writing of the research output. The identity of one of the 
potential HIV/AIDS-affected households was also kept secret.  
 
The last ethical consideration in this research is related to the protection of the research 
participants and their households from possible social, psychological and economic harms. 
To avoid potential marital and other social tension associated with individual interviews 
and group discussions, no adult other than the informants/group discussants was allowed to 
attend interviews or discussions. A financial incentive was offered to research participants 
as compensation for the time “lost” because of the research. In some cases, the researcher 
had to buy food and drink for informants and had to provide financial assistance when an 
urgent need was observed. In addition, when deemed necessary, the research project offered 
transportation services for the research participants and other community members. 
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5.7 Practical data collection problems 
The researcher encountered various problems during the data collection. The most common 
problem was related to the busy schedule of respondents and informants. On the Amhara 
study location, the research participants were busy because of the peak agricultural season, 
with harvesting, threshing and the extensive collection of fodder for livestock, while on the 
Gurage study location, research participants were busy with market activities and a labour 
exchange related to enset processing. This problem was addressed by repeatedly paying 
visits to villages and by making appointments. In addition, an effort was made to visit 
respondents either very early in the morning, before they went out, or late in the evening 
when they arrived back home. This was often problematic because of women’s domestic, 
responsibilities. There were several cases in which women responded to our questions 
while cooking or carrying children. This practice had negative consequences for the data 
collection because the respondent could not focus, while the interviewer had to rush to 
address all the questions.  
 
Some respondents and informants were either unable or not open enough to tell information 
related to their use of loan funds, net incomes earned from their business, intra-household 
conflicts, and the like. There are three plausible reasons for this. Firstly, borrowers might be 
frightened to disclose loan-related information because they assume that the information 
may reach the lending institution. Sometimes loans were partly used for unintended 
purposes as opposed to what the lending institutions had approved for. Despite our 
explanation about the objective of the study and student status of the researcher before 
every interview, some individuals continued to consider the researcher as part of the 
microfinance-providing institution. As a result, the researcher had to repeat that she was 
independent from their lender and had to promise that she would keep interview 
information confidential. The research team also tried to establish a good rapport with the 
research participants so as to build trust. Secondly, initially, for many women it was not 
easy to speak about questions related to “private” and “sensitive” household affairs to an 
outsider - the researcher.  But this problem was reduced by informing the respondents about 
the confidentiality of the information collected. Thirdly, it was also found that some 
research participants could not give answers to questions because they experienced 
difficulties remembering or recalling some events. In such cases, the information gap was 
addressed through the information collected from men. 
 
The final problem encountered during data collection was associated with the national 
election campaign. Data collection time overlapped with the time of the national election 
campaign, and as a result some Kebele officials were suspicious of the research team.  
There was an instance where a local official wanted to listen to an in-depth interview. As a 
result, the researcher had to interrupt the interview in order to explain about the purpose of 
the study to the local official. This instance interrupted the tape recording process.      
 
5.8 Data entry, processing and analysis, and time schedule 
A cross-case synthesis strategy was employed to analyze the case study’s evidence. In this 
strategy, first each individual case was treated separately, and then the evidence of the cases 
(two in this study) are compared (Yin, 2003). The similarities and differences between the 
two cases were analyzed in relation to the theoretical propositions of the study.   
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The qualitative inquiries resulted in long descriptive reports. The less structured and open-
ended questionnaire made data categorization and analysis complex. Most of the 
information obtained through key informant interviews, in-depth interviews and group 
discussions were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. In addition, the researcher took 
field notes on key interview topics and events. This information was manually tabulated 
and analyzed. Several word tables were created to display the qualitative evidence and to 
make cross-case comparison (See Yin, 2003). In addition, some case histories and 
testimonies of borrowers were briefly summarized.  
The survey data were coded and entered into a computer using a software package, – the 
Statistical Programme for Social Scientist (SPSS) version 12 -, followed by a check for data 
entry errors and cleaning. With the help of SPSS, the descriptive analysis and summary 
statistics were computed to get a preliminary sense of the data collected. Using the Stata-
transfer software package, the data was transferred to the Stata software programme version 
9 for regression analysis. In order to identify potential factors affecting intra-household 
resource allocation, part of the regression analysis was computed using the Stata software 
package.  
 
This PhD research was started in June 2003 and was conducted in three phases. During the 
first phase (June 2003 to May 2004), I spent most of my time in the Netherlands, at 
Wageningen University, following different courses and developing the research proposal. I 
carried out the fieldwork in Ethiopia in the second phase (June 2004 and December 2005). 
Finally, the data analysis, interpretation, and writing the manuscript took place between 
2006 and 2009.  
 
5.9  Characteristics of the respondents  
As indicated in Chapter 4, the survey questionnaire was administered in the studied areas to 
142 married women (86 from ACSI and 56 from OMFI) who took a loan from ACSI or 
OMFI during the survey year (2004). In this section, the main characteristics of the 
borrowers and their households are presented.  
The descriptive statistics, which are used in the analytical chapters (Chapters 6 and 8), are 
displayed in Table 5.2.  
 
Age: the age distribution of ACSI borrower respondents shows that about 29 percent of the 
respondents were under 30 years of age, 26 percent between the ages of 30 and 39, 30 
percent between the ages of 40 and 49, and about 15 percent were in the age group of fifty 
and above. The age distribution of OMFI borrower respondents shows that 32 percent were 
under 30 years of age, 41 percent in the age group of 30-39, while about 16 and 11 percent 
were in the age group of 40-49 and fifty and above, respectively. The age of ACSI 
borrower respondents in the age group of 40 and above is relatively higher (45%) compared 
to the MFI borrower respondents in the same age group (27%). This implies that ACSI 
borrower respondents are relatively older than OMFI borrowers.  
 
Literacy53: the majority of the ACSI (80%) and OMFI (88%) borrower respondents 
reported that they were illiterate or had no education. Only a fifth of the ACSI and about 12 
                                                 
53 The information regarding the borrowers’ education was initially collected in an interval in three groups, 
but later on it was transformed to a dummy variable because of the small number of observations in the last 
subgroup.  
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percent of the OMFI borrower respondents had some education. This indicates that on both 
study locations women had a very low literacy level, below the national average for females 
in Ethiopia, which is 27 percent. 
 
Membership duration: this refers to the number of years since a woman became a member 
of an MFI credit group and started to access microfinance services. The length of the 
respondents’ membership for ACSI borrowers ranged between one and six years.  The 
average number of years of membership for ACSI borrowers was 3.3 years.  Similarly, the 
length of the respondents’ membership for OMFI borrowers ranged between one and seven 
years. The average membership duration for OMFI borrowers was 3.6 years. On average, 
OMFI borrower respondents  are older than ACSI borrower respondents by 3 months. 
 
Religion: all ACSI borrower respondents were Orthodox Christians, while about half of the 
OMFI borrower respondents were Muslims, and the other half were Christians (41% 
Orthodox Christian and 9% Protestant Christian).  
 
Form of Marriage: all ACSI borrower respondents reported that they belong to 
monogamous households. On the other hand, 70 and 30 percent of OMFI borrower 
respondents reported that they lived in a monogamous and polygamous marital union, 
respectively.  
 
household size: about 62 percent of ACSI borrower respondents reported that their 
households comprised six or more individuals, while 35 percent reported a household size 
of three to five persons, and 4 percent of the ACSI borrower respondents reported that their 
households included two individuals. Similarly, over three-fourth of the OMFI borrower 
respondents reported that their households had a family size of six or more individuals, and 
about 21 percent reported that their household consisted of three to five individuals. In one 
case (2%), there were only two individuals in the household. This shows that  the OMFI 
respondents had relatively large-sized household compared to the ACSI respondents. 
 
Land rights: the survey respondents were asked to indicate if they had usufruct rights over 
the farmland registered by their households. An overwhelming majority (9%) of ACSI 
borrower respondents reported that they had joint land use rights over the household plot. 
About 5 percent reported that they had an independent right, while another 5 percent 
reported that their husband had an independent right. Conversely, the majority (82%) of 
OMFI borrower respondents reported that their husband had a use right over household 
plots, while the proportion of respondents who reported some kind of land use right over 
the household plot was reported to be less than a fifth (18%). This considerable difference 
between the two locations could be explained in terms of difference in formal and informal 
institutional rules that govern resource allocation in the respective localities, which I have 
already discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Chronic sickness: the survey respondents were asked if any of their household members 
suffered from serious illness during the 12 months up to and including the time of the 
survey. About 35 percent of the ACSI and 39 percent of OMFI borrower respondents 
replied that their household members had experienced serious illness in the 12 months up to 
and including the time of the survey. 
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Table 5.2 Description statistics.  
Source: Household Survey 2004 
Notes:  figures in parenthesis represent standard deviations  
 
Sources of livelihood and income 
The survey respondents were asked about both the main and the supplementary sources of 
livelihood for their households, as well as the main sources of income for themselves and 
their spouses. Table 5.3 presents the main and the additional sources of livelihood for 
ACSI respondent households, and Table 5.4 displays the main sources of cash income for 
ACSI respondents (female borrowers) and their spouses. As shown in Table 5.3, the 
household grain production was the main source of livelihood for almost all (99%) 
households of ACSI borrowers. Livestock provided additional sources of livelihood for 
about 89 percent of ACSI borrowers’ households. The off-farm sector (local brewing, wage 
labour) provide additional income for less than 10 percent of ACSI borrowers’ households.  
 
Explanatory Variable  ACSI N=86 OMFI =56 
  Frequency % Frequency % 
>20  2 2 - - 
20-29 23 27 18 32 
30-39 22 26 13 41 
40-49 26 30 9 16 
Women’s age (interval) 
+ 50 13 15 6 11 
Illiterate  69 80 49 88 Women’s education (dummy) 
Literate  17 20 7 12 
Membership duration  (years)    3.33 
(1.057) 
 3.52 
(1.897) 
Orthodox 
Christians  
86 100 23 41 
Protestant 
Christians  
- - 5 9 
Religion  
Muslims  - - 28 50 
Marital relation (dummy) Monogamy 
polygamy    
86 
 
0 
100 
 
0 
39 
 
17 
70 
 
30 
2 3 4 1 2 
3-5 30 35 12 21 
6-8 37 43 33 59 
Household  size (interval) 
More than 8 16 19 10 18 
Men 4 5 45 82 
Couples 
jointly 
76 90 4 7  
Land use right   (ordered) 
 
Women 4 5 6 11 
Chronic sickness (dummy) Yes 
No 
30 
 
56 
35 
 
65 
22 
 
34 
39 
 
61 
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Table 5. 3 Frequencies and percentage distribution of OMFI respondents by the source of 
household income.  
Main Additional Main source of income 
Frequency % Frequency %
On-farm    
Grain production  85 99 3 4
Livestock farming 1 1 68 89
   Subtotal on-farm   86 100 71 93
Off-farm - -  
Wage employment - - 2 3
Others - - 3 4
Subtotal off-farm 0 0 5 7
Total  86 100 73 100
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
 
Similarly, as shown in Table 5.4, ACSI borrower respondents (55%) and their husbands 
(80%) earned their main cash income from grain farming. In addition, livestock provided 
sources of cash income for 35 percent and 7 percent of ACSI borrower respondents and 
their spouses, respectively. Only 10 percent of ACSI borrower respondents and their 
spouses generated their main cash income from the off-farm sector.   
 
Table 5. 4 Frequencies and percentage distribution of ACSI respondents by the source of their 
own and their spouse’s cash income. 
Respondent 
(women) 
Spouse 
(men) 
Sources of income 
Frequency % Frequency %
On-farm  
Grain 47 55 69 80
Dairy products/cattle 10 12 6 7
Poultry  20 23 - -
Trees  - - 2 2
Subtotal on-farm   77 90 77 89
Off-farm    
Trading  2 2 1 1
Local drink 6 7 - -
Wage employment  1 1 5 6
Others  - - 3 4
Subtotal off-farm 9 10 9 11
Total  86 100 66 100
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
 
 
As indicated above, an overwhelming majority of the ACSI borrower respondents and their 
husbands generated their main cash income from farm activities. But the types of farm 
activities and the degree of their importance appeared to vary by gender. Men 
predominantly earned their incomes from grain production than women. In addition, small-
scale poultry, dairy and local drink processing provided important sources of income for 
women, while the sale of cattle and wage employment were important for men. 
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The above discussions and figures reveal that on-farm enterprises are important sources of 
livelihood and cash income for the great majority of the ACSI borrowers’ households, and 
for both men and women.  The information also shows that on the ACSI study location off-
farm income is very limited.  
 
Table 5.5 presents the main and the additional sources of livelihood for OMFI borrowers’ 
households. Similarly, nearly all (99%) OMFI borrowers’ households generated their main 
income from on-farm sources. Three-fourths of households generated an additional 
livelihood from on-farm sources, including the pepper production (39%), livestock (20%), 
enset farming (9%), and grain production (7%). As indicated in the table, slightly more than 
a fourth (26%) of OMFI borrowers’ households generated additional income from the off-
farm sector, such as trading (13%).  
 
Table 5. 5  Frequencies and percentage distribution of OMFI respondents by the source of their 
own household’s source of income. 
Main Additional Main source of income 
Frequency % Frequency %
On-farm    
Grain production  52 93 4 7
Livestock - - 11 20
Enset farming 1 2 5 9
Pepper production 2 4 22 39
Subtotal on-farm   55 99 42 75
Off-farm  
Trading - - 7 13
Local drink processing - - 2 4
Wage employment - - 3 5
Other 1 1 2 4
Subtotal off-farm 1 1 14 26
Total  56 100 56 101
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
Note: the total is not 100%, due to a rounding error.  
 
Similar to the ACSI study location, agriculture was the most important source of income for 
OMFI borrowers’ households. However, the source of income for the latter was slightly 
more diversified both within and outside the agricultural sector. For example, pepper and 
enset crops were sources of income for OMFI borrowers only. Off-farm income is 
relatively more prevalent among OMFI borrowers’ households compared to ACSI 
borrowers’ households.    
 
Table 5.6 displays the main sources of cash income for OMFI respondents (women) and 
their spouses (men). A relatively larger proportion (59%) of men compared to women 
(41%) generated their main cash income from on-farm sources. A larger proportion (60%) 
of women compared to men (42%), on the other hand, obtained cash income from the off-
farm sector.  
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Table 5.6 Frequencies and percentage distribution of OMFI respondents by the source of their 
own and their spouse’s cash income. 
Respondent 
(women) 
Spouse 
(men) 
Source of income 
Frequency % Frequency %
On-farm    
Grain  4 7 18 33
Dairy products/livestock  4 7 2 4
Pepper, khat and fruits 6 11 11 20
Poultry 9 16 - -
Trees   - - 1 2
Subtotal on-farm  23 41 32 59
Off-farm    
Trading  16 29 11 20
Wage employment - - 6 11
Local drink 15 27 - -
Others  2 4 6 11
Subtotal off-farm 33 60 23 42
Total  56 101 56 101
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
Note: the total is not 100% due to a rounding error.  
 
As the above figures suggest, both on-farm and off-farm enterprises provide important 
sources of cash income for both OMFI borrowers and their spouses. However, a significant 
proportion of OMFI borrowers (women) earn their main cash income from the off-farm 
sources, while a similar proportion of men obtain their main cash income from the on-farm 
sources. It seems that poultry, dairy products and local drink are income sources reserved 
exclusively for women, while wage employment is reserved for men.   
 
The above four tables have demonstrated that the agricultural sector provided the most 
important means of livelihood for both ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households and 
important sources of cash income for men and women. However, the degree of its 
significance and the types of farming income varied by gender and location. On both the 
ACSI and OMFI study locations, crop production (including pepper, enset,) was the 
predominant source of income for men in comparison to women. On the other hand, small-
scale poultry, dairy products and local drink processing were the exclusive sources of cash 
income for women on both locations. The off-farm sector was an important source of 
income on the OMFI study location, especially for women.  
 
Past borrowing history and sources of credit 
Borrowers were asked if they had experiences with borrowing before they joined the MFIs. 
Table 5.7 presents the general sources of microcredit for the ACSI and OMFI borrowers in 
the past. As indicated in the table below, before they joined the ACSI credit group, nearly 
half (49%) of the respondents had experience with borrowing money from friends and 
relatives (67%), local money lenders (26%) and the eqquib (7%). Compared to the ACSI, a 
relatively larger proportion (80%) of OMFI borrowers had past borrowing experience. 
Again, friends and relatives (53%), the eqquib (31%) and local money lenders (16%) were 
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the three most important sources of credit. The above figure shows that for both ACSI and 
OMFI borrowers, the informal sector was the main source of  credit in the past.  
 
Table 5.7 Frequencies and percentage distribution of ACSI and OMFI respondents by past 
borrowing history and sources of borrowing.  
ACSI OMFI Description 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Has past borrowing 
experience  
    
Yes  42 49 44 80 
No 44 51 11 20 
Total   86 100 56 100 
Main sources of credit      
Relatives /friends 28 67 24 53 
Eqquib 3 7 14 31 
Local money lenders  11 26   7 16 
Total   42 100 44 100 
      Source: Household Survey 2004. 
 
The survey respondents were asked whether they had been engaged in independent income-
generating activities before they accessed MFI loans. In addition, the respondents were 
asked about the sources of capital for the income-generating activities (Table 5.8) As 
indicated in the first part of Table 5.8, about 71 percent of the ACSI respondents were 
engaged in independent income-generating activities before they joined an ACSI credit 
group. Over two-thirds (68%) of the ACSI respondents reported that they used to finance 
their economic activities through household production, while about13 percent got money 
from their husbands. The informal sector, namely relatives/friends, local money lenders, 
and the eqquib, comprised about 14 percent.  
 
As shown in Table 5.8, a relatively larger proportion (82%) of OMFI respondents reported 
that they were engaged in independent economic activities prior to joining an OMFI credit 
group. The main sources of capital for the respondents independent income-generating 
activities were the eqquib (28%), household production (20%), relatives and friends (17%), 
spouses (15%) local money lenders (9%), and others (11%). The informal credit sources, 
namely the eqquib, local money lenders, and relatives and friends, accounted for over 50 
percent of the credit needs of OMFI borrowers who were involved in independent 
economic activities in the past.  
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Table 5. 6  Frequencies and percentage distribution of ACSI and OMFI respondents by past 
involvement in IGA54  and sources of capital.  
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
 
From the above table, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, a significant 
proportion of ACSI and OMFI borrowers were engaged in independent income-generating 
activities. Secondly, a significant proportion of ACSI respondents were dependent on 
household agricultural production to finance their businesses compared to OMFI 
respondents. Thirdly, over half of the OMFI borrowers were used to access credit for 
income-generating activities from the informal financial institutions that include the eqquib, 
relatives or friends, and local money lenders. This could be due to the widespread trade and 
commerce on the OMFI study location.   
 
Loan uses  
Table 5.9 presents the purpose for which the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households used 
their last loans. During 2004, both ACSI and OMFI extended loans55 in the studied areas 
for investment in livestock fattening. In line with this, nearly all (98%) the ACSI 
respondents reported that they used their last loans during 2004 for livestock fattening56, 
and only 2 percent of the ACSI respondents reported that they used loans for off-farm 
income-generating activities. In addition, a fifth of the ACSI respondents reported that they 
used part of their loans for consumption, e.g. food, clothing, education of children, and 
medical expenses.  
 
Similarly, an overwhelming majority (96%) of the OMFI respondents reported that they 
used their loan funds in 2004 for livestock fattening. In addition, over a third (38%) and a 
fifth (21%) of the OMFI respondents reported that they used their loan funds on off-farm 
economic activities and for crop production (renting land, seeds, fertilizer), respectively. A 
fifth of the OMFI respondents reported that they used part of their loans for consumption 
uses.  
 
                                                 
54 Income-generating activities. 
55The minimum and the maximum loan sizes for ACSI borrowers were ETB 1000 and 3500, respectively. For 
OMFI borrowers, on the other hand, it was ETB 900 and 2500, respectively. 
 At the time of the survey, 1 USD was equivalent to ETB 8.65. 
56This also includes investment in dairy cows. Six ACSI and five OMFI borrowers invested loans in dairy 
cows.  
ACSI OMFI Description  
Frequency % Frequency %
Involvement in independent IGAa      
Yes 62 72 46 82 
      No 24 38 10 18 
Total  86 100 56 100 
Source of capital for  IGA  
Eqquib  2 3 13 28 
Agricultural produce 42 68 9 20 
Relatives/friends 4 6 8 17 
Spouse  8 13 7 15 
Local money lenders 3 5 4 9
Others  3 5 5 11 
Total  62 100 46 100 
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Table 5. 7 Frequencies and percentage distribution of ACSI and OMFI respondents by loan use 
purpose (2004).   
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
 
The above figures demonstrated that the majority of ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ 
households had used women’s loans during year 2004 on livestock, as proposed by the 
MFIs. In-depth interviews, especially on the ACSI study location, showed the use of loans 
for different economic activities, including grinding mills, fertilizer, the reclaiming of 
pawned land, poultry, and the local brewing trade, which were not reported in the survey. A 
relatively larger proportion of the OMFI borrowers used loans for off-farm income-
generating activities compared to the ACSI borrowers. One possible reason for this 
difference could be the availability of diversified economic opportunities on the OMFI 
study location for individuals (women included) and households57. It could also be due to 
the initial loan product of the OMFI, which was directed towards micro-business operators. 
In-depth interviews also revealed that most long-time OMFI borrowers used part of their 
2004 loans for off-farm economic activities. The ACSI and OMFI borrower households 
also used part of women’s loans for consumption purposes, particularly for food. This may 
be an indication of the very poor economic status of such households (Borchgrevink et al., 
2005).  
 
An overview of the income from loan-funded enterprises  
The qualitative in-depth interviews offered some information about the gross incomes that 
borrowers had generated through the loan-funded livestock fattening and off-farm activities 
from an investment made either in 2002 or 2003. The information consists, however, of 
rough estimations and gives only an indication of the income-generating potential of the 
various activities. In addition, the study did not examine earnings across borrowers, but 
focused on in-depth interview participants. Because loans were partly used to finance 
different economic activities, a financial cost benefit analysis was expected to be a 
cumbersome exercise for a survey. It is difficult for women  to calculate every coin 
generated from the loan investment. For example, most borrowers bought oxen with the 
loan fund and used the animal for crop cultivation. Borrowers were able to tell for how 
much they sold their oxen, but were unable to calculate the profit generated through crop 
cultivation due to the loan fund. The other important reason for focusing on in-depth 
interviews is the sensitivity of the subject matter, that is, income. In a survey, borrowers 
may not be open enough to disclose their actual earnings, for fear of a possible tax and of 
an increase in the borrowing interest rate.         
 
                                                 
57 On the OMFI locations, crops such as teff and pepper are widely grown as cash crops, and trading is an 
important economic activity to women in particular. On the ACSI location, the economy is largely dominated 
by cereal production, largely food crops, and livestock husbandry.  
ACSI 
N=86 
OMFI 
N=56 
Loan-use purpose 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Livestock-related 84 98 54 96 
Off-farm IGA  3 4 21 38 
Crop production  2 2 12 21 
Consumption use   18 21 11 20 
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The analysis presented here focuses on cash income derived from livestock and non-farm 
loan-funded economic activities. The information was based on information provided by 
some ACSI and OMFI (long-time and short-time) borrowers 58 and their spouses.  
 
As I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, at the time of this study, ACSI and 
OMFI59 extended credit for investment in livestock with the objective of improving poor 
household’s access to draught power for farming and of enabling such households to 
generate some cash income. Most ACSI and OMFI borrowers used loan-funded livestock 
(an ox) for crop farming.  According to in-depth interview participants on the OMFI 
locations, the monetary value of using an ox for one agricultural season was estimated to be 
ETB 200-300. But on the ACSI study location, it was impossible to get such information 
about the monetary value of an ox.  
 
The information was drawn mainly from ACSI and OMFI short-time and long-time 
borrowers. Borrowers were grouped into three categories, depending on the size of the 
gross profit they generated from loan-funded (LF) livestock enterprise. Three borrowers out 
of twenty-four could not estimate the size of their income from this source. Table 5.9 
presents estimated gross cash income earned from LF livestock-fattening enterprises by 
ACSI and OMFI borrowers for one loan period. As shown in the table, two ACSI short-
time (2nd-time) borrowers earned an estimated gross cash income of ETB 200 or less. For 
this group, the cash return from a loan investment in livestock fattening seemed to be very 
low, and in some cases it was negative when the interest rate on the loan was calculated. 
This does not necessarily imply, however, that such households did not benefit from their 
loans, because the loan-funded animals may have facilitated crop cultivation and thereby 
may have contributed to agricultural production. Moreover, the study found that all 
borrowers in this group (except one) also earned some cash income from additional loan-
funded activities, e.g. crop production and/or off-farm activities, or retained some assets 
(reclaimed pawned land). The second group consisted of four ACSI borrowers who earned 
an estimated income between ETB 250 and 550. The third group comprised five ACSI 
borrowers who earned an estimated income between ETB 700 and 1100. Except for one, all 
borrowers in this group had received loans about six times.  
 
About four OMFI borrowers (three second-time borrowers) reported that they earned about 
ETB 200 or less from livestock fattening, while half (six) of the OMFI borrowers who had 
participated in the in-depth interviews, reported that their earnings from livestock fattening 
was estimated between ETB 250 and 550. Half of the borrowers in the last group took loans 
for about seven times.   
  
In relation to income from LF off-farm enterprises, information was gathered from six in-
depth interview participants (five OMFI and one ACSI participant). Only one person was 
interviewed from the ACSI study location, because only two in-depth interview participants 
reported to have used part of their loans for off-farm economic activities. As indicated in 
the table below, the majority (five of six) of the borrowers reported that they earned an 
estimated monthly income of between ETB 240 and 534. The highest monthly income was 
reported by an long-time OMFI borrower who was engaged in multiple off-farm activities. 
                                                 
58 Long-time borrowers are borrowers who were in their sixth or seventh year in the credit group and who 
took on average six or seven loans, while short-time borrowers are borrowers who were in their first or second 
year in the credit group and had on average taken one or two loans. 
59 In the studied areas, prior to 2001, the OMFI was lending for microbusinesses and later shifted its loan 
product to livestock fattening.  
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The smallest monthly income, which was ETB 60-80, was reported by another long-time 
OMFI borrower. This woman was engaged in a single economic activity (pepper trading) 
and was involved in two or three markets per week.   
 
Table 5. 8 Summary of Gross Incomes  (in ETB). 
Source: In-depth Interviews 2005. 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn on reported gross cash earnings obtained from loan-
funded livestock enterprises by ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. Firstly, a loan 
investment in livestock helped most households to generate some cash income. Secondly, 
most repeated borrowers earned a relatively higher income compared to short-time 
borrowers, particularly on the ACSI locations. This may be related to the fact that in the 
course of time, repeated borrowers had invested more money in livestock fattening. 
Thirdly, most ACSI borrowers earned a relatively higher gross income from livestock 
fattening compared to OMFI borrowers. This could be due to the importance of livestock in 
the local economy, as discussed in the previous chapter. Fourthly, women who engaged in 
multiple off-farm activities generally earned a higher income than women who engaged in a 
single activity. This comparison suggests that a loan investment in diversified economic 
activities, a full-time engagement in market activities, and the size of the investment may 
positively influence the amount of earnings. Fifthly, the analysis of loan-funded enterprise 
earnings (gross) indicated that a loan-investment in women’s off-farm activities provides a 
relatively better cash income than a loan investment in livestock enterprises. This might be 
because a loan investment in livestock may not necessarily be meant to generate direct cash 
returns; the aim may be to support crop cultivation. Sixthly, off-farm income-generating 
activities were important sources of income for OMFI borrowers compared to ACSI 
borrowers, which again may be explained by differences in the local economies. 
ACSI OMFI Gross cash income/Group  
Livestock Off-farm Livestock  Off-farm  
200 or less  2  - 4   1 
240-550 4 1 6 4 
700-1100 5 - 0 - 
Do not know income 1 1 2 - 
Subtotal  12     2 12 5 
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CHAPTER 6 INTRA-HOUSEHOLD DECISION-MAKING 
ON USES OF LOANS AND LOAN-FUNDED 
ENTERPRISE INCOME 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter seeks to explore to what extent the women who borrowed money from ACSI 
and OMFI participated in intra-household decision-making on the use of their loans and the 
income that was generated through the newly established enterprises. The chapter focuses 
on the two aspects of decision-making that are directly related to women’s access to 
microfinance services, i.e., the uses of the loan funds and loan-funded (LF)  enterprise 
earnings60. The chapter has three main objectives. First, it describes how couples organize 
their decision-making on the uses of women’s loans and LF enterprise earnings within the 
household. Second, it identifies the possible factors that may influence loan investment 
decisions within the household. Third, it identifies the possible factors determining couples’ 
decision-making on the uses of LF enterprise earnings within the household.  
 
The question of who determines decisions over loan uses and LF enterprise earnings within 
the household is crucial to the understanding of the contribution of microfinance to 
women’s empowerment (or to a change in gender relations). It is increasingly recognized 
that access to and control over credit and related income are important pathways for women 
to expand their income, to make an independent financial contribution to the household, 
and to increase their bargaining power within the household. Knowing to what extent 
women have decision-making power and, hence, control over loans and income, thus is 
important to understand whether microfinance programmes do actually support women. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the debate in the microfinance literature about whether or not 
women have full control over loans extended in their names or not is ongoing. The existing 
literature provides mixed conclusions about the degree to which women have control over 
their loans within the household. Several studies have offered supportive evidence that 
women participate in loan use decision-making within households independently and/or 
“jointly” with men (Lakwo, 2006; Johnson, 2005; Holvoet, 2005; Kabeer, 2001; Mayoux, 
1999). Studies that compared the patterns of women’s decision-making power on loan uses 
within female and male loanee households found that female loanees exercise significant 
authority over the uses of their loan funds, compared to females in male loanees’ 
households (Holvoet, 2005) but not within female loanees’ households (Kabeer, 2001). 
Other studies have indicated that women borrowers either transfer their loans to their 
husbands or have limited control over their loans within the household (Hunt and 
Kasynathan, 2001;Rahman, 1999; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Ackerly, 1995). Studies have 
also found that women borrowers sometimes are forced or manipulated by their husbands to 
join credit groups and bring home loans for the men to use (Lakwo, 2006; Borchgrevink et 
al., 2005; Rahman, 1999).  
 
Similarly, research provides conflicting conclusions about women’s authority over loan-
funded enterprise earnings within the household. Several studies have shown that women 
borrowers exercise decision-making power over the income generated from the LF 
enterprises (Johnson, 2005; Kabeer 2001; Mayoux, 2001a). However, the degree of 
                                                 
60 Chapter 8 discussed which expenditures are financed by income from the LF enterprises. 
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influence appeared to vary considerably by gender, with male borrowers mostly exercising 
primary authority, while female borrowers participate in “joint” decision-making with their 
spouses. Still, when a credit is provided to the woman, she is more likely to influence 
decision-making on the income from the LF enterprise than when a loan is given to her 
husband (Kabeer, 2001).  
 
Other studies, on the other hand, have suggested that women borrowers exercise limited 
control over LF enterprise earnings within the household (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Ackerly, 
1995; Montgomery et al, 1996). Researchers argue that women have limited access to 
marketing ( Hunt and Kasynathan, 2001; Ackerly, 1995) and little to say about the use of 
cash resources within the household (Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Montgomery et al., 1996). In 
part, this is a question of definition, as some regard “joint” decision-making as “disguised” 
male dominance (Montgomery et al., 1996). Evidence has also shown that women may 
agree with their husbands’ decision, which they regard as a “jointly” made decision, for 
fear of abandonment by their husbands if they pursue their own preferences (Borchgrevink 
et al., 2005). Women also involve men in loan investment decisions because they need men 
in their businesses, especially in marketing (Kabeer, 2001). 
 
Hashemi et al. (1996) in Bangladesh have shown that the degree of women’s control over 
their loans and loan-funded enterprises (profit) starkly varies between different localities. 
At one extreme, women borrowers had full control over their loans, while on the other 
extreme, they had no authority or were completely excluded from the decision-making. 
 
In the literature, little explanation has been offered as to why some women influence 
household decisions over the uses of the loan funds and related enterprise earnings, while 
others do not. Preliminary assessments have demonstrated that women’s authority over 
loans and enterprise earnings may vary depending on the women’s marital status, forms of 
marriage, the nature of enterprises, membership duration in the credit programmes and MFI 
strategies, economic settings and gender norms, etc. (this will be discussed in the next 
section). For example, negative research conclusions were mainly observed in Bangladesh, 
while studies in African countries showed that women have a significant voice regarding 
the uses of their loan funds (Lakwo, 2006; Borchgrevink et al., 2005) and LF enterprise 
income within the household (Johnson, 2005; Mayoux, 1999). This may arise from the 
cultural and socio-economic differences in these two societies. Hashemi et al.(1996) found 
in Bangladesh that women lose control over their loans and related enterprises in areas 
where there is intense competition between men and women over scarce resources. This 
implies that economic constraints and an asymmetric gender hierarchy may work together 
to downplay women’s control over their loans and enterprises (earnings).   
 
Chapter 2 discussed the plausible reasoning regarding the conflicting research findings 
discussed above. Some of the key methodological problems include the differences in the 
judgment of researchers concerning the type of change that is considered to be evidence of 
women’s empowerment, and the validity of the indicators used to capture the issues of 
control over loans and LF enterprise earnings (Kabeer, 2001). For example, the positive 
research conclusions considered women’s independent and “joint” decision-making as 
aspects of change in women’s status within the household, while the negative evaluations 
focused on female independent decision-making as an aspect of change in women’s status 
within the household. In addition, most positive evaluations (Holvoet, 2005; Kabeer, 2001) 
directly asked women about their decision-making power regarding the uses of their loans 
and related enterprise earnings, while most negative evaluations used proxy indicators 
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(Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Ackerly, 1995) which may fail to fully capture the issues of 
control over loans and earnings.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual 
framework of the study, which discusses the different variables included in the regression 
analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical findings of the study. The first part of section 3 
presents the descriptive findings, while the second part presents the outcomes of the 
regression analysis. In-depth interviews are used to interpret and supplement the descriptive 
findings and the regression outcomes. Finally, section 4 presents a short summary. 
  
6.2 Conceptual Framework 
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter deals with the two important resource 
allocation decisions within the households of ACSI and OMFI married female borrowers’, 
namely those regarding credit and earnings. Women’s ability to influence decisions in these 
areas is vital for the achievement of greater equality within the household. The first 
dependent variable is intra-household decision-making on loan uses, which is defined as a 
woman’s relative influence on the uses of her loan fund, compared to her husband’s 
influence within the household. The information was collected based on the subjective 
judgment of ACSI and OMFI married female borrowers regarding their decision-making 
power relative to that of men. The survey’s female respondents were asked: “who made the 
final decision on how to spend your last loan within the household?”. Value 1 was assigned 
to the response ‘me myself (women)’, 2 to ‘joint’, 3 to ‘spouse”. There was a follow-up 
question for those responding ‘joint’, in order for them to specify their level of influence in 
the ‘joint’ decision-making. Next, a value 1 was assigned to those who responded ‘limited’, 
2 to the response ‘equal’, and 3 to the response ‘significant’. Finally, the two responses 
were combined and an ordered variable was constructed for the dependent variable intra-
household decision-making on loan uses, with value 1 being assigned to ‘mostly men’, 2 to 
‘equal’, and 3 to ‘mostly women’.   
 
The second dependent variable is intra-household decision-making on earnings from the LF 
livestock-fattening (household) enterprises, which is defined as a woman’s relative 
decision-making authority on the uses of income from the LF household enterprise 
compared to that of her husband .The survey’s female respondent was asked: “what is the 
level of your control over earnings from the LF household enterprise?”. Value 1 was 
assigned to the response ‘full’, 2 to ‘significant’, 3 to ‘equal’, 4 to ‘partial’, 5 to ‘no 
control’. The first two (‘full’ and ‘significant’) were combined, labelled ‘mostly women’, 
and were given value 3, we gave value 2 to ‘equal’, while the last two responses (‘partial’ 
and ‘no control’) were combined, labelled ‘mostly men’, and given value 1.    
Women’s ability to influence decisions on the uses of their loans and related earnings is 
inextricably linked to the individual/household socio-economic factors and wider 
institutional contexts in which women’s lives and household relations are embedded. These 
factors may operate at individual, household, and MFI levels, and may shape intra-
household decision-making outcomes in different ways. Figure 6.1 displays the conceptual 
framework of the study. As indicated in the figure, accessing credit in her own name may 
contribute to a woman’s active involvement in loan-related decisions within the household. 
Nevertheless, access may not be automatically translated to control due to various factors. 
The socio-economic background of the women and the characteristics of the household, 
which include age, education, types of marital relation, membership duration in the credit 
groups, religion, and land rights may facilitate or limit women’s authority over loans and 
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related earnings. The wider institutional contexts, such as local social (gender) norms and 
local economic systems, and MFI-related policies and strategies may not only affect 
women’s authority over loans and LF enterprise income, but may also shape the socio-
economic factors. The variations in institutional context of the two studied communities 
may also lead to differences in intra-household decision-making outcomes. 
  
Factors that are hypothesized to affect women’s decision-making power on uses of loans 
and related earnings are discussed in the following paragraph. The descriptive statistics, 
including the measurement of the variables, is presented in the previous chapter in Table 5.  
 
Age (AGE): refers to the age of the female respondent. In many cultures, great value is 
accorded to individuals (women and men) at an old age, partly due to the experiences they 
accumulate in life. Numerous investigators in Africa have demonstrated that older wives 
exercise relatively more authority in household decision-making compared to younger 
wives (Kritis and Makiwa-Adebusoye, 1997; Kiriti et al., 2003; CSA and Macro 2006). In 
Nigeria, married women gain authority with age, irrespective of their residential area and 
ethnic group (Kritis and Makiwa-Adebusoye, 1997). Older women in Ethiopia exercise 
relatively more authority on issues pertinent to their health, mobility, or large and small 
purchases, compared to their younger counterparts (CSA and ORC Macro, 2006). In the 
context of microfinance clients, too, Goetz and Gupta (1996) have suggested that older 
women may have greater control over loan-related investments within the household 
compared to younger women. We also hypothesize that, with her rising age, a woman is 
more likely to exercise authority on how to invest (spend) her loan funds and earnings from 
LF household enterprises within the household. Hence, we expect both a positive and a 
significant association between the variable AGE and the two dependent variables.  
 
Education (EDU): refers to the educational background of the female respondent. 
Education enhances a woman’s confidence and ability to have a voice in household 
decision-making. A number of studies have suggested a positive association between a 
woman’s education and her participation in household decision-making (Kritz and 
Makinwa-Adebusoy, 1997; Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2002; CSA and ORC Macro, 
2006). A study by Kritz and Makinwa-Adebusoy (1997) in Nigeria shows that women’s say 
in household decision-making on matters such as selling or buying land, the schooling of 
and medication for children, the use of the husband’s income, or purchases for the house 
increases with formal education (primary and secondary). A national survey in Ethiopia by 
CSA and ORC Macro (2006) suggests that women with primary and secondary education 
are more likely to exercise more authority on their health, mobility, and large and small 
purchases, compared to women with no education. Hence, we hypothesize that women with 
some education are more likely to have a say on the use of their loans and related earnings 
within the household than women with no education. However, due to the low level of 
women’s education in both subsamples, we do not expect a very strong effect.   
 
Religion (REL)61: refers to the religious affiliation of the respondent. Religious beliefs and 
practices may play a role in determining women’s status in society. There is a widespread 
assumption that Muslim women enjoy limited rights over resources within the household. 
Evidence also suggests that Muslim women exercise less authority in household decision-
making than Christian women (Kritz and Makinwa-Adebusoy, 1997). Several studies in 
Ethiopia indicate that the customary practice in Orthodox Christian-dominated regions 
                                                 
61 The variable is only applicable for the OMFI, not the ACSI, since there was no variation in religion among 
ACSI respondents. 
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provide women with more rights over household properties (WAO and World Bank, 1998; 
Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2002), and more decision-making power (CSA and ORC 
Macro, 2006) compared to women in the Muslim-dominated regions. Hence, being a 
Christian may positively relate with women’s authority in decision-making on loan uses 
and LF enterprise earnings than being a Muslim. However, the effect may not be 
significant, partly because the cultural practices in the area transcend religious practices. 
For example, for ACSI borrowers, Orthodox Christianity is the norm and marriage is 
mainly monogamous, while among OMFI borrowers even Orthodox Christians practice 
polygamy. Religion is measured as a discrete variable set equal to “1” if the woman is an 
Orthodox Christian, 2 if she is Protestant Christian, and 3 if she is a Muslim. “Muslim” is 
used as a reference group in the regression analysis.  
 
Membership duration (DUR): refers to the number of years that a female respondent has 
been a member of a credit group. It also represents the frequency of borrowing and the size 
of loan funds. This means, as indicated in Chapter 4, that the number and the size of loans 
that individuals’ access is likely to increase in tandem within the duration of their 
participation in the credit group. In other words, borrowers who are members of credit 
groups for a larger number of years are more likely to have taken a relatively higher 
number and amount of loans than women with a few years of membership in credit groups. 
With the lengthening of her stay in a credit group, a woman may access more resources, 
and gain experiences in the operation of credit services and the management of economic 
enterprises (Goetz and Gupta, 1996). Evidence has demonstrated a positive association 
between the duration of a woman’s participation in a credit programme and her authority 
regarding household decision-making (Hashemi et al., 1996; Holvoet, 2005; Goetz and 
Gupta, 1996). Hence, we hypothesize that a woman’s decision-making power on loan uses 
and use of earnings from LF household enterprises within the household may increase in 
tandem with her length of stay in the credit group/programme62. We expect both a positive 
and a significant association between a woman’s membership duration variable and her say 
in decision-making over loan uses and earnings from LF household enterprises. The data on 
the women’s membership duration has been collected in years. 
 
Form of marriage (MAR): refers to the form or type of marital relation in which the female 
respondent is involved. The type of marital relation can be broadly divided into monogamy 
and polygamy, and women’s decision-making status within the household may vary 
depending on the marital relation they are in. Some studies suggest that women in 
polygamous households are primarily responsible for the consumption need of their 
households (Mandel, 2004). Moreover they maintain a certain level of autonomy within the 
household (Narayan et al., 1999; Baerends, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1988). As indicated in Chapter 
5, some women in polygamous households can be depicted as de facto heads of household, 
with them getting little support (or interference) from their husbands. On the other hand, 
however, polygamous women are a far from homogenous group, because their status within 
the household may vary depending on seniority. We expect a positive and significant 
association between the variable polygamous form of marriage and a woman’s say on uses 
                                                 
62 In the literature, various researchers comment that membership duration may exaggerate the effects of 
women’s credit on household decision-making outcomes. The reason is that women who are more 
autonomous and influential in household decision-making may choose to join a credit programme earlier than 
less autonomous women and, hence, would have a lengthier duration in the credit programme (Hashemi et al, 
1996; Osmani, 2007; Shuler et al, 1996). Nevertheless, in this study, the various backgrounds and household 
characteristics such as women’s age, women’s land right, or women’s education may control for such biases, 
since such characteristics are hardly affected by women’s access to microfinance in the studied area. 
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of loans and related enterprise earnings (LF livestock) within the household. This means 
that women in polygamous household are hypothesized to have more authority on the uses 
of their loans and related income (from LF livestock enterprise) within the household, in 
comparison to women in monogamous households. But we do not expect a very strong 
significant relationship because polygamous women are not differentiated based on 
seniority due to the small number of observations. MAR is a dummy variable, indicating 
whether the woman lives in a polygamous (1) or a monogamous household., 
 
Woman’s land right (LNR63): is defined as the level of a woman’s right to family land 
compared to the right of her husband. Growing evidence in the developing countries shows 
that women’s land right (ownership or usufruct right) enhances women’s bargaining power 
within the household (Agrawal, 1994; Doss, 1996; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000). In 
view of the bargaining theory of the household, women who own more resources relative to 
their husbands may be able to economically support themselves outside marriage (Folber, 
1997; Agrawal, 1994),  and as a result they may bargain for the transfer of resources by 
other household members (Doss, 1997). Nevertheless, we do not expect married women 
who have a significant land right to use divorce as a threat in case of loan-related conflicts 
within the household. This is because in traditional and religious societies divorce is more 
likely to involve great legal and social consequences. In such situations, instead of divorce, 
women may use “refusing to bring home a loan” as an alternative bargaining strategy. This 
is because the level of a woman’s land-right within the household may influence a woman’s 
decision to leave credit programmes or not. Therefore, we assume that a woman who has a 
significant right to family land may use her access to MFI credit (credit group membership) 
as a bargaining strategy in loan-related decision-making within the household. On the other 
hand, for a married woman with limited a land right within the household, access to MFI 
credit alone may not offer the power to influence loan-related decisions within the 
household. Therefore, our hypothesis is that with an increase in the level of a woman’s land 
right compared to that of her husband, she is more likely to influence decisions over the 
uses of a loan and earnings from a LF enterprise within the household. The variable LNR is 
an ordered variable, where the value 1 is given if the household land belongs to the man, 
value 2 is given if a man and a woman “jointly” own land, and the value 3 is given if the 
land belongs to the woman.  
 
 
 
                                                 
63 It is important to note that in Ethiopia land belongs to the state. It cannot be legally and permanently sold or 
purchased, and therefore, it is unlikely that either the loan fund or the income generated thereof will influence 
women’s land ownership status within the household. 
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Figure 6. 1 The conceptual framework: loan and income allocation.  
 
The models  
We use the Ordered Probit Regression Model to analyze the data since the two dependent 
variables are ordered and take three discrete values each. The same explanatory variables 
are used to analyze the determinants of the two dependent variables. However, two separate 
models are developed for ACSI and OMFI because of the structural differences between the 
two studied communities. As already mentioned in chapter 5, there is no difference among 
ACSI respondents regarding religion and types of marital relations, as opposed to the OMFI 
borrowers. As a result, these variables are only included for the OMFI model.   
 
 
The model for ACSI is: 
ADM = f(AGE, EDU, DUR and LNR)          (2.1) 
                    (2.2) 
 
The model for the OMFI is: 
ODM= (AGE, EDU, DUR, LNR, RIL, MAR)   (2.3) 
 
Where  
 
ADM = ACSI married female borrower respondent decision-making on loan uses and LF  
enterprise earnings;  
ODM = OMFI married female borrower respondent decision-making on loan uses and LF  
enterprise earnings; 
AGE = the age of the respondent;  
EDU = the literacy or educational status condition of the respondent; 
DUR = the number of years that the respondent was a credit group member and  
accessed credit; 
LNR = the respondent’s land ownership right;  
REL = the religion of the respondent;  
MAR= the form of marriage in which the respondent is involved. 
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6.3 Empirical Results 
6.3.1  Descriptive statistics  
a. Intra-household decision-making on loan uses  
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive findings regarding decision-making on the use of 
women’s last loans within ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. A third (33%) of the 
ACSI borrowers reported that they influenced decisions on the use of their last loans, while 
about a fourth (21%) reported that they made joint decisions on how to spend their last loan 
with their husbands. In nearly half (47%) of the cases, borrowers reported that their 
husbands influenced loan use decisions within the household. Similarly, nearly a third of 
(30%) the OMFI borrowers reported that they influenced the use of their last loans, while 
about slightly more than a forth (27 %) of the OMFI borrowers mentioned that they jointly 
decided with their husbands on the use of their last loans. About 43 percent of the OMFI 
borrowers were excluded or had little say in loan use decision-making within the 
household.  
 
Table 6. 1  Frequencies and percentage distribution of ACSI and OMFI borrowers by decision-
making on loan uses (2004). 
Source: Household Survey 2004. Note: there is no significant difference between ACSI and OMFI borrowers 
(Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test64); Percentage may not add up to exactly 100% due to a rounding error.  
 
The statistical test suggests that there is no significant difference in the patterns of decision-
making on loan uses between the borrowers of the two institutions. Although the loan was 
given in a woman’s name, nearly half (43-47%) of the ACSI and OMFI borrowers had little 
or no authority over the use of their loans, compared to only a third (30-33%) of the 
spouses (men) who had little or no authority over the use of their wives’ loans within the 
household. This may appear surprising, particularly in relation to the ACSI, given its 
persistence with its monthly centre meeting, where it teaches borrowers (also 
representatives) about women’s rights. Nevertheless, there are three plausible reasons that 
may explain why women had limited authority over the uses of their loans compared to 
men. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 4, in the studied areas both institutions extended loans 
for investment in livestock, with the objective of addressing the draught animal constraints 
of poor households. Because this type of investment is associated with men’s traditional 
economic roles, it is possible that men influence decisions concerning how much money 
must be invested in the livestock-fattening enterprises. We also learned from the in-depth 
interviews that men’s knowledge and roles in agricultural production and livestock 
marketing had contributed to their significant authority over the uses of loan money. This is 
important for women because the cooperation of men is required in the running of the 
enterprise. Secondly, the ACSI’s and OMFI’s lending rules, which required men to be co-
signatory for their wives’ loans, may have encouraged men to become involved in loan use 
decision-making within the household. This is because the consequences of any loan 
default may impinge on household resources, such as land or crops. Finally, in both the 
                                                 
64 This test is used for ordered data and two independent observations.  
ACSI OMFI Decision-making  
Frequency % Frequency % 
Mostly men 40 47 24 43
Men and women “equal”  18 21 15 27
Mostly women  28 33 17 30
Total  86 101 56 100
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studied societies, men influence household decision-making on loan uses partly because of 
their traditional role as the head of the household, and partly because of their dominance 
over women.  
 
Although women’s authority over loan use decision-making is limited compared to that of 
men, in group discussions women pointed out they would not have had such a level of 
influence over loan uses if the loan had been given to the men. According to group 
discussants, if loans had been given to their husbands, in the worst scenario, some women 
would not even have had an idea about the amount of money their husband might have 
borrowed. With a few exceptions, women borrowers did not see men’s significant influence 
over loan use decision-making within the household as a serious problem. This might be 
because, as I have already shown in the previous chapter, most households used their loans 
for the intended livestock-fattening activities, and this suggests that the interests of men 
should not always be seen as contradictory to the interests of women within a household.  
 
b. Intra-household decision-making regarding LF enterprise earnings  
It was mentioned in the previous chapter (5.3) that the great majority of ACSI and OMFI 
borrowers’ households used women’s loans for livestock-fattening enterprises. In addition, 
over a third of the OMFI borrowers invested part of the loan funds on off-farm economic 
enterprises. The livestock-fattening enterprise is often regarded as a household  enterprise, 
undertaken by household members and owned by both men and women. On the other hand, 
an off-farm income-generating enterprise is an individual-level enterprise, mostly 
undertaken/owned either by the woman or the man. The next paragraph analyzes the 
decision-making about the use of earnings generated from household-level enterprises and 
off-farm enterprises. ACSI borrowers are excluded from this analysis because the number 
of borrowers who reported a loan investment in off-farm economic enterprises was very 
low. 
 
Table 6.2 displays the patterns of intra-household decision-making on incomes from the LF 
household enterprise incomes. The data shows that around 44 percent of ACSI borrowers 
reported that they mostly influence decisions on the incomes generated from the LF 
household enterprises and about a third reported that they were mostly involved in joint 
decision-making with their husbands. In about 23 percent of the cases, ACSI borrowers had 
little or no authority on incomes from the LF household enterprises. with regard to OMFI 
borrowers about 47 percent of OMFI borrowers reported that they mostly influence 
decision-making over incomes from LF household enterprises and about 43 percent of 
OMFI borrower reported that their husbands mostly influence decisions on the uses of 
incomes from the LF household enterprise. Only 8 percent of OMFI borrowers reported 
that they make a “joint” decision with their husband.  
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Table 6. 2  Frequencies and percentage distribution of ACSI and OMFI borrowers by decision-
making on incomes from loan-funded livestock enterprise. 
Source: Household Survey 2004. Note: there is a significant difference between ACSI and OMFI borrowers at the 
10% level (Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test65). 
 
The above table shows that the ACSI and OMFI borrowers had relatively significant 
decision-making power on the uses of earnings from traditionally male-dominated 
enterprises compared to their husbands. This could be partly because they are the ones who 
borrowed the money, but it might also be due to a microfinance-related awareness. In 
relation to loan uses, it was also stated that some women influence decisions because they 
are the ones who borrowed the loan fund.   
 
On the other hand, a Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test indicated that there is a 10% significance 
difference between the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households regarding the patterns of 
intra-household decision-making arrangements. A relatively larger proportion of ACSI 
borrowers (74%) compared to OMFI borrowers (55%) had a significant voice in decision-
making regarding the uses of earnings from the LF household enterprises. This difference 
may partly arise from the pre-existing difference in women’s status in the two communities. 
As described in Chapter 4, women in the Amhara (including the studied Kebele) appeared 
to exercise significant authority in “household” resource allocation decisions, compared to 
women in the SNNPR (including the Kebele studied there). It is also possible that the 
ACSI’s awareness-raising campaigns regarding women’s rights at the centre meeting may 
have significantly contributed to women’s significant involvement in decision-making 
regarding the uses of earnings.   
 
In addition, a relatively larger proportion (33%) of the ACSI respondents reported that they 
and their husbands “jointly” make decisions on the income generated from the LF 
livestock-fattening enterprises, compared to only 8 percent of the OMFI respondents who 
reported that they and their husbands “jointly” make decisions on such income. This 
reflects the normative intra-household decision-making arrangements in the studied 
Amhara and the Gurage localities. In the former, household decision-making is largely 
characterized by “jointness”, while among the Gurage households, men and women mostly 
exercise their authority in separate spheres of decision-making.     
 
Table 6.3, presents intra-household decision-making arrangements regarding the income 
generated from LF off-farm economic activities, mainly trading. The data show that over 
three-fourths of the OMFI borrowers had significant authority over earnings from LF off-
farm economic activities within the household, compared to only 24 percent of the men 
who had a similar degree of influence. This is because women’s loans were largely used to 
                                                 
65 This test is used for ordered data and unpaired observations.  
ACSI OMFI Decision-making  
Frequency % Frequency % 
Mostly men 19 23 23 45 
Men & women “equal”  27 33 4 8 
Mostly women 37 44 24 47 
Total  83 100 51 100 
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finance women’s independent off-farm enterprises, compared to men’s independent off-
farm enterprises.66 
Table 6. 3 Frequencies and percentage distribution of the OMFI borrowers by decision-making 
on loan-funded off-farm earnings.   
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
 
In conclusion, the descriptive findings discussed in this section indicated that both ACSI 
and OMFI borrowers had a limited say in loan use decision-making within the household, 
but they had significant authority regarding the uses of income from the LF enterprises, 
compared to their husbands. However, there was a significant difference in the degree to 
which the borrowers (women) of the two institutions influence decision-making on income 
from the LF household enterprises.  
 
6.3.2  The estimated model  
As already mentioned earlier, a separate model was estimated for the two independent 
observations (ACSI and OMFI) because of the structural differences in the two studied 
communities in terms of marriage and religion. Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 present the results 
of the estimated models for the determinants of decision-making on loans and LF 
household enterprise income in relation to the two observations, respectively. As is evident 
from the tables, the explanatory power of the models as measured by R² is very low, 
particularly for the ACSI observations. This could be due to various reasons, including the 
small number of observations, unobserved individual and household characteristics, and the 
exploratory nature of the study. 
 
a. Intra-household decision-making on loan uses   
Table 6.4 presents the estimation result for household decision-making on loan uses for the 
ACSI and OMFI models. As indicated in the table, only one variable in the ACSI model 
explains the dependent variable, intra-household decision-making on loan uses. In the 
OMFI model, on the other hand, three variables, namely age, membership duration, and 
form of marriage explain intra-household decision-making on income from the LF 
household enterprises to different degrees. One of these variables, i.e. the form of marriage, 
is specific to the OMFI observations. The estimation results are discussed in the subsequent 
paragraphs.  
                                                 
66 It is important to note that OMFI borrowers who used their loans for off-farm activities were mostly long-
time borrowers who joined credit groups when the OMFI extended credit to finance microbusinesses.   
The OMFI Decision-making  
 Frequency % 
Mostly the husband  5 24 
Mostly the wife 16 76 
Total  21 100 
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Table 6. 4 Estimation result for intra-household decision-making on loan uses. 
Note *: the comparison group consists of Muslims. 
            a, significant at 5%; b: significant at 10%; c: significant at 15%; and d: significant at 20%. 
 
As indicated in the table (6.4) above, AGE has a significant (p<.05) positive effect on loan 
use decision-making within ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. This is in line with 
our expectation that, with a rise in a woman’s age, her influence over the use of her loan 
funds is likely to be significant. This means older women are more likely to have more 
authority on how to spend their loan funds within the household in comparison to younger 
women. The greater social value and respect attached to old age may have provided older 
women with a better voice within the household compared to younger women. In addition, 
the life and work experiences that a woman accumulates within marriage may offer older 
women more roles in household resource management compared to younger women, and as 
a result they may influence decision-making on loan uses within the household. 
Furthermore, according to in-depth interviews (on the ACSI location) in older couples’ 
households, some men appeared to exclude themselves from loan-related activities and 
decision-making. In such households, even the decision to join the credit programme was 
said to be mostly made by women themselves. As a result, women seemed to assume major 
responsibilities over loan-related decisions and seemed to work with little interference or 
assistance from their husbands. This could be, in part, because older men may be unable to 
assume new responsibilities within the household, due to physical incapability, as they are 
more likely to be older than their wives.  
 
Women’s education (EDU) has no significant effect on loan use decision-making for both 
the ACSI and the OMFI models. The sign of the coefficient for the ACSI model is positive 
as predicted, while it is negative for the OMFI model. The low level of women’s education 
may explain why the education variable is insignificant.  
 
The forms of marriage (MAR), which is used for the OMFI model, has a significant 
positive effect (p<.20) on a woman’s authority over loan use decision-making within the 
household. This implies that women in polygamous marriages are more likely to have a say 
in loan use decision-making, compared to women in monogamous households. However, 
the variable is not as significant as it was expected to be. The in-depth interviews with 
women and men in polygamous households offered some insights into the variations and 
the complexities involved regarding decision-making in such households. The position of 
(senior or junior) co-wives and different residential arrangements are the two variables that 
ACSI OMFI Loan-use  
Coefficient Coefficient  
Age  .29(.13)a .42 (.20)a 
Education .18(.22) -.08(.37) 
Membership duration .08(.13) .15(.10) b 
Form of marriage       - .50(.38)d 
Land use right -.49(.43) -.23(.27) 
Orthodox Christian*      - -.33(.38) 
Protestant Christian*      - -.33(.58) 
No. of observations 83 55 
LR chi2(8) 6.74 12.28 
Porb>chi2 .1403 0.0918 
Pseudo R2 .0385 0.1040 
Log likelihood -85.151379 -52.880176 
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explain resource management and decision-making in polygamous households. Firstly, a 
polygamous woman appeared to exercise significant or independent authority in loan use 
decision-making if her husband was living mostly (regularly staying) with (an) other 
wife(s) in different districts or regions. This is because the husband often has minimal 
interference in household affairs and hardly provides assistance to his wife and his children. 
Secondly, a senior co-wife is more likely to engage in loan use decision-making, either 
independently or jointly with her husband. The reason is that, in most cases, senior co-
wives tend to own property, including land registered in their own names (or allotted by 
their husbands) and often have an adult son or sons, who assist them in farming. As a result, 
such women seem to be less dependent on their husband. Finally, a junior co-wife is more 
likely to exercise limited decision-making authority compared to a senior co-wife. This 
might be because men often spend more time with junior co-wives, with whom they share 
familial and financial responsibilities.  
 
The variable Religion (REL), which is used in the OMFI model, has no significant effect on 
loan use decision-making within the household. In addition, the sign of the coefficient is 
also negative, contrary to the initial hypothesis suggesting that being an Orthodox Christian 
is negatively associated with women’s authority over loan use decision-making compared 
to being a Muslim. This could be related to the point mentioned in the conceptual 
framework section, that the distinction between the two religious groups may not be sharp 
enough to affect intra-household decision-making because of the powerful cultural practice 
that transcends people’s adherence to religion.  
 
Membership duration (DUR) has a significant (10%) positive effect on loan use decision-
making within the household for the OMFI model. This means that, with an increase in the 
duration of a woman’s participation in the credit programme, it is more likely that an OMFI 
borrower will influence loan use decisions within the household. In the ACSI model, 
membership duration has an insignificant but positive effect.   
 
In-depth interviews with OMFI borrowers offered two possible reasons for the importance 
of membership duration in explaining intra-household decision-making on loan uses. 
Firstly, a woman who has been a member of credit groups for relatively many years (or a 
long-time borrower) is likely to have more public exposure and interaction (related to credit 
group meetings and the microfinance institution) and access to relatively more and larger 
loans. A woman’s public exposure and interaction increases her awareness and self-
confidence, and consequently strengthens the voice she has in household decision-making. 
In addition, most of the long-time borrowers, who were interviewed in-depth (five out of 
six), used part of their loans to finance independent, off-farm economic activities. Hence, 
larger and more loans may imply more independent earnings for the woman (and her 
household) and more assets, and consequently more bargaining power for the woman. This 
point may indicate the potential effects of microfinance to women. The second point is 
related to the change in OMFI loan products. In chapter 4, I have described that the long-
time OMFI borrowers joined credit groups at the time when the OMFI’s credit was 
extended for individuals to operate non-farm microbusinesses, while the short-time 
borrowers joined credit groups when the OMFI’s credit was targeted towards agricultural 
activities (livestock fattening). This means long-time borrowers joined credit groups in 
order to access credit to start up a new business or expand own independent off-farm 
enterprises, while short-time borrowers joined credit groups to bring home loans for the 
household-level enterprises traditionally managed by men. As a result, long-time OMFI 
borrowers may assume ownership of the loan fund, while the short-time borrowers may act 
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as a conduit to bring credit into the household. In line with this, most long-time OMFI 
borrowers continued to finance their independent enterprises and to attend credit group 
meeting regularly to collect their monthly savings, discuss loan investments, and share 
experiences. Conversely, short-time OMFI borrowers hardly used loans to finance 
independent off-farm enterprises or met as a group, except at the time of borrowing. 
Instead, their husbands meet and make arrangements for the collection of the monthly 
compulsory savings. Hence, in addition to women’s long years of experience and exposure 
in credit-related activities, the OMFI’s initial loan product for individual  off-farm activities 
(also for women) seemed to facilitate women’s ownership of the loan fund and, 
consequently, increased women’s authority over loan use decision-making within the 
household. 
 
In-depth interviews with the ACSI’s long-time and short-time borrowers also suggested the 
limited effect of membership duration on intra-household decision-making on loan uses and 
offered a possible explanation why the variable membership duration has a limited effect in 
the ACSI model. As mentioned in Chapter 4, ACSI began facilitating centre meetings for 
its credit group members after three years of operation in the studied Kebele. In the centre 
meeting, credit group members were taught about issues related to loan uses, women’s 
rights, and HIV/AIDS, among other things. Short-time ACSI borrowers’ exposure to such a 
forum might have facilitated a quick learning process and awareness among this group and 
might have narrowed the knowledge gap among borrowers in this different loan cycle.   
 
The variable land right (LNR) has an insignificant and negative effect in women’s say in 
loan use decision-making within the household for both the ACSI and the OMFI models. 
This is contrary to our initial expectation, which was that a woman who has more right over 
the family plot would influence loan use decision-making within the household.  However, 
there is a plausible explanation for the negative relationship between land right and 
decision-making on loan use. A landless woman may want to invest her loan fund 
according to her preference, because of her limited right over the family plot.  
 
The interaction terms, such as MAR x AGE, AGE x EDU, and MAR x LNR in the OMFI 
model, are not significant. Moreover, when these interaction terms were included in the 
model, the significant variable became insignificant. Similarly, when the interaction term 
AGE x EDU is included in the ACSI model, the sign as well as the significance of the 
original variables change, while the variable LNR becomes significant. This could be 
largely due to the small number of observations. As a result, the interaction terms are 
excluded from the model for loan uses.   
b. Intra-household decision-making on the uses of earnings from LF household 
enterprises 
Table 6.5 displays the findings regarding the estimation result for intra-household decision-
making on earnings from the LF household enterprises. As indicated in the table, none of 
the variables in the ACSI model explain the dependent variable. By contrast, in the OMFI 
model, three variables, namely form of marriage, religion, and membership duration in 
credit groups explain intra-household decision-making on earnings from the LF household 
enterprises to different degrees. The first two variables are specific to the OMFI 
observations. As a result, the following discussion will entirely focus on the OMFI. At the 
end, a possible explanation will be offered for the ACSI, using the findings from the in-
depth interviews. 
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Table 6. 5  Estimation result for intra-household decision-making on earnings from the LF 
household enterprises.  
Note * the comparison group consists of Muslims.  
           a: significant at 5%; b: significant at 10%; c: significant at 15%; and d: significant at 20%. 
 
Both AGE and EDU have no significant effect on household decision-making on income 
from LF household enterprises. However, both variables have positive coefficient as 
expected, suggesting that a woman’s say in decision-making on income from LF enterprises 
may potentially rise with age and having some education. This is because education 
contributes to knowledge and enhances an individual’s problem-solving capacity. 
Moreover, education may enhance a woman’s confidence and ability to articulate her ideas 
in household decision-making. 
 
Form of marriage (MAR) has a significant (p<.05) positive effect on intra-household 
decision-making on the uses of earnings from the LF household enterprises. This is 
consistent with our prediction that women in polygamous households are more likely to 
influence household decision-making on income from LF household enterprises, compared 
to women in monogamous households. As discussed in relation to loan use, decision-
making patterns on earnings also vary among polygamous women, depending on their 
seniority and residential arrangement.  
  
Religion has a significant (p<.10) and negative effect in relation to religion 2, which 
represents Protestant Christians. This may imply that Protestant Christians are less likely to 
have decision-making power concerning LF enterprise income compared to other religion 
followers. In relation to religion 1, - Orthodox Christianity -, the variable is insignificant 
and the sign of the coefficient is contrary to the initial prediction. Initially, it was predicted 
that an Orthodox Christian woman would have more power over household decision-
making compared to a Muslim woman. This assumption was largely established based on 
the difference in the status of women between Orthodox Christian- and Muslim-dominated 
regions in Ethiopia. Quite the opposite, the estimation result shows a negative association 
between being an Orthodox Christian and women’s decision-making power. The 
explanation given in relation to loan use applies here.  
  
Membership duration (DUR) has a significant (p<.10) positive effect in the OMFI model. 
The reasons discussed in relation to loan use, i.e., experience and exposure in the credit 
programmes and the institutional arrangement, apply here as well. 
Variable  ACSI OMFI 
 Coefficient Coefficient  
Women’s age   .29(.13) .02(.26) 
Woman’s education -.080(.21) -.26 (.43) 
Membership duration -.01(.12) .14(.11)d 
Form of marriage        - 1.13(46) a 
Woman’s land right .14(.41) .55(36)c 
Orthodox Christian*      - -08(.44) 
Protestant Christian*         _ -1.46(.77) b 
No. Observation 80 50 
LR chi2(8) .52 18.84 
Porb>chi2 .9711 0.0087 
Pseudo R2 .0031 0.2058 
Log likelihood -85.207825                     -36.35954 
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The variable land right (LNR) has a significant (p<.20) positive effect on women’s say on 
income derived from the LF household enterprises in the OMFI model. This means that, 
with an increase in a women’s right to the family plot, she is more likely to exercise 
authority on the use of earnings from LF household enterprises. In the ACSI model, the 
variable land right is not significant, but the sign of the coefficient is positive.  
 
When the interaction terms MAR x AGE, AGE x EDU, and MAR x LNR are included in 
the OMFI model, the significance of the original variables remain the same. However, none 
of the interaction terms significantly explain intra-household decision-making on earnings. 
On the other hand, the overall significance of the model drops from 1% to 5%. Hence, the 
original model is retained.  
 
6.3.3 Insight from the in-depth interviews and group discussions  
The outcome of the model discussed above does not fully explain why different decision-
making arrangements prevail among ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. As already 
mentioned, it could also be partly due to the small number of observations and the 
exclusion of some potential explanatory variables. In addition to explaining and interpreting 
the descriptive and estimation results, the in-depth interviews and groups discussions are 
used to provide additional information on possible factors determining intra-household 
decision-making on the use of loans and enterprise earnings.  
 
a.  Gender norms and male dominance 
Gender norms that are strictly observed by men and women, particularly on the OMFI 
location, were important in reinforcing the already existing unequal power structure within 
the household. The variables included in the regression model hardly capture the extent to 
which individuals adhere to traditional gender roles in decision-making or not. The variable 
land right, which is partly determined by local custom, was incorporated in the estimated 
models to check whether ownership of material resources determines women’s bargaining 
power over allocation of loans and related income within the household.  
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, different socio-cultural factors may determine 
intra-household decision-making arrangements. Social perceptions about the roles that men 
and women are expected to assume within the household (and beyond) may significantly 
affect household decision-making outcomes. Although it may appear as if a particular 
social norm is common to a given society, it is amenable to change over time, due to such 
intervention. The regression analysis has revealed that the variable of women’s membership 
duration in a credit programme plays a significant role in determining the way in which 
women influence loan-related decisions within the household. This could be partly 
attributed to a microfinance-induced increased incomes and awareness. In-depth interview 
participants, especially short-time OMFI borrowers, explained that they played a limited 
role in loan-related decision-making, due to the prevailing social practices in their society. 
These women perceived their roles as “subordinate” and their husband’s role as key 
“decision-makers” within the household. Descriptions such as “he is the head of the house”; 
“this is not the custom of this community; “the decision-maker is the husband, and I give 
the money to him”; “I am under him; I cannot make decisions on my own”; and “it is the 
right of the man” were used by some women borrowers to explain the reason why their 
husbands had influenced the decision-making regarding loan and income use within their 
households. This was also supported by some men, as the testimony of one OMFI 
borrower’s husband illustrates: “I accept the money right there [loan office]… She is a 
woman. How can you give money to a woman? That does not work in our culture, maybe 
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in town”. The following case shows how men can use their power to persuade their wives 
to bring home loans and make related decisions. 
 
Case 6.1  Male dominance  
AM is in her late 40s, married with children. She joined the OMFI credit group in 2002. She 
joined the credit programme at the time when the OMFI was exclusively targeting women in 
her locality. According to AM, the OMFI exclusively targeted women during that period 
because women were repaying their loans timely, compared to male borrowers. Since her 
husband was not eligible for OMF loans because of the focus on women, he forced her to join 
the programme and bring him money. When explaining how she joined the group, she said: “It 
was with a fight. He [her husband] asked me to bring him a loan. But I refused and we 
quarrelled. I told him to use the property he already has. But he insisted and finally I brought 
him the money”.   
 
She said she refused to join the programme because her household had enough resources for 
survival, including a pair of oxen, and there was no need for cash in her household. In addition, 
she did not want any problems, because she knew some men in her area failed to repay their 
loans on time. According to AM, even her relatives advised her not to borrow any money, 
recognizing the economic status of her household and the health problem of her husband. 
However, she said her husband forced her to bring him money and she joined the OMFI credit 
programme and brought him the loan money. After this, her husband did not involve her in any 
of the decisions. Although he told her that he had bought an ox with the loan money, she was 
not sure whether it was from the loan money or not. At the moment of loan repayment, her 
husband had to settle her loan by selling crops cheaply. She noted that the “loan-funded” ox 
was not sold because it was not properly fed, as she was not involved. She complained about 
the consequences of taking the loan by saying in Amharic: “yalegnen yizo weta”, which 
literally means “it took away what I had”. After this experience, AM told her husband that she 
would leave him if he would ask her to bring home a loan again. He did not ask her again, and 
she left the group.   
 
The above case shows how a man may force his wife to bring home a loan, may control 
loan investment decisions and determine the sources of loan repayment. As the case 
indicated men may use the existing power hierarchy in the household to influence decision-
making and perpetuate women’s subordination. This kind of problem is more likely to be 
pronounced when loans are exclusively targeted to women, excluding the men.  
 
It was discussed in Chapter 4 that local customs, in the Amhara and the Gurage 
communities define the socially appropriate market space for men and women. As a result, 
it is socially unacceptable for married women to participate in livestock marketing (see 
Chapter 7). Despite this, some women tried to participate in loan-related livestock 
marketing for the following reasons: a) when they did not trust their husbands; b) when the 
husband was not around or sick; and c) just because they took the loan in their own name. 
One ACI borrower explains the significance of attending the livestock market for women as 
follows:   
“When a woman goes to a livestock market, she will have the opportunity to see the purchasing 
and the selling prices of the animal. This will help her to avoid wastage [misappropriation by 
the husband] of the loan money. By going to the market, I am able to check and manage my 
finances, because I can see it. If I do not have the chance to see the transaction, I cannot guess 
the true price”.  
Ms. ST went to the livestock market to buy livestock with the loan fund and also to sell the 
fattened livestock, despite her husband’s discontent. She decided to participate in livestock 
marketing because she feared that her husband might misappropriate the money. Although 
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she was not open enough to tell her “private” story, it was understood from the neighbours 
that her husband was very addicted to alcohol. But by going to the market, Ms. ST was able 
to monitor and control the loan uses and related earnings as well. Another woman who had 
a husband addicted to alcohol was unable to enter this male gender-specific space, as her 
story discloses:  
  
Case 6.2  Gendered market space    
Ms. KL is in her late 30s. She is married and has 8 children. She joined ACSI credit and saving 
group in 1998 at the advent of ACSI in her Kebele. Initially, her husband applied for a loan, but 
his application was rejected by the credit committee because of his other debt to the service 
cooperatives. As a result, Ms. KL joined the programme to bring home a loan for the purchase 
of livestock for her household. Until this in-depth interview in 2005, Ms. KN borrowed loans 
from ACSI for about eight years for the purpose of a livestock-fattening enterprise. However, 
her loan was used in her household for various purposes, including buying livestock (including 
a cow, oxen, sheep and a donkey), to get back pawned land, settle previous debts, to pay for 
fertilizer and tax, to buy food, and to cover the costs of her children’s clothing and education. 
According to Ms. KN, her access to credit improved the well-being of her household members. 
She plays a significant role in the loan-funded livestock-fattening (household) enterprise. She 
also participates in loan use decision-making within the household, but she has little control 
over loan-related earnings. Her husband spends household income for his own personal 
consumption, such as alcoholic drink, food, and prostitutes in town. As a result, starting from 
her first loan, she wanted to monitor loan-related earnings by joining her husband in the 
livestock market. She feared that her husband might embezzle loan-funded earnings. Although 
her husband did not agree, she accompanied him to the market to sell the first loan-funded 
livestock. In the market, the husband did all the negotiations with the buyer, while she followed 
the process. She observed that her husband sold the loan-funded cow ETB 850 (with a gross 
profit of ETB 550) and he received ETB 710 from the buyer, with an agreement to collect the 
rest of the money in a week’s time. As per local custom, Ms KN’s husband, the buyer and other 
men, who witnessed the transaction process in the market, went to a local beer house for a 
drink, finter. Since it is not the norm for a woman to join men in such a public space, Ms. KN 
stayed outside the bar and waited for her husband. After he finished his drink, her husband went 
directly to a shop, where she followed him. She observed him buying a pair of shoes for 
himself. She then asked him to buy her a cloth in front of the shopkeeper, which he did not dare 
to refuse. 
 
After a couple of days, she asked her husband whether he had collected the second instalment 
from the buyer or not. He then told her the date of the appointment with the shopkeeper. During 
the date of the appointment, Ms. KN went to town and collected ETB 100 from the trader 
before her husband collected it. Afterwards, she directly went to her sister in town, because she 
was not confident enough to confront her husband. The same day, her husband went to the 
trader to ask for the money, where he was told that his wife had already collected it. This caused 
a conflict between the couple. Finally, her relatives settled the dispute, but she had to give the 
money to her husband.  
 
In the second year, Ms. KN wanted to join her husband to the market, to sell the loan-funded 
ox. Again her husband was unhappy, but she followed him anyway. However, he walked to the 
market using a different path in order to avoid other people, who might hear and observe his 
violent actions against his wife. On the way to the market , her husband was nagging and 
beating her so much that she returned back home. When they had almost reached the market, 
she could not bear the violence anymore and decided to return back home. Since then, she has 
never again tried to go to the livestock market. But she collects information about prices from 
other individuals (her sons and neighbours), who often join her husband in the livestock market. 
When describing the unequal power relations in her household, she desperately and furiously 
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said, “He is a man!”, “powerful!”, “we women talk a lot but we cannot win.”, “a woman never 
wins!”.   
 
Ms. KN wanted to participate in the livestock market not just to challenge the gender norm, 
but mainly because she did not trust her husband, who embezzles household income for his 
personal needs, such as alcoholic drinks and prostitution. The issue of men’s behaviour, 
particularly addiction to alcohol, was also expressed by other women on both the ACSI and 
OMFI locations. Ms. KN tried to enter into the male’s traditional space, livestock 
marketing, like other women, but for her the cost was “unbearable”: violence. Her effort to 
attend the livestock marketing was in vain. Even her sister and other individuals, who were 
involved in the conflict resolution described in this case, did not support Ms. KN’s action, 
and their verdict was in favour of the man. This was because they were also socialized to 
think the way her husband did. As she desperately noted, she “lost” but he “won” the game!  
 
c. Entrepreneurship skill 
In-depth interviews on the OMFI location revealed that women’s entrepreneurial skills 
played an important role in enhancing women’s authority to influence loan use decisions 
within the household. Some women described that they influenced loan use decision-
making within the household because they had better entrepreneurial skills than their 
husbands. The following statement by a long-time OMFI borrower (WD) illustrates the 
importance of women’s entrepreneurial competence in loan use decisions within the 
household: 
 “I am a good business woman, but he [her husband] is a farmer. He just farms. I am the one to 
decide [on loan use]… But I inform him [her husband] of what I plan to do with the loan 
money. He advises me to use it properly. This is because I work hard. He trusts me because I do 
not abuse the loan money. So when I manage the finances, he is not discontent. He knows that I 
do the right thing.”  
Hence, it is possible that women’s business experience may play a role in loan allocation 
decisions within the household. Kabeer (2001) also found in Bangladesh that women with 
superior entrepreneurial skills influence loan use decision-making within households.  
 
d. Male out-migration 
In the OMFI study’s locations, it was found through the in-depth interviews that male out-
migration in search of employment in cities to affect intra-household decision-making on 
loans and related income differently. The negative effect was observed at the initial stage of 
male migration, because the loan fund may be used by men to cover transportation and the 
costs of settlement in the area of destination. The following case indicates how male out-
migration may contribute to women’s loss of control over a loan.  
Case 6.3   A husband’s disappearance with the loan fund  
Ms. SA is a young woman of only 22 years, and has two children. She is separated from her 
husband after he abandoned her in 2002. She joined the OMFI credit group initiated by her 
husband. She took her first loan (ETB 1000) from the loan office and she gave it to her 
husband. However, before the loan money was invested, her husband took the money and 
disappeared from the area, leaving her indebted. In order to repay her loan, she pawned part of 
her farm land, sold a heifer that was a gift from her father, and sold food crops. After settling 
her debt she left the credit group. Although it was three years since Ms. SA settled her loan, she 
did not get her land back until the time of this interview in 2005. Because of her borrowing, 
feeding her children became difficult for her. Her farm income declined because she pledged 
part of her fertile land to fulfil her loan repayment obligation. In addition, the income from her 
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other farm was inadequate for her family. It was cultivated through a sharecropping 
arrangement, since she did not use either adult male labour or a draught animal. In order to 
supplement her meagre farm income, she is engaged in mat-making, but has received hardly 
any assistance from her husband.  
 
Ms. SA also told a similar story, of a friend who passed away some time ago. Given the 
high level of male out-migration among the Gurages in search of business opportunities and 
the relatively larger number of programme dropouts on the OMFI locations, it is more 
likely that male out-migration plays a role in limiting women’s control over loan uses. 
Conversely, male out-migration seemed to strengthen women’s control over loans and 
related earnings, when the husband was away from home while the woman took the loan. 
This was observed among some polygamous women, whose husbands had migrated to 
urban areas in search of employment and had married another wife and settled partially.  
e. The nature of economic activity  
Intra-household decision-making on earnings from the loan-funded enterprises was also 
affected by the nature of the loan-funded activity. In-depth interviews with ACSI and 
OMFI borrowers clearly demonstrated that women had full authority over the income 
generated from female traditional occupations, such as petty trading, food processing, and 
local brewing. This is partly because they control all the stages of the enterprise production 
process, including marketing the products. With regard to income from the LF livestock 
fattening, the result was clear from ACSI in-depth interview participants. In most cases, 
men and women on the ACSI location tend to make joint decisions, but on the OMFI 
location, the result is mixed.  
 
f. MFI strategies  
The strategies of the MFI institutions have mixed implications for intra-household decision-
making on the uses of loans and LF enterprise income. The lending institutions provide 
credit to households through women, so that women participate in its allocation and 
associated decisions. According to some in-depth interview participants and focus group 
discussants, women influence loan-related household decisions mainly because they are the 
ones who brought the loan fund to the household. For example, one ACSI short-time 
borrower stated: “...because I borrowed the money, I have a part in the decision.” When 
asked what would have happened if the loan was in her husband’s name, she replied: “he 
[her husband] would decide by himself.” Another OMFI borrower also said, “I borrowed 
the money, so it is my right to decide on how to invest it”.  Some group discussants on both 
locations stressed that if loans would be given to men, women would have little room to 
participate in loan allocation decisions or to access the money. Therefore, for some women, 
access to credit in their names had contributed to their bargaining power regarding loan-
related decisions within the household.   
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
The study’s findings discussed in this chapter indicate that both the ACSI and OMFI female 
borrowers had a limited say in loan use decision-making within the household, but they did 
have significant authority regarding decisions on the uses of earnings from the LF 
enterprises, compared to their husbands. The fact that loans were given to women for a 
livestock-fattening (household) enterprise, which is traditionally a male domain of 
responsibility, men being the co-signatory for their wives’ borrowing, and men’s traditional 
responsibility as the head of the household might have contributed to men’s greater 
authority over loan use decision-making within both the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ 
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households. Furthermore, women borrowers may be forced to allow their husbands to 
decide on the uses of the loan fund because their cooperation is required in the running of 
the enterprise. Nevertheless, the study suggests that men’s influence on the uses of the loan 
fund does not necessary imply that men always use loans for their own activities, or that it 
is against the women’s preferences, as it is always assumed. This is partly because on both 
the ACSI and OMFI locations, loans were reported to be invested largely in the purpose 
approved by the MFI institutions, i.e. a livestock-fattening enterprise. In addition, except in 
a few cases, borrowers did not mention problems related to men’s dominant role in loan use 
decision-making, as their decisions were perceived as being in the interest of the household 
as a whole. For some women, credit in their own name had facilitated their influence on the 
uses of the loan fund. 
  
As already stated, both ACSI and OMFI women borrowers had a significant influence on 
the use of earnings derived from the newly established (and/or expanded) enterprises. ACSI 
borrowers had a significant authority over income from the LF household enterprises. 
Furthermore, OMFI borrowers had a similar level of influence over the use of earnings 
from the LF household enterprises with their husbands and they had considerable influence 
on the income derived from the LF off-farm enterprises. In addition, the patterns of 
decision-making in relation to LF enterprise income on the two locations vary 
systematically in some way. Among ACSI borrowers’ households, decision-making on 
income from the LF household enterprises involved men’s and women’s “independent” and 
“joint” decision-making, while among OMFI borrowers, this decision-making was largely 
characterized by men’s and women’s “independent” decision-making authority. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, on the ACSI location, household decision-making (such as on 
household property) is traditionally characterized by joint decision-making by couples, with 
a slight male dominance, while on the OMFI locations such decisions are traditionally 
made by men. However, the fact that 44 to 47 percent of the ACSI and OMFI women 
borrowers exercised a mostly independent decision-making over the income derived from 
LF household enterprises is suggestive of the contribution of microfinance to women’s 
empowerment. It is also important to note that the OMFI’ initial lending for female 
traditional occupations has contributed to women’s authority over LF enterprise earnings. 
The study also found the importance of forms of marriage in determining intra-household 
decision-making. Women in polygamous relationships had a significant influence on the 
way in which loans and incomes from the loan-funded enterprises were used within the 
household.   
 
The main policy implication of the study is that giving credit to a woman indeed improves 
women’s decision-making power, particularly over income from the LF enterprises. But as 
this study showed, women may exercise limited control over the way in which the loan 
fund should be spent when a loan is extended for investment in men’s traditional 
occupation, i.e. livestock fattening. Although women seemed not to worry so much about 
their husbands’ dominance in loan use decision-making, it is important that programmes 
ensure women’s participation in loan use decision-making within the household. If women 
exercise significant control over their loans, they may use part of their loans for 
independent income-generating activities, and also minimize the risks of loan 
misappropriation by men. 
 
The study suggests that giving credit to women may contribute to the valuation of women’s 
contribution within the household and may change existing gender stereotypes in economic 
activities, even when the loan is used for household-level or male traditional enterprises. It 
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is important to realize, however, that the same strategy may have a different impact in 
different socio-economic and cultural settings. This study has shown, for example, that 
giving credit to male-dominated enterprises may contribute little to women’s empowerment 
on OMFI locations where men and women traditionally exercise control over separate 
economic spheres. Women in this area who started accessing credit for traditionally male 
livestock-related enterprises mainly served as a conduit to bring a loan to the household and 
scarcely played a role in any of the decision-making. Hence, further research is required in 
different cultural and socio-economic settings to gain a better understanding of how 
households organize decision-making on loans and related income, and to determine the 
impact of microfinance on women’s empowerment.  
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CHAPTER 7  INTRA-HOUSEHOLD LABOUR 
ALLOCATION TO ENTERPRISES 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the organisation and the allocation of labour to the LF enterprises 
within ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. The chapter focuses mainly on labour 
allocation to the LF enterprises within the household, while Chapter 8 will examine the 
potential effects of women’s access to microfinance services on intra-household labour 
allocation (farming, domestic work, leisure). The chapter has three specific objectives. 
Firstly, it assesses the relative labour contributions of couples to the LF enterprises. 
Secondly, it investigates the factors determining intra-household labour allocation to the LF 
enterprises. It gives special consideration to the analysis of the gender- and age-based 
division of tasks in the LF enterprises, and assesses whether women’s participation in 
microfinance programmes has affected the traditional gender division of labour in relation 
to the loan-funded enterprises. The chapter also gives special attention to the potential 
effects of HIV/AIDS (proxied by illness and death) on the intra-household labour allocation 
to LF enterprises.   
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the focus of many empirical studies on microfinance and 
women’s empowerment has been primarily on non-labour dimensions of decision-making, 
such as the use of loans and enterprise profits, enterprise management, household financial 
decisions, mobility, contraceptive use, etc. As a result, to date, there has been only a limited 
systematic and in-depth analysis regarding how households organize and allocate their 
labour force around loan-funded enterprises. Few studies have used women’s labour 
contribution to the LF enterprises as a proxy indicator to assess other empowerment 
dimensions, such as control over loans (Goetz and Gupta, 1996) and accounting knowledge 
(Ackerly, 1995). According to these studies, women borrowers may significantly contribute 
their labour to loan-funded enterprises, but they may have little control over the product of 
their labour, due to their limited access to the market. Other studies have compared male 
and female loanees’ labour supply to market-oriented activities within the household and 
found that the gender of the loanees may determine the degree of men’s and women’s 
labour supply in market-oriented activities within the household (Pitt and Khandker, 1996). 
The result showed that women’s credit increases women’s time spent in market-oriented 
activities, while it reduces men’s time spent in market-oriented activities. The researchers 
interpreted the increase in women’s time spent in market-oriented activities as an aspect of 
empowerment. They based this interpretation on the presumption that an increase in a 
woman’s market-oriented activities has to be associated with the creation of self-
employment opportunities for a woman who had limited access to non-programme (non-
MFI) credit for income generation and wage employment opportunities compared to men.  
 
In addition, no systematic research has been done so far regarding the determinants of the 
degree to which men and women allocate their labour to LF enterprises within microfinance 
clients’ households. Studies have shown the prevalence of “gender segregation” in 
economic activities, which means that men and women borrowers engage in their 
respective traditional occupations (Hashemi et al., 1996; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 
2001). This may imply that when loans are used to finance female traditional occupations, 
women loanees may contribute more labour to loan-funded enterprises compared to men or 
the other way round. Others have examined how illness and death (also caused by the 
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HIV/AIDS pandemic) may reduce women loanees’ time spent on loan-related activities 
within the household (Barnes et al., 2003; Barnes, 2002). In some cases, health problems 
obliged women loanees to leave microfinance programmes (Johnson, 2005).   
 
This chapter is intended to provide a detailed insight into the organisation and distribution 
of household labour to LF enterprises within ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. It 
compares couples’ relative labour contributions to the LF enterprises, and analyzes detailed 
task divisions in relation to the LF enterprises. It also assesses the determinants of labour 
allocation to the LF enterprises. By making a comparative analysis, it attempts to provide 
insight into the importance of social norms and economic organisation for the way in which 
men and women allocate their labour to the LF enterprises. The chapter is based on two 
types of analysis: 1) a quantitative analysis on the basis of survey data, and 2) a qualitative 
analysis on the basis of the in-depth interviews and group discussions. The two methods of 
analysis are complementary and also have some differences in emphasis. The survey data 
are used to describe the patterns of intra-household labour allocation to the LF enterprises 
within ACSI and OMFI respondents’ households. In addition, based on the survey, an 
econometric model is estimated to identify factors affecting intra-household-labour 
allocation to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise in relation to OMFI. ACSI is excluded 
from such an analysis because of the limited variation in intra-household labour allocation 
among its borrowers. Furthermore, I have not estimated an econometric model for intra-
household labour allocation to the LF off-farm enterprises because of the small number of 
observations. The qualitative data analysis offers a more detailed account of intra-
household labour allocation to the LF enterprises, with special emphasis on gender, age, 
and HIV/AIDS variables, and compares labour allocation to the LF enterprises between the 
two observations. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis is used to interpret the results of the 
survey analysis. This chapter contributes to the answering of the research questions related 
to labour allocation and its determinants, including research questions 2 to 6.   
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 deals with the theoretical 
framework and discusses the various variables used in the regression analysis.  Section 7.3 
presents the empirical findings. The first and the second subsections present the descriptive 
findings, followed by the result of the estimated model. Subsection 7.3.3 discusses the 
findings of the in-depth interviews and group discussions. This subsection provides a 
detailed description of the tasks and related division of tasks within the household. 
Furthermore, it discusses the way chronic sickness and death within microfinance clients’ 
households may affect the intra-household labour allocation. Finally, section 7.4 
summarizes the discussion and the key conclusion of the study.   
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7.2 Conceptual framework  
The main dependent variable is intra-household labour allocation to the loan-funded 
livestock-fattening (household) enterprises. The variable shows a woman’s relative labour 
contribution to the LF livestock-fattening (household) enterprises vis-à-vis her husband. 
Intra-household labour allocation in the LF off-farm enterprises is not used in the estimated 
models because of the limited number of respondents who used loans for such enterprises. 
The variable was constructed following the survey questionnaire, which asked the female 
survey respondent to indicate “the contribution of labour by household members, namely 
the man, the woman, the girls, the boys, and others (including hired labourers) to the LF 
livestock fattening67”. The female survey respondent was given four response choices to 
choose from, ranging from high to medium, little, and none. After comparing the degree of 
women’s and men’s labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises, the 
variable intra-household labour allocation to the loan-funded livestock-fattening 
(household) enterprises was constructed. If neither of the spouses in a household 
contributed any labour to the enterprise, they were excluded from the comparison. If the 
contribution of the wife was lower than that of the husband, a value 1 was assigned; if the 
contribution of husband and wife were equal, a value 2 was given; and finally, if the 
contribution of the wife was higher than that of the husband, a value 3 was assigned. 
Greater value was attached to a woman’s higher labour contribution to the LF enterprises 
compared to her husband, while small value was assigned to women’s lower labour 
contribution compared to her husband. In this way, we constructed a rank-ordered variable 
that captures the relative labour contribution of men and women to the LF livestock-
fattening and off-farm economic enterprises.   
 
As already indicated in Chapter 4, the ACSI’s and OMFI’s credit in the studied areas has 
contributed to the expansion of individual and/or household economic portfolios. This has 
direct implications for the organization and distribution of labour to loan-funded enterprises 
within the household. The conceptual framework displayed in Figure 7.1 depicts the intra-
household labour allocation as an outcome of interrelated factors at individual, household, 
and societal levels. Women’s access to credit in their own name may contribute to the 
relative labour contribution of women to the loan-funded enterprises within the household, 
because loan-related activities may be considered women’s responsibility. The relative 
labour contributions of men and women to the LF enterprises may also vary, depending on 
the individual life cycle course (age), demography factors (family size), the forms of 
marriage, and the burden of disease and death (also caused by HIV/AIDS) within the 
household. Furthermore, membership duration in the credit programme may also have an 
effect on the relative labour contribution of women to the LF enterprises, compared to men. 
The description of the explanatory variables is presented in Chapter 5. The definition, the 
measurement and the hypothesized relationship between the independent and explanatory 
variables are discussed below.  
 
A woman’s age (AGE) is used as a proxy indicator for life experiences and physical 
capability. The earlier stage of the household or the woman’s life cycle may require women 
to spend more time doing child care activities than participating in the household 
production. This is based on the assumption that fairly young households are comprised of 
young couples who have younger children than older households. The second assumption is 
that older women may have more work and life experiences compared to younger women, 
                                                 
67The same question was asked in relation to the LF off-farm economic enterprises.  
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and as a result, they may contribute more labour to the household production. Old age may 
also imply physical deterioration and a limited capacity to work. However, given the 
possibility of an age gap between husband and wife68, in old couple households, a woman 
may be relatively younger and more capable of carrying out physically demanding 
activities compared to her husband. In young couple households, on the other hand, both 
men and women are likely to be physically capable but because of the possibilities of young 
children in such a household, a woman may be occupied with child care responsibilities and 
may contribute less to the household production. Various studies have shown that the 
presence of young children within the household reduces women’s participation in farm 
activities (Tu, 2002) or in income-generating activities (Cain et al., 1982). This could be in 
part because taking care of young children may reduce young women’s labour availability 
for economic activities. Hence, we hypothesize that a woman’s labour contribution to the 
LF livestock-fattening enterprises is expected to rise with her age within the household. The 
AGE data were collected in interval. A significant positive association was expected 
between a woman’s age and her labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening 
enterprises.  
 
Membership duration (DUR) refers to the number of years since a woman became a 
member of a credit group and accessed credit. It is designed to capture women’s exposure 
to and experience in the credit programme. Studies have shown a positive association 
between women’s membership duration in credit programmes and women’s empowerment 
(Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Hashemi et al., 1996). However, the link between women’s 
membership duration in a credit programme and their relative labour contribution to loan-
funded enterprises is still not clear. Nevertheless, we hypothesize a positive association, 
because a woman with more years in the credit programme may be empowered enough to 
control the overall loan-related production processes, including labour. In order to confirm 
the hypothesis, the outcome of this variable will be interpreted in relation to the previous 
chapter and the in-depth interviews. The variable DUR was collected in years. A positive 
and significant association was expected between a woman’s membership duration and her 
relative labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises.   
 
The form of marriage (MAR) is hypothesized to affect couples’ relative labour contribution 
to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. Married women are not a homogenous group. 
They can be grouped into two broad categories on the basis of the form of marriage, i.e., 
monogamy and polygamy69. Married women in different conjugal relations may also have 
different rights and obligations within the household (Warner et al., 1997). Women in 
polygamous households are primarily responsible for their own and their children’s 
maintenance, with little support from their husbands (Kandiyoti, 1988, Mayoux, 2001a). 
Women in a polygamous relationship are often expected to assume more economic roles to 
maintain their household, partly because resources owned by husbands are more likely to 
be shared among co-wives (Rahemeto, 1990), or they may have been abandoned by their 
husbands (Mandel, 2004). Hence, we assume that women in polygamous households get 
less assistance from their husbands in the LF livestock-fattening enterprise compared to 
women in monogamous households. The variable MAR is measured in a dummy variable, 
                                                 
68 The Ethiopian demographic and health survey has shown that in married couple’s households a wife is 
more likely to be younger than her husband (CSA and ORC Macro, 2000). 
69 Although a distinction can be made between senior and junior wives in polygamous households, this is not 
considered for the model because the proportion of women in polygamous households was small and cannot 
be further divided into two. However, in-depth interviews did take such variations into consideration.    
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in which 1 indicates polygamy and 0 indicates monogamy. A significant and positive 
coefficient was expected.   
 
Household size (HSZ) refers to the total number of people living in a household, including 
men, women, children, and other individuals. In agrarian economies, household labour 
allocation patterns depend largely on the availability of farm labour within the household. 
Household members are an important source of labour in smallholding farming, and larger 
families are more likely to provide more of the labour necessary for agricultural activities 
than small families per unit of output (Tesema, 2006). The household size may determine 
the way in which women allocate labour between domestic and farm activities in two ways. 
Firstly, large families can mobilize more labour for agricultural activities (LF livestock 
fattening) than small families. Large families may be in a better position to mobilize labour 
for fattening a relatively large number of livestock intensively, compared to small families. 
Secondly, a large family size may imply more domestic activities (more cooking) for 
women than for men. Hence, a larger family means more hands to work and more mouths 
to feed. This may suggest that a woman contributes less labour to the LF livestock-fattening 
enterprise because she engages in more domestic activities. The variable household size is 
constructed in interval. A negative significant association was expected between a large 
family size and women’s relative labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening 
enterprise within the household. 
 
Chronic illness (ILL) refers to serious sickness experienced by a borrower’s household 
within a year at the time of the survey. We hypothesize that serious sickness in the 
household may affect the individual labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening 
enterprise. Various studies in the developing countries have shown that adult illness in the 
rural areas affects the household labour allocation in economic activities  
(Ahmed, 2005; Barnett and Whiteside, 2002; Ilahi, 2001; Rugalema, 1999). In the context 
of HIV/AIDS, evidence suggests an inverse relationship between women’s participation in 
productive activities and domestic work (Barnett and Whiteside, 2002; FAO/IP, 2002; 
Rugalema, 1999). This means that the existence of an AIDS patient within the household is 
likely to oblige women to withdraw labour from productive activities, in order to take care 
of sick individuals within the household. Evidence has indicated that female microfinance 
clients are likely to give little attention to their loan-funded enterprises in order to take care 
of an AIDS patient within the household (Barnes et al., 2003; Barnes, 2002), and in some 
cases women give up their credit group membership due to illness within the household 
(Johnson, 2005; Parker et al., 2000). The variable illness is a dummy variable (the value 1 
represents the household experiencing serious illness and 0 represents otherwise). Because 
the survey data on sickness were neither disaggregated by gender nor by age, two 
alternative scenarios are hypothesized. Firstly, the coefficient may be significant and 
negative if a woman could not work because she was either sick or spent more time taking 
care of a non-adult sick person within the household. Secondly, the coefficient may be 
significant and positive if a woman contributes more labour to the LF livestock enterprises 
because her husband was sick and unable to work.  
 
In addition, as indicated in the figure, the wider institutional context, including the local 
gender divisions, socio-economic settings, and the MFIs’ strategies may play a significant 
role in determining intra-household labour allocation to the LF enterprises. For example, in 
many traditional societies, gender and age influence the way in which households allocate 
their members’ labour among various economic activities.   
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Figure 7. 1 The conceptual framework for labour allocation. 
 
The model 
The Ordered Probit Regression Model was used to analyze the data, since the dependent 
variable is ordered and takes three discrete values. A model was designed to identify the 
possible factors affecting the relative labour contributions of couples to the LF livestock-
fattening enterprises for the OMFI observation. It is important to note that couples’ relative 
labour contribution to the LF off-farm enterprises was excluded from such an analysis 
because of the limited number of observations. In addition, ACSI was excluded from this 
estimation because of the limited difference in labour allocation among the observations. 
Thus, the following model was designed for intra-household labour allocation in relation to 
the LF household enterprise for the OMFI observation only. 
OLC = (AGE, MDR, MAR, HSZ, ILL)           
Where 
OLC = represents the intra-household labour allocation to the LF livestock-fattening  
enterprises for the OMFI observation;   
AGE = the age of the respondent; 
DUR= the number of years that the respondent was a member of a credit  
group and accessed credit; 
MAR= the form of marriage in which the respondent is involved; 
HHS = the number of individuals who resided within a respondent’s household  
as a member of the household; 
ILL= the presence or absence of any individual who was sick within a year  
until the time of the survey.  
 
7.3  Empirical results and discussions  
7.3.1  Descriptive statistics 
a.Intra-household labour allocation to the LF livestock-fattening (household) enterprises 
Table 7.1 presents the relative labour contribution of couples to the LF livestock-fattening 
(household) enterprises.  
 
Wider institutional 
context 
Socio-economic setting, 
local custom including 
gender, MFI policies  
Intra-household labour 
allocation to LF enterprises  
Women’s access to 
credit 
Individual & household 
 factors 
Women’s age 
Membership duration 
Form of marriage 
Household size 
Chronic illness/death  
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Table 7. 1 Frequencies & percentage of couples’ relative labour contribution to the LF livestock 
fattening enterprise. 
Source: Survey 2004. 
Note: there is a significant difference (1%) between ACSI and OMFI borrowers (Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test). 
Percentage may not add up to exactly 100% due to rounding.  
 
As indicated in the table above, an overwhelming majority (94%) of ACSI borrowers 
contributed more labour to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises compared to their 
husbands (1%). It was only in 5 percent of the cases that men and women had an equal 
level of labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. This suggests that on 
the ACSI location, women contributed more labour to LF livestock enterprises compared to 
men. There are three plausible and complementary factors that may explain the reason for 
the increased labour contribution of women in LF livestock enterprises on this location. 
Firstly, women on the ACSI location are mostly available around the homestead, where 
livestock is stall-fed70, compared to men, who spend most of their time away from the 
homestead, either working on the household farm or attending public affairs or engaging in 
leisure-related activities. Secondly, most of the routine activities involved in intensive 
livestock fattening in the area, such as preparing homemade feeds, water fetching, and 
cleaning barren are traditionally done by women (and girls).  Finally, the significant labour 
input by (women) ACSI borrowers may also be explained in terms of the ACSI’s insistence 
that women should play an active role in the loan-funded enterprises. As the in-depth 
interview with ACSI staff members revealed, the main reason for targeting women is to 
promote women’s economic role within the household. 
 
On OMFI locations, slightly more than half (55%) of female OMFI borrowers had a greater 
labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises; in about 40 percent of the 
households, the labour contribution of husbands and wives was similar.  In about 5 percent 
of the cases, men and women had a similar level of labour contribution to the LF livestock-
fattening enterprises. Although the difference between men’s and women’s degree of 
labour contribution among OMFI borrowers was not as wide as observed with the ACSI, 
women still appeared to contribute more labour to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. 
This could be partly due to women’s traditional responsibility for the routine tasks involved 
in livestock fattening, including fetching water, cleaning barren, and collecting animal 
dung. In addition, mobility patterns such as male out-migration and polygamous marriage 
may explain women’s significant labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening 
enterprises. 
  
The Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test shows that there is a significant difference between the 
ACSI and OMFI observations in terms of the relative labour contribution of men and 
women to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise. This difference may largely arise from the 
differences between the two studied communities in terms of the economic importance of 
                                                 
70 Men often spend more time on the field, which is located away from the backyard, and in the public sphere 
and in recreational areas.  
 
ACSI OMFI   
Frequency % Frequency % 
More by men  1 1 21 40 
Equal for men and women 4 5 3 6 
More by women        78 94 29 55 
Total 83 100 53 101 
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livestock, local gender norms, mobility patterns, and MFIs’ strategies. Firstly, although in 
both the Amhara and the Gurage communities livestock is an integral part of the mixed 
farming economic system, it has a relatively greater economic importance as a source of 
cash earnings in the former. Secondly, on the Amhara location, livestock fattening is a 
labour-intensive undertaking, which involves a great deal of “traditional” female labour, 
compared to the Gurage locations. Thirdly, Gurage women are relatively more mobile than 
Amhara women because of their market engagement, and as a result, they may contribute 
less labour to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises compared to the Amhara women. 
Finally, the ACSI’s supervision and follow-up activities, which are carried out during the 
monthly centre meeting, may also promote and mobilize women’s labour for the loan-
funded livestock-fattening enterprises. The detailed labour allocation among ACSI and 
OMFI borrowers’ households will be discussed in subsection 7.3.3.  
 
b. Intra-household labour allocation to the LF off-farm enterprises 
Table 7.2 displays couples’ relative labour contributions to the LF off-farm economic 
enterprises mainly for the OMFI observation. The ASCI observation is not included in this 
analysis because in the survey, only three borrowers reported that they used part of their 
loans for off-farm economic activities.   
 
Table 7. 2 Frequencies and percentage of OMFI respondents by couples’ labour contribution to 
the LF off-farm enterprises. 
OMFI  
Frequency % 
More by men 4 10 
Equal for men and women  - 0 
More by women        17 81 
Total 21 100 
Source: Survey 2004. 
 
As the table shows, over 80 percent of OMFI borrowers had a greater labour contribution to 
the LF off-farm enterprises compared to that of men. In less than a fifth (19%) of the cases, 
men had contributed more labour to LF off-farm enterprises compared to their borrowing 
wives’ contribution. This is plausible given the OMFI’s initial focus on women business 
operators for its lending, and Gurage women’s long-standing history in petty trading 
activities. This labour allocation pattern may also suggest that most LF off-farm enterprises 
belong to women.  
 
7.3.2  The empirical model 
Table 7.3 displays the results of the ordered Probit regression analysis, which aims at 
explaining the relative labour contributions of husbands and wives. The model is only 
significant at the 5 percent level with an R² of 0.1253. The low level of significance of the 
model and the R² might be due to the small number of observations. For these reasons, we 
do not consider conventional levels of significance, but instead 15 and 20 percent. The 
model may not be enough to explain variations in couples’ labour contributions to the LF 
livestock fattening, due to unobserved individual and household characteristics that may 
influence intra-household labour allocation behaviour. Hence, these gaps are partly 
addressed through the in-depth interviews and the group discussions that follow the 
regression outcomes below.  
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Table 7. 3 The results of the regression analysis for the OMFI labour allocation. 
Note= * standard deviations are in parenthesis a: significant at 5%, b: significant at 15%.  
 
Women’s age (AGE) has a significant (p<.15) and positive effect on women’s relative 
labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. This entails that, with an 
increase in a woman’s age, it is more likely that a woman contributes more labour to the LF 
livestock-fattening enterprises compared to her husband.  
 
Membership duration (DUR) has a significant (p<.15) positive effect on the relative labour 
contribution of women to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise. This suggests that a 
woman’s labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises increases with a rise 
in a woman’s membership duration in the credit group/programme. This is because a 
lengthier duration of participation in a credit programme/group may improve a woman’s 
ownership of the enterprises and control over the overall enterprise production process. 
This should be interpreted in relation to the findings in Chapter 6, which suggested a 
positive association between membership duration in the credit programme and women’s 
control over income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. 
 
Form of marriage (MAR) has a significant (p<.05) positive effect on couples’ relative 
labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. This means that women in 
polygamous relationships are more likely to contribute more labour to the LF livestock-
fattening enterprises within the household, compared to women in monogamous 
households. This is in line with the initial hypothesis, which suggested that women in 
polygamous households are likely to be more responsible for the survival of their families 
and, as a result, contribute more labour to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises within the 
household. In addition, the irregular presence of men in such households may increase 
women’s responsibility for the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. In such households, 
men’s labour contribution may vary, depending on the residential arrangements and the 
position of their wives, which will be discussed in section 7.3.3. 
 
The variable household size (HHS) has no significant effect on the relative labour 
contribution of couples to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises within the household. The 
sign of the coefficient suggests a possible negative association between a large household 
size and women’s relative labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise 
compared to men.  The availability of labour in the form of assistance from children 
(particularly females), dependent and hired labourers in large families71 may imply less 
                                                 
71 In the area, some households hire boys to work on agricultural activities but they also regard them as 
household members, since such boys share the residence, meals, work, and other aspects of social life with the 
household members.     
Explanatory variable  Coefficient (Sd Dev)*  
Woman’s age .37(.24)b 
Membership duration .17 (11)b 
Forms of marriage .83 (.42)a 
Household size -.34 (.29) 
Chronic sickness  -.28 (.44) 
Number of observations    53 
LR chi2(5)       11.42 
Prob > chi2     0.0437       
Pseudo R2        0.1253                                                  
Log likelihood -39.834796                        
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labour to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise by women compared to her husband. The 
other reason for the negative association between the variable household size and women’s 
relative labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise could be related to 
women’s increased time spent in domestic activities because of large family size.  
   
Chronic Illness (ILL) has no significant effect on couples’ labour contribution to the LF 
livestock-fattening enterprises. However, the coefficient sign is negative, and it may 
suggest that borrowers who experience chronic illness within their households may reduce 
their labour contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises compared to women who 
did not experience chronic illness within their households. This could be due to a burden of 
disease, or women’s traditional care-giving responsibility when non-adult household 
members fall sick.  
 
In summary, the result of the regression analysis shows that women’s age, women’s 
membership duration in the credit programme, and the forms of marriage may determine 
the relative labour contributions of couples to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises within 
OMFI borrowers’ households. 
 
In the subsequent subsection, the results from the in-depth interviews and the group 
discussions are discussed in more detail.  
 
7.3.3  The results from the in-depth interviews and focus group discussions 
This subsection discusses the qualitative data about intra-household labour allocation in 
relation to the two types of LF enterprises, i.e. livestock fattening and off-farm economic 
activities. It particularly sets forth detailed task descriptions involved in these enterprises, 
and analyzes the roles played by different household members. It examines the relative 
workload of men and women, and assesses whether women’s access to credit has changed 
the traditional division of tasks in relation to the LF enterprises. The similarities and the 
differences between the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households in terms of the 
organization and allocation of household labour to the LF enterprises are highlighted. 
Furthermore, based on a few cases of borrowers who experienced chronic illness and deaths 
within their households, this subsection examines the possible effects of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic on the intra-household labour allocation to the LF enterprises within ACSI and 
OMFI clients’ households.  
 
a.Intra-household labour allocation to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise 
Livestock fattening involves a range of activities, including tending, collecting fodder, 
fetching water, watering, preparing homemade feeds, feeding, collecting dung, cleaning the 
barn, bathing the oxen, vaccination, marketing, supervision, and management (Table 7.4. 
and Table 7.5.). These activities are carried out to different extents, depending on the 
importance of livestock in the household and societal economies. In the studied areas, 
livestock-fattening activities can be broadly categorized into three major phases. During the 
first phase, the loan-funded livestock (often oxen) is used for farming and does not get any 
special treatment. During the dry months (April and May), crop residues and natural 
pastures provide the major sources of animal feed, while during the wet months (July and 
August), communal pasture and farmlands provide sources of livestock feed. During the 
second phase, the loan-funded livestock is partly confined to the homestead72 and is fed 
                                                 
72 It is common that livestock and humans share the same house but stay in different compartments.  
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with grasses, weeds, enset and maize leaves73, and the like. The third period involves an 
intensive livestock fattening where the loan-funded livestock is stall-fed and regularly gets 
different kinds of feeds, including factory by-products (such as oil cakes), crop residues, 
grass, enset and maize leaves, and homemade feeds (Kita and dreg). Intensive livestock 
fattening involves feeding and watering the livestock on average three to five times a day, 
and cleaning the animal barn everyday or every other day. 
In the studied areas, livestock-fattening tasks are allocated to different household members 
across gender (also age) lines, and broadly grouped into “shared” tasks and “gender-
specific” tasks. A “shared” or “gender-neutral” task refers to a task that is undertaken by 
different household members, regardless of age and gender differences. A “gender-
specific” task refers to a task that is exclusively assigned to a specific gender group, either 
female or male. Tasks in these categories are rigidly defined, and as a result, it is unlikely 
for individuals to assume tasks assigned to the opposite gender. In the studied areas, 
women’s “gender-specific” tasks in livestock fattening have three key characteristics: they 
are mostly located around the homestead, and they are routine and low-status jobs. Men’s 
“gender-specific” tasks, on the other hand, have contrasting characteristics: they are mostly 
located in the public sphere, and they are less of a routine and high-profile (managerial) 
task.  
 
The ACSI  location 
Table 7.4 presents the patterns of task division in the LF livestock-fattening enterprise 
among ACSI borrowers’ households. As shown in the table, all household members74 are 
involved in the activities of livestock fattening, with some variation across age and gender 
lines. All household members look after livestock, collect weeds (fodder), fetch water, and 
feed and water livestock. Yet, women contributed relatively more labour to some of the 
“shared” tasks, especially to fetching water, and watering and feeding livestock, compared 
to other household members. This is partly because, traditionally, women and girls are 
responsible for water fetching within the household, while men and grown-up boys assist 
when there is a shortage of “female” labour due to illness and maternity, and also 
depending on the availability of donkeys for water transportation. Women also contributed 
more labour compared to other household members  
(including men) to feeding and watering the animals, particularly during the intensive 
livestock-fattening phase, due to their limited mobility. Amhara women spend more time 
around the homestead, where the loan-funded animal is fully or partially confined.  Men, on 
the other hand, spend little daytime at the homestead because most farmlands are located 
some distance away from it. Coupled with men’s role in community affairs and leisure 
activities, men are less likely to spend more time at the homestead (especially in the 
daytime) to carry out activities related to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 Enset and maize are mainly available in OMFI locations.  
74 This refers to individuals who are capable of engaging in some work. 
Intra-household labour allocation to enterprises 
128 
 Table 7. 4    The ACSI households’ task division in the livestock-fattening enterprise. 
Source: Compiled from in-depth interviews 2005. 
Note *  √√ denotes more work;  √ refers to some contribution and infrequent work. 
 
Gender-specific tasks: both men and women in ACSI borrowers’ households carry out 
tasks that are socially “appropriate” for their respective gender. Women and girls were 
exclusively responsible for collecting animal dung, cleaning the animal barn, and 
preparing homemade feeds (baking kita75 and local brewing76). These activities are 
labelled as yeset sira, which literally means “female task”. With regard to such 
activities, a woman traditionally hardly demands or even expects assistance from her 
husband and boys, because of the strong association of the chores with being “female”. 
When a long-time ACSI borrower was asked whether her husband assists her in animal 
dung collection, she replied, “how can a man clean dung? That is for a woman! It is 
shameful in our culture”! The tone of her response as well as its content conveyed a 
very strong message that such a job is strictly for women, not for men. Cleaning the 
animal barn is one of the dirtiest, inferior, and routine activities of the livestock-
fattening enterprise. On the ACSI location, animal sheds are cleaned every day 
(sometimes twice a day) throughout the fattening period. This is not only to protect the 
health of the livestock, but also that of human beings, who in some cases share a house 
with the livestock. Women and girls collect, bake, dry, and store animal dung for the 
household energy supply, and to generate petty cash income.  
 
On the ACSI location, women play a vital role in the preparation of animal feeds, 
particularly during the intensive livestock-fattening period, regardless of the length of their 
membership duration in the credit programme. During such a period, women (assisted by 
girls) prepare homemade supplementary animal feeds. They bake kita almost on a daily 
basis, and brew local drinks (areke) every week or fortnight, to provide the dreg or the 
sediments (atela) to the loan-funded livestock. The in-depth interviews revealed that in 
three cases (out of 12), sons and male hired labourers were involved in female tasks, mainly 
kita baking. In the first case, boys assisted their sister in baking animal feed since their 
mothers were not capable to do such a job because of a health problem. In the second case, 
the household was a relatively better-off household that could afford to mobilize hired 
                                                 
75 Kita is a home-made supplementary feed prepared by women. It is baked from maize and sorghum flour.  
76 Women brew local alcohol in relation to the LF livestock- fattening enterprises. They sell the alcohol to 
generate cash income for monthly compulsory savings and provide the by-product or dreg (atela) for animal 
feed.    
List of tasks household member degree of engagement* 
 Husband  Wife   Boy   Girl 
Tending livestock   √ √ √√ √ 
Cutting and collecting fodder √√ √ √ √ 
Baking animal feed - √√ - √ 
Local brewing  - √√ - √ 
Feeding – involves mixing feeds √ √√ √ √ 
Water fetching √ √√ √ √√ 
Watering √ √√ √ √ 
Dung collection &  cleaning barren    - √√ - √ 
Washing the animal  √ - - - 
Marketing √√ √ - - 
Vaccination  √ - - - 
Management of livestock √ - - - 
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labourers for agricultural activities. In the third case, boys assisted their mother in baking 
animal feed because their mother was too busy with domestic activities because of the large 
size of the family. In all of these cases, the contribution of males to this traditional female 
activity was an irregular incidence that emerged out of necessity during critical times. 
 
On the ACSI location, men’s “gender-specific” tasks include mowing grass, vaccination, 
bathing livestock, buying manufactured feeds (oil cakes), marketing livestock, and the 
supervision and management of livestock. Men mobilize household labour (including 
women’s labour) for livestock-fattening work, supervise whether the livestock gets enough 
feed and water, and regularly monitor its weight. As one ACSI borrower put it, “the man is 
the manager of the animal”. Men are also responsible for the handling of livestock-related 
issues in the public sphere, including the purchase of feeds, vaccination, and marketing 
livestock. Most of these activities (washing animals, vaccination, buying animal feed, and 
marketing animals) are non-routine activities, which are performed a few times (or some 
activities may not even be carried out al all) throughout the livestock-fattening period. 
Women only assume a management role in the livestock-fattening enterprise in the absence 
of men, or when men are unable to assume these roles due to health problems, old age, or a 
lack of interest. 
 
Livestock marketing is one of the important gender-specific tasks for men. It is one of the 
strategic tasks in the livestock-fattening enterprise, which involves financial decisions: the 
buying and selling of livestock. Although involvement in the livestock market creates an 
opportunity for women to experience the public sphere, to acquire marketing skills, monitor 
loan uses, and gain control over associated earnings, they were unable to do so for several 
reasons. These included cultural constraints, male dominance, lack of interest, and lack of 
negotiation skills. The survey findings (Appendix 7.1), the in-depth interviews, and the 
group discussions revealed that men played a considerable role in livestock marketing. 
However, because of their access to credit in their names, a small group of women (a fifth) 
began to participate in livestock marketing, partly because they did not trust their husbands. 
As Case 6.2 in the previous chapter showed, penetrating this gendered space was not easy 
for women due to male dominance.  
 
Analysis of the work burden and associated benefits 
During in-depth interviews, men and women were consulted to evaluate their relative work 
burdens in relation to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. All the long-time ACSI 
borrowers and spouses who were interviewed in-depth ubiquitously stressed that women 
had a greater work burden in the LF livestock-fattening enterprises than men. As shown 
earlier, this could be partly influenced by the social norm, which ascribes the most routine 
livestock-fattening tasks to women. In addition, women take on more work even in the 
gender-neutral tasks, partly due to their limited mobility compared to men, and also when 
their husbands are unable to work because of a health problem or old age. They were close 
to home and therefore available to look after the LF livestock. It is also plausible to suggest 
that women undertake more work in the LF livestock enterprises because they took the loan 
in their name, and as a result, they want to maintain their social and institutional reputation 
by working hard. Short-time borrowers did not emphasise their work burden, which could 
be due to their relatively small investment in the LF livestock-fattening enterprises, the few 
times they took a loan.    
 
In the previous chapter, it was discussed that the majority (75%) of the ACSI borrowers had 
significant authority over the uses of income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. 
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In-depth interviews also showed that women contribute a significant amount of labour to 
the loan-funded livestock-fattening enterprises and also exercise at least “joint” decision-
making power over income derived from the same source. However, a forth of the ACSI 
borrowers had little control over the income from the LF enterprises, although they may 
have made a significant labour contribution to the LF enterprise.  
 
The OMFI locations  
Table 7.5 presents the patterns of task division of the LF livestock-fattening enterprises 
among OMFI borrowers’ households. As presented in the table, similar to the ACSI 
borrowers, livestock fattening involves tending livestock, mowing fodder77, fetching water, 
feeding, collecting animal dung and cleaning the barn, bathing the animal, livestock 
marketing, supervision and management. Similar to the Amhara location, on the Gurage 
locations livestock fattening involves both “shared” and “gender-specific” tasks. Activities 
such as tending, watering, and feeding loan-funded animals are “shared” tasks, which are 
mostly carried out by all capable household members, with some difference in the degree of 
individual engagement across gender and age lines. Except for water fetching, men and 
boys carry out most of the “shared” tasks, including cutting and collecting fodder, tending 
livestock, and watering and feeding the animals. Children look after livestock starting at an 
age as young as five. The broader traditional gender division of labour in the studied areas 
may largely explain the gender difference in the “shared” tasks: agriculture is seen as men’s 
sphere and domestic chores and, partly, trading as women’s domains,. Men, boys, and hired 
male labourers carry out most of the “shared” tasks, while women are largely responsible 
for fetching water, as it falls within their domestic work domain. In addition, the 
organization of the local economies including the farming system and trading activities tend 
to shape the relative labour contribution of couples to the “shared” task. It was described in 
Chapter 4 that Gurage men carry out agricultural activities near the homestead, where the 
home gardens and other farmlands are located, while their wives are often away from the 
homestead to engage in market activities outside their villages. Because men spend most of 
their time within the compound, they are strategically located to do most of the “shared” 
tasks. In-depth interviews revealed that women traders tend to assume fewer roles in the 
“shared” tasks compared to non-traders. On the other hand, the level of labour contribution 
to the LF livestock fattening also varies, depending on the regular presence or absence of 
men within the household. When men are away from the homestead, women often take on 
much of the responsibilities of the “shared” tasks. In other words, women tend to assume 
more roles related to the “shared” tasks if their husbands are away from home for some 
reason. Particularly women in a polygamous union appeared to assume more responsibility 
in the “shared” tasks if their husbands lived with other co-wives in other areas. Again, 
similar to the ACSI location, the availability of men and women around the homestead is an 
important factor that determines the relative labour contributions of men and women to the 
LF livestock-fattening enterprises.  
 
                                                 
77 On the OMFI location, maize and enset provide major sources of animal fodder.  
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Table 7. 5  The OMFI households’ task division in the livestock-fattening enterprise. 
Source: In-depth Interviews 2005. 
Note *:  √√ denotes more work;  √ refers to some contribution and infrequent work. 
 
Gender-specific roles: similar to the Amhara location, some activities in livestock 
fattening are rigidly defined across gender and age lines. Females are exclusively 
responsible for dung collection and cleaning the animal barn, and in a few cases process 
local alcohol to provide the by-product or the dreg (atela) to the loan-funded livestock. 
Women collect dung on a daily basis and clean the animal barn on average every two days. 
A few women process local drinks to provide the by-product to the livestock, while at the 
same time generating petty cash income from the sale of the alcohol. In general, women on 
the OMFI locations are not expected to prepare special homemade feeds for the livestock, 
unlike women on the ACSI location. This could be partly because livestock fattening is less 
intensive, and may partly be due to the availability of maize and perennial crops such as 
enset, which provides a vital source of animal feeds in the area.  
 
Men and grown-up boys are in charge of cutting fodder and washing the livestock, while 
marketing the livestock, vaccination, and the overall management of the loan-funded 
animals is the sole responsibility of the husband, unless the household is polygamous. 
Senior wives in a polygamous marriage may undertake these activities, assisted by sons or 
relatives, when their husbands mostly live with other co-wives in other areas.  
Similarly to the ACSI borrowers, the survey findings, the in-depth interviews, and the focus 
group discussion in the OMFI location have demonstrated that women had a limited 
involvement in livestock marketing. However, women in a polygamous union, particularly 
if their husbands live in far-away places with other co-wives, often go to the market to buy 
and sell loan-funded livestock. Such women get assistance from elder sons or male 
relatives, who escort the livestock to and from the market, and negotiate prices on their 
behalf. The women get consulted in the price negotiation process and handle the finances in 
the market. This may imply that women’s participation in livestock marketing partly arises 
from the absence of men, who will not perform the work. Similar to the ACSI location, 
group discussants in OMFI locations identified some of the key reasons for women’s 
limited participation in livestock marketing. These included cultural constraints, a lack of 
trust in men, women’s lack of interest, and men’s responsibility for the loan repayment. 
Men’s dominance was not mentioned as a possible reason by group members, but it was 
noted that men do not want their wives to accompany them to the livestock market, in order 
to avoid any “shame” and “humiliation” associated with women’s involvement in the 
livestock market.  
Degree of engagement* List of tasks 
Husband Wife  Boy  Girl 
Tending livestock   √√ √ √√ √ 
Cutting and collecting fodder   √√  √ √√ - 
Water fetching √ √√ √ √√ 
Watering √√ √ √√ √ 
Local brewing - √   
Feeding √√ √ √ √ 
Cleaning barren and dung collection - √√ - √ 
Washing the animal √√  √ - 
Vaccination  √ - - - 
Marketing √√ √ - - 
Management of livestock  √√ √ - - 
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Analysis of the work distribution: unlike on the ACSI location, on the OMFI location, the 
livestock-fattening enterprise was not very intensive and both men and women often saw 
the activity very lightly. As stated earlier, men’s and women’s relative labour contribution 
to the LF livestock-fattening enterprises tend to vary, depending on their availability around 
the homestead. Men seem to assume more work in the LF livestock-fattening enterprise 
when they spend more time around the homestead doing farm work, and when their wives 
participate in other loan-related market activities.  
 
The relative labour contribution of men and women in polygamous households was 
complex to capture from the in-depth interviews, in part because the few polygamous 
women included in the in-depth interviews had variable characteristics. This makes any 
conclusion difficult. Generally speaking, in polygamous households, the relative labour 
contribution of couples to livestock-fattening enterprises seemed to depend on the 
residential arrangements. A polygamous woman is unlikely to get support from her husband 
if he spends most of his time, days or months with another co-wife (or co-wives) in other 
localities. Some senior wives in polygamous households are de facto household heads, in 
the sense that their husband contributed little to the well-being of the women and her 
children.  
 
The in-depth interviews did not reveal a clear pattern regarding the relation between 
women’s decision-making over income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprise and their 
labour contribution to the LF livestock enterprise. Yet, it was evident that short-time 
borrowers had little influence on income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises, even 
if they contributed labour to the enterprises. However, most of the long-time or repeated 
borrowers seemed to have at least an equal say over the fruit of their labour.   
 
Regional comparison   
As discussed above, in both the studied communities, livestock fattening is a joint 
household business to which all capable household members contribute their labour. In 
addition, in both societies livestock fattening involves “gender-specific” and “shared” tasks. 
Both the ACSI and OMFI borrowers were in charge of tasks that are inferior and routine, 
while their husbands were responsible for tasks that are managerial and public. Women had 
a limited involvement in livestock marketing, due in part to cultural constraints that shape 
attitudes about the socially “appropriate” gender space for men and women.  
In the two societies, couples’ relative labour contribution to LF livestock-fattening 
enterprises appeared to vary for two complementary reasons. Firstly, in-depth interviews 
revealed that the female ACSI borrowers were mostly responsible for the routine “gender-
neutral” or “shared” tasks, and as a result, they had a heavier work burden compared to 
their husbands. On the OMFI location, on the other hand, men were largely responsible for 
carrying out these activities. The difference can be explained in terms of the difference 
between the two communities regarding the importance of livestock in the cash economy, 
men’s and women’s mobility patterns, and the broader gender division of labour in the two 
studied communities. As stated before, because the female ACSI borrowers spend most of 
their time around the homestead, they assume more responsibilities in livestock fattening, 
while the contribution of the female OMFI borrowers in livestock-fattening enterprises 
seemed to vary depending on their involvement in other loan-funded enterprises. Hence, the 
extent of individual involvement in the “shared” tasks was largely determined by the 
availability of men and women close to the homestead. Furthermore, a livestock-fattening 
enterprise on the Amhara location was an intensive venture, which required the preparation 
of various feeds by women, while on the Gurage locations, such practice ware very limited.  
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The ACSI and OMFI borrowers showed a slight difference with regard to their authority 
over the fruit of their labour. Regardless of their membership duration with the credit 
programme, the ACSI borrowers tend to be rewarded for their significant labour 
contribution in the LF livestock-fattening enterprise, while among OMFI borrowers, this 
was not clearly evident from the in-depth interviews. 
 
b. Intra-household labour allocation to the LF off-farm enterprises  
As described in Chapter 4, the economy of the OMFI location (the Gurage area) is 
dominated by trade and commerce. The female OMFI borrowers were involved in various 
economic activities to generate income, including trading in agricultural products, local 
brewing, food processing (injera), enset processing, and mat weaving (jiba). The following 
paragraph discusses the organization and the allocation of labour in relation to women’s 
off-farm LF economic activities, by presenting three individual cases (two with regard to 
the OMFI and regarding the ACSI).   
 
Case 7.1  Labour allocation in diversified LF economic activities  
Ms. WT is in her early 30s. She is married and has four daughters (13, 10, 7, and 3 years old). 
At the time of the study, she is pregnant with her 5th child. Before she joined the OMFI credit 
group, Ms. WT used to brew local alcohol to generate petty cash income in order to cover 
domestic expenses. She joined OMFI saving and credit group in 1998, at the advent of the 
OMFI extension of credit for off-farm operators in her locality. Since then, she has borrowed 
for about eight years. In the first four years, she used her loans exclusively for her independent 
income-generating activities. Following OMFI’s shift of emphasis to agricultural loans for 
livestock fattening, she began to use the major part of her loan fund for the intended investment. 
The size of her loan fund increased over the years from ETB 500 in 1998 to ETB 2500 in 2005. 
In addition to this agricultural-related investment, her access to OMFI loans enabled Ms. WT to 
expand and set up various income-generating activities. Ms. WT is involved in four types of 
micro-business, which include trading in agricultural products, baking injera, brewing alcohol, 
and mat making.  
She trades in agricultural products in three areas and markets, namely Enseno (on Saturdays), 
Meshig (on Thursdays), and Butajira (on Fridays). Enseno is located in the neighbouring 
Mareko district, while the last two markets are located within the studied district of Meskan. 
Ms. WT travels to these markets on foot, together with other merchants. It takes her two hours 
on average to reach the Butajira market and four hours to reach the Enseno and Meshig 
markets. She uses a donkey, which she bought with the aid of her OMFI loans, to transport her 
tradable goods. She usually gets up early in the morning, at 3:00 am, to undertake her domestic 
responsibilities and some market-oriented activities, before departing for the market around 
9:00 am. She often gets back home from the market by 8:00pm at the latest. Her household 
members do not have any direct role in her trading. But when she is late coming home from the 
market, her husband fetches her on the way and escorts her home.   
 
Ms. WT brews local alcohol twice a week to sell in the local market. She is responsible for most 
activities involved in brewing, with crucial support from her eldest (13-year-old) daughter. Her 
daughter assists in activities related to the preparation of brewing ingredients, in the distillation 
process, and in the marketing of the local alcohol produced. She gets minor help from her 
husband fetching water and preparing fuel wood during the distillation process.   
 
She also bakes injera (local bread), which she sells on the local market. Ms. WT is responsible 
for undertaking almost all activities in injera baking, assisted by her daughter. The contribution 
of her husband is, again, limited to fetching water and preparing fuel wood. Ms. WT bakes 
injera up to four days a week, using a traditional three-stone open fire stove. She bakes an 
average 70 injera at a time, enough for 70 people. She sells injera two days a week (on Monday 
and Tuesday) on the markets located within an hour’s distance each from her village. Her 
daughter also supplies injera on the Saturday market, together with the local alcohol.   
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Ms. WT also used her loan for making jiba, a traditional carpet, which she weaves from the 
enset plant. She undertakes this activity during her “leisure time” and during non-market days, 
and in the evening. She hardly gets assistance from her household members during this activity 
because they do not have the skill.   
 
With regard to income, Ms. WT earned the highest (ETB 534) monthly income from LF off-
farm enterprises described in Chapter 5. She mostly decides over the use of her earnings herself, 
but she also consults her husband.    
 
The above case shows that Ms. WT is fully engaged in market activities; even during 
her leisure time she works. She is one of the dynamic women aggressively and 
diligently engaged in several businesses. She was able to diversify her independent 
income sources because of her access to OMFI credit. She managed and implemented 
her LF economic enterprises with little assistance from her husband. She was fully 
involved in her businesses and used to spend most of her daytime in the market, 
exposed to the sun for many hours. Her young daughter usually assists in the local 
alcohol processing and marketing, despite the risks of exposure to open fire and alcohol 
at a young age. The assistance she received from her husband in her business was 
limited. Ms. WT toiled a lot to make ends meet. She earned relatively the highest gross 
monthly income, compared to other borrowers who used their income for a similar 
purpose. She also had authority over her income, with little interference from her 
husband.    
 
Case 7.2 From “laborious” to “light” business      
Ms. SY is in her late 30s, married with three children. She lives in a monogamous household 
after the death of her co-wife a long time ago. Prior to OMFI, she was involved in the sugarcane 
trade, which she used to finance by borrowing money from local money lenders at a weekly 
interest rate of 4 percent. She regards the sugarcane trade as a physically demanding task, 
because it involves the loading and unloading of bundles of sugarcanes. Ms. SY joined an 
OMFI saving and credit group in 1998, immediately following the advent of OMFI in her 
Kebele. Until 2005, she borrowed money for about eight years, which she used to finance her 
trading, livestock fattening and crop production activities. Over the years, her loan size 
increased from ETB 300 in the first year to ETB 1500 during the eighth year. Due to her access 
to an OMFI loan, she changed her business from the physically demanding sugarcane trading to 
the relatively “easy” pepper trading. She also increased her trading capital from about ETB 50 
in sugarcane trading to about ETB 400 in pepper trading. During 2004 and 2005, Ms. SY did 
not use her OMFI loan for trading, because she had already built the capital she needed for 
trading, due to her borrowing from OMFI.  
 
Ms. SY is responsible for carrying out her trading with little or no direct support from her 
household members. She trades on three markets, namely Butajira (on Fridays), Kella (on 
Saturdays), and Hamus Gebya (on Thursdays), located within the Meskan district at a walking 
distance of about 2-3 hours each from her village. She walks to these markets on foot but she 
often uses public transport on the way back home, and she transports her goods to and from the 
market with a donkey bought from her loan money. Ms. SY gets up early in the morning 
(around 5:00 am) to attend to her domestic responsibilities, such as water fetching, food 
preparation, etc, before she leaves for the market. She controls her trading income. 
 
The above and another, similar case indicate that access to credit had created an 
opportunity for women to make choices, which was previously constrained by a lack of 
finances. They now could also engage in a less arduous economic activity. In addition 
to changing to a relatively “convenient” business, Ms. SY increased her business capital 
to an amount eight times higher than she made from her previous sugarcane trading. 
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Furthermore, she built her capital for her trading, and reduced her dependency on MFI 
loans for her business. 
   
Ms. SY trades without any direct support from her household members, because petty 
trading usually is an individual undertaking. She also independently decides on the 
income generated from her business.  
 
Case 7.3 expanding an existing business  
Ms. ST is 35 years old, married and has three children. She joined an ACSI credit and saving 
group in 2003, in order to access credit to pay for fertilizer, and also to finance her petty 
trading. Before ACSI’s loan, she used to borrow money from traditional money lenders, who 
charge an exorbitant interest rate of 5 percent per week, to finance her petty trading. She took 
her third loan in 2005. The size of her loans increased from ETB 500 during the first year to 
ETB 2000 in the third year. She mostly uses her loan for agriculture-related investments. Every 
year, however, she spends 5 to 10 percent of her loan fund on her petty trading and local 
brewing enterprises. She increased her independent business capital from about ETB 50 in 2003 
to ETB 200 in 2005. She also expanded her markets from two markets before she gained access 
to credit to about five markets after she gained access to the ACSI’s credit. Ms. ST did not want 
to invest more capital in her business because she did not want to travel long distances and 
spend nights away from home to do business. The reason was the family responsibility she felt.  
 
Ms. ST trades onions and lemons in very small quantities. In one market she invests ETB 45 to 
buy 20 kilograms of onions and 2-3 kilograms of lemon, from which she earns a gross profit of 
about ETB 15-20 plus grain78, which she uses for her local brewing business. She trades on six 
markets located in four locations, namely Enewari town (on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and 
Saturdays), Kersa village (on Sundays), Deneba town (on Thursdays), and Anchikorer town (on 
Wednesdays). The first two markets are located within the Moretena Juru district where this 
research was carried out, while the last two are located in two different neighbouring districts. 
Ms. ST walks to all the markets on foot, and it takes her 1 hour to reach Kersa, 2 hours to reach 
Enewari and Deneba, and 3 hours to reach the Anchikorer market. She uses public transport 
only when she returns home from the Enewari and Deneba markets, since these areas are 
accessible by public transport. She often carries her tradable goods to and from the different 
markets. Other than the support she gets from her daughters (12 and 14 years old) in the 
transportation of the tradable items to one of the nearby markets, Kersa, she does not get any 
assistance from her household members in her trading.   
 
Ms. ST started local alcohol brewing due to her access to credit. She invests as small an amount 
as ETB 40 in her local brewing business. Fortnightly, she process about 12 litters of local 
alcohol for the market, from which she earns only ETB 10. As already indicated in case 7.1, 
local alcohol brewing involves preparing and processing local ingredients, performing the 
distillation processes, and marketing. She spends one to two days performing the distillation 
process, to produce 12 litters of local alcohol drink. In this enterprise, she gets some assistance 
from her daughters in water fetching and dry animal dung collection, while the assistance from 
her husband is limited to cutting fuel woods.  
 
Ms. ST earns a gross average income of ETB 45-65 per week from the two enterprises, and she 
herself solely decides how to spend it.  
       
Ms. ST’s and another, similar case represent the extent of diversification in a woman’s 
economic activities on the ACSI location, and clearly demonstrate the limited off-farm 
income-generating opportunities for women (as well as for men) in the area. Local 
alcohol brewing is the most common off-farm income-generating activity for both 
                                                 
78 There is a bartering marketing system, where people exchange in kind.  
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ACSI borrowers and non-borrowers. In addition, the fact that Ms. ST travels on foot for 
up to 3 hours, carrying tradable goods, clearly illustrates that the volume of her business 
is very small. Yet, this woman does not want to inject more money in her business in 
order to expand, due to her domestic responsibilities. Like the other cases described 
above, Ms. ST is solely responsible for undertaking the activities involved in her petty 
trading and local brewing enterprises and also fully controls the fruit of her labour.  
 
The case histories discussed above have offered detailed information on how women 
(households) organize and allocate their labour in the LF off-farm enterprises. They 
demonstrated that female off-farm operators are overwhelmingly responsible for 
undertaking the tasks involved in such enterprises within the household. In households 
where women had invested loans in multiple off-farm loan-funded economic activities, 
girls appeared to make both a direct and an indirect labour contribution to the LF 
enterprises, while the assistance from male household members was limited. The reason 
for this may be that activities such as local brewing and food processing are an 
extension of women’s domestic responsibilities, and are portrayed as “female” 
occupations. For men to be involved in such activity is socially “degrading”. As one of 
the cases showed, a female child was obliged to engage in a risky venture just because 
she is female. It is also important to point out that domestic labour shifts to daughters 
when women are away to the market (this will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter).  
 
The cases discussed above and several other cases suggest that women who used loans 
for a diversified generation of income had a greater workload than those women, who 
used loans for single economic activities. In instances of the former, the women were 
engaged in market activities at least three days a week, while in examples of the latter 
women’s market involvement was limited to a maximum of three markets a week. On 
the other hand, credit helped some women to change their business from a laborious to 
a relatively “easy” one. For all the cases, however, access to credit had increased 
women’s market activities. Travelling and transporting goods to various markets 
consumes women’s time and energy. As shown in the cases, women traders travel on 
average one to four hours each single trip to reach a given market. For instance, the 
woman described in case 7.1 was travelling a total of twenty-five hours (five hours a 
day) on average to five markets per week. Although public transport was not available 
to reach all the rural markets, even when it was available, women do not often use such 
a service because they prefer to spend such money on their households.  
 
The other issue common to all the cases presented above was related to women’s ability to 
exercise control over their earnings. The income generated from their enterprises was small 
compared to the time and the energy they spend on their business. Nevertheless, given 
women’s limited access to wage labour and the small wage rate that is usual for them (i.e. 
not more than ETB 5 per day for a woman compared to ), the earnings (ETB 15-20 per 
market) that they earn from their loan-related business should not be underestimated.   
 
In conclusion, the analysis of the in-depth interviews confirms the quantitative findings, 
which suggest that women contribute more labour to the loan-funded off-farm enterprises, 
and also the finding of the previous chapter, which suggests that women off-farm operators 
control the income from their LF off-farm enterprises.   
 
c.  Labour allocation in the context of chronic sickness and adult death  
Chapter 7 
137 
One of the objectives of this study is to examine the potential effects of HIV/AIDS on 
resource allocation within ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. As it was described in 
Chapter 2, the most obvious impact of HIV/AIDS at the household level is the loss of 
productive labour through death and chronic illness. Prolonged illness caused by 
HIV/AIDS does not only weaken the working capacity of the person who lives with AIDS, 
but also affects the organization and the allocation of labour among other household 
members. It was mentioned in Chapter 5 that it was difficult to identify borrowers affected 
or afflicted by HIV/AIDS, as the prevalence of HIV/AIDS was possibly low in the studied 
areas, particularly among ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. Even if the problem 
may exist, people do not openly discuss HIV/AIDS-related problems because of the stigma 
attached. As a result, only one potential HIV/AIDS household on the ACSI location and 
one OMFI borrower who experienced sickness and death within the household are 
presented as case studies. One of the households experienced chronic sickness within the 
household (at the time of this study) that could be related to HIV/AIDS, while the other 
experienced death as well. These two cases are intended to provide some insight and 
understanding as to how serious sickness and death experienced by microfinance clients’ 
households may affect the distribution of household labour to loan-funded enterprises. One 
of the cases was developed and reported retrospectively, because the household 
experienced both sickness and death at the time of data collection.  
 
Case 7.4 Male adult sickness and labour scarcity 
Mr. MM is in her late 20s and married. She has three children aged 2, 7, and 10. She joined 
ACSI credit and saving group in 2001 to access credit for oxen fattening. Until the time of this 
interview, she borrowed from ACSI for four years, which her household used mostly for 
livestock fattening and for chemical fertilizer. During 2004, her household used about 15 
percent of her last loan (ETB 2000) to cover the medical expenses for her husband.  
 
In June 2004, Ms. MM’s husband, Mr. MM, was sick after he bought an ox and a horse with his 
wife’s ACSI loan. His neighbours informed me secretly that Mr. MM’s health problem could be 
AIDS, since it was associated with tuberculosis. According to the neighbours, Mr. MM’s was 
exposed to risks of HIV because he used to be away from his family to do business in towns.  
When Ms MM. took her forth loan, her husband was not sick. During the months of April and 
May 2004, Mr. MM used the loan-funded animals to plough the family plot. By June 2004, Mr. 
MM’s husband’ health started to deteriorate and became worse in September and October 2004. 
By the time of this interview, in April 2005, he was being treated for TB.  
 
In order to better understand the impact of Mr. MM’s sickness on the household’s labour 
allocation there is a need to examine household labour allocation throughout the different stages 
of Mr. MM’s illness, stages under the headings of ‘pre-illness’, ‘sickness’ and ‘bedridden’. 
During the pre-illness period or before Mr. MM became sick, he was involved in livestock-
fattening work, and was responsible for activities such as cutting and collecting fodder (grass 
and weeds), tending livestock, feeding, marketing and overall management of the loan-funded 
livestock. At the onset of his illness, between June and August 2004, no significant problem 
was observed regarding his farm activities in general, or the LF livestock-fattening work in 
particular. This was partly because his sickness was not very “serious”. Besides, during this 
period, little care is normally given to livestock by adults, as water and grazing are abundantly 
available in the nearby areas, and also because schools are closed and children look after the 
animals. Between September and April 2005, Mr. MM was bedridden and completely withdrew 
his labour from all productive activities. He was also partially away from home for intensive 
medical assistance in the nearby town. This period coincides with the intensive livestock 
fattening, when animals are confined to the homestead and supplied with different feeds in term 
of both “quantity” and “quality”. The months of September and October in particular are the 
times for wokia i.e., the practice of uprooting grasses and weeds from and around farmlands by 
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household members, often led by the husband. But Mr. MM began to withdraw his labour from 
livestock fattening during this critical period. As a result, the household encountered serious 
labour scarcity and used various strategies to re-allocate household labour to the LF livestock-
fattening enterprise. Firstly, Ms. MM took over all responsibility for taking care of the loan-
funded livestock and other farm activities, with the assistance of her daughters (7 and 10 years 
old). Secondly, Ms. MM mobilized labour from her relatives in the form of a labour exchange. 
Thirdly, she hired labourers for some agricultural activities. Because the oldest daughter 
assumed more chores that are part of the fattening work together with her mother, she had to 
miss classes particularly during wokia, while Ms. MM’s youngest daughters were unable to 
enrol in school in September 2004 because they were responsible for looking after the livestock, 
including the loan-funded livestock.  
 
The consequences for Ms. MM were overwork and a reduction in leisure time because she was 
responsible for the agricultural production and domestic activities, including caring for her sick 
husband. When we had the first in-depth interview, Ms. MM was worried about the loan-funded 
animal, since it was not as properly fed as it had been the previous years. The gross cash income 
that the household generated from livestock fattening during the first, the second, and the third 
year were ETB 500, 600 and 800, respectively, while the money invested to buy livestock was 
ETB 1000 during the first two years, and ETB 1,600 in the third year. During the follow-up 
interview, the economic impact of the labour scarcity in Ms. MM’s household was evident. As 
she feared, the gross cash income that she obtained from her 2004 investment in livestock 
fattening was only ETB 100 instead of the expected ETB 900. 
 
As seen above, chronic adult illness within the household led to the withdrawal of adult 
labour, which subsequently resulted in the reorganization of household labour among the 
adult and non-adult household members. The new work distribution imposed work pressure 
on the woman because she had to assume more responsibilities in household production, 
including the LF livestock-fattening enterprise, and in the domestic sphere due to her care-
giving responsibility. Moreover, children shared the brunt of the adult’s illness by assuming 
more responsibilities at a young age. The impact on the children’s schooling was negative. 
Moreover, in terms of cash, the enterprise was not successful as the cash generated from 
selling the livestock did not even cover the costs of the enterprise. Yet, on the other hand, 
the household was able to cultivate the land with the livestock.  
 
In the previous section, the in-depth interviews demonstrated that some ACSI borrowers (2 
out of 12) and their children had to undertake more work in the LF livestock-fattening 
enterprises due to health problems of the men. On the other hand, two active ACSI 
borrowers indicated that, because of own problem, they interrupted their borrowing, and 
then rejoined groups after they got well. One of the women, a widow, was unable to repay 
her loan on time and defaulted. This was because her LF livestock was sold for less than 50 
percent of its original price, because it was sick and lost weight. This could be partly due to 
the burden of disease, which reduced her ability to work.  
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Case 7.5    Adult death and socially imposed mourning  
Ms. WD is 51 years old. She became a widow in June 2005 after the death of her second 
husband, whom she married in levirate marriage79. Ms WD lives with her son and daughter, 
aged 13 and 16, respectively. She joined the OMFI credit and saving group in 1998, and until 
2005 she took loans for eight years. Due to her access to credit, she expanded her past 
businesses and initiated new income-generating activities.   
 
Ms. WD used her loan funds for diversified economic activities, which include enset 
processing, local brewing, a small restaurant, and a dairy cow. The broader gender division of 
labour in Ms. WD’s household was that she undertakes most of the activities related to enset 
processing, local brewing, and the small restaurant, with significant support from her daughter, 
while her deceased husband was responsible for activities related to the dairy cow and other 
livestock bought from the profit, with the help of his son and a boys’ labour exchange group. 
Most of Ms. WD’s LF economic activities are home-based, and as a result, her market 
involvement was limited to buying ingredients and selling the enset product (kocho). 
 
Every year, Ms. WD buys live enset trees from farmers in the locality to process Kocho. She 
stores the Kocho and sells it during the rainy season, when the price is high. Enset processing 
involves several activities, including removing and cleaning the dry outer layer of the enset tree, 
cutting the leaves and the branches, and then uprooting the plant, decorticating and storing it. 
The first three activities are usually undertaken by adult males, while the last two are done by 
adult females. Ms. WD’s late husband was responsible for the mobilization of male labour 
exchange groups for the tasks traditionally performed by men, while she employs female 
labourers and mobilizes female labour exchange groups for enset decortications. With the help 
of her daughter, Ms. WD also prepares food and drinks for men and women engaged in the 
enset processing business.  
 
Ms. WT owns a small local restaurant in the homestead, where she sells food and drinks. With 
significant assistance from her daughter, she prepares food and the local alcohol for selling. Her 
late husband sometimes used to assist her in fetching water and serving and entertaining 
customers in the restaurant. She sometimes employs female labourers for baking injera.  
 
During the first in-depth interview with Ms. WD in February 2005, her husband was not in the 
village. He went to Nazareth town, in the neighbouring region, for medical treatment. During 
that time, Ms. WT was running her businesses, including the small restaurant. Her husband 
passed away in June 2005 and until our last follow-up interview in August 2005, Ms. WD had 
not resumed her businesses. She tells her experiences with resentment as follows:  
“It [the death of her husband] has a huge impact on my job. I did not work for three months, and 
as a result I lost profit for three months. I spent three months receiving guests who came to my 
house. If I did not have this job I would sit idle for a year. They [other people who face a 
similar problem] do not work. I think it is the culture of the area. I do not know any tradition! 
And I do not care what they would say about me! I have to work and support myself! Since I 
borrowed money from the government [the OMFI] it should not be wasted. If I do not work, I 
cannot support my children. Since my husband is not with me anymore, I cannot send them [the 
children] to school and buy them new clothes. I am afraid my children will quit school”.  
As described in the case, Ms. WD’s late husband made important contributions, particularly 
to the dairy cow and the enset processing. She was bereaved over the loss of her husband 
and missed his economic contributions to the household, but on top of that, she closed her 
business due to social expectations about mourning. The local custom expects a woman to 
express her mourning the loss of a family member by quitting market-oriented activities 
                                                 
79 On the Gurage location, widows used to be inherited by one of her brother-in-laws or cousins with the aim 
of “protecting” the family of the deceased and his property. This practice was observed among old couples’ 
households and is being abandoned by now.  
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and by being confined at home. She is also expected to stay at home receiving guests who 
visit the family to express their sorrow about the deceased. According to Ms. WD, such 
norms do not apply to a man if he looses his wife. Furiously, she added that a man is 
privileged even to remarry another wife between three to six months following the death of 
his wife, leave alone that he would have to quit his job.  
I found a similar case on the Gurage location. An OMFI borrower lost her son after he had 
been bedridden for some time. This woman abandoned her trading in order to care for her 
sick son and also in adherence to the local custom, which imposes a restriction on a 
woman’s mobility in such instances. According to this women, a woman who leaves a sick 
person behind and goes to do business on the market is criticized by society and portrayed 
as being “inconsiderate”. This social imposition persisted and became stronger after her son 
passed away. This woman stopped her trading for nearly a year altogether. As a result, her 
household encountered a loan repayment problem. This might be expected because, on the 
one hand, part of the loan fund was used to cover the medical expenses of the deceased, and 
on the other hand, the woman stopped her trade activities and lost potential income to the 
household. Other cases on OMFI locations also revealed that women not only give up their 
business at times of illness and death, but they may drop out of the credit group as well. 
According to a focus group discussion on an OMFI location, illnesses and deaths were the 
main reason for almost half (four out of nine) of the female dropouts in one saving and 
credit group. In-depth interviews with several dropouts from an OMFI credit group 
confirmed that women give up their credit group membership when they are seriously sick 
and unable to work.  
The above analysis clearly illuminates the way sickness and death affect labour allocation 
to LF enterprises among microfinance clients’ households. The cases have shown that 
households loose adult labour as a consequence of adult mortality and morbidity. As a 
result, households attempt to compensate the loss of labour by redistributing work among 
non-sick adults and children. On the ACSI location, chronic adult male illness was found to 
increase the workload of women (also children) both in household production and in the 
domestic sphere. Women’s health problems, on the other hand, were found to increase the 
workload of children and trigger women to end their credit group membership. The 
situation on OMFI locations differed, partly due to the nature of the LF enterprises, and 
partly due to social expectations regarding the “care giving” and “mourning” associated 
with sickness and death. Both adult sickness and death had a significant effect on women’s 
LF off-farm enterprises. The effect on LF livestock fattening was not serious, in part 
because of the less intensive nature of the livestock-fattening work. Societal gender norms 
had a considerable impact on the way in which women allocate their labour between 
market-oriented activities and care giving in the context of sickness and death within the 
household. Due to their traditional responsibility, women are expected to withdraw labour 
from market activities to act on their care-giving responsibility. Local custom on the 
Gurage locations also imposes restrictions on both women’s mobility and their involvement 
in market-oriented activities at times of sickness and death within the household. This norm 
imposes that a woman should not engage in business for at least three months following the 
death of a close family member. Thus, chronic illness and death constitute an important 
direct as well as indirect factor explaining repayment problems and quitting from credit 
groups. 
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7.4 Concluding remark 
This chapter attempted to provide a detailed analysis of the organization and allocation of 
labour regarding the main LF enterprises within ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. It 
shows that women’s access to credit has mobilized household labour including that of men, 
women and children of both sexes, for economic activities, particularly for the LF 
livestock-fattening enterprise. It has found that both ACSI and OMFI women borrowers 
made a significant labour contribution to the market-oriented LF enterprises, compared to 
men. This is in line with what Pitt and Khandker (1998) found in Bangladesh: women’s 
access to credit increases women’s labour supply to market-oriented activities compared to 
men. However, women’s relative labour contribution to the LF enterprises in the two 
studied communities varied greatly, depending on the nature of the LF enterprise and its 
importance to the local economy. Female ACSI borrowers provided a considerable labour 
input to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise, while female OMFI borrowers made a 
significant labour contribution especially to the LF off-farm enterprise. Other factors, such 
as women’s (household) life cycle course, the form of their marital relationship, and 
women’s duration in the credit programme, also had a significant effect in determining a 
couple’s relative labour contribution to the LF enterprises on the OMFI location. Being 
older, living in a polygamous marital union, and a longer duration of their membership in 
the credit programme are found to increase women’s relative labour contribution to the LF 
enterprises, compared to that of men.   
 
Giving credit to women for a traditional male-dominated enterprise, i.e. livestock fattening, 
may be commendable, as it may expand women’s economic choices and opportunities and 
may consequently transform the traditional gender divisions (gender segregation) in 
economic activities. However, the microfinance programmes reinforced the hierarchical 
gender division of tasks within the LF livestock-fattening enterprises. In both Amhara and 
Gurage societies, female borrowers were involved mostly in the routine, dirty, home-based 
and low status jobs, while men were engaged in tasks that are mostly infrequent, 
managerial, public and high status jobs. The fact that some women were excluded from 
decision-making on income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises while contributing 
their labour, implies that labour contributions to market-oriented activities alone may not be 
empowering to women. Contrarily, women who used credit for LF off-farm enterprises 
contributed more labour to the off-farm enterprises and controlled the income generated 
thereof. Therefore, the main policy implication of the study is that if microfinance 
programmes seek to contribute to women’s empowerment by increasing women’s access 
and control over independent or household earnings, they need to consult women regarding 
their choice of enterprises. As this study has shown, women’s significant control over 
income from the LF enterprises varied, depending on their economic and social 
circumstances. It is also important that programmes design strategies to ensure women’s 
control over the fruit of their labour (e.g. to enhance their market participation) and to 
minimize the unintended negative effects of interventions. Further research is needed to 
understand the relation between couples’ labour contributions to the loan-funded 
enterprises and their control over the product of their labour.   
 
The survey did not find chronic illness (proxy for HIV/AIDS) within the household to 
significantly determine the intra-household labour allocation to the LF enterprises. 
However, the in-depth interviews showed that an adult male’s illness within a microfinance 
household may significantly increase the workload of women and children in livestock 
fattening especially if the work is intensive. In a society where strong social value is 
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attached to care giving and mourning, illness and death within microfinance clients’ 
households may oblige female borrowers to abandon their market-oriented activities or,  in 
a worst scenario, to quit their membership of credit groups. The study also found that 
women may leave credit groups/programmes when they are seriously sick and unable to 
perform tasks. Further study is required in HIV/AIDS-prevalent areas to understand the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on intra-household labour allocation within microfinance clients’ 
households.  
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CHAPTER 8 CHANGES IN GENDER ROLES, 
RESPONSIBILITIES & DECISION-MAKING 
PROCESSES 
8.1  Introduction  
The previous two chapters looked into the way in which the ACSI and OMFI clients’ 
households organized decisions regarding the uses of women’s loans and income from the 
LF enterprises (Chapter 6), and the labour allocation to the LF enterprises (Chapter 7). 
Chapter 6 found that the female ACSI and OMFI  borrowers played a limited role in loan 
use decision-making within the households, but had significant authority over the LF 
enterprises’ earnings80. Chapter 7 demonstrated that the female OMFI borrowers made 
significant labour contributions to the LF enterprises compared to men. In addition, the 
chapters showed that the degree of women’s influence over their income and their labour 
contribution to the LF enterprises vary between the borrowers of the two institutions, 
depending on the type of the LF enterprises. The chapters suggested that women’s access to 
microfinance services is likely to improve women’s access to earnings and to enhance their 
economic role within the household. The issues discussed in Chapter 6 and 7 are directly 
related to women’s borrowing; they are important pathways through which greater 
empowerment or achievement can be attained in women’s lives. The reason for this is that 
the degree of women’s control over loans and related income as well as their control over 
the enterprise’s production process (labour contribution) may facilitate women’s ability to 
build independent (joint) household assets, contribute to the household, and consequently 
enhance their bargaining position within the household. Building on the findings of the 
previous two chapters, Chapter 8 attempts to explore whether women’s access to 
microfinance services transforms the prevailing gender roles and responsibilities regarding 
the labour division, expenditure responsibilities, and financial decision-making within the 
household.   
 
As stated in Chapter 2, the expansion of microfinance programmes in low-income countries 
has enabled millions of poor women in these countries to access microcredit services. 
However, whether the rationale for targeting women is premised on efficiency or equity 
arguments, microfinance programmes are generally presumed to contribute to women’s 
empowerment. Nevertheless, to date, this assumption is under close scrutiny and debate, as 
the available evidence and literature are partial and provide seemingly conflicting evidence. 
On the positive side, several studies (Osmani, 2007; Lakwo, 2006; Pitt et al., 2006; Kabeer, 
2001; Hashemi et al., 1996; Pitt and Khandker, 1996) provide evidence about the gender-
transforming or empowering effects of microfinance targeting women. By increasing 
women’s independent income, assets and economic contribution to the household, 
microfinance is said to enhance women’s bargaining power within the household (Osmani, 
2007; Pitt et al., 2006; Kabeer, 2001; Hashemi et al., 1996; Pitt and Khandker, 1996).  
 
On the other hand, other studies have shown that microfinance interventions may 
perpetuate women’s subordinate position within the household (Rahman, 1999; Goetz and 
Gupta, 1996; Montgomery et al., 1996; Ackerly, 1995). Some of the adverse effects of 
microfinance provided to women include domestic violence against women (Rahman, 
                                                 
80 Note that ACSI borrowers had significant authority over income from LF household enterprises, while 
OMFI borrowers had a similar level of authority (with their husbands) over income from LF household level 
enterprises and had a significant influence over the income from the LF off-farm enterprises.  
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1999; Goetz and Gupta, 1996), an increase in women’s workload (Leach and Sitaram, 
2002;Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Ackerly, 1995); and an expansion of women’s expenditure 
responsibilities within the household (Mayoux, 2001a). Moreover, microfinance provided 
to women has been found to intensify the workload of female children within the 
household, due to women’s increased involvement in market-oriented activities (Leach and 
Sitaram, 2002), and negatively affect their schooling (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). Johnson 
(2005) and Mayoux (2001a) have shown that microfinance provided to women had a 
limited effect on women’s empowerment because of the strength of gender-based 
constraints that women face. Arguably, researchers question whether giving microcredit to 
poor women alone will meaningfully transform existing power hierarchies without 
addressing gender barriers that poor women encounter within and beyond the household 
(Johnson, 2005; Mayoux, 2001a; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; Ackerly, 1995). Yet, programmes 
that used microcredit interventions to promote gender equality were successful in 
enhancing women’s earnings and their decision-making power within the household 
(Mayoux 2001a; Ackerly, 1995).  
 
The fact that researchers have reached conflicting conclusions can be partly explained by 
their choices of different indicators of empowerment and their focus on different 
dimensions of it (see Chapter 2). Studies may also give conflicting results because it is 
quite possible that microfinance interventions will improve one aspect of empowerment 
while undermining another81. In addition, it is probable that microfinance programmes have 
different effects because of different institutional contexts (Johnson, 2005). In the literature, 
little is known about how variations in institutional settings may affect microfinance 
programme outcomes differently.  
 
This chapter attempts to provide insights into how women’s access to microfinance services 
potentially affects gender roles and responsibilities within the household and household 
decision-making. The hypothesis is that various institutional settings may facilitate or 
hinder the potential contribution of microfinancing to gender transformation or women’s 
empowerment. The study attempts to explain how variations in the wider institutional 
settings may affect programme outcomes, by comparing the potential effects of 
microfinance between the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. As it was already 
discussed in Chapter 5, this chapter does not claim to prove an impact in quantity terms, but 
rather seeks to understand the direction and the potential impact of women’s access to 
microfinance largely based on the testimonies of borrowers (and their husbands). 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 briefly discusses the 
conceptual framework of the study. Section 8.3 presents and discusses the empirical 
findings of the study. The first part of section 8.3 discusses the potential effects of women’s 
access to credit on the gender division of labour within the household. It gives particular 
emphasis to changes in farm production, domestic work and in women’s relative workload. 
The second part of this section presents the potential effects of women’s borrowing on 
expenditure roles within the household. It discusses in-depth how earnings from the LF 
household and off-farm enterprises are often spent within the household. The last part of 
Section 8.3 briefly discusses changes in household decision-making with a particular focus 
                                                 
81 For example, Kabeer (2001) found a positive increase in women’s income and asset ownership, but she also 
found an increase in women’s workload. However, she did not interpret the workload as “negative”, because 
women who were subject to this workload did not complain for the reason that their benefit “prevails over” 
their workload. 
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on key finance-related decisions within the household.  Finally, a concluding remark is 
presented in Section 8.4. 
 
8.2 The conceptual framework 
The study recognizes that development policies and programmes do not necessarily affect 
all individuals within the household in the same way. Development programmes that are 
designed to increase women’s resources had different effects on household preferences than 
policies that aim to enhance men’s income (Thomas, 1997; Khandker, 1998; Pitt and 
Khandker, 1996). Evidence shows that resources owned by women, including assets (Doss, 
1996; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000) and credit (Hashemi et al., 1996; Osmani, 2007; 
Pitt and Khandker, 1996) were found to strengthen women’s bargaining position within the 
household more than resources owned by men (Pitt et al, 2006). This is because ownership 
over resources is more likely to strengthen an individual’s fall-back position beyond the 
household. However, it is increasingly argued that intra-household resource allocation is 
too complex to be captured exclusively by economic logic (Sen, 1990; Folber, 1997; 
Agarwal, 1997b; Katz, 1997). The reason is that institutional constraints such as  social 
norms may limit individual choices by prohibiting individuals from doing certain activities 
or making certain decisions, and may set rules for the conditions under which they are 
permitted to do so (North, 1991). Societal gender divisions, too, may shape the 
management and the distribution of resources within the household (LeMay-Boucher, 2007; 
Kevean and Wydick, 1999; Moser, 1993; Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Social norms may 
also reduce women’s bargaining power compared to men (Folber, 1997; Katz, 1997). This 
suggests that both material and economic resources may be important determinants of one’s 
individual bargaining position within the household. Therefore, women’s ability to 
influence intra-household resource allocation decision is inextricably linked, both to their 
access to economic resources and to the prevailing institutional contexts, including societal 
norms. 
 
Figure 8.1 presents the conceptual framework of the study. The figure displays the 
interaction between four interrelated components: women’s access to microfinance 
services, women’s bargaining position, wider institutional settings, and intra-household 
outcomes (the gender divisions of labour, expenditure roles, and decision-making). As the 
figure shows, access to microfinance services may enhance women’s bargaining position 
within the household by increasing women’s self-employment possibilities, their income 
and contribution to the household, and by building their independent (joint) assets and 
social networks. As the broken arrow shows, it is also possible that microfinance provided 
to women may bring little change in women’s bargaining position, or that it may even 
perpetuate existing unequal gender power relations within the household. This is because 
the wider institutional settings, including social norms, economic structures and strategies 
and regulations of microfinance organizations, may intervene to hinder the gender-
transforming and women’s empowerment potential of microfinance. Institutions define and 
limit individual choices (North, 1991). Household members may follow the prevailing 
gender norms for labour allocation and decision-making within the household. Social 
norms may continue to dictate household resource allocations because of the high social 
cost associated if they are violated. For example, when women take up new economic 
activities due to their access to credit, the prevailing gender-based divisions may remain 
intact due to strong gender norms, which dictate who should do what within the household. 
Women (and girls) may be disproportionately affected by a heavier workload due to an 
expansion in their market-oriented activities, as they are   traditionally responsible for 
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domestic tasks. Formal and informal economic rules, including individual property rights 
and access to economic opportunities, may affect an individual’s fall-back position and 
consequently affect her or his bargaining power within the household. Furthermore, 
microfinance-related exposure and meetings may raise women’s consciousness, self-
confidence, and negotiation skills within the household. An increase in a woman’s 
bargaining power may lead to changing gender roles, responsibilities, and decision-making 
within the household in favour of women. However, if the institutional context does not 
contribute to women’s bargaining power, it is more likely to reinforce the prevailing gender 
divisions of labour, roles and decision-making, as shown by the broken arrows. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 1 The conceptual framework: women’s access to microfinance services and 
change in gender relations. 
• Women’s access 
to credit and 
credit group 
Effect on the household: 
• Gender division of labour 
• Expenditure roles 
• Finance-related decision-
making 
Institutional contexts  
• Social (gender) norms  
• Economic settings 
• Microfinance rules 
 
Women’s bargaining 
position  
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8.3 Empirical findings and discussions 
8.3.1  The gender division of labour  
As societies experience economic change, the type of work and its division between men 
and women may change as well (Mackintosh, 1984). The expansion of credit to “poor” 
households by ACSI and OMFI was intended to bring an economic change in poor 
households, by creating self-employment opportunities and/or expanding existing 
(individual or household) economic portfolios. Loan-induced economic activities may 
affect both the quality and quantity of time devoted by household members to other 
activities such as domestic work and household production within the household. This 
subsection explores how women’s access to credit may potentially affect the distribution 
and the types of work undertaken by men, women and children of both sexes within the 
ACSI and OMFI married women clients’  households.    
 
a. Changes in gender roles  
Crop production 
It was mentioned in Chapter 5 that both ACSI and OMFI extended loans in their respective 
operational areas for investment in livestock to address the draught animal constraints of 
poor farm households. It was also discussed that livestock ownership was used as a proxy 
indicator to select poor households82. Access to credit had enabled many poor households 
to access (or own) at least one draught animal necessary for crop cultivation83. In-depth 
interviews revealed that, prior to women’s access to credit, the ACSI borrowers’ 
households used to employ different strategies to get their land cultivated. Firstly, half of 
the active ACSI borrowers we interviewed in-depth noted that their household had only a 
single draught animal (an ox or horse) before they accessed credit, and as a result they used 
to make a livestock-sharing arrangement with similar households, or beg relatives to pair 
their animals and cultivate their lands turn by turn. Secondly, three of the ACSI borrowers’ 
households (out of twelve in-depth interviewed) were engaged in a labour-for-livestock 
arrangement. In such arrangements, a poor farmer is expected to plough the land of the rich 
farmer for two days in order to get a pair of oxen for one day. If a given poor household 
needs a pair of draught animals for 5 days to work on its farmland, the adult male needs to 
work for 10 days on the farm of the oxen owners in exchange for a pair of oxen. In 
addition, the wife of the poor farmer may be expected to provide some agricultural and 
domestic labour assistance to the household of the rich farmer.  
The in-depth interviews with men and women on the ACSI study location revealed that 
women’s loans had enabled men to perform their traditional roles in crop cultivation in two 
important ways. First, due to access to draught animals, poor men were able to undertake 
agricultural activities, particularly ploughing, sowing, and threshing at the “appropriate” 
time. In the past or before women’s access to credit, a timely implementation of these 
                                                 
82 This focus was particularly common at the initial stages of ACSI’s operation on the study’s location.  A 
household that owned less than a pair of oxen was regarded as poor and was targeted for credit services 
through either the woman or the man.  
83 Usually, borrowers buy a draught animal before the start of the agricultural activity, so that they work with 
it throughout one agricultural season and then sell it and repay the loan money. In some cases, they keep the 
loan-funded livestock and repay their loans from other sources. There are also households that already owned 
one or more draught animals through their loan-induced earnings.  
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activities was impossible since poor farmers were highly dependent on other farms to get 
access to draught animals. The very poor households,  which did not own any draught 
animals before getting access to credit, used to access pairs of oxen from better-off 
households through a labour-for-livestock exchange arrangement as mentioned earlier. 
Because ox owners usually lent their draught animals to poor farmers after cultivating their 
own lands, such an arrangement used to delay and impede a timely implementation of farm 
activities for poor farmers. As crop cultivation is largely rain-fed in the studied areas, like 
in many other parts of Ethiopia, delaying or postponing cultivation has negative 
consequences for agricultural production. Hence, access to livestock was instrumental to 
poor households to execute their farm duties at the “appropriate” time. Second, access to 
draught animals through women’s loans was reported to free some poor households (men 
and boys, and women to some extent) in the ACSI study area from the “exploitative” 
labour-for-livestock exchange arrangement mentioned earlier. One of the women from such 
a household describes the change in her household as follows:  
“If he [her husband] spends time working in the field of a rich farmer to get a pair of oxen, I 
work in that rich man’s house. At the time of the harvest I uproot vetch and pick beans and 
other tasks that a woman can do. If they have a kind of feast I may need to prepare the 
ingredients of the local drink” (AA). 
This woman noted that she has no more involvement in such chores and also described the 
change in her husband’s work, “... my husband no longer has to toil on the farm of the rich 
men. He spends the day working on his own land”. This means that, on the ACSI study 
location, women’s access to credit and loan investment in draught animals freed men (also 
boys and women) from an exploitative arrangement and facilitated men’s traditional roles 
within the household.  
 
On the OMFI study location, the situation was slightly different, which was explained in 
monetary terms. Nearly half of the men interviewed in-depth (3 of 7) noted that they did not 
own draught animals in the past and, as a result, they used to pay ETB 200 for renting a 
draught animal for one cultivation season. In another case, a household used to acquire 
draught animals through livestock-sharing arrangements and borrowing from other people, 
which was said to delay the timely implementation of agricultural activities.    
 
In conclusion, women’s credit for livestock fattening had been instrumental for the very 
poor households to be freed from exploitation, and reduced or eliminated the total 
dependency of poor households on relatives or other farmers for draught animals and rental 
payments. Moreover, it contributed to the timely implementation of agricultural activities 
and to the time spent on the households’ own farms. In this manner, women’s credit for 
livestock fattening had addressed men’s practical needs and facilitated their traditional role 
in crop cultivation.  
 
The in-depth interviews also assessed whether women’s access to credit has any effect on 
women’s traditional role in crop farming. In this regard, some change was observed, mainly 
among the OMFI borrowers who used loans to finance independent off-farm economic 
activities. The evidence shows that five of the six women involved in LF off-farm 
enterprises had either reduced or abandoned their contribution to household crop production 
after they joined credit groups. This was because these women increased their time spent in 
market-oriented activities in connection with their access to credit. Two of these women 
(long-time borrowers) reported that they substantively withdrew their labour from farm 
activities since they were engaged in diversified income-generating activities because of 
their access to credit. A woman describes her labour withdrawal from the family farm as 
follows:  
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“I was weeding for my husband; I was transporting the corn during harvest time; I was planting 
vegetables. Now I am too busy to carry out such activities. Sometimes I do not have time even 
to eat from the garden (maize and beans). Because I’m engaged in the business, I have almost 
forgotten about the other [farm] activities” (WD).   
 
Another two borrowers (OMFI) said that they also reduced their labour input in crop 
farming due to the same reasons mentioned above, and another one because of a loan-
induced health problem. Although in the studied areas, traditionally, men can mobilize 
women’s labour for agricultural activities, this situation seemed to change slightly. This 
was due to women’s business expansion and the significance of women’s new income to 
the household, and the fact that women are away from home and not available for work. 
Women who did not entirely abandon their farming role noted that they assisted their 
husbands during non-market days. The reduction or removal of women’s labour from crop 
farming could in part be an indication of women’s bigger say about their time allocation, at 
least when this involves an economic activity that provides little independent income.  
 
On the ACSI study location, in-depth interview participants did not report the withdrawal 
of labour from crop production, and there was little sign of change in gender roles in crop 
production. This could partly be because there is a limited independent economic activity 
for women in the area, and as a result, women used loans for independent off-farm 
activities only in very rare cases.  
 
There is one plausible explanation why the OMFI borrowers withdrew labour from crop 
farming while the ACSI borrowers did not. It is to be remembered from Chapter 4 that 
Gurage women traditionally exercise little authority over household production compared 
to Amhara women, who exercise a more or less equal right over household production with 
men. As a result, for the female OMFI borrowers, it is a strategic choice to withdraw labour 
from less remunerated agricultural production and then to allocate it to an activity that 
provides income under their control. This may suggest that microfinance has, indeed, a 
potential to enhance women’s bargaining power, if loans are directed to women to finance 
their independent economic activities.  
 
b.  Domestic Activities 
Domestic work, which includes housework and child care activities, is important in the 
sustenance, survival, and reproduction of the workforce within the household. Yet, it is 
often classified as “unproductive” labour and given little value. It is widely recognized that, 
particularly in traditional societies, housework is overwhelmingly performed by women 
(and girls). Thus, how women respond to new economic opportunities outside the 
household is usually conditioned by the societal gender division, which requires them to 
combine outside work with housework (Sen, 1990).   
 
It was mentioned in Chapter 4 that, traditionally, women and girls in the studied areas 
undertake the bulk of the housework and child care activities. Chapter 7 showed that 
women’s access to credit had increased women’s labour contribution to LF economic 
enterprises within the household compared to that of men. The findings from the in-depth 
interviews show that both the ACSI and OMFI borrowers remain dominantly responsible 
for the domestic activities, despite their increased labour contribution to the LF enterprises. 
Women often fit the activities of LF enterprises into their existing tasks, and employ a 
multi-tasking strategy to simultaneously accomplish their new (or expanded) economic role 
and domestic responsibilities within the household (Bock, 2004). The multi-tasking strategy 
is especially important for the ACSI borrowers, since most of the routine tasks involved in 
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livestock fattening are performed within the homestead. This means that women borrowers 
simultaneously undertake livestock fattening and domestic activities. It is common for 
women to carry small children on their back while feeding livestock or cleaning barren, 
brewing, etc. During intensive fattening periods, they get some assistance for domestic 
activities from their children, particularly from the girls.  
 
On the OMFI study location, the mobilization of domestic labour takes a slightly different 
form. Women who were engaged in market-oriented activities outside the home seemed to 
assume their domestic responsibilities before and after market, and they transferred part of 
their tasks to their daughters as well. The demand for girls’ labour was very crucial, both in 
the domestic sphere and in relation to women’s home-based economic activities. In some 
cases, girls appeared to be at the verge of substituting their mothers. One of the cases (7.1) 
described in Chapter 7 elucidated the relations between women’s economic activities and 
the intensification of female child labour. As indicated in the case, the woman used her 
loans for diversified economic activities and her trading required her to attend about five 
markets per week. Furthermore, during her none-market days and after the market, she was 
often engaged in various home-based income-generating activities. As a result, her oldest 
daughter (13 years old) was obliged to assume a great bulk of domestic tasks and child care 
activities, with little assistance from her young sibling and her father. Besides, the girl used 
to assist her mother in her local brewing business, which included the marketing after 
school. As a result, she had little time to play with her peers and to study. Both parents 
recognized that their daughter was overloaded with work. The mother describes the 
situation as follows:  
 
 “...she [the daughter] is young to bear such responsibilities. Now she acts like an adult. Her 
peers are not as busy as she is. I have given her some time on Sunday as I am at home. She will 
go to her friends to study. However, she has not time for playing.” (WT) 
 
The above case and similar ones in the OMFI study area revealed that female children 
became increasingly involved in household chores, because their mothers invest loans 
in market-oriented activities. The intensive use of female child labour appeared be 
widespread, especially when a woman takes on off-farm activities as full-time work. 
This suggests that with an increase in a woman’s involvement in off-farm economic 
activities, there is a tendency that she shifts part of her domestic work to the female 
children. In households where assistance from female children was limited, however, 
women choose not to expand their petty businesses to avoid the potential conflict 
between their business and their domestic role within the household. The following case 
illuminates this point: 
“I can’t handle that [big business]. It may require me to spend the night away from home. 
Who can take care of my children? I am the one that feeds them, and sends them to 
school. I have nobody else to help me” (AA). 
 
In both the Amhara and Gurage study areas, men’s contribution in the domestic sphere was 
limited. Their level of assistance was largely conditioned by the presence or absence of 
female household members to assume domestic responsibilities, and partly depending on 
women’s economic contributions to the household. In a few cases, men in the Amhara 
study area said they support their wives in child care when their wives undertake loan-
related activities and attend monthly centre meetings. In the Gurage study areas, the degree 
of men’s participation in household tasks seemed to vary, depending on the extent of 
women’s involvement in market activities and the significance of women’s economic 
contribution to the household. In households in which women are engaged in multiple LF 
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economic activities and contribute substantially to the household income, some men 
appeared to assume relatively more domestic tasks. For example, the spouse of one of the 
long-time OMFI borrowers gives the following testimony about his role in the domestic 
sphere:  
“In the past, I was not involved in duties of this sort [household tasks]. Her business helps me a 
lot [economic contribution], so I have to help in the housework. I am happy about it. I even 
fetch water and if my daughter prepares lunch, I prepare firewood for her. I participate in almost 
everything including making coffee and giving lunch to children” (KH).  
  
In households where women did not fully engage in trading, men’s role in the domestic 
sphere appeared to be limited to minding small children and looking after the homestead.  
The main reason for men’s limited participation in domestic activities is local custom, as 
explained by an OMFI borrower. As one woman described this,  
“This is the countryside: a man does not assist a woman. He works on his own farming 
activities. She [her daughter] is the only one in the home who can work [domestic work]; her 
brothers do not do the home activities because that is not the norm for male children in this 
community” (BB).  
 
According to the testimony of the above woman, the gender division of labour in the 
domestic sphere is largely determined by the social norm, and as a result, men and women 
adhere to the norm to allocate their labour. This implies that for women who were not 
“fully” engaged in independent economic activities, their access to credit and a related 
business expansion did little to alter the prevailing work distribution between the sexes. 
This might be because they have relatively more time for domestic work, compared to 
women who spend more time in LF off-farm economic activities. But in general, men’s 
contribution to domestic activities appeared to be limited, even in a context in which men 
spend more time around the homestead where the family plot is located, while women do 
business in the market.  
The analysis of the domestic division of labour suggests that even if women take up new 
tasks or expand their economic role within the household, they tend to be primarily 
responsible for the domestic activities. As this study shows, a redistribution of domestic 
tasks was observed largely between the female household members, not between genders. 
This is partly because the domestic task is often considered to be an aspect of a gender 
relation that is “natural”, “immutable” and “non-negotiable”. In a few cases, men were 
engaged in domestic activities, but this circumstance did not lead to a complete reallocation 
or renegotiation of domestic tasks between gender groups. Men’s involvement in domestic 
work appeared to be largely conditioned by the absence of female adults or children within 
the household. Women with a substantial, independent loan-related income contribution to 
the household, however, are more likely to get some assistance from their husbands in 
domestic tasks than women with no or a small independent income contribution to the 
household. This suggests that social (gender) norms limit in what way individuals should 
perform and under what condition they are allowed to do so (North, 1990). 
 
c. Women’s workload and leisure    
A question was included in the survey to assess whether women’s access to credit had led 
to an absolute increase in women’s work or not. Table 8.1 presents the survey findings 
regarding change in women’s work within the household due to their access to credit. A 
considerable proportion (91-92%) of the ACSI and OMFI borrowers reported that access to 
credit had increased their workload. Only less than 10 percent of the ACSI and OMFI 
borrowers reported that access to credit either did not change or decreased their workload.  
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Table 8. 1 Frequencies and percentage distribution of respondents by MFI and change in 
workload. 
ACSI OMFI Change in women’s work 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Increased   79 92 51 91 
No change or decrease 7 8 5 9 
Total  86 100 56 100 
Source: Household Survey 2004.  
 
The ACSI staff members in the field noted that one of the reasons for extending a loan to 
women was to enhance women’s economic role within the household. During in-depth 
interviews, several women also noted that they longed for such economic opportunities 
because they were either “idle” or pressed by the severity of economic poverty and 
deprivation within the household. In addition, the in-depth interviews assessed the effects 
of women’s borrowing on couple’s relative workload. The findings show that the long-time 
ACSI and OMFI borrowers had a relatively higher workload compared to men because of 
intensive livestock fattening and expansion of off-farm economic activities, respectively. In 
the Amhara study area, women tend to have a higher workload when livestock fattening is 
intensive, when they operate additional loan-funded income-generating activities, and when 
they get little support from household members for reasons including  the husband’s 
sickness and public responsibility, the children are attending schools, etc. On the Gurage 
study locations, on the other hand, the long travelling time required in trading (on foot 1 to 
4 hours for a single trip) and the arduous nature of women’s home-based economic 
activities (such as cooking and brewing) are found to be the cause of women’s higher 
workloads compared to those of men. In-depth interview participants also mentioned the 
consequences of the increase in workload to women, which include a reduction in leisure 
and sleeping time, fatigue, and health problems.  
 
One of the criticisms of microfinance provided to women is that it may increase 
women’s work burden without a meaningful increase in women’s income (Goetz and 
Gupta, 1996). In the studied areas, the ACSI and OMFI borrowers hardly complained 
about their work burden because of the contribution it made to the survival of their 
families. Instead, they emphasized that they need to “work hard” in order to improve 
their living conditions. Several female in-depth interview participants pointed out that 
they scarified their leisure and sleeping time to fulfil their new (or expanded) economic 
opportunities and traditional obligations within the household. For example, one 
borrower noted, “I am labouring more now but I also benefit more. Rural life is tough; 
you do not count your tiredness”. Another woman stated: “This is the countryside. We 
normally don’t have resting time. What we call rest is to work and get income. That is 
rest for us. I am afraid of poverty. I am not tired of working as long as God keeps me 
healthy”. Hence, women did not grumble about the increased workload because of its 
positive effects and despite the existence of fatigue, lack of leisure time, and health 
problems. Similarly, Kabeer (2001) observed in Bangladesh that female borrowers give 
more weight to the benefit that they acquired through their borrowing than the cost of 
borrowing in terms of their workload. However, this by no means implies that the work 
burden was not that important for women; it rather showed the price that women are 
ready (or forced to accept out of necessity) to pay in pursuit of their goals, whether it is 
to tackle household poverty or to obtain economic independence.  
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The analysis of women’s labour allocation showed that women employ different 
strategies to reduce their work burden.  As already discussed in the previous 
subsections, some borrowers began to withdraw or minimize their farm labour, and 
started to share or transfer some of their traditional responsibilities to other household 
members, particularly girls. This was observed especially in the Gurage study areas, 
among women who used loans to start or expand independent income-generating 
activities. In the worst scenario, when women reach the point that they can no longer 
bear the work pressure, they make a choice by quitting their credit group membership. 
In both the ACSI and OMFI study areas, in-depth interviews with programme dropouts 
revealed that women may quit their credit group membership when they are unable to 
combine the loan-related work responsibilities with their regular tasks. This is the case 
especially if they do not get “enough” assistance from other family members, as the 
following case illuminates.    
 
Case 8.1 Competition between domestic and LF economic activities 
Ms. FA is 22 years old and married. She has two small children (less than three years old). In 
2001, Ms. FA joined an ACSI credit group after her husband advised her to do so. She 
borrowed from ACSI for three consecutive years and used her loans for a livestock-fattening 
enterprise. After the second year, Ms. FA was reluctant to continue borrowing from ACSI 
because of the work burden associated with the fattening work. She was mostly responsible for 
both the specifically female and the gender-neutral activities in livestock fattening, with little or 
sporadic assistance from her husband. However, her husband was unable to provide her with the 
necessary support, partly because of his involvement in local administration activities (the 
Kebele office), where he spends most of his daytime. As a result, the livestock-fattening work 
competed with Ms. AF’s child care responsibilities within the household. She often used to 
carry her small baby on her back while carrying out the activities of the LF livestock-fattening 
enterprise. She could not cope and finally dropped out of the programme after settling her debt 
in 2004. 
 
Similarly, there are several cases in which women left credit groups due to the loan-
induced work pressure and due to a lack of support from men, for various reasons 
mentioned earlier. 
 
The effect of women’s credit on men’s workload was seldom emphasized, either by men or 
by women. As discussed in the previous chapter, on both the Amhara and Gurage study 
locations, men’s labour contributions to the LF enterprises tend to be relatively lower than 
women’s contributions. Coupled with men’s limited traditional role in daily household 
maintenance, and their possibly “ample” leisure time because of the seasonality of their 
traditional gender role in agriculture, it is more likely that men are little affected by the 
workload caused by their wives’ borrowing. In this regard, remarks made by two women 
such as, “the man gets cleaned and relaxed”, and “the man is doing nothing these days” are 
illustrations of men’s limited work burden. If that is so, development policy may reinforce 
inequalities between the sexes by providing resources to women and mobilizing their 
labour.   
 
8.3.2  Expenditure responsibilities 
On both the Amhara and the Gurage study locations, traditionally, men and women assume 
distinct expenditure responsibilities. Men are expected to cover expenses related to 
chemical fertilizer, land tax, clothing, the children’s education, medication, and household 
level social networks. Women, on the other hand, are expected to cover daily expenses 
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related to daily food expenses (e.g. vegetables, grain and beans, oil, salt, coffee, species) 
cooking fuel, the grinding mill service, house lightning, sanitary materials, and household 
utensils. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the study areas, traditionally, the main sources of 
income for women’s domestic expenses were the sale of agricultural products (in small 
quantities), housekeeping for men, and women’s own, independent income-generating 
activities. The local custom on the ACSI study location grants women access to agricultural 
products or household income to cover part of their domestic expenses. On the OMFI study 
location, on the other hand, women are traditionally expected to generate their own cash 
income to fulfil their domestic responsibilities. Nevertheless, women partially depend on 
their husbands or sell subsistence crops to generate petty cash income, either because they 
do not generate their own income or their independent income is insufficient to cover 
domestic expenses. This subsection explores the way in which LF enterprise earnings were 
used within the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households, and analyzes the potential effects 
of women’s access to credit on men’s and women’s expenditure responsibilities. 
 
a. Loan-funded livestock income expenditure  
Table 8.2 presents the survey results regarding the primary and secondary uses of income 
from the LF livestock-fattening (household) enterprises within the ACSI borrowers’ 
households. The findings suggest that the ACSI borrowers primarily used income from the 
LF livestock-fattening enterprises on chemical fertilizer (80 %). The remaining 20 percent 
were used for food, children’s education and clothing, assets (including livestock, savings 
and reinvestments in business), for social affairs and other purposes. Over half (46 out of 
86) of the ACSI borrowers’ households used earnings from the LF livestock-fattening 
enterprises for more than one expenditure area. About 52 percent of these ACSI borrowers 
used income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises for secondary purposes, including 
the education and clothing of children (53%), food (22%), assets (18%), and social affairs 
and other purposes (4%).  
 
 
 
Table 8. 2 Frequencies and percentage distribution of the ACSI borrower respondents by primary 
and secondary uses of income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprise. 
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
 
As the above table indicated, fertilizer, children’ education & clothing and food were the 
three most common expenditures on which income from the LF livestock enterprises was 
used by the ACSI borrowers’ households.  
 
Primary Secondary Expenditure area 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Fertilizer  66 80 2 4 
Food 7 8 10 22 
Children’s education and 
clothing 
4 5 24 53 
Assets, savings and 
reinvestment in business 
4 5 8 18 
Social affairs and others 2 2 2 4 
Total  83 100 46 100 
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Table 8.3 displays the survey results regarding the primary and secondary uses of income 
from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises within the OMFI borrowers’ households. As 
shown in the table, more than a third of the OMFI borrowers’ households reported that they 
primarily used income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises on food and the 
education and clothing of children, respectively, and about 18 percent on assets (including 
property, savings and a reinvestment in business), and about 10 percent on social affairs 
and others. About 58 percent of the OMFI borrowers reported that they used income from 
the LF household enterprises on additional areas. About 39 percent of the borrowers 
reported food and clothing and the education of children as secondary expenditure areas, 
followed by assets, Savings and re-investment in business (12%), and social affairs and 
others (10%).   
 
Table 8. 3 Frequencies and percentage distribution of the OMFI borrower respondents by 
primary and secondary uses of income from LF livestock-fattening enterprises. 
 
Expenditure area  Primary Secondary 
 Frequency % Frequency % 
Fertilizer  1 2 - - 
Food  18 36 13 39 
Children’s education and clothing 17 34 13 39 
Assets, savings and re-investment in 
business 
9 18 4 12 
Social affairs and others 5 10 3 10 
Total  50 100 33 100 
Source:  Household Survey 2004.  
 
As displayed in Table 8.2, the great majority of the ACSI borrower respondents reported 
that their households used income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises on chemical 
fertilizer, while the proportion of the OMFI borrower respondents who reported that they 
used income on chemical fertilizer, on the other hand, was very small (Table 8.3)84. 
However, because of the fact that chemical fertilizer was used on the ACSI study location 
to increase crop productivity, it can be said that women’s credit has also contributed to the 
household’s food supply. This relationship is plausible, given Amhara women’s right over 
household agricultural production and their food-provisioning role. In-depth interviews 
with the ACSI borrowers showed that women preferred to use income from the LF 
livestock-fattening enterprises on fertilizer in order to prevent the selling of extra grain by 
men, on the pretext of covering fertilizer expenses85. This could be a strategy employed by 
women to control household production and any misappropriation of household grain by 
men. Therefore, it can be concluded that, directly or indirectly, food is the most common 
and important expenditure area for the borrowers of the two institutions. Given women’s 
limited say over household agricultural products on the OMFI study location, the uses of 
income from traditionally male occupations on food-related expenses may suggest that 
access to credit may indeed help women to fulfil their traditional obligations. Nevertheless, 
as Kabeer (2001) has pointed out, loan-induced expenditure on food may also reflect the 
survival and poverty orientation in expenditure, rather than gender-based choices. This is 
because borrowers are likely to belong to poor households, where food becomes the urgent 
                                                 
84 Chi-square test was  used to see the distributions of ACSI and OMFI observations but it was rejected 
because more than 20 percent of the  cells have expected counted less than five .  
85 It is also important to note that the timing of fertilizer final instalment payments is arranged to coincide with 
the time that borrowers sell their LF livestock. 
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need which both men and women may want to address. Still, the fact that the ACSI and 
OMFI borrowers’ households had a significant say over the uses of such income (see 
Chapter 6) may reflect that their expenditure preferences are taken into account. In addition, 
the uses of income (from LF household enterprises) on fertilizer and children’s education 
and clothing may be an indication that women’s credit also contributes to addressing men’s 
traditional expenditure role within the household. The fact that loan-related earnings are 
used on food, shows the potential effects of microfinance in enhancing household food 
security. This is because, as it was described in Chapter 4, poverty is the main criterion for 
targeting individuals for the ACSI and OMFI loans, and as a result, food might constitute 
the most pressing need for both men and women.   
 
The uses of income from the LF livestock-fattening enterprises for assets, savings and re-
investment in loan-related businesses, may strengthen women’s right over household 
properties. This is particularly true for the OMFI borrowers, who traditionally had a limited 
right over household properties. Because such resources are obtained through women’s 
loans and their efforts, they are more likely to claim at least a “joint” ownership right.  
 
b. Women’s earnings and expenditure patterns  
Although the loan investment in women’s independent (off-farm) economic activities was 
limited, it was included in this analysis to understand how women spend their independent 
income within the household. About a third of the OMFI borrowers reported that they 
earned earnings from the LF off-farm enterprises. ACSI was excluded from this 
quantitative analysis because the number of borrowers who reported loan-use on off-farm 
independent economic activities was limited to three (Chapter 5). Nevertheless, we 
included a few cases from ACSI in the analysis of the in-depth interviews so as to make 
some regional comparison. 
 
The survey findings show that two-thirds and nearly a fifth of the OMFI borrower 
respondents reported that they often use their independent LF enterprise earnings to buy 
food for their families and to cover expenses for their children’s education and clothing, 
respectively, while another 18 percent of OMFI borrowers spends it on other things 
(personal assets, savings and investment, and household utensils). This means that women’s 
independent LF enterprise income was used in the area of women’s traditional expenditure 
responsibility (food), to build women’s resource bases, and partly to cover men’s traditional 
expenditure areas (the education and clothing of children. 
 
A more in-depth insight into the use of women’s independent earnings was obtained 
through the in-depth interviews with eight women (2 from ACSI and 6 from OMFI) who 
used part of their loans to finance independent income-generating activities. Table 8.4 
summarizes the areas of women’s expenditures before and after they gained access to 
credit. 
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Table 8. 4 In-depth interview summary of the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ income sources and 
expenditure patterns before and after getting access to credit. 
    Source: In-depth interviews conducted in 2005 
 
Domestic expenditures: as mentioned before, this refers to women’s traditional 
expenditures such as daily food-related expenses, cooking fuel, the grinding mill service, 
and house lightning, sanitary materials and household utensils. As indicated in Table 8.5, 
both the ACSI and OMFI borrowers appeared to cover domestic expenses regardless of 
membership duration in the credit groups. The long-time OMFI and ACSI borrowers 
compared their situations before and after getting access to credit, respectively, as follows:  
“I did not have enough to support the family, so he [her husband] used to give me money. 
However, after I started saving [access to OMFI credit] I was able to cover all the expenses 
related to the household or the family. In the past, he [her husband] used to provide. Now, I 
can afford to cover the expenses (SY)”.  
 
“Well, before I joined the programme, I used to ask him [her husband] for money for little 
things, including buying coffee and so forth. Now I am working and have money in my 
hand, so I do not need to ask him [her husband] to buy oil or coffee. I will buy it, as I will 
have money on hand (YN)”.  
 
In addition to reducing or removing women’s financial dependency on men, the quantity 
and the quality of the food that women provide to the household increased. Several women 
mentioned that because of their increased independent income, they buy food items 
relatively abundantly and provide household members (especially small children) with 
nutritious foods. Women’s loan-induced independent income was also essential during 
seasons of scarcity, as a husband of an OMFI borrower noted, “I get harvest during the 
spring time. During summer, I have nothing; she [his wife] is the one who feeds the family 
through the profit she [his wife] makes from her business” (AH). This analysis shows that 
women’s independent income was crucial for the survival of poor households, whose 
livelihood is often hand to mouth.   
 
Investment in a woman’s own assets and clothing: the increase in women’s independent 
earnings helped some women to cater for personal effects that are strategic to gender 
relations. As indicated in Table 8.3, the income effect of repeated borrowing was evident in 
Before getting access to credit MFI 
Sources of 
income 
Expenditure  
Expenditure 
After getting access to credit 
ACSI  
Short-time  
 
Long-time 
Own off-farm 
income 
 
Husband  
Domestic 
expenses:    
 
Domestic 
expenses    
Domestic expenses, children’s clothing and 
schooling, own clothing, iddir, social 
network.  
Domestic expenses, children’s clothing and 
schooling, own clothing, iddir, social 
network, medical expenses. 
OMFI 
Short-time 
 
 
Long-time 
Own off-farm 
income and that 
of husband 
 
own off-farm 
income, food 
crops, husband’s  
Domestic 
expenses 
 
 
Domestic 
expenses  
Domestic expenses, iddir , social network.  
 
Domestic expenses, iddir, children’s 
clothing and schooling, own clothing and 
jewellery, personal assets and savings, 
medical expenses, giving cash to men.  
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a range of personal expenditures such as clothing, jewellery, independent assets, and 
savings. However, among the ACSI borrowers, the effect was limited to women’s clothing 
and savings, while among the OMFI borrowers it also included investment in women’s 
jewellery and independent assets. From the viewpoint of the social value given to clothing, 
women on the OMFI study location stressed the significance of their independent income 
for buying their own clothes. One OMFI borrower vividly describes as follows how, in the 
past, she used to borrow clothes from her neighbours during important social occasions: 
 “I did not have enough clothes. But now, I have enough so I can change. Before, I used to 
borrow from neighbours, and I sometimes could not get it. I remember times that I went to 
mourning with someone else’s clothes. But now, I have everything I need”. (WT)  
 
The above testimony suggests that loan-induced women’s independent incomes contributed 
to women’s social participation, as they were able to buy the necessary clothes, shoes, and 
even jewellery.  
 
The study also assessed the contribution of women’s independent income (including that 
from livestock fattening) to women’s savings (including savings in kind). The survey and 
the in-depth interviews showed that borrowers save part of their loan-related income in 
different forms. Table 8.5 shows that over a third of ACSI and nearly half of the OMFI 
borrowers save part of their loan-related earnings in cash.  
 
Table 8. 5 Frequencies and proportional distribution of the respondents by MFI and availability 
of loan-related voluntary savings.  
ACSI OMFI Voluntary saving  
Frequency % Frequency % 
Yes 32 37 27 48 
No 54 63 29 52 
Total  86 100 56 100 
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
Note: There is a  significant difference (5%) between ACSI and OMFI observations (Chi-square test). 
 
With regard to the places of saving, the majority of the ACSI (78%) and OMFI (97%) 
voluntary savers save their loan-related income with the informal sector, namely with the 
traditional eqquib or friends (Table 8.6). In other words: only a fifth of the ACSI and less 
than 3 percent of the OMFI borrowers had a voluntary savings account with the respective 
MFIs. Women prefer to save their income with the informal sources because such savings 
is often organized among peers within the village, or kept with friends, and can be “easily” 
accessed. Saving with the MFIs, on the other hand, requires borrowers to go to the nearby 
town and process the withdrawal of voluntary savings, which they believe is time-
consuming. Yet, compared to the OMFI borrowers, a relatively higher proportion of the 
ACSI borrowers have a MFI saving account.  
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Table 8. 6 Frequencies and proportional distribution of respondents by the MFI and place of 
loan-related voluntary savings.    
 
ACSI OMFI Voluntary savings  
Frequency % Frequency % 
1.Eqquib or friends 22 69 24 93 
2.Above and MFI   10 31 2 7 
Total  32 100 27 100 
Source: Household Survey 2004. 
Note: There is no significant (only 20%) difference in the distribution between ACSI and OMFI observations 
(Chi-square test). 
 
In-depth interviews and group discussions also revealed that the long-time OMFI borrowers 
save loan-related income mostly in the form of cash, especially with the eqquip (the 
Rotating Saving and Credit Association) and with relatives. Individual cases show that 
women save up to ETB 30-50 per week.  For example, a long-time OMFI borrower 
mentioned the increase in her savings from ETB 2.50 per week before she gained access to 
credit, to ETB 50 per week after she diversified her independent economic activities due to 
her gaining access to credit. There were women who became a member of more than one 
ROSCA to diversify their savings. There are also cases in which women practiced 
clandestine saving (hiding earnings from their husbands) to cover familial as well as their 
own emergency needs, and to help family members. For example, one long-time OMFI 
borrower mentioned that she saved about ETB 2000, hiding it from her husband in order to 
establish a business for her son. Savings are often used for re-investment in business and as 
a security in case of emergency. Particularly on the OMFI study location, women used 
loan-related (independent) income and savings for assets such as poultry, goats/sheep, 
calves, heifers, etc. For women, savings and building their own assets are strategic actions, 
especially in a context in which women’s right over household property is very limited, as 
was the case on the OMFI study location.   
 
Investing in extra-household networks or social capital: poor people hardly access 
formal insurance to protect themselves at times of crises. As a result, to invest in a social 
network is an important livelihood strategy for such people, in order to access financial 
(and also social) resources, particularly in times of need (Narayan et al, 1999; World Bank, 
2001). In both the Amhara and the Gurage communities, great social and economic value is 
attached to being a member of informal social institutions such as the iddir (funeral and 
mourning association) and women’s networks among kin, friends, and neighbours. Social 
support systems among the Gurages were found to be strong. For example, a household in 
this community can be a member of five iddirs, while on the Amhara study location, 
households often have only one iddir. This has financial implications for the household. 
Although traditionally, it is men who are expected to pay iddir fees, women on both studied 
locations have begun contributing their independent income in this area and, as a result, 
have taken over more responsibilities.  
 
Increased independent earnings also enabled women to strengthen their own social ties, and 
improve their social standing within the community. During in-depth interviews, several 
women emphasized the importance of their borrowing for improving their financial ability 
to provide gifts to other people at times of weddings, mourning, maternity, etc. This in turn 
had improved women’s confidence and social standing, as the following testimonies vividly 
portray:   
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“It is obvious that if you have money, you will have friends and relatives. We have more friends 
and relatives because we have money now. However, when you do not have money, people will 
not come to you, as you would not visit them. However, now [after access to credit] thanks to 
God, I can reasonably participate in the same activities even though I do not need to spend 
much” (WT). 
 
“Well, I can go to a wedding ceremony with gifts. In the past, my resources were very limited 
and I could not do what I liked to do. Now I freely go to such occasions and give wedding gifts 
to people. Therefore, my social interactions are better now, because I have finances through my 
trades. My contribution to other people’s affairs has increased now, and so has my living 
standard” (WD). 
 
As the account of the first woman indicates, poverty seemed to restrict poor women’s 
participation in mutual social networks, as their poverty makes them unable to reciprocate. 
This is crucial, because transfers, gifts, or loans between network members operate with an 
anticipation of reciprocity (World Bank, 2001).  
 
Other household expenditures: children’s clothing, education, and medication are the 
other, non-traditionally female expenditures that women business operators started 
covering, particularly after gaining access to credit. Although women’s credit appears to 
intensify child labour, particularly that of female children, as we discussed earlier, 
borrowers seemed to offset this by addressing the schooling and clothing needs of their 
children. In this regard, one long-time OMFI borrower told us how she favours her 
daughter who assists her in her work. She said, “....especially for my daughter, because she 
works for me. I properly dress my daughter with fine clothes”.  
 
 c. Loan repayment responsibility  
Table 8.7 displays the survey findings regarding the loan repayment responsibilities within 
the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. As indicated in the table, over half (59%) of 
the female ACSI borrowers reported that men and women feel “equally” responsible for the 
repayment of the ACSI’s loans. In addition, nearly a third (31%) of the female ACSI 
borrowers indicated that they feel primarily responsible for the repayment of ACSI’s loan, 
compared to men within the household. Only 8 percent of the ACSI borrowers reported that 
their men feel more responsible for the loan repayment compared to women, while in one 
percent of the cases an individual other than the couple was reported to be responsible for 
ACSI’s loan repayment. On the other hand, nearly half (45%) and a fourth (23%) of the 
OMFI borrower respondents reported that women and men feel a primary responsibility for 
repayment of the OMFI’s loan, respectively. In about a third (32%) of the cases, both men 
and women are reported to feel “equally” responsible for the loan repayment.  
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Table 8. 7 Frequencies and proportional distribution of respondents by MFI and loan repayment 
responsibility. 
ACSI OMFI Responsible  
Frequency % Frequency % 
Men  7 8 13 23 
men and women jointly  52 61 18 32 
Women  27 31 25 45 
Total  86 100 56 100 
Source: the survey findings of 2004. 
Note; there is no significant difference  between ACSI and OMFI observation (Kolmogrov-Smirnov Test). 
 
As indicated above, the loan repayment among the ACSI borrowers’ households falls 
primarily under the joint responsibility of men and women, followed by women’s 
independent responsibility. This finding was supported by in-depth interviews with men 
(seven). Six of the men noted that men and women feel “equally” responsible for the 
repayment of ACSI’s loans taken by women, and one man noted that his wife feels more 
responsible for the loan she took from the ACSI. According to a group discussion with the 
long-time ACSI borrowers, female borrowers work hard, primarily in order to fulfil their 
loan repayment obligations.  
 
On the other hand, as displayed in the table above, on the OMFI study’s location, women 
borrowers seemed to feel more responsible for the repayment of the OMFI loans, followed 
by men’s and women’s “equal” responsibility. In-depth interviews with men revealed that 
OMFI long-time borrowers who used part of their loans to generate independent income, 
feel primarily responsible for the repayment of the loan they took from the OMFI, 
compared to OMFI short-time borrowers. This was because the OMFI long-time borrowers 
had significant control over the use of the loan funds (Chapter 6) and contribute more 
labour to the loan-funded enterprises (Chapter 7) compared to men. When such women 
encounter loan repayment problems, they get financial assistance from their husbands. For 
example, an OMFI borrower husband said, “she [his wife] is responsible for settling her 
loan [OMFI]. But when she gets a loss, and is unable to repay the loan, I help her settle the 
loan. Another man in a polygamous household said, “she [his wife] is responsible for the 
repayment. So, I advise her to handle the money with care. But, when she doesn't have 
enough [to settle the loan], I add some money and we repay the loan. So, we cooperatively 
repay our debt”.   
 
On the OMFI study location, group discussants noted that men shared or assumed loan 
repayment responsibility because they were co-signatory for their wives’ loans. In addition, 
men are considered to be responsible for the loan repayment because of their role as the 
“head” of the household.   
 
The study also looked into the main sources of loan repayment for the ACSI and OMFI 
borrower households. Both the survey findings and the in-depth interviews demonstrated 
that the main source of loan repayment for the borrowers of the two institutions is the loan-
funded enterprise. This does not necessary mean, however, that borrowers repay their loans 
from the profit generated by the loan-funded enterprise. This is because, as indicated in 
Chapter 5, in most cases the profit generated through the loan fund hardly covers the 
principle (the loan fund) and the interest on the loan. As a result, households mostly repay 
their loans by selling the loan-funded livestock itself. The economic activity that borrowers 
undertake is highly dependent on a continuous injection of capital: a loan from the 
Changes in gender roles, responsibilities & decision-making processes 
162 
microfinance institutions. It was found through the in-depth interviews that households also 
repay women’s loans by selling crops (such as grain), especially when they want to retain 
the loan-funded enterprise (such as livestock), when they used the loan fund for non-
productive investments (such as house construction, medical expenses) and when they have 
encountered problems with loan-funded enterprises (e.g. the loss of animals).  
 
During the group discussions with the ACSI and OMFI credit group members, it was found 
that credit group members also assume loan repayment responsibility if a member is unable 
to repay her loan on time, or if she defaults. Two of the approached ACSI related credit 
group members repaid loans for members who failed to settle their loans on time, but they 
got their money back from the defaulted members later on. Those who experienced loan 
repayment problems settled their loans by renting out their farm plots or by borrowing from 
local moneylenders. The in-depth interviews identified loan repayment problems as one of 
the reasons for women to end their credit group membership.  
 
d. Compulsory saving responsibilities 
The other aspect of responsibility that emerged in association with women’s borrowing is 
compulsory savings. It was indicated in Chapter 4 that both ACSI and  OMFI need their 
credit clients to save a certain amount of money on a monthly basis. Such savings are used 
by a lending institution if a member of a given credit group fails to repay a loan on time. 
ACSI borrowers save 10 percent of their loans as compulsory savings, and the size of the 
compulsory savings for the ACSI borrowers ranges from ETB 10 to 30, while for OMFI 
borrowers, it was ETB 6, independent of the size of the loan fund.   
 
Table 8.8 presents the sources of the compulsory savings for the ACSI and OMFI 
borrowers’ households. For the ACSI borrower’s households, the sources of income for the 
monthly compulsory savings include both loan-funded and non-loan-funded household 
enterprises (69%), women’s own non-loan-funded enterprises (23%), women’s own loan-
funded enterprises (5%), the loan fund (1%), and other sources (2%). For the OMFI 
borrowers’ households, the sources of income for the monthly compulsory savings are 
women’s own non-LF enterprises (32%), household enterprises (22%), women’s own LF 
enterprises (16%), the loan fund (14%), spouses (14%), and other sources (2%).  
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Table 8. 8 Frequencies and proportional distribution of respondents by MFI and source of 
compulsory savings. 
ACSI OMFI Source 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Own LF enterprise 4 5 9 16 
Own non-LF enterprise 20 23 18 32 
Household  enterprises  
(both loan-funded and non-loan-
funded) 
59 69 12 22 
Spouse   - - 8 14 
The loan fund 1 1 8 14 
Other sources 2 2 1 2 
Total  86 100 56 100 
Source: the survey findings of 2004. 
Note: no statistical was done for reasons mentioned in footnote 82. 
 
The above table shows that a considerable proportion of the ACSI borrowers’ households 
deposit compulsory savings from the income generated through household level enterprises 
(both loan-funded and non-loan-funded), followed by income from women’s own non-loan-
funded enterprises. In the case of the OMFI, on the other hand, a relatively significant 
proportion of borrowers fulfil their compulsory saving obligations from their own non-LF 
enterprises, while others use various sources. A relatively significant proportion of the 
ACSI borrowers reported that the household level enterprises provided the major source of 
cash income for compulsory savings compared to the OMFI borrowers’ households. A 
significant proportion of ACSI borrowers used household level enterprises for compulsory 
savings compared to OMFI borrowers. There are three possible reasons for this. First, the 
Amhara women were able to use such earnings because they had more or less equal rights 
over the income from such enterprises, compared to the Gurage women. Secondly, men and 
women may be jointly responsible for compulsory savings since the ACSI’s loans were 
mainly invested in livestock fattening, which is a household level enterprise. Finally, 
households or individuals on the ACSI study’s location had limited non-farm economic 
opportunities compared to the OMFI study’s locations.  
 
In-depth interviews with the ACSI and OMFI borrowers showed that women use their 
independent income for compulsory savings, whether they invest their loans in independent 
economic activities or not. The compulsory savings responsibility adds an additional 
burden on women because they have to work more to generate income for such savings. As 
one ACSI borrower described it: “to me, it [access to credit] is a load. Each month, I worry 
about the saving. But he does not care”. Some ACSI borrowers noted that they used their 
independent income for compulsory savings because they did not want to sell grain. 
However, this new responsibility may still undermine women’s other expenditure 
responsibilities to the household and themselves.  
 
In conclusion, microfinance provided to women is likely to increase women’s 
responsibilities for loan repayment and compulsory savings compared to those of men. 
These financial responsibilities may intensify anxiety among women and may oblige 
women to labour more, in order to generate earnings to repay their loans and maintain their 
compulsory savings.   
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d. Women’s expenditure role and marital conflicts  
The previous subsection discussed how women’s access to credit and increase in 
independent income affected expenditure responsibilities within the household. Both the 
survey and the qualitative findings showed that loan-related income increments were 
largely used (directly or indirectly) to improve household food consumption, suggesting 
that access to credit indeed helps women to address their traditional expenditure 
responsibilities within the household, and to contribute to household food security. 
Additionally, loan-related independent income enabled women to address some of their 
strategic gender needs (savings, assets, jewellery, and social networks). The contribution of 
loan-related earnings to children’s schooling and clothing, the family’s health, and the 
family’s social network was also evident, particularly from the qualitative findings that 
suggest an expansion in women’s expenditure role within the household and their taking 
over of traditional male responsibilities.  
 
In-depth interviews and groups discussions examined whether women contribute their 
independent income to the household voluntarily or under pressure by men. The findings 
suggest that women contribute their independent income to the household willingly. For 
instance, focus group discussants on the OMFI study location strongly stressed the absence 
of expenditure pressure from their husbands. On the other hand, women employ different 
strategies to avoid expenditure demands from their husbands. One long-time OMFI 
borrower explained how she deliberately asks money from her husband to remind him that 
he contributes to the household expenditure. Moreover, the fact that women have 
clandestine savings and independent assets may also suggest that they systematically 
circumvent extensive expenditure expectations from the household members. This could be 
because they are aware of the risk of taking over too many male responsibilities. 
 
The in-depth interviews also explored the effects of women’s economic independence on 
marital conflict. In the context of poverty and gender inequality within the household, 
women’s financial subordination to men and their request for money used to result in 
disagreements and marital conflicts. According to in-depth interviews, before women’s 
access to credit, some households in the Gurage study area used to experience domestic 
arguments and conflicts on financial matters. Women’s access to credit and the related 
income expansion was instrumental in reducing women’s financial dependency on men, 
and consequently also in reducing domestic conflicts. The testimonies of two long-time 
OMFI borrowers illuminate how marital conflict over finances began to decline because of 
the change in women’s financial status or their independence within the household. 
“... before I joined the programme, there was a lot of quarrelling between us [the couple]. I used 
to ask him [her husband] for money, and he did not want to give it; that usually led to conflict. 
Now [after gaining access to credit], however, because I work and get money, I do not need 
much from him. I just do what I want by myself” (BB). 
“...in the past, we were having conflicts because of our poverty. We were grumbling and 
complaining because of the lack and that used to lead us into conflict. ... We were usually 
quarrelling because he [her husband] was not giving finances for the various needs of the 
family. It is not the custom of this area for a man to cover the daily expenses of the household. 
The woman toils a lot to cover those expenses” (WW).  
 
From the above discussions several issues emerged regarding household expenditure 
patterns. First, the change observed in the expenditure responsibilities among some of the 
ACSI and OMFI borrowers is suggestive of the fact that women’s access to credit indeed 
increases the income for some women. It is because of the increase in their independent 
earnings that women were able to widen the scope of their expenditure responsibilities 
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within the household. Second, in particular the OMFI borrowers, who used loans for 
independent off-farm income-generating activities, derived benefit from their independent 
income, not only as a member of the household but also personally, as the owner of the 
money. This was possible most importantly because they used their loans to finance 
independent economic activities. Women’s expenditures on personal savings, assets, 
children, and social networks may enhance women’s fall-back position within the 
household, improve their self-confidence, and raise their social standing within the 
community. Some women confidently described the change in their status as follows: “I 
can now do what other people do. So I am not behind other people”. “I am at equal status 
with friends”.   
 
8.3.3  Change in household decision-making  
In the research areas, households make decisions about a variety of issues, including the 
selling of crops, the selling and buying of livestock, the education of the children, clothing, 
labour allocation, mobility, fertility, house construction, land rent, the children’s marriage, 
etc. Some decisions (e.g. the children’s marriage, house construction) are made less 
frequently and are not relevant to every household. Day-to-day decisions, such as the  
buying and selling of small items, are often carried out by men and women independently, 
without explicit discussions and negotiations, following their traditional “independent” 
income streams and expenditure responsibilities. For example, a man may sell trees to buy 
meat for holidays, or a woman may sell chicken to cover domestic expenses. Decisions that 
are regularly implemented by most households in the study areas include the selling of 
grain, the buying and selling of livestock, the education of the children, clothing, and labour 
allocation. I focused on these types of household decisions because they are very crucial in 
the lives of the poor, as they revolve around household economy and finances.  
Table 8.9 summarizes the results of in-depth interviews concerning intra-household 
decision-making among the ACSI borrowers’ households. It was already mentioned in 
Chapter 4 that the normative household decision-making in the Amhara study area was 
characterized by a more or less “joint” decision-making process by couples, with some 
male dominance. For example, a man may sell household crops in relatively larger 
quantities, partly because of his more sizeable expenditure responsibilities compared to a 
woman, who may sell crops in small quantities to cover daily domestic expenses. As 
indicated in the table, household decision-making among the ACSI borrowers’ households 
was characterized by “joint” decision-making by men and women, with some individual 
independent decision-making. The table shows little difference in decision-making power 
between the short-time and long-time ACSI borrowers. In both cases, household decisions 
are predominantly made by men and women together. The majority (10 out of 12) of the 
ACSI borrowers we interviewed in-depth rarely attributed their current decision-making 
status to their access to credit. Only few women and men mentioned that women’s access to 
microfinance services had contributed to women’s increased decision-making within the 
household in the areas of the sale of crops and livestock, labour allocation, and the clothing 
of children. One of the women described the change in her decision-making as follows: 
 “…it is since I joined the saving programme that I started to control him [her husband] 
and I came to realize some things about money. Before that, I was not conscious even 
whether he squanders the money. That is a change to me”. 
 
Access to credit and participation in credit societies may have strengthened the prevailing 
“egalitarian” decision-making within the ACSI borrowers’ households. Especially women’s 
exposure and interactions outside the household may have improved women’s voice within 
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the household. For example, one of the men mentioned earlier described the change 
observed in his wife as follows: 
“...I have realized that her attending meetings and seminars has helped to broaden the scope of 
her [his wife] thinking. She [his wife] talks about things that she was not previously thinking 
and talking about, for example the rights of women and men”. (SB) 
 
Table 8. 9  In-depth interview summary of decision-making within the ACSI borrowers’ 
households. 
Short-time borrower  Long-time borrower  Description  
Women Men  Joint  Women Men  Joint  
Selling of grain √ √ √√√ - - √√√ 
Selling/buying 
livestock 
 
√ √√ √√√ - - √√√ 
Clothing  √ - √√√ - √√ √√√ 
Education of children √ - √√√ - √√ √√√ 
Labour allocation  √ - √√√ - √ √√√ 
Source: in-depth interviews conducted in 2005. 
Note *:  √ represents not very common; √√ common; and √√√ very common decision-making.  
 
Table 8.10 presents the results of the in-depth interviews concerning household decision-
making arrangements within the OMFI borrowers’ households. The result shows that 
household decision-making among the OMFI borrowers regarding the selling of grain, the 
selling/buying of livestock, clothing, the education of the children, and labour allocation is 
made either by the man or jointly by the couple. As the table indicates, there is clear 
variation between the short-time and the long-time borrowers regarding the patterns of 
decision-making. In the former, men appeared to exercise more decision-making authority 
in all decisions, while in the latter, men’s influence was limited to selling grain, and selling 
and buying livestock. This means that the long-time OMFI borrowers tend to have 
relatively more voice in household decision-making compared to short-time borrowers.  
As mentioned repeatedly in this document, on the OMFI study location, men traditionally 
exercise considerable authority in household decision-making. Yet, access to credit 
appeared to be instrumental for the long-time OMFI borrowers to participate in major 
household decisions related to crops, livestock, and the children’s schooling and clothing. 
In one of the studied Kebeles, focus group discussants compared their decision-making 
power with non-credit programme beneficiaries regarding household production. These 
women indicated that they are involved in decisions regarding the disposal of household 
agricultural products, unlike non-credit group participants who “steal crops during 
harvesting, as they do not work and trade”. However, the effect on short-time borrowers 
was limited. As already pointed out, men tend dominate decisions on agricultural products, 
and education and clothing of children among the short-time OMFI borrower households. 
And none of this group interviewed in-depth reported any change in their decision-making 
power because of their access to credit. For example, a woman from this group said she had 
limited right over household agricultural products and, as a result, she generates cash 
income by gleaning or gathering usable leftover (karmia) from the household pepper field 
after the harvest. This practice clearly demonstrates that this woman does not control the 
household grain. 
In-depth interviews also revealed that the long-time OMFI borrowers in particular are 
“valued” as important partners in decision-making within the household. This was partly 
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because of their vital economic contribution, which was central to addressing problems 
involving finances. Women’s access to credit and their involvement in economic activities 
also contributed to women’s entrepreneurial skills and business experiences, which in turn 
enhanced their voice in household decision-making, as the following testimony suggests.  
“In the past, I didn’t have knowledge of the market. So not only my husband, but I myself 
wanted to sell what we had in the home. Now I know what makes profit and what makes a 
loss. I stopped selling our items spontaneously. I have even managed to control him, that he 
wouldn’t sell our properties unwisely” (SY).  
 
Although the above woman was engaged in some kind of business even before she joined 
the OMFI credit group, it seemed that she became more aware and acquainted with 
economic cost-benefit analysis after she joined the OMFI credit group. Similar remarks 
were made by other business women.  
 
Unlike in the previous chapters, there was no clear distinction in household decision-
making arrangements between polygamous and monogamous households. This could be 
partly because the number of polygamous women included in this chapter was smaller 
compared to the previous chapters, which included programme dropouts.   
 
Table 8. 10 In-depth interview summary of decision-making within the OMFI borrowers’  
households. 
OMFI borrowers 
Short-time borrower  Long-time borrower  
Decision  
Women Men  Joint  Women Men  Joint  
Selling grain - √√√ √√ - √√ √√√ 
Selling/buying 
livestock 
- √√√ √√ - √√ √√√ 
Clothing  - √√ √√√ - √√ √√√ 
Education of 
children 
- √√ √√√ - - √√√ 
Labour allocation  - √√ √√√ - - √√√ 
Source: in-depth interviews conducted in 2005. 
Note *:  √ represents not very common; √√ common; and √√√ very common decision-making.  
 
Finally, two major conclusions can be drawn about household decision-making in relation 
to the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households. In the Amhara study area (ACSI), women’s 
access to credit did little to alter household decision-making arrangements, as women in the 
area are traditionally involved in household decision-making processes, although not on 
equal terms with men. In the Gurage study area (OMFI), the independent income 
contribution of women (long-time or repeated borrowers) to the household and their 
entrepreneurial talents appeared to enhance their voice in household decision-making. 
However, in most areas, men still play a significant role in household decision-making, 
even after women have gained access to microfinance services.    
 
8.4 Concluding remarks  
The evidence presented above shows that the outcome of microfinance interventions 
targeting married women may vary systematically, depending on the institutional contexts 
in which women’s lives and gender relations are embedded. In-depth interviews show that 
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women’s access to credit for investment in livestock was instrumental in facilitating poor 
men’s practical gender role in crop production. Prior to women’s access to credit, the very 
poor households used to acquire draught animals for crop cultivation through various 
arrangements for livestock rental and sharing, including an “exploitative” labour-for-
livestock arrangement with relatively richer farmers. Such arrangements used to delay the 
timing of agricultural activities, which access to credit in part addressed. The study also 
found that, for some women, access to credit resulted in a reduction or withdrawal of their 
labour from crop farming. This was mainly observed among long-time OMFI borrowers 
who invested part of their loans in independent economic activities. The change observed in 
women’s crop farming role could be explained in terms of the economic importance of 
women’s off-farm income to their bargaining power regarding the use of their time within 
the household. Another, practical reason is that such women mostly spend their time on 
market activities. 
 
On the other hand, in the area of the gender division of work, the study shows that 
microfinance programmes are likely to perpetuate gender inequalities, by inducing women 
to devote more time to the loan-funded economic activities and by increasing their 
workload compared to that of men. This was because female borrowers take up new tasks 
or expand their economic roles within the household, while they remain primarily 
responsible for the bulk of domestic activities, with assistance from their daughters. 
Women’s market involvement has also intensified the use of female child labour within the 
household. As this study shows, a redistribution of domestic chores was observed between 
female household members, not between genders. Although in few cases, men tend to assist 
in domestic activities, the situation did not lead to a reallocation or renegotiation of 
domestic tasks between gender groups to bring more equality. As a result, especially for 
repeated borrowers, combining domestic work and loan-related activities became a big 
challenge. Such competition was one of the reasons for women to end their credit group 
membership on both the ACSI and OMFI study locations. As most negative evaluators 
concluded, microfinance targeting women indeed does increase women’s workload. Even 
so, in the contexts of starvation and deprivation, women may not consider a loan-induced 
workload as a serious problem, because the work pays off and their economic situation is 
much better than before. It is worthwhile for women to do so much work because now there 
is enough food, whereas that was not the case before. Thus, they are willing/ready to pay 
the price and cannot afford not to pay it. However, the little emphasis given by women to 
their workload needs to be interpreted carefully, because their analysis may have been the 
result of their socialization and gender ideology. As Sen (1990) has argued, “it can be a 
serious error to take the absence of protests and questioning of inequality as evidence of the 
absence of that inequality (or of the non-viability of that question)” (pp 126). The increase 
in women’s work burden and girls domestic responsibilities calls attention to what Goetz 
and Gupta (1996) describe, “...a second-generation-problem; the first-generation problem 
having been managing institutional changes in order to provide for women’s access to 
credit in the first place”. Development programmes need to design strategies to avoid an 
unintended negative outcome and maximize on the positive outcome to achieve a 
sustainable result in people’s lives. Otherwise, the result will be a vicious circle of poverty, 
because of the heavier workloads and small net benefit for some women, and because 
others (girls) bear the cost. The debate on the literature should also focus on how to 
overcome such a development challenge. 
 
The study has found that income from the LF livestock enterprise was used to address 
men’s and women’s traditional expenditure responsibilities within the household. However, 
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the loan use on women’s independent income-generating activities had led to the expansion 
of women’s expenditure responsibilities and decision-making within the household. Most 
repeated OMFI borrowers were able to establish independent businesses, because they 
joined credit groups at the time that the OMFI extended loan products to finance 
microbusinesses, such as petty trading. Access to credit enabled such women to raise (or 
generate) their independent income, thus contributing to the household and improving their 
independent asset ownership, savings, and social networks. These women started to 
exercise some authority over the allocation of their labour, to expand their expenditure 
domains, and to participate in decision-making within the household. In a relatively 
“egalitarian” society, as is the case in the ACSI study area, women’s borrowing had a 
limited effect on women’s decision-making status within the household, because they are 
mostly viewed as a more or less “equal” partner in household decision-making anyway.  
 
The study indicates that, despite the fact that the loans are given to the household level 
enterprises, both ACSI and OMFI borrowers feel primary responsibility for the loan 
repayment and the monthly compulsory savings. These new financial responsibilities are 
more likely to intensify both women’s concern and their workload, and undermine 
women’s other expenditure responsibilities.    
 
The study has two major findings with policy implications. First, microfinance programme 
outcomes are likely to vary, depending on institutional contexts (socio-cultural, economic, 
and microfinance policies). Second, women’s access to microfinance services may 
positively transform some aspects of gender relations (expenditure responsibilities, 
household decision-making, women’s economic independence) while perpetuating other 
aspects (domestic labour, the workload, loan repayment and compulsory savings). Hence, 
policies and programmes that intend to narrow gender gaps through the provision of credit 
to women need to analyze and consider local circumstances and institutional constraints in 
programme designs. Further in-depth research is needed to understand and compare the 
impact of women’s access to microfinance services on intra-household gender relations in 
different contexts (within and across nations). 
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CHAPTER 9  CONCLUSIONS, POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This chapter presents the main conclusions, the policy recommendations, and the 
suggestions for further research. The chapter consists of two sections. In Section 1, the 
objectives of the research and its contexts are briefly described, followed by the 
presentation of the study’s main conclusions, in line with the research questions. Section 2 
presents the policy recommendations and the suggestions for further research.    
 
9.1  Conclusions 
9.1.1  The research objective  
The objective of this study was to investigate if and how microfinance targeted to married 
women may affect the division of labour and of decision-making power within the 
household. The study emphasized women, in recognition of the recent development policies 
that stress the need to target resources (or at least microcredit) to poor women. in order to 
contribute to the goals of poverty reduction and women’s empowerment. Moreover, the 
study focused particularly on married women, to provide a better understanding of how 
such policy intervention may influence the prevailing gender hierarchies at the household 
level. 
 
The study adopted an exploratory comparative case study research strategy, because 
variations in institutional contexts were expected to influence the outcomes of microfinance 
programmes differently. A combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods 
and data collection techniques was used in order to explore the complexities and the 
dynamic involved in intra-household arrangements.  
 
The study focused on two microfinance institutions in Ethiopia, namely the Amhara Credit 
and Saving Institution (ACSI) and the Omo Microfinance Institution (OMFI), which are 
operational in the States of the Amhara and the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples’ 
(SNNPR) regions, respectively. In the Amhara region (ACSI), the study was conducted in 
the Mangudo Kebele, located in the Moretena Juru district, in the North Shoa Zone. In the 
SNNPR, the study was carried out in the  Dirama-Shershera, Wita and Wolenshu-Aned 
Kebeles, located in the Meskan district, in the Gurage zone. 
 
The studied ACSI and OMFI districts and Kebeles differed in various ways, including 
ethnicity, religious affiliation, forms of marriage, the source of livelihoods, and the 
normative gender divisions and level of adherence to social norms, among others. The 
population of the Mangudo Kebele (ACSI) belongs to the ethnic group of the Amhara. 
Orthodox Christianity and the monogamous form of marriage are very common in this 
Kebele. The population of the Dirama-Shershera, Wita and Wolenshu-Aned Kebeles  
(OMFI) belongs mainly to the Gurage ethnic group. In these Kebeles, Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam are the main religions, with some Protestant Christians. Both 
monogamous and polygamous forms of marriage are practised in the area, although the 
latter is being abandoned in recent years.  
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The main sources of livelihood for the households in the studied ACSI Kebele were mixed 
crop and livestock farming. The people in the area produce mainly annual food crops (e.g. 
cereals, pulses) for subsistence and for the market. Livestock fattening was a lucrative 
business on the studied location, while non-farming economic opportunities were very 
limited. In contrast to the ACSI study location, the agricultural sector on the studied OMFI 
location was more diversified. Here, households produce different kinds of annual (e.g. 
cereals, pulses) and perennial (e.g. fruits) food crops for subsistence and for the market, and 
grow cash crops as well, such as khat, pepper and coffee. Livestock husbandry was also 
part of the agricultural system and the source of additional income. Moreover, the non-
farming income-generating activities (e.g. trading and handicrafts) were vital sources of 
income, both for individuals and households.  
 
The gender relations in the Amhara (ACSI) and the Gurage (OMFI) study locations also 
differed, at least in three important ways. Firstly, women on the Amhara study location 
played a significant role in the agricultural sector compared to women on the Gurage study 
location. Secondly, women on the Gurage study location were extensively engaged in 
market-oriented activities (especially trading) to generate independent cash income, while 
women on the Amhara study location rarely engaged in market activities. Finally, women 
on the Amhara study location had better rights and more decision-making power with 
regard to household property (e.g. land, agricultural produce) compared to women on the 
Gurage location.   
 
9.1.2  The main findings   
The key findings of the study are summarized in line with the specific research questions.  
 
Question 1: Does women’s participation in a microfinance programme affect decision-
making patterns within the household and, if so, how? 
 
The study attempted to respond to this specific question by examining decision-making 
arrangements on the uses of the loan funds and related earnings, and other household 
matters (the sale of grain, the sale and purchase of livestock, the education and clothing of 
the children, and labour allocation) within the ACSI and OMFI clients’ households. The 
study shows that the female ACSI and OMFI borrowers have limited decision-making 
power over loan use decisions within the household, while they have significant authority 
over the uses of enterprise earnings, compared to their husbands. In addition, the study 
found that, especially in the OMFI study location, loan-induced increased independent 
income has enhanced women’s’ decision-making power over the sale of grain, the sale and 
purchase of livestock,  and the education and clothing of the children. 
 
Decision-making on loan uses: the survey findings show that female borrowers from both 
ACSI and OMFI have a limited influence on the uses of the loan fund within the household. 
The proportion of women who have a significant influence on the uses of the loan fund was 
limited to 30-33 percent, while the proportion of men who have a significant influence on 
loan use decisions was about 43-47 percent. In about 21-27 percent of the cases, men and 
women were reported to “jointly” determine the use of the loan fund. However, women 
expected that they would have been less involved in the decision-making if loans had been 
given to men. This means that the proportion of women who would influence loan use 
decision-making would then have been much lower. The study shows that women have 
gained some authority over loan use decision-making because they took the loan in their 
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own name. However, taking the loan in their name has not ensured women’s full authority 
over its use within the household.  
 
Decision-making on loan-funded enterprise earnings: the study found that both the ACSI’s 
and the OMFI’s female borrowers have significant authority over the uses of the income 
generated through the loan-funded (LF) enterprises within the household. Nearly half 
(44%) of the female ACSI borrowers have considerable authority over the LF livestock-
fattening enterprise earnings, compared to less than a fourth of the men who exercise a 
similar level of influence. In about a third of the cases, the female ACSI borrowers and 
their spouses reported to make “joint” decisions. In the OMFI study location, women (47%) 
and men (45%) exercise an almost similar level of influence over the uses of the income 
from the LF livestock-fattening enterprise, while in about 8 percent of the cases “joint” 
decision-making by couples was reported. Among the female OMFI borrowers, on the 
other hand, who used the loan fund to finance independent off-farm enterprises, the 
majority (77%) has full control over the income generated from such an enterprise.  
 
Decision-making on other issues: the findings of this study show that the ACSI’s 
intervention has not significantly altered the prevailing intra-household decision-making 
about the sale of crops, the sale and purchase of livestock (non-loan-funded), the clothing 
and education of children, or the allocation of labour. Only in a few cases, the female ACSI 
borrowers attributed the improvement in their decision-making power to their access to 
microfinance services and related awareness. On the Gurage study location, on the other 
hand, the study demonstrates that women’s access to credit has significantly contributed to 
women’s decision-making authority in the areas of the sale of crops, the sale and purchase 
of livestock, the clothing and education of the children, and labour allocation. As was 
mentioned earlier, this change has been observed among long-time OMFI borrowers who 
used loans for independent economic activities, and who contributed their independent 
income to their households.  
 
Question 2: Does women’s participation in microfinance affect intra-household labour 
divisions and responsibilities and, if so, how? 
 
The study found that the ACSI and OMFI interventions have hardly transformed the 
existing gender division of household labour. Rather, they have reinforced women’s 
workload, their responsibilities, and the gender typing of activities. The interventions have 
increased women’s workload within the household, as women have had to adopt new 
(expanded) work in the livestock-fattening and off-farm income-generating activities, while 
they have also kept all traditional female responsibilities. This has furthermore resulted in 
an intensive use of female child labour, especially with regard to household chores and 
child care activities. It was only on the OMFI study location, that women who used their 
loans for independent income-generating activities have been able to negotiate the uses of 
their labour in farm work. Furthermore, access to microfinance services has expanded 
women’s expenditure domains (especially for the OMFI borrowers) as well as women’s 
responsibilities for loan repayment and compulsory savings.    
The workload: the study demonstrates that women’s access to microfinance services has 
increased the workload for women within the household, compared to that of men. It was 
found that the female ACSI borrowers have a considerable labour involvement in the LF 
livestock-fattening enterprise in comparison to that of men. Similarly, the female OMFI 
borrowers have a significant labour input in the LF enterprises, particularly in the off-farm 
LF enterprises, in comparison to men. The women who used the loan fund in diversified 
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off-farm income-generating activities have had to spend more time in market-oriented 
activities, receiving little direct support from other household members other than their 
daughters.  
 
The task division in livestock fattening: women’s access to credit has not transformed the 
traditional gender division of tasks in the livestock-fattening enterprise. Female borrowers 
from both ACSI and OMFI are mainly involved in the routine, home-based and low status 
tasks, while men, on the contrary, are engaged in tasks which are less frequent, managerial, 
and taking place in the public sphere. Women’s involvement in livestock marketing is very 
limited. The study found that males and females will only engage in tasks that are socially 
“inappropriate” for their gender in the absence (or due to a shortage) of individuals 
normally responsible to do these tasks.    
 
The domestic task: although female borrowers are increasingly involved in livestock-
fattening or independent off-farm income-generating activities due to their access to 
microcredit, they continue to be primarily responsible for the domestic work. As a result, 
women have had to scarify their leisure and sleeping time in order to fulfil their traditional 
obligations in the domestic sphere. Moreover, girls have had to share or take over their 
mothers’ responsibility at a very young age and, as a consequence, they have missed 
classes, and have had no time to study and play with their peers. It was only in limited cases 
that men assisted their wives in household tasks or child care activities. Women’s child care 
responsibility has constrained women from scaling up their businesses, and it has become a 
reason for some women to drop out of the microfinance programmes.  
 
Labour allocation in crop farming: women’s access to credit has had two main effects on 
labour allocation in crop farming. First, due to women’s access to credit for livestock, the 
spouses of ACSI borrowers (in one case the women and boys, too) could stop working on 
the land of relatively better-off farmers in exchange for a pair of oxen for crop cultivation. 
It has also facilitated men’s farm responsibilities and timely undertaking of farm activities, 
by improving their access to draught animals. Second, on the OMFI study location, women 
traders have begun to withdraw their labour from crop farming because of an expansion of 
their independent income-generating activities. This is either because they have no time to 
spare for crop farming, or because participation in the programme has increased women’s 
bargaining power over the use of their time. 
 
The expenditure responsibility: the study shows that the earnings generated from the LF 
enterprises were used for expenses related to women’s and men’s traditional responsibilities 
within the household. Moreover, female borrowers who used loans for independent off-
farm economic activities not only fulfilled their expenditure responsibilities, but they have 
also begun to contribute to traditional male expenditures, such as the education of the 
children, clothing, the social network, etcetera.  
 
Loan repayment and compulsory savings: the study shows that both the ACSI’s and the 
OMFI’s female borrowers feel relatively more responsible for the loan repayment and 
compulsory savings compared to men, since they took the loan in their name. It is partly 
because of this responsibility that female borrowers have contributed relatively more labour 
to the loan-funded enterprises than their men did. In addition, both the ACSI’s and the 
OMFI’s female borrowers were found to use their own non-loan-funded enterprise income 
to fulfil their monthly compulsory saving obligations. 
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Question 3: Which factors related to the microfinance institutions facilitate or hinder 
women’s participation in ACSI and OMFI with consequences for the intra-household 
allocation of both labour and decision-making power?  
 
The study identifies key microfinance institutional arrangements that play a part in shaping 
the outcome of the ACSI’s and OMFI’s interventions regarding the intra-household 
division of labour and decision-making. These include the targeting strategy, the type of 
loan product delivered, the co-signatory requirement for loans, and the centre and group 
meetings. 
 
The targeting strategy: the study found that both ACSI and OMFI promote a targeting 
strategy to “encourage” women to participate in their respective programmes, because 
powerful local customs constrain women’s participation in the public sphere. In-depth 
interviews and groups discussions with the female ACSI and OMFI borrowers revealed that 
bringing the loan-fund in their name has contributed to women’s authority over the uses of 
the loan fund and enterprise income within the household. Furthermore, this targeting 
strategy has increased women’s labour contribution to the loan-funded enterprises, as well 
as their responsibility for loan repayment and compulsory savings.   
 
The type of loan product:  the study found that the type of loan product for which the loan 
fund was extended has affected the ways in which the household has allocated its members’ 
labour and has made decisions. Both on the Amhara and the Gurage study locations, all 
“healthy” and physically “capable” household members have contributed labour to the LF 
livestock-fattening enterprises. This is because livestock fattening is an activity that is 
organized at the household level, under the overall management of the head of the 
household, who is socially privileged to mobilize household labour. In addition, as stated 
before, the agricultural loan product for livestock fattening has helped men to be free from 
working on the land of relatively richer farmers. Furthermore, the OMFI’s past microloan 
product has increased women’s engagement with and labour supply to their own market-
oriented activities. This in turn has increased women’s independent earnings and 
contribution to the family support. Consequently, it has strengthened their bargaining power 
within the household.    
 
The co-signatory requirement: the study found that both ACSI and OMFI required the non-
loan-taking spouse to be co-signatory for the loan-taking spouse. This strategy was 
promoted to ensure that couples’ are “jointly” accountable for loan repayments. As a result, 
on both the ACSI and OMFI study locations, men have claimed a right over the uses of 
their women’s loan funds and have influenced the uses of the loan fund within the 
household. Nevertheless, the study reveals that female borrowers bear relatively more 
responsibilities for the loan repayment and compulsory savings in comparison to men. As a 
result, women’s independent income-generating activities (both loan-funded and non- loan-
funded) are important sources of income for the monthly compulsory saving.  
The non-financial service: the main non-financial services offered by the MFIs include the 
monthly centre meeting organized by ACSI and the credit group meetings by the OMFI. 
These meetings have made some contribution to the enhancement of women’s self-
confidence and women’s voice in household decision-making. ACSI’s awareness-raising 
campaign, conducted at the monthly centre meetings, has made some contribution to 
women’s decision-making power, particularly over the uses of income from the loan-
funded enterprises. OMFI borrowers, especially those who maintained their credit group 
Conclusions, policy recommendations, and suggestions for further research 
176 
meetings, were found to exercise significant authority in various household decision-
making processes (both loan- and non-loan-related) within the household, compared to 
those who did not meet as a group. This difference can in part be attributed to the OMFI’s 
credit group meetings. 
 
Question 4: Which socio-cultural and economic characteristics of the research areas 
influence the allocation of labour and decision-making power within microfinance clients’ 
households?  
 
The findings of the study have demonstrated how socio-cultural variables (such as gender, 
marriage, and age) and economic variables (such as the farming system, the type of 
economic activity, or women’s land right) determine the effect of microfinancing on gender 
relations. The differences in these variables between the ACSI and OMFI study locations 
have resulted in a systematic difference in the two microfinance programmes’ outcomes 
regarding gender relations. This study suggests that, due to socio-cultural variables, 
microfinance programmes have reinforced the locally prevailing gender division of labour 
within the household, instead of transforming it. 
 
The social norm: this study reveals that social norms either facilitate or hinder the gender-
transforming potential of microfinancing in several ways. First, men have influenced the 
labour allocation and household decisions, including the uses of loans and other household 
decisions, by virtue of their social status as the “head” of the household. Second, on the 
study locations, the prevailing gender norms regarding marketing have constrained 
women’s livestock market engagement and, consequently, they have limited women’s full 
control over the uses of the loan fund and related earnings. Even the Gurage women, who 
have a long-standing history of trade and commerce, are hardly involved in livestock 
marketing, because such a market is not a socially appropriate space for them to be seen in. 
The study shows that a few women, who succeeded in participating in the livestock market, 
are able to control the uses of the loan fund and related earnings within the household. On 
the other hand, women who used loans to finance independent income-generating activities, 
such as petty trading or food and drink processing, are actively involved in such markets 
and control their earnings, because it is socially acceptable for women to be involved in 
such markets. Third, social norms have dictated the type of tasks that men and women 
should undertake in the LF enterprises and other activities. As stated before, female 
borrowers are mostly involved in the most routine and low status jobs, as opposed to men, 
who are involved in less routine and managerial jobs. Moreover, women (and girls) 
continue to be responsible for the daily household maintenance and child care activities 
within the household, despite their increased productive roles due to the microfinance 
intervention. Fourth, variables such as age and forms of marriage have significantly 
affected programme outcomes regarding gender relations. On both the Amhara and Gurage 
study locations, older women have significantly more authority over loan use decisions than 
younger women. In addition, on the Gurage study location, women in polygamous 
relationships, especially senior co-wives, have significantly more authority over the uses of 
their loans, related earnings, and their labour contribution to the LF enterprises, than 
women in monogamous relationships.   
 
The economic structure: the outcomes of the ACSI’s and OMFI’s microfinancing 
interventions are influenced by the structure of the respective local economies. A relatively 
larger proportion of women on the Amhara study location make a more significant labour 
contribution to the LF livestock-fattening enterprise than their husbands and their female 
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counterparts on the Gurage study location. This is because on the Amhara study location, 
livestock is vital to the local cash economy. It is also a labour-intensive undertaking that 
requires a great deal of traditional female labour. In addition, the Amhara women mostly 
remain around the homestead, available for this type of work, compared to their husbands 
and their Gurage female counterparts. On the other hand, the availability of off-farm 
economic opportunities for women on the Gurage study location has enabled a relatively 
larger proportion of the female OMFI borrowers to spend more time on independent 
market-oriented activities (mostly away from the homestead).  
 
Furthermore, the study reveals that OMFI borrowers who have a right over the family plot 
have exercised a significant say over the income generated through the LF livestock-
fattening enterprises.  
 
Question 5: To what extent and how does the HIV/AIDS pandemic affect the allocation of 
labour within microfinance clients’ households?  
 
This study did not explicitly look into AIDS/HIV per se but examined any chronic disease 
and death experienced by the ACSI and OMFI clients’ households. It was impossible to 
identify HIV-affected individuals and household for ethical reasons, and also because 
HIV/AIDS was not identified as a serious problem in the studied Kebeles in general and 
among the ACSI and OMFI clients’ households in particular. The study concludes that 
mortality and morbidity, including the cases caused by HIV/AIDS, has not only led to the 
reallocation of household labour among household members (for different activities), but it 
may cause women to drop out of credit groups and to default as well.        
The findings from the in-depth interviews revealed that, on the Amhara study location, 
male adult chronic sickness within the household obliges households to reallocate 
household labour among healthy household members, i.e. women and children. In addition, 
such households mobilize hired labourers and labour exchange groups to carry out 
traditional male activities in farm work, and the women have to divert some labour to care 
for the sick individual. Male adult chronic illness was found to lead to an intensive use of 
child labour, which in turn has a negative impact on children’s schooling. Children have to 
miss class and/or have to postpone school enrolment in order to assist at home and in the 
LF livestock-fattening enterprises. Furthermore, because the women’s labour and time has 
to be divided among various activities (including nursing the sick), the total amount of 
labour and time devoted to the LF enterprise becomes inadequate. This, in turn, negatively 
affects the success of the LF enterprise. With regard to chronic sickness of female 
borrowers, the study shows that women either shift female traditional tasks in livestock 
fattening to the children, or they completely withdraw from their credit group membership. 
 
On the Gurage study location, the situation was slightly different, especially for borrowers 
who used loans for independent off-farm enterprises. The study found that any illness and 
death (both of adult males and non-adults) within the household obliges female borrowers 
to withdraw labour from market-oriented activities. This is because women provide care for 
the sick household member, as nursing the sick falls under their traditional responsibility. 
The ideology of care giving on this study location, however, goes beyond nursing the sick. 
It involves fulfilling social expectations as a “considerate” mother or wife by staying 
around the sick person, which is critical for such women’s social reputation. Moreover, 
following the death of a spouse or a child, a female off-farm operator has to abandon 
market-oriented activities for three or more months in order to welcome visitors, and to 
demonstrate her grief for the deceased. Such a practice, however, hardly applies to a man if 
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his wife dies. In addition, the study found cases in which some female OMFI borrowers 
ended their credit group membership when they became seriously ill, or following serious 
illness and death within the household. The study suggests that health problems within the 
household also cause loan repayment problems.   
 
9.2 Policy recommendations and suggestions for further research 
9.2.1  Policy recommendations 
The study identifies gender-responsive recommendations to be considered by policy makers 
and microfinance programme designers, in order to increase the contribution of 
microfinance interventions to women’s empowerment and to minimize unintended negative 
effects on women and children. The study offers five main policy recommendations, which 
are: a) design locally specific loan products; b) design a strategy to ensure women’s control 
over loans; c) promote women’s access to the market; d) the need for greater social 
intermediation and skill development; e) the need for gender-responsive impact monitoring 
strategies; and f) child care services. 
 
Design locally specific loan products: product development in the microfinance industry is 
dominated by the idea of “one product fits all”, despite the fact that a loan product that is 
suitable for people in one socio-economic setting may not necessarily be suitable in another 
socio-economic context (Wright, 2004). In addition, men and women may not necessarily 
have a similar demand for a given loan product (Binns, 1998). This means that 
microfinancial product development needs to be client-responsive and should be developed 
based on market research, not as a blueprint replication. This study shows that both ACSI 
and OMFI supplied their clients with agricultural loan products for investment in livestock 
fattening, despite the variation in their respective programme areas in terms of economic 
and socio-cultural contexts. This study suggests that the development of a microfinance 
product should involve consultation with both women and men in a given economic 
context. For a woman, the appropriateness of a given loan product should be evaluated in 
terms of a woman’s ability to determine loan uses, ownership of the enterprise, access to 
and control over the marketing of the produce, and over enterprise earnings and savings.  
 
Design a strategy to ensure women’s control over loans: development policy makers, 
donors, and governments have been increasingly targeting microcredit to poor women in 
the developing countries, recognizing women’s limited access to resources within the 
household. However, women’s control over loans and related earnings has received little 
attention in development policy and practice. As this study shows, women’s access to credit 
does not always translate necessarily into women’s control over loan uses and related 
earnings within the household. This further raises a concern about the potential, multiple 
effects of targeting credit to women, as women may not necessarily access and control LF 
enterprise income. Hence, microfinance programmes and policies need to promote 
strategies that ensure not only women’s access to credit, but also their decision-making 
power over loans and related earnings within the household.  
 
Development policy makers need to recognize that poor women and men may have 
separate responsibilities within the household. Accordingly, they may have different 
financial needs that should be independently addressed, enabling them to assume their 
responsibilities. However, ACSI and OMFI extended credit either to the man or to the 
woman within the household. As a result, when men are excluded from access to MFI 
credit, they usually persuade or force their wives to get loans, or they influence the uses of 
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their wives’ loans. This suggests that failure to address men’s financial needs may leave 
women in a worse position, by aggravating domestic conflicts and intensifying women’s 
expenditure burden within the household (Binns, 1998). Therefore, microfinance policy 
makers should design a strategy to ensure that women have control over their loans and 
related earnings within the household. There is a need to enhance public awareness about 
women’s equal rights and develop the capacity of women’s credit groups in collaboration 
with other organizations, such as NGOs, government offices, and women’s associations.    
 
Promote women’s access to markets: as mentioned in the previous section, both the ACSI’s 
and the OMFI’s female borrowers had limited access to livestock marketing for various 
reasons, including social norms, male dominance, and a lack of marketing skills. This is 
one of the reasons for women’s lack of full control over the uses of the loan fund and 
related earnings within the household. Such a social barrier can be removed by encouraging 
women to participate in the livestock market, by making a requirement for households to 
involve women in livestock marketing, by raising women’s and men’s awareness about the 
importance of women’s market participation, and by enhancing women’s marketing skills. 
In collaboration with women’s rights organizations, microfinance institutions can 
strengthen the ability of women’s credit groups to undertake collective action, and to 
challenge such cultural barriers.  
 
A gender-responsive impact monitoring strategy: as this study shows, women’s access to 
microfinance services has resulted in an unintended negative impact, particularly on women 
and girls, and perpetuated gender inequalities within the household. The microfinance 
programmes have led to women’s overwork, and a lack of sleeping and leisure time, both of 
which are dangerous for women’s health. Moreover, female borrowers have had to shift 
part of their domestic responsibilities to female children, which in turn affects the well-
being and education of girls. This means that the negative outcomes of microfinance may 
extend to future generations. Improving the position of adult women now endangers the 
position of the young generation and thereby the sustainability of change in women’s 
empowerment.  
 
Hence, development policy makers need to integrate a gender-responsive impact 
monitoring system, which will enable them to check periodically whether microfinance 
interventions are generating a negative effect on the lives of women and children, and then 
to design strategies to overcome such problems. Development is about bringing a 
sustainable change in people’s social and economic lives for the better (Barnet and 
Whitehead, 2002). The past development policies and programmes have been criticized for 
discriminatory policies that were in favour of men. The current development policies and 
programmes, however, should not make another mistake by ignoring the various constraints 
that female borrowers may encounter in the process of translating their credit access right 
into more power and resources.  
 
Social intermediation and skill development: group lending is a widespread form of social 
intermediation, promoted by microfinance institutions as part of the provision of 
microfinance services to poor people, and used as social collateral for loans. As this study 
shows, women’s participation in credit-related meetings and their greater entrepreneurial 
skills increase the potential of microfinance for strengthening women’s decision-making 
authority within the household. Microfinance programmes should keep up with this routine, 
as it is worth investing in it. They can use the existing institutional arrangements, such as 
centres and credit groups, to bring about attitudinal change with regard to gender 
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discrimination and business skill development, and to mobilize women for collective 
action. Microfinance institutions should not necessarily undertake all activities by 
themselves, as it may divert their financial intermediary function, but they can partner up 
with other organizations, e.g. community-based organizations (including women’s 
associations), religious institutions, local governments, and non-government development 
organizations.  
 
Child care services: despite the fact that female borrowers make a greater labour 
contribution to the LF enterprises than men do, they remain responsible for child care and 
domestics activities, with the help of their daughters. This has a negative impact on the 
women’s health, their economic activities, their membership of the credit programmes, and 
the education of girls. Consequently, this will negatively influence the goal of poverty 
alleviation and women’s empowerment. In order to facilitate women’s active involvement 
in self-employment activities and to reduce the burden of women and female children, 
development policy makers should allocate more resources to the expansion of child care 
and kindergarten services in the rural and urban areas.   
 
9.2.2  Suggestions for further research  
Because of the exploratory nature of the research, this study has raised several issues for 
further exploration and methodological consideration. These include: a) assessing the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on labour allocation; b) issues of polygamy; c) researching 
microfinance programme dropouts; d) the need for further comparative study; and e) the 
need for a mix of research methods in microfinance impact assessment. 
 
The impact of microfinance in an HIV/AIDS context: this study has only highlighted how 
chronic sickness and death within microfinance clients’ households may potentially affect 
the household’s labour allocation to the loan-funded enterprises. The direction of this study 
also shows that HIV/AIDS may negatively affect the success of microfinance clients, the 
profitability of the enterprises, and loan repayment practices. Further research is urgently 
needed in highly HIV/AIDS-prevalent rural and urban areas, to understand and estimate the 
effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on microfinance programme outcomes at the level of 
the individual, the household, and the MFIs. Specifically, this research should look at the 
following three questions. Firstly, how does HIV/AIDS affect the success of microfinance 
interventions? Secondly, how does the HIV/AIDS pandemic lead to the exclusion of certain 
groups from accessing microfinance services? Finally, what kind of financial services are 
suitable for HIV/AIDS-affected households?  
  
The research has also demonstrated that it is important to better understand how ‘normal’ 
emergencies or risks, including sickness and death, the loss of loan-funded animals, 
etcetera, endanger the success of microfinance interventions at different levels. Such risks 
constitute the common causes of poverty and, at the same time, are a consequence of 
poverty. Although it is to be expected that “normal” risks influence the outcomes of 
microfinance interventions, little is known about it yet. More knowledge might allow us to 
develop specific services, like insurances for illness and death, burial, enterprises, etcetera. 
 
Issues of polygamy: the study demonstrates that married women are not a homogenous 
group, and as a result, they are likely to be affected by microfinance interventions in 
different ways. A married woman can be a de facto “head” of a household due to 
abandonment, polygamy, and male out-migration. This research shows that resource 
management and various living arrangements in polygamous unions deserve further 
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investigation. Young co-wives may be in a disadvantaged position and may not benefit 
from microfinance programmes as much as senior co-wives (Mayoux, 2001a). In addition, 
women’s increased economic independence and contribution to the household may 
encourage men to take additional wives (Johnson, 2005). Further research is required to 
understand the rights and obligations of different categories of women, and also to see how 
their life and relation are impacted by microfinance interventions.  
  
The microfinance programme dropout: the advantage of retaining clients in microfinance is 
widely evident. However, client dropout is a widespread problem for microfinance 
institutions. Due to dropouts, microfinance institutions lose individuals with an extensive 
credit history, incur additional costs in the recruitment and training of new clients, while 
new group members may weaken group solidarity (Wright, 1997). The findings of this 
study suggest that the OMFI has a relatively higher incidence of client dropout compared to 
the ACSI. As this study shows, clients may end their credit group membership due to health 
problems and death, women’s work burden, and loan repayment problems. It is also 
possible that clients may drop out of credit groups when institutions fail to address their 
financial needs (Wright, 1997). Further research is required to estimate microfinance 
programmes’ dropout rates and to make a careful analysis of the reasons behind this 
dropout from a gender perspective.  
 
The need for further comparative research: this study is one among the few studies that 
employ a comparative analysis. In contrast to previous research, this research has attempted 
to identify the potential factors that shape microfinance programme outcomes regarding 
gender relations. This allowed comprehending both the differences and the similarities in 
microfinance interventions’ outcomes with regard to women’s empowerment in different 
socio-cultural and economic settings. However, because of the limited number of 
observations and the exploratory nature of the study, it only offers insight into the direction, 
the potential determinants and the potential impacts of microfinance interventions on 
gender relations. The study suggests that variations in institutional settings might constitute 
the factors contributing to the conflicting/contradictory research conclusions in the existing 
literature. As a result, there is an urgent need for a comparative microfinance impact 
assessment study within and across nations to inform policy makers.  
 
A mix of research methodologies: this study combined both quantitative and qualitative data 
generation techniques and analysis. The former approach was crucial for a comparative 
analysis, to offer information on prevalence, and to identify significant factors affecting 
intra-household decision-making and labour allocation. On the other hand, the qualitative 
methodology (which involved in-depth interviews, key informants, and group discussions) 
was important to understand the dynamic of different kinds of impact in its multifaceted 
nature and trends, and also to interpret the results of the survey data analysis.  
To evaluate the different kinds of impact of microfinance interventions on gender relations 
or women’s empowerment, this study recommends a large-scale survey research method, 
continuously supported by in-depth interviews and group discussions. Combining 
qualitative and quantitative research methods allows for a quantification, explanation, and 
structural analysis of intra-household resource allocation dynamics. A qualitative research 
approach is useful if a research objective is to gain a profound and in-depth understanding 
of the impact of microfinance in relation to one or two empowerment dimensions. 
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Appendix 4. 1  The profile of microfinance institutions in Ethiopia (in ETB) 
No. Name 
No of 
Active 
client 
Loan 
outstanding
Client 
Savings
Total 
asset
Total  
liability 
Total 
Capital 
Regional*  
government  
backed MFI 
1 ACSI 528,227 743,691,000 387,481,000 934,083,000 686,762,000  247,321,000  Amhara Region
2 ADCSI 92,515  166,037,000 50,045,000 238,188,000 80,005,,000  158,183,000  
Addis Ababa 
City 
Administratio
n
3 Aggar MFI 1,936  3,194,796 1,720,362 5,659,908 2,562,720  3,097,188  
4 Asser  MFI 1,303 311,436 245,153 651,513 285,234  366,279  
5 AVFS 8,008 7,950,793 2,474,185 12,170,315 7,473,381 4,696,934  
6 
Benshangul 
Gumuze 
MFI 
20,428 3,571,350 15,799,704 25,073,246 168,327  24,904,919  
Benshangul 
Gumuze
7 Bussa Gonofa 20,468 13,271,223 2,535,772 18,478,784 8,230,334  10,248,450  
8 DECSI 427,490  853,259,581 261,329,597 1,134,615,295 899,775,097  
234,840,198
  
Tigray region 
9 Dire Dawa MFI 4,609  4,671,977 1,277,861 15,869,993 5,222,956  10,647,037 
Dire Dawa
City 
Administratio
n
10 Digafe MFI 621  583,410 778,580 1,078,140 859,380  218,760  
11 Eshet MFI 27,144 33,004,565 3,554,473 36,662,492 25,215,588 11,446,904 
12 Gasha MFI 9,168 13,448,207 5,128,240 18,645,028 14,087,138  4,557,890 
13 Ghion MFI 233 348,113 308,186 555,258 312,361  242,897  
14 Harbu MFI 6,012 3,849,005 1,611,669 4,383,538 3,183,255 1,200,283  
15 Letta MFI 309 464,207 57,544 815,073 61,048 754,025 
16 Meket MFI 3,465 2,335,021 312,796 2,935,645 866,298 2,069,347 
17 Meklit MFI 8,840  14,181,863 4,948,007 16,219,429 9,429,069 6,790,360  
18 Metemamen MFI 9,143  4,766,260 820,140 6,847,060 843,130  6,003,930  
19 Ocssco 256,801  412,013,493 70,175,908 274,861,728 152,013,770  
122,847,958
  
Oromiya 
region
20 Omo MFI 120,277  135,418,534 35,757,852 178,958,567 157,703,600  21,254,967 
Southern 
Region
21 PEACE 19,809  30,024,854 7,091,247 32,002,644 22,619,873  9,382,771  
22 SFPI 22,221 24,602,831 10,691,055 30,322,952 18,334,629  11,988,323  
23 Shashimene  2,033  2,581,165 612,741 3,784,587 638,456  3,146,131  
24 Sidama MFI 26,567  17,932,215 4,852,850 25,208,115 12,610,624  12,597,491  
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No
. Name 
No of 
Active 
client 
Loan  
outstanding 
Client 
Savings
Total 
asset
Total 
liability
Total 
Capital 
Regional*  
government  
backed MFI 
25 Wasasa MFI 29,256  29,809,767  6,487,677 25,208,115 22,646,480 9,956,583  
26 Wisdom MFI  45,915  57,193,980 14,374,032 69,277,613 46,545,059 22,732,554  
27 Harari  MFI 267 1,728,497 372,204 5,897,043 403,824 5,493,219 Harari region
 Total 1,692,798   2,578,516,646   890,471,631 
 3,119,950,98
6  2,178,454,806 
 946,989,39
9 
Source: Association of Ethiopian Microfinance Institutions, 2008  
Note * this information was obtained from Amha (2008) 
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Appendix 4. 2 List of MFIs by No. of Active client & Percentage of Female client,  
December’01.  
Source: Amha, 2003 citing AEMFI, 2001  
Microfinance institution Active client % female active 
client 
1. Addis Credit and Savings Institution S.C 6906 83
2. Africa Village Financial Services S.C 606 58
3. Amhara Credit & Savings Institution S.C 152601 38
4. Asser Micro-Financing S.C 311 92
5. Benushangul –GMFI 1319 41
6. Bussa Gonofa Microfinance S.C 3030 81
7. Dedebit Credit & Savings Institution S.C 158689 39
8. Eshet Microfinance Institution S.C 2337 41
9. Gasha Micro-Financing S.C 4381 75
10. Meket Microfinance Institution S.C 2485 43
11. Meklit Microfinance Institution S.C 1952 70
12. Metemamene 385 80
13. Omo Microfinance Institution S.C 58058 35
14. Oromia Credit & Savings Institution S.C 38186 13
15. PEACE Microfinance Institution S.C 3367 59
16. Shashemene EYA- MFI 1081 35
17. Sidama Micro-Financing Institutions S.C 7891 55
18. Specialized Financial & Promotional   Institution 
S.C 
6526 73
19. Wasasa – MFI 1457 66
Total 461327 38
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        Appendix 4. 3   ACSI & OMFI Outreach 1995-2003 & proportion of female active     
          client. 
Source  *ACSI Enewari subbranch office and **OMFI Butajir subbranch office 
 
         
 ACSI* OMFI**  
Year  No. of Active Client Percentage female 
active client 
No. of Active 
Client 
Percentage female 
active client 
1995 672 33 - -
1996 7,799 35 - -
1997 38,190 43 - -
1998 68,580 50 22,460 37
1999 107,143 49 39,469 36
2000 131,330 45 48,000 43
2001 152,601 38 58,058 35
2002 215,970 33 65,448 35
2003 288,681 30 70,590 38
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Appendix 4. 4   Women and men explaining why women joined credit programs.  
Source In-depth Interview 2005. 
The voices of women borrowers  
… from the beginning those in charge of the credit program explained that priority is given to women 
(YN, loan cycle 6, ACSI, monogamy household). 
 
…they [ACSI staffs] were not giving loan to the men at the time (TK, loan cycle 2, ACSI, monogamy 
household).  
 
They said [the credit committee], it is the right of women that is to be maintained  
and we do not need men now. When we went there some did not want to send their  
wives’ while the others allowed us. Thus we [women] took the loan (SG, Loan cycle 
6, ACSI site, monogamy household). 
 
The loan is meant for women only. He [her husband] went to borrow himself, but they told him that 
women only could borrow. So I went, signed and borrowed the money (RS – loan cycle 2, OMFI site, 
polygamous household). 
 
He [her husband] went to borrow, but the loan office had arranged loan for women only, not for men. So I 
went and borrowed (AA,- loan cycle 2, OMFI site, polygamous household). 
 
… I am a good business woman, but he [the husband] is a farmer. He just farms (WT, loan cycle 7, OMFI 
site, monogamy household). 
 
I was the one that was invited [for OMFI meeting]. My husband was not invited. Hard working people 
[involved in off-farm economic activities] were screened, and I was one of them (WD, loan cycle7, 
monogamy household). 
 
The voices of  the spouses of women borrowers’ 
… it [the loan] was only for women and there was no arrangement made for men (AA husband of ZA, 
loan cycle 2- OMFI, monogamy household).  
 
I didn't want to join. My wife was already involved in business. She said that she needed money for her 
business. So I allowed her to join the program so that she could do her business properly (AM, husband of 
AH, loan cycle 7, OMFI site, polygamy household) 
 
…I asked to join the program. But they told me that it meant to increase the participation of women (SB, 
husband of YN, loan cycle 6, ACSI, monogamy household). 
 
… they [ACSI] were providing loan to women only (EA the husband of KN loan cycle 6, ACSI, 
monogamy household).  
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Appendix 5. 1 Key informant interview guiding question  
 
 
Region  Kebele             MFI_____________  
                    
 Date                            Interview starting/ending time    
 
List of Participants  Sex     Roles in the community/MFI 
 
 a. Key Informant: community  
 
1. Household 
? Would you tell us what household means in your language? 
? What are the common household structure, composition and boundary in 
your community? (Size, sex composition, head of household) 
? What are the special privileges of age and/or sex within households? 
? What are the major functions of a household in your community? 
? Did you observe changes in household structures and compositions in your 
community in the last five years? If yes, what? What do you think are the 
causes? 
2. Understanding the Gender division of labour  
? What are the major economic activities that households perform for living in 
your community? 
? What are the major households chores performed by households? 
? What are the major social or communal activities that households undertake? 
? How are these tasks organized within households? Who does what? Is the 
division of labour rigidly defined? 
? What attributes or values are attached to the tasks performed by different 
individuals? 
? Who do you think has more responsibilities and workloads among 
household members? Why? 
? Do you observe any change in your community in the last 5 years regarding 
gender division of tasks and responsibilities? If yes, what are the changes 
and the causes? 
3. Understanding household decision-making 
? What major decisions are made within households? (finance, labour 
allocation, education, marriage, etc) 
? How are decisions arranged within households? Who makes which 
decisions? 
? What are the rationales for individual to influence household decisions? Do 
you observe any change (in the last five years) regarding the decision-
making power of men and women within households in your community? If 
yes, in what sphere?  
4. Resource ownership  
? What are the major resources that households own in your community? 
(Rich,  middle, and poor) 
? Can you tell us the major forms of resource ownership arrangements within 
the households? Are there differences between men’s and women’s access 
and control over resources? (use access and control profile) 
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? What power within household does resource ownership provides men and 
women? 
? Do you observe any change in resource ownership structure between the 
different 
? categories of wealth and within households (men and women) in the   last 
five  years? If yes, what?  
 
5. Marriage and Divorce 
? What are the common forms of marriage in your community? 
? What are the common ages of marriage for boys and girls? 
? How is marriage arranged in your community in the past and at present? 
? Are extra-marital relations and plural marriage common in your area? 
? What are the major causes of marital disputes and divorces? Who often 
initiate? Why? 
? How do people settle marital dispute and divorce? 
? Are both men and women allowed to re-marry after divorce? If not why not? 
? Did you observe changes in marriage and divorce practices in the last five 
years? If 
? yes what changes and what do you think are the potential reasons? 
 
6.  Gender based norms and values  
? How does the community value the roles played by men and women, boys 
and girls (both at household and community levels)? 
? What does the community expect from men and women, boys and girls in 
terms behavior, rights and obligations? 
? Do both sexes have equal exposures to public spheres (community meeting, 
market, church, and training)? If not, why not? 
? Is domestic violence common in your community? If yes, what are the 
causes? And how does it affect women? 
? If women and men do not adhere to a certain social/gender norms, what are 
the consequences?  
? Would you please tell us if there are any symbols and proverbs used in your 
community to explain gender differences? 
? Do you see changes in your community about gender relations? If yes, what?  
What are the implications to men and women (also girls and boys)? 
 
7. Microfinance Related  
? What are the major sources of finance for men and women in your 
community? (past and present) 
? How do you judge women’s participation in SMFI? Do you observe any 
change in gender relations (issues discussed above) due to women’s access 
to finance? If yes what?     
 
8.  Vulnerability  
? Discuss the major vulnerability situations, which have been affecting the 
livelihood (economy and health) of the community (drought, epidemic, 
HIV/AIDS, fall in coffee price, crop and animal diseases, etc?) for the last 
five years.  
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 b. Key informant:  ACSI and OMFI staffs 
1. Information about current status of MFI operation in the district/kebele 
2. Male and female credit group membership trends  
3. What are the MFI institutional arrangements? 
1. Types of products (loans and savings) 
2. Target groups  and targeting criteria, targeting women 
3. Strategies to promote women’s participation in the programs 
4. Credit  committees – roles and members 
5. Loan application, distribution and repayment procedures 
6. Credit group and center meeting functions 
7. Working with men and women clients 
4. What are the economic opportunities for borrowers in the area? 
5. What cultural factors affect female participation in the program?  
6. information on loan repayment  
7. Program dropouts 
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Appendix 5. 2 Survey Questionnaires  
 
Demographic profile (Question 201-216) 
ID 
Code  
201. Name 
of 
Respondent 
202.Name 
of Res. 
Spouse 
 203.Age 
01->20 
02-20 to 29 
03-30 to 39 
04-40 to 49 
05-Over 50 
 
204.Religion 
01-Orthodox 
02-Protest. 
03-Catolic. 
03-Muslim 
 
205. 
Education 
01-Illitrate  
02-Grade 1-
4 
03-Grade 5-
8 
04-Over 
Grade 8 
 
206.Marital 
status before 
joining ACSI 
01-Married 
02-Widow  
03-Single 
04-Divorced 
       
       
 
Demographic profile cont… 
ID 
Code 
206. Is your 
spouse 
currently 
living with 
you? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
207.Marital 
relations  
01-
Monogamy 
02-
Polygamy 
208. If the 
answer for 
question 207 
is 
02(Polygam
y), do you 
pay land tax 
by your 
name? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
210.No. of  
Children 
01-None 
02-Two and 
less  
03-Three to 
five 
04-Six-eight 
05-Over 
eight  
   
209. Family 
Size  
01-Two 
02-Three to 
five 
03-Six to 
eight 
04-Over 
eight  
 
 
212. Is there 
any one who 
joined your 
household 
due to long-
term illness 
&/or death 
of parents 
since the last 
5 years? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
1       
2       
 
Demographic profile cont… 
ID 
Code  
213 Have you ever 
taken any 
contraceptive? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
 
214. If the Answer 
for Question 
No.213 is YES, 
when did you start 
taking? 
01-Before joining 
SACG 
02-After joining 
SACG 
215. Is there a 
family member in 
your household 
with chronic health 
problem since the 
last one year? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
216. If the 
Answer for 
Question No. 215 
is YES, what is the 
major health 
problem? 
01-TB 
02-Diarrehea  
03-Coughing  
04-All 
05-Other (Specify) 
1     
2     
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Economic profile  (Question 217-225) 
ID 
Code  
217.  What is the 
main source of living 
for your household? 
01-Crop farming 
02-Livestock farming 
03-01 and 02 
04-Local drink 
processing 
05-Other (Specify)  
 
218. What is the 
second source of 
living for your 
household? 
01-Crop farming 
02-livestock 
03-Local drink 
processing 
04-Wage employment 
05-Other (Specify) 
219. What is your 
(personal)  2 main 
source of cash income 
(prioritize)? 
01-Grain 
02-Butter 
03-Local drink 
processing 
04-Eggs and Chicken  
05-Wage employment 
06- Others (Specify) 
220. What is your 
spouse’s 2 main 
source of cash 
income(prioritize)?? 
01- Grain 
02-Livestock  
03-Trees 
04-Wage employment 
05-Others (Specify) 
 
1     
2     
 
Economic profile cont… 
ID 
Code  
221. Does your 
household have land 
registered in its name? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
222. If the Answer 
for Question No 221 
is YES, who has use 
right? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03-Self and spouse 
04-Family members 
05-Other (Specify) 
 
223. Does your 
household own any 
livestock?  
01-Yes 
02-No 
 
224. If the Answer 
for Question is No 
223 is YES, to whom 
does it belongs? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03-Self and spouse 
04-Family members 
05-Other (Specify) 
 
1     
2     
 
Economic profile cont. 
ID 
Code  
225. Do you have any livestock, which only 
belongs to you? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
226. If the Answer for Question is No 225 is 
YES, how did you acquire the livestock? 
01-Through ACSI’s loan 
02-Gift from parents 
03-Gift from spouse 
04-Other (Specify 
1   
2   
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Credit Group and Credit facilities (Question 227-257) 
ID 
Code  
227.  How did you 
first come to know 
about ACSI’s credit? 
Through:   
01-ACSI  staff 
02-Household 
members 
03-Friends 
04-Local 
administration 
05-Others (Specify 
228. Who initiated 
you to join ACSI 
credit group? 
01-Self 
02-ACSI’s staff 
03-Spouse 
04-Friends 
04-Local 
administration 
05-Others (Specify) 
 
 
229. Did you ever 
encounter opposition 
from people for 
joining the credit 
group? 
01-Yes 
02-No  
230.  If the answer 
for Question No 229 
is YES, from whom? 
01-Spouse 
02-Relatives 
03-Friends 
04-Other (Specify) 
1     
2     
 
Credit Group and Credit facilities cont… 
ID 
Code  
231.  Did you ever 
absent from group 
meeting? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
232.  If the answer 
for Question 231 is 
YES, why? 
01-Illness  
02-Workload 
03-Influence from 
spouse 
04-Social commitment 
05-Other (Specify) 
233.   Did your spouse 
ever attend a group 
meeting on your 
behalf? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
 
234. Do you see any 
advantage from 
participating in group 
meeting other than 
accessing the loan? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
1     
2     
 
Credit Group and Credit facilities cont… 
ID 
Code  
235. Did you ever 
borrow money before 
ACSI?  
01-Yes 
02-No 
236. If the answer for 
Question 235 is YES, 
what was your main 
source? 
01-Eqquib   
02-Freiends and 
relatives              
03- Service 
cooperative            
04- Money lenders   
05- Government 
projects 
06-Other (Specify) 
237. How many times 
did you take loan 
since you joined the 
credit group/ ACSI 
01-One 
02-Two  
03-Three  
04-Four  
05-Five 
06-Six 
238.  Whose initiative 
was to take your last 
loan? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03-Self and spouse 
04-ACSI’s staff 
05-Group members 
06. Other (Specify 
1     
2     
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Credit Group and Credit facilities cont… 
ID 
Code  
239. How many times 
did you take loan 
since you joined the 
credit group/ ACSI 
01-One 
02-Two  
03-Three  
04-Four  
05-Five 
06-Six 
240.  Whose initiative 
was to take your last 
loan? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03-Self and spouse 
04-ACSI’s staff 
05-Group members 
06. Other (Specify) 
241.  Who made the 
decision on the 
amount/ size of your 
last loan? 
01-Self  
02-Spouse 
03- Self and spouse 
04-MFI staff 
05-Group members 
06-Other (Specify) 
242. Who is responsible 
to repay the loan in your 
household? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03-Self and Spouse 
04-Other (Specify) 
1     
2     
 
Credit Group and Credit facilities cont… 
ID 
Code  
243.  Did you ever 
encounter loan 
investment related dis-
agreement with your 
spouse? 
01-Yes 
02-No  
244.If the Answer for 
Question No 243 is 
YES, what is the major 
cause? 
01-Low Profitability of 
enterprise  
02-Use of loan for 
consumption 
03-Misuse of Loan by 
spouse 
04-Other (Specify)  
245. Did you ever 
engage in income 
generating activities to 
earn independent income 
before joining ACSI 
credit group? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
246. If the answer for 
question 245 is YES, 
what was the source of 
capital? 
01-Eqquib  
02-Spouse 
03-Relatives/friends 
04-Local money lenders 
05-Grain 
06-Other (Specify) 
1     
2     
 
Credit Group and Credit facilities cont… 
ID 
Code  
247. Did you ever 
encounter loan 
repayment problem? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
 248. If the Answer 
for Question No 247 
is YES, what is the 
major cause? 
01-Low Profitability 
of enterprise  
02-Using the loan for 
consumption 
03-Loan transfer to 
spouse 
04-Other (Specify) 
249. Did you ever 
engage in income 
generating activities to 
earn independent 
income before joining 
ACSI credit group? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
250. If the answer for 
question 249 is YES, 
what was the source of 
capital? 
01-Eqquib02-Spouse 
03-Relatives/friends 
04-Local money 
lenders 
05-Spouse 
06-Other (Specify) 
1     
2     
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Credit Group and Credit facilities cont… 
ID 
Code  
251. For what purpose 
does your household 
often use 
ACSI’s/OMFI’s loan 
fund? 
01-Economic 
activities 
02-Education and 
clothing 
03-Food consumption  
04-Other (Specify 
252. Who made the 
final decision on how 
to spend your last 
loan? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03-Joint (Self 
&spouse) 
04-Other (Specify) 
253. If the answer for 
Question No 252 is 
Joint (03), what was 
the level of your 
influence? 
01-Significant 
02-Equal 
03-Limited 
04-None 
254. Who is 
responsible to manage 
the loan fund in your 
household? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03-Self and Spouse 
04-Other (Specify) 
 
 
1     
2     
 
Credit Group and Credit facilities cont… 
ID 
Code  
255. Did you ever 
influence decisions on 
the use of the loan 
fund? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
256. Was there any conflict 
within your household on the 
use of the loan fund? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
 
257. What was the source of cash for 
your last loan repayment? 
01-Loan funded enterprise 
02-Grain  
03-Sell of asset 
04-Renting out land 
05-Other  (Specify) 
1    
2    
 
Loan-funded enterprises type, ownership, labour allocation, marketing (258-277) 
ID 
Code 
258.  What is the 
major loan funded 
enterprise in your 
household?   
01- Fattening            
02-Dairy cow          
. 
03-Crop 
production. 
04-Other (Specify)   
05- Trading 
06-Pepper Prod 
07-Enset Prod 
259. Who 
owns the 
LF 
enterprise 
within 
your 
household? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03- Self 
and 
Spouse 
What is the degree of  individual 
labour contribution by (women 
(W), men (M), sons (S), daughters 
(D) and others(O) 
01-High,  
02-Medium, 
 03-Little, 
 04-None 
Level of involvement in 
marketing by(women 
(W), men (M) and 
others including 
children(O)  
01-High, 02-
Medium,03-Little, 04-
None 
   260 
W 
261 
M 
262 
S 
263 
D 
264 
O 
265 
W 
 
266 
M 
267 
Other 
1           
2           
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Loan-funded enterprises type, ownership, labour allocation, marketing (258-277) 
ID 
Co
de  
268.  What is the 
2nd loan funded 
enterprise in your 
household?   
01- Fattening           
02-Dairy cow          
.03-Crop 
production. 
04-Other (Specify)   
05- Trading 
06-Pepper Prod 
07-Enset Prod 
269. Who 
owns the 
LF 
enterprise 
within 
your 
household? 
01-Self 
02-Spouse 
03- Self 
and 
Spouse 
What is the degree of  individual 
labour contribution by (women 
(W), men (M), sons (S), 
daughters (D) and others(O) 
01-High,  
02-Medium, 
 03-Little, 
 04-None 
Level of involvement in 
marketing by(women (W), 
men (M) and others 
including children(O)  
01-High, 02-Medium,03-
Little, 04-None 
   270 
W 
271 
M 
272 
S 
273 
D 
274 
O 
275 
W 
276 
M 
277 
Other 
1           
2           
 
Level of control over loan-funded enterprise incomes (278-283) 
ID 
Code  
What is the level of your control over income on the main enterprises (related to ownership 
structure): 
 278. Own enterprise? 
01-Full 
02-Significant 
03-equal 
04  Partial 
05-No Control 
279. Spouse’s enterprise? 
01-Full 
02-Significant 
03-equal 
04  Partial 
05-No Control 
280. Joint household enterprise? 
01-Full 
02-Significant 
03-equal 
04  Partial 
05-No Control  
1    
2    
 
Level of control over loan-funded cont… 
ID 
Code  
What is the level of your control over income from the secondary enterprises (related to ownership 
structure): 
 281. Own enterprise? 
01-Full 
02-Significant 
03-equal 
04  Partial 
05-No Control 
282. Spouse’s enterprise? 
01-Full 
02-Significant 
03-equal 
04  Partial 
05-No Control 
283. Joint household enterprise? 
01-Full 
02-Significant 
03-equal 
04  Partial 
05-No Control  
1    
2    
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Uses of loan-funded enterprise incomes  (284-289) 
ID 
Code  
How do you often spend income from the main LF enterprises  
(Please list according to priorities)  in  
 284. Own enterprise   
01-Purchase food item 
02-Education, Clothing 
& Medication 
03-Household utensils  
04-Personal asset  
05-fertilizer 
06 savings  
285. Spouse’s enterprise? 
01-Paying tax   
02- Education, Clothing & 
Medication 
03-Household asset 
04-Personal asset  
05-Drinks  
06-Other (Specify) 
286. Joint household enterprise? 
01-Paying tax   
02-Purchase food item 
03-Education, Clothing & Medication 
04-Household asset 
05-Personal asset  
06-Drinks  
07-Other (Specify) 
1    
2    
 
Uses of loan-funded enterprise cont… 
ID 
Code  
How do you often spend income from the secondary LF enterprises  
(Please list according to priorities)  in  
 287. Own enterprise   
01-Purchase food item 
02-Education, Clothing 
& Medication 
03-Household utensils  
04-Personal asset  
05-fertilizer 
06 savings  
288. Spouse’s enterprise? 
01-Paying tax   
02- Education, Clothing & 
Medication 
03-Household asset 
04-Personal asset  
05-Drinks  
06-Other (Specify) 
289. Joint household enterprise? 
01-Paying tax   
02-Purchase food item 
03-Education, Clothing & Medication 
04-Household asset 
05-Personal asset  
06-Drinks  
07-Other (Specify) 
1    
2    
 
Savings  (290-303) 
ID 
Code 
 290. Have you ever 
saved income before 
joining the credit 
group? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
291. If the Answer for 
Question 290 is YES, in 
what form? 
01-In cash 
02-In kind 
292. If the answer for question 291 is in 
cash (01), where did you saved? 
01-Eqquib 
02-With spouse 
03-with relatives & friends 
04-By myself 
05-Other (Specify) 
1    
2    
 
Savings  cont… 
ID 
Code 
293. Do you currently 
have a voluntary saving 
account with ACSI? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
294. If the Answer for 
Question No.293 is YES, 
does your spouse know 
about your voluntary 
saving? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
295. If the answer for Question 294is 
YES, what is the source of income for 
your voluntary saving? 
01-Own loan funded enterprise. 
02-Own none loan funded enterprise 
03-Spouse 
04-Other (Specify) 
1    
2    
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Savings  cont… 
ID 
Code  
296. Do you 
currently have 
a voluntary 
saving 
account with 
ACSI? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
297. If the 
Answer for 
Question No. 296 
is YES, does your 
spouse know about 
your voluntary 
saving? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
298. If the answer for 
Question 297 is YES, what is 
the source of income for your 
voluntary saving? 
01-Own loan funded 
enterprise. 
02-Own none loan funded 
enterprise 
03-Spouse 
04-Other (Specify) 
299. What is the major 
source of cash for 
compulsory saving (5%) 
required before taking any 
loan? 
01-Own enterprise 
02-Spouse 
03-Other (Specify) 
1     
2     
 
Savings  cont… 
ID 
Code  
300. What is the source of 
income for the monthly 
installment of compulsory 
saving requirement (after taking 
the loan)?  
01-Own loan funded enterprise 
02-Own none loan funded 
enterprise.  
03-Spouse 
04-Other (Specify) 
301. Do you save 
income from loan-
funded enterprise 
other than with 
ACSI (eqquib, 
relatives, etc)? 
01-Yes 
02-No   
302. If the 
answer for 
Question 
No.301 is YES, 
does your spouse 
know about this 
saving account? 
01-Yes 
02-No 
303. For what 
purpose do you use 
your savings? 
01-Food 
02-Asset  
03-expand business 
04-Clothing 
05-Other (Specify) 
1     
2     
 
Changes in women’s life (304-310) 
If the Answer for Question 304 is YES 
what are the changes in terms of your 
 
 
ID 
Code  
304 Is there any 
change in your life 
because of your 
participation in ACSI 
Credit program?  
01-Yes 
02-No 
305. Participation in 
economic activities? 
01-Created self-employment  
02-Expanded pre-existed 
business 
03-Involved in new business 
04-Other (Specify 
306. Work? 
01-Increased 
02-Decreased 
03-No change 
307. Responsibilities? 
01-Increased 
02-Decreased 
03-No change 
 
1     
2     
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Changes in women’s cont… 
If the Answer for Question 304 is YES 
what are the changes in terms of your 
 
 
ID 
Code  
304 Is there any change 
in your life because of 
your participation in 
ACSI Credit program?  
01-Yes 
02-No 
305. Participation in 
economic activities? 
01-Created self-
employment  
02-Expanded pre-existed 
business 
03-Involved in new business 
04-Other (Specify 
306. Work? 
01-Increased 
02-Decreased 
03-No change 
307. Responsibilities? 
01-Increased 
02-Decreased 
03-No change 
 
1     
2     
 
Changes in women’s cont… 
If the Answer for Question 304 is YES 
what are the changes in terms of your 
 
ID 
Code  
308. Access to independent 
income? 
01-Incrased 
02-Decreased 
03-No change 
309. Contribution to 
household income? 
01-Increased  
02-Decreased 
03-No change 
310. Participation in public 
sphere? 
01-Improved 
02-No change 
1    
2    
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Appendix 5. 3  Checklists for the In-depth Interviews 
 
A. Short-time and Long-time borrowers  
 
1. General  
1.1 Why do you want to join the saving and credit group? Why didn’t your spouse join? 
What are the group membership criteria? 
 
1.2 List the number and size of loans taken by the respondents from the MFI so far. Ask 
how the respondent (her household) invested the loans. Why did you or your household 
(wife) prefer to engage in these activities? Who owns the enterprise (wife, husband or 
joint)? What are the justifications? 
 
2. Gender Division of labour 
2.1 Ask if the above activities are new to the respondent’s household (wife). Where the 
respondent involved in similar activity or where she idle before accessing credit?  
 
2.2 Do you observe any change in the division of tasks, responsibilities and workload 
within your household? Discuss the effect to the different household members.  
2.3 Does your involvement in the credit program have effect on your other household 
responsibilities such as child care and leisure time? If yes, how do you resolve or handle 
such problems? 
2.4 Does your participation in public sphere (such as market, community meeting, saving 
and credit group) changed after joining the credit group? How does this influence your 
roles and status within your household? 
 
3. Decision making patterns 
3.1 Who within your household influences decisions related to the size of loan and loan 
investment and why? Discuss if there are any conflict between husband and wife in these 
decision making spheres and how the respondent resolved the problem. 
 
3.2 Ask the average income derived from loan funded enterprise, income utilization and 
decision making process for last loan. Discuss if the respondent has observed changes 
through the years in this regards. Does the household ever invested income from loan 
funded activities on assets, own clothing, personal network, etc? If invested on assets, who 
owns the assets? Do you see any changes in household expenditure patterns as a result of 
women’s participation in credit programs (loan related and non related income)? If so, how 
and why? 
 
3.4. As the respondents to list down major and minor household decisions. Discuss whether 
the respondent’s say in the decision spheres have changed over the last few years (since the 
client has started participating in the credit program).  Solicit the respondent to give some 
examples and further elucidate about the factors which have contributed for the changes 
observed. 
3.6. Ask if the respondent has ever resisted decisions (overtly or covertly) related to loan 
and enterprise income utilization, other household affairs, attending group meetings, labour 
allocation, involvement in income generation (mobility) and explore her strategies. 
Investigate if the respondent has ever refused taking loans.   
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4. Saving 
4.1.What are the sources of income for compulsory saving?  Who is responsible for this 
saving? 
4.2. Did you (your household) ever withdraw money from saving with the MFI? If yes, 
please tell the frequencies and the reasons for saving withdrawal. Who makes the 
decision concerning when to withdraw and how to use the saving? Ask if and how the 
respondent benefit from her saving. 
 
5. Contribution to household 
5.1. What difference does your participation in the credit program have brought to your 
life and to your family? Discuss the costs and benefits of participation to different 
household members? 
 
5.2. What is the contribution or share of income from loan funded enterprise to the overall 
household income? How does this affect intra-household expenditure responsibilities? 
How do the members of your household evaluate this contribution, and how do you feel 
about it? 
 
6. Health – HIV/AIDS  
 
6.1 Discuss how chronic illness within respondent’s household affect loan funded 
economic activities, loan and income utilization patterns, loan repayment, saving patterns 
and labour divisions within the respondent’s household.  
6.2 How did your group member treat you? Did they ever ask you to leave the group? If so 
why? 
 
7. Problems  
7.1 Ask the respondent to discuss problems and constraints encountered due to  
participation in credit program at household, community and institutional levels. 
 
 
B. Short-time and Long-time borrowers’ Spouses  
1.1 How and why did your wife join the credit group? Whose initiative and decision was it? 
Why didn’t you join? 
1.2 What is the most common loan funded enterprise within your household? Ask if these 
activities are new to the respondent’s household (wife). Why did your household (your 
wife) prefer to engage in these activities? Who owns the enterprise (wife, husband or 
joint) and why? 
1.3 Did your household (wife) ever spend the loan fund (or part of it) in none-economic 
activities? If yes, how and why? 
1.4 Who within your household influences decisions related to the size of loan, loan 
investment and use of enterprise income and why? Discuss if there are any conflict and 
resistance between husband and wife in these decision making spheres and how the 
respondent handled the problem. 
1.5 Who is responsible for loan administration, compulsory savings and loan repayment 
within your household? Discuss if the respondent’s household every faced problems in 
these regards. Assess also the effect of these responsibilities to the respondent and his 
wife.  
1.6 What is your opinion about your wife’s participation in the public sphere such as credit 
group meeting, market, contact with MFI staff, etc? How does this affect your 
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household? Did you ever participate in credit group meeting on behalf of your wife? If 
yes, why?   
1.7 How do you judge your wife’s participation in the credit program? Do you observe any 
change in your relationship with her? Do you see any change within your households 
regarding decision making arrangements and processes? Discuss if there is change in 
your wife’s bargaining power and status within your household? How do all these affect 
your position within your household? 
1.8 Do you observe any change in the division of tasks, responsibilities? Discuss the effect 
to the different household members (especial emphasis to the respondent).  
 
C. Program dropouts  
1.1 When and how did you join the credit and saving group? Whose initiative was to 
participate and to take loan? 
1.2 For how long did you access credit and saving facility from the MFI? 
1.3 What did you do with the loan fund or how did you spend the money?  
1.4 Who within your household used to influence decisions related to taking loan, the 
size of loan, investment decisions and on loan funded earnings? Why? 
1.5 What was the effect of your participation in credit program to the members of your 
household? How did it affect intra-household division of labour and decision 
making?  
1.6 Did you ever encounter loan repayment problem? When? Why? 
1.7 When did you live the credit group/program? Who influenced you to dropout? 
Why? What do you miss from the program? Do you regret now? 
 
D. Loan Defaulter  
1.1 When and how did you join the credit and saving group? Whose initiative was to 
participate and to take loan? 
1.2 For how long did you access credit and saving facility from the MFI? 
1.3 What did you do with the loan fund or how did you spend the money? 
1.4 Who used to influence decisions related to taking loan, the size of loan, investment 
decisions within your household? Why? Who was responsible for loan repayment and 
compulsory saving within your household? 
1.5 What was the effect of your participation in credit program to the members of your 
household (for respondent, husband (if any), sons and daughters)? Specifically, how did 
it affect intra-household division of labour and decision making? 
1.6 When did you encounter loan repayment problem? What are the factors for your 
default? Whose responsibility was loan repayment within your household before you 
default? 
1.7 How did you address your loan repayment problem? Or from what source did you 
repay? Who helped you to repay? 
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Appendix 5.4  Focus group discussion with saving and credit groups   
 
1. Group members related  information 
a.  Membership in the credit group 
- what were the criteria for membership in this credit group, and who set the criteria?  
- Did any one (husband  or MFI staffs) had influence with whom you should form the 
group? 
b. Do you have group and centre meetings regularly? How often? If, yes do all members 
attend meetings regularly? If not why not? What are the issues you mostly discuss during 
group and centre meetings? 
c. Savings and loans 
- Why do women often become responsible for the compulsory savings (own none-
loan funded and loan funded enterprise)? 
- How does this compulsory saving affect women’s expenditure responsibilities? 
- Do your members have personal saving with OMFI? Who influence the amount you 
should save? 
- Describe the loan application procedures? 
- What is the responsibility of the group in loan repayment? 
- What will happen if a member fails to repay loans timely? 
- Did your group ever encounter loan repayment problem by members? If yes, What 
did you do to address the problem? What are the major causes of loan repayment 
problem? 
- Does the group have a mechanism to monitor loan uses within members’ 
households (What is the experience of the group up to now?) 
- Why do some members drop out of the credit groups? Is there anyone from your 
group  who left? (assess if health problem and gender power conflicts are included). 
2. MFI  related 
a. Why does the MFI give priority to women? What do you feel about it? What it the 
importance of giving the loan in the women’s name? 
b. What support do women credit group members get from the MFI other than the loan and 
saving facilities? 
a. What institutional factors hinder group members/women participation in the 
credit program and economic activities? (Including orientation and educational 
programs, collateral, minimum loan size, investment on livestock, loan 
repayment requirements, advises by male credit officers 
 
3. Socio-economic Environment 
a. What are the main economic opportunities or income generating activities 
available in the area ( for women and men)? Is there a difference between 
the types of loan-funded enterprise between men and women (married and 
female headed) loanees? Economic activities between within monogamy and 
polygamy households and Islam and Christians? If you were given the 
chance to choose, what activity would you choose? 
b. Marketing- some women are involved in trading but have little involvement 
in marketing of Livestock. Why? Difference within polygamy and 
monogamy households, Islam and Christian. The number of markets 
accessed by group members. 
4. Gender Issues    
a. The labour contribution of couples in petty trading and within the two types of 
marital relations are different. Why? 
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b. The contributions of women and girls in loan funded activities and domestic 
chores 
c. Impact on house-hold decision making :- separate economy and joint 
economy 
5. Effect of participation in credit group 
a. What are the advantage and costs of participation in the credit group and 
accessing credit to you as women (and also different household members)? 
What changes does your participation in credit group and accessing credit 
have brought to you and your hose hold members in terms of division of 
labours and decision- making? 
b. What difference do you observe between women credit group members and 
non-members? (In terms of work, income, public participation, house hold 
decision making, etc.). If there is any difference, what factors explain the 
difference? 
c. How does health problem ( ask if clients in the area are experiencing 
HIV/AIDS) within household affect membership in credit group and the 
economic activities of women loanees? 
d.  Does women’s access to credit and saving services from the MFI has effect 
on the traditional revolving credit and saving institution (equib)? 
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Appendix 7. 1 Frequency and proportion of ACSI and OMFI borrower women by 
the degree of involvement in livestock-marketing.  
 
 
ACSI OMFI Degree of 
involvement  No. %  No. %  
Significant  6 7 6 11
Equal with men  13 16 5 9
Little or non   65 77 43 80
Total  84 100 54 100
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Summary  
With the expansion of microfinance programmes in the low-income countries, millions of 
poor women in these countries have been able to access microfinancial services, 
particularly microcredit and savings. The provision of microfinance services to women has 
been largely premised on the assumption that credit facilitates or expands women’s self-
employment opportunities, and consequently leads to their empowerment. In recent years, 
however, this proposition is under scrutiny and debate, as the available studies provide 
conflicting evidence. 
 
This study explores whether and how microfinance granted to married women affects the 
intra-household division of labour and decision-making power. It also investigates the 
effect of an HIV/AIDS infection on microfinancing results. The study compared the effects 
across two regions in Ethiopia in order to understand the role of local socio-cultural 
practices and economic structures. Simultaneously, the effects across two (regional) 
microfinancing institutions were compared, which differed in institutional regulations and 
strategies. The study took as its point of departure the bargaining theory approach of the 
household and the differentiation between cooperative and non-cooperative models, in 
order to examine how women’s access to microfinance services affected women’s 
bargaining power within the household. The study employed a (comparative) case study 
research strategy in order to understand the complexity of (structural, cultural and 
individual) factors shaping the outcomes of microfinance programmes with regard to 
gender relations. A mix of research methods and data collection techniques, including key 
informant interviews, in-depth interviews, a small-scale household survey, and focus group 
discussions were used to understand the resource allocation and bargaining dynamics 
within the household.    
 
The study focused on the Amhara Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI) and the Omo 
Microfinance Institution (OMFI), which were operational in the Amhara and Southern 
Nations and Nationalities People’s (SNNPR) regions during 2004, respectively. Both of 
them worked with female clients in the rural areas and had five or more years of experience 
in microfinancing. In the Amhara region, the study was conducted in the Mangudo Kebele, 
located in the Moretena Juru district, of the North Shoa zone, while in the SNNPR, the 
study was conducted in the Dirama, Wita and Wolenshu Kebeles, located in the Meskan 
district of the Gurage zone. The case study’s locations were selected because of their 
distinctiveness in socio-cultural practices and economic structures, and because of 
accessibility. 
 
The study aimed to answer the following research questions. 
 
Research questions: 
Does women’s participation in microfinance programmes affect decision-making patterns 
within households, and if so, how? 
Does women’s participation in microfinance programmes affect the intra-household 
division of labour and responsibilities, and if so, how? 
Which characteristics of microfinance institutions facilitate or hinder change towards a 
more egalitarian intra-household allocation of labour and decision-making power, and how 
does this occur?  
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How do socio-cultural and economic factors influence the allocation of labour and 
decision-making power within clients’ households? 
How does the HIV/AIDS pandemic affect the allocation of labour within microfinance 
clients’ households?   
 
Both ACSI and OMFI targeted women in their respective programmes, in recognition of 
women’s contribution to household food security, and their own wish to support women’s 
empowerment. Both microfinance institutions extended microloans to their clients for 
investment in the fattening of livestock, which could serve as draught animals and as a 
source of cash income. At the beginning of its operation, the OMFI also lent money for 
investment in microbusinesses, such as trading. In most borrowers’ households on the 
studied ACSI and OMFI locations, women used the loans for livestock fattening. 
Nevertheless, some women used the money for other purposes, such as crop production 
(e.g. seed, fertiliser and the renting of land), for off-farm income generation (mostly for 
women), for debt payments, and for consumption (e.g. food, medical expenses, the clothing 
and education of children, house construction).  
 
In both regions, the clients’ husbands had significant authority over how women’s loans 
were used within the household. Hence, women’s access to credit in their own name did not 
guarantee that women had full control over the loan uses. Nevertheless, it had improved 
women’s voice in decision-making on that matter. Most women agreed that they had would 
have had less of a say when the loan had been given to their husband. There was no 
significant difference in the patterns of intra--household decision-making on loan uses 
between the ACSI and OMFI borrowers’ households.  
 
In contrast to the loan use decision, women in both regions exercised significant authority 
over the earnings generated through the loan-funded enterprises. In particular the ACSI 
borrowers had considerable influence on income generated by livestock when compared 
either to the influence of men, or to that of their female OMFI counterparts. Still, the latter 
(OMFI borrowers) had more to say about the uses of income generated through livestock 
fattening, and had considerably more authority over income earned through off-farm 
enterprises than their husbands. The in-depth interviews suggested that borrowing the 
money in their name importantly contributed to women’s influence on the use of income 
generated through the loans. This was especially the case among long-time OMFI 
borrowers who used their loans for independent off-farm activities. Here, access to 
microfinance services had significantly enhanced their bargaining power within the 
household, and had consequently increased their influence on finance-related decisions 
within the household (namely the sale of grain, the sale and purchase of livestock, and the 
education and clothing of children). 
 
Targeting microfinance services to married women hardly transformed the gender divisions 
of labour. Only some borrowers had negotiated a reduction of their labour contribution to 
crop farming (mainly long-time OMFI borrowers) and access to non-traditional activities 
(livestock marketing). In most cases, the microfinance interventions reinforced gender 
inequalities by increasing women’s workload and perpetuating the gender segregation in 
economic activities. On both locations, women borrowers contributed a significant share of 
labour to the LF enterprise while remaining responsible for domestic chores. This led to an 
intensive use of female child labour, especially for household chores and child care. 
Furthermore, the task division in the livestock-fattening enterprise was organised in such a 
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way that, in comparison to men, the women undertook the activities that were the most 
routine and the least managerial.  
 
Most long-time OMFI borrowers took on more expenditure responsibilities as a result of 
their new income from their loan-funded, off-farm activities. They now covered 
expenditures that traditionally were the responsibility of their husbands. Moreover, both 
ACSI and OMFI borrowers assumed more responsibility for loan repayment and 
compulsory savings.   
 
The study examined how institutional contexts (e.g. MFI strategies, socio-cultural and 
economic variables) and the HIV/AIDS pandemic influenced the potential of microfinance 
services to transform gender relations and promote women’s empowerment. The study 
found that the strategy of the microfinance institutions to prioritize women as their target 
group for microfinancing did facilitate women’s empowerment to some extent. Generally 
speaking, women’s decision-making power about loan and income use increased as a result 
of their access to loans; women’s participation in centre and group meetings also played a 
role in this. However, as another result, their responsibilities for household expenditures 
increased as well. The initial loan product that the OMFI delivered to microbusiness 
operators had offered women the opportunity to earn independent earnings and to 
contribute income to the household. Consequently, they had more bargaining power in 
loan-related and non-loan-related decisions in household matters. It was also found that the 
co-signatory procedures that ACSI and OMFI put in place to ensure that couples were 
jointly accountable for loan repayments, undermined women’s full control over loan use 
decision-making within the household.  
 
The effect of microfinance interventions on gender relations differed significantly per 
region. In this, socio-cultural variables played an important role. Especially on the studied 
Gurage location (OMFI), the man, being the traditional “head” of the household, heavily 
influenced the way in which loans and income were used within the household.  Yet in both 
regions, social norms predicted the gendered division of labour in LF enterprises. This 
resulted in increased work loads for women and daughters (see above). Local norms also 
privileged men to control the livestock marketing, which is a strategic activity in the 
livestock production process.  
 
A woman’s age and stage in life also influenced the outcomes of microfinancing. In both 
regions, older women played a more significant role in decision-making regarding loan uses 
than younger women. Especially on the OMFI study location, older women also 
contributed more labour to the LF livestock enterprises. In the same region, senior co-wives 
in polygamous households had more decision-making authority over loan uses and 
enterprise earnings than junior wives, but the share of work they contributed to the LF 
enterprises was higher a well.  
 
The difference in the regions’ economic structures played an important role as well. The 
ACSI borrowers tended to have a higher work burden in LF livestock fattening, both 
compared to their husbands and compared to their female OMFI counterparts. In this 
region, livestock fattening is an important economic activity that, traditionally, requires a 
great deal of female labour, while men tend to work on the land, at quite a distance from the 
homestead where the fattened livestock are being looked after. In the OMFI region, women 
tend to spend more time on market activities, away from the homestead. These women 
therefore have little time for livestock fattening. Although in this region men tend to work 
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the land, too, this can easily be combined with livestock fattening, as the land is close to the 
homestead where the fattening of livestock takes place. 
 
Partly for ethical reasons, the study did not examine the effects of AIDS/HIV infections in 
particular, but looked into the effects of all chronic illness and death. The results clearly 
demonstrated that mortality and morbidity (caused by HIV/AIDS, among others) did lead to 
the reallocation of household labour among healthy household members (for different 
activities). Moreover, it did cause women to drop out of credit groups and to forego their 
duties of loan repayment and compulsory saving.  
       
The study allows the formulation of various recommendations for policy and further 
research. In order to promote women’s empowerment and to minimize the deterioration of 
the position of women and girls, development policy makers should allocate more resources 
to enhance women’s entrepreneurial skill development and promote child care services in 
rural areas. In addition, we consider it important that microfinancing institutions (a) design 
locally specific loan products, (b) design strategies to ensure women’s control over loans, 
(c) promote women’s access to the market, and (d) regularly monitor the impact of 
microfinancing strategies on gender relations. 
 
Furthermore, we consider it important to further explore (a) the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
labour allocation, b) the impact of microfinancing on gender relations in polygamous 
households and (c) the reasons for dropping out. More generally, we encourage the use of a 
mix of research methodologies in microfinance impact assessments and the continuation of 
comparative studies. 
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Samenvatting 
Met de uitbreiding van microfinancieringsprogramma's in de lage-inkomenslanden hebben 
miljoenen arme vrouwen toegang gekregen tot microfinancieringsdiensten, vooral 
microkredieten en spaarproducten. Het verstrekken van microfinancieringsdiensten aan 
vrouwen is grotendeels gebaseerd op de aanname dat dergelijke diensten vrouwen de kans 
bieden om een eigen bedrijf op te zetten, wat wederom zou bijdragen aan de zelfstandigheid 
van vrouwen, hun onafhankelijkheid en zelfbeschikkingsrecht (oftewel ‘empowerment’). 
De laatste jaren staat deze aanname echter in toenemende mate ter discussie. 
 
Dit onderzoek verkent of en hoe het verstrekken van microfinanciering aan getrouwde 
vrouwen invloed uitoefent op de verdeling van arbeid en het recht en de macht van 
vrouwen om beslissingen te nemen. Ook wordt gekeken of een HIV/AIDS infectie de 
resultaten van microfinanciering beïnvloedt. Het onderzoek vergelijkt de effecten in twee 
regio's in Ethiopië, om zodoende de rol van sociaal-culturele kenmerken en economische 
structuren te kunnen begrijpen. Tegelijk worden twee microfinancieringsinstituten 
vergeleken en daarmee de effecten van verschillende institutionele regelingen en 
strategieën. Het onderzoek vertrekt vanuit de theorie van onderhandeling binnen het 
huishouden (de zogenaamde ‘bargaining approach’), en de differentiatie tussen 
coöperatieve en non-coöperatieve huishoudens. Op die manier kan worden gekeken of en 
hoe toegang tot microfinanciering de onderhandelingsruimte van vrouwen in het 
huishouden beïnvloedt. Het onderzoek maakt gebruik van de ‘case study’-methode, om 
zicht te krijgen op de complexe samenwerking van allerlei (structurele, culturele en 
individuele) factoren. Daarnaast is een mix van onderzoeksmethoden toegepast om de 
allocatie van hulpbronnen en de dynamiek van onderhandelingen binnen het huishouden in 
kaart te brengen; tot de onderzoeksmethoden behoren interviews met sleutelinformanten, 
diepte-interviews, een kleinschalige enquête onder huishoudens, en discussies met 
focusgroepen.  
 
Het onderzoek richtte zich op het Amhara Credit and Saving Institution (ACSI) en het Omo 
Microfinance Institution (OMFI), die gedurende 2004 werkzaam waren in de regio Amhara, 
respectievelijk de Southern Nations and Nationalities People's Republic (SNNPR). Beide 
instituten werkten met vrouwelijke cliënten in landelijke gebieden en hadden vijf jaar of 
meer ervaring in microfinanciering. In de regio Amhara werd het onderzoek uitgevoerd in 
het Kebele Mangudo, gelegen in het district Moratena Juru, in North Shoa. In de SNNPR 
werd het onderzoek uitgevoerd in de Kebeles Dirama, Wita en Wolenshu, gelegen in het 
district Meskan in Gurage. De locaties van de case studies zijn gekozen omdat zij 
verschillen in sociaal-culturele gewoonten en economische structuren, en vanwege de 
toegankelijkheid van deze gebieden. 
 
Het onderzoek beoogde de volgende onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. 
1. Beïnvloedt de deelname van vrouwen aan microfinancieringsprogramma's de 
besluitvorming binnen huishoudens, en zo ja, hoe? 
2. Beïnvloedt de deelname van vrouwen aan microfinancieringsprogramma's de verdeling 
van arbeid en verantwoordelijkheden binnen huishoudens, en zo ja, hoe? 
3. Welke karakteristieken van microfinancieringsinstituten faciliteren of belemmeren de 
verandering naar een meer egalitaire verdeling van arbeid en beslissingsmacht binnen 
het huishouden, en zo ja, op welke manier? 
4. Hoe beïnvloeden sociaal-culturele en economische factoren de allocatie van arbeid en 
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beslissingsmacht binnen de huishoudens van cliënten van microfinancieringsinstituten? 
5. Hoe beïnvloedt de HIV/AIDS pandemie de allocatie van arbeid binnen de huishoudens 
van cliënten van microfinancieringsinstituten? 
 
Zowel ACSI als OMFI richtte zich specifiek op vrouwen vanwege de bijdrage die vrouwen 
leveren aan de voedselzekerheid van huishoudens; daarnaast wilden ze zo bijdragen aan het 
zelfbeschikkingsrecht van vrouwen. Beide microfinancieringsinstituten gaven 
microleningen aan hun cliënten om te investeren in het vetmesten van vee. In het begin van 
de operatie leende OMFI ook geld uit voor investeringen in micro-ondernemingen, zoals 
kleine handelsondernemingen. De meeste vrouwen gebruikten de lening voor het vetmesten 
van vee. Sommige vrouwen gebruikten het geld ook voor andere doelen, zoals het kweken 
van gewassen (bijvoorbeeld voor zaden, kunstmest en het pachten van land), voor 
bedrijfsactiviteiten buiten de boerderij, voor het afbetalen van schulden, en voor 
consumptie (bijvoorbeeld voor voedsel, medische kosten, kleding en onderwijs voor 
kinderen, of voor (ver)bouw van een huis).  
 
In beide regio's hadden de echtgenoten van de cliënten veel invloed op de bestedingen van 
de leningen. Het feit dat het krediet op naam van de vrouw stond, bood geen garantie dat de 
vrouwen volledig over het gebruik van de leningen konden beschikken. De meeste vrouwen 
waren wel van mening dat ze minder inspraak zouden hebben gehad als de lening aan hun 
echtgenoot was verstrekt. Kredietverlening aan vrouwen versterkte volgens hen dus wel de 
stem van vrouwen in de besluitvorming. Of de lening door ACSI of OMFI was verstrekt 
had geen invloed op de besluitvorming over de besteding van leningen.  
 
In beide regio’s hadden de vrouwen duidelijk wel inspraak in de besteding van de 
inkomsten. Vooral de leners bij ACSI hadden veel invloed op de besteding van inkomen, in 
vergelijking met zowel mannen als de vrouwelijke cliënten van OMFI. Toch hadden ook de 
leners bij OMFI meer te zeggen over het gebruik van inkomen dat verdiend werd met het 
vetmesten van vee, dan over het inkomen dat hun echtgenoten in ondernemingen buiten de 
boerderij verdiend hadden. Uit de diepte-interviews met vrouwen kwam naar voren dat het 
lenen van geld op hun eigen naam hun invloed op de besteding van het zo verdiende 
inkomen sterk vergroot had. Dat was in het bijzonder het geval onder vrouwen die al 
meerdere jaren geld leenden bij OMFI en geld verdienden met bedrijfsactiviteiten buiten de 
boerderij. In die gevallen had toegang tot microfinanciering de onderhandelingsruimte van 
vrouwen binnen het huishouden op significante wijze verbeterd, en hun invloed op 
financiële beslissingen in het huishouden vergroot (te weten beslissingen over de verkoop 
van graan, de aankoop en verkoop van vee, en het onderwijs en de kleding van kinderen).  
 
De verdeling van arbeid tussen mannen en vrouwen was nauwelijks veranderd ten gevolge 
van het verstrekken van microfinanciering aan vrouwen. Slechts enkele leners bedongen 
een vermindering van hun arbeidsbijdrage aan de teelt van gewassen (dit betrof vooral de 
meerjarige leners van OMFI) en toegang tot niet-traditionele activiteiten (het vermarkten 
van het vee). In de meeste gevallen versterkte microfinanciering de ongelijke verdeling van 
arbeid; de werklast van vrouwen nam veelal toe terwijl de verdeling van soorten taken 
gelijk bleef. In beide regio's besteedden de vrouwelijke leners een significant deel van hun 
tijd aan het vetmesten van vee, terwijl ze verantwoordelijk bleven voor huishoudelijke 
taken. Vaak leidde dit ertoe dat dochters een deel van het werk in huishouden en 
kinderopvang van hen overnamen. Voor wat de taken rondom het vetmesten van het vee 
betrof, namen vrouwen vooral de routinematige taken van hun man over; management en 
vermarkten bleef veelal de verantwoordelijkheid van mannen.  
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De meeste meerjarige leners bij OMFI kregen als gevolg van hun nieuwe inkomsten meer 
verantwoordelijkheid voor huishoudelijke uitgaven. Ze begonnen veelal ook die kosten te 
dekken die traditioneel tot de verantwoordelijkheden van hun echtgenoten behoorden. 
Daarnaast waren de vrouwen zowel bij ACSI als bij OMFI hoofdverantwoordelijk voor de 
terugbetaling van leningen en de bijdragen aan verplichte spaarprogramma's.  
 
Kort samengevat laat het onderzoek zien dat de positie van vrouwen inderdaad in bepaalde 
opzichten kan verbeteren als microfinancieringsinstituten zich specifiek op vrouwen 
richten. Zo was het recht en de macht van vrouwen om over het gebruik van lening en 
inkomen te beslissen, toegenomen als gevolg van hun toegang tot leningen; daarbij heeft de 
deelname van vrouwen aan groepsbijeenkomsten zeker ook een rol gespeeld. Maar de 
verantwoordelijkheid van vrouwen voor de uitgaven van het huishouden nam eveneens toe. 
In het werkgebied van OMFI gaf het microkrediet vrouwen de gelegenheid om 
onafhankelijke inkomsten te verwerven, en zodoende bij te dragen aan het inkomen van het 
huishouden. Als gevolg daarvan hadden ze meer inspraak in zowel lening-gerelateerde als 
niet-lening-gerelateerde beslissingen in huishoudelijke kwesties. Daarnaast is vastgesteld 
dat de door OMFI en ACSI verplicht gestelde gezamenlijke verantwoordelijkheid van paren 
tot terugbetaling van de lening, de volledige zeggenschap van de vrouwen over het gebruik 
van de leningen ondermijnt.  
 
Het effect van microfinanciering op de man-vrouw verhouding verschilde per regio. 
Sociaal-culturele verschillen tussen de regio’s speelden daarbij een belangrijke rol. Vooral 
in Gurage (OMFI) had de man, als traditioneel 'hoofd' van het huishouden, veel invloed op 
de manier waarop de leningen en het inkomen binnen het huishouden besteed werden. In 
beide gebieden bepaalden sociale normen hoe het werk tussen mannen en vrouwen werd 
verdeeld. Dit resulteerde in een groeiende arbeidslast voor vrouwen en dochters (zie 
hierboven) en meer toezicht van mannen op het vermarkten van vee.  
 
Daarnaast waren leeftijd en levensfase van de vrouw van invloed op de uitkomsten van 
microfinanciering. In beide regio's hadden oudere vrouwen meer invloed op de 
besluitvorming aangaande het gebruik van leningen dan jongere vrouwen. Op de OMFI 
onderzoekslocatie waren oudere vrouwen tevens actiever betrokken bij het vetmesten van 
vee dan jongere vrouwen. In dezelfde regio hadden de oudere echtgenotes in polygame 
huishoudens meer beslissingsbevoegdheid over het gebruik van leningen en opbrengsten 
dan de jongere echtgenotes; daar stond tegenover dat het aandeel van de oudere echtgenotes 
in het werk ook groter was.  
 
Het verschil tussen de regio's in economische structuur speelde ook een belangrijke rol. De 
vrouwelijke ACSI leners besteedden de meeste tijd aan het vetmesten van vee, zowel in 
vergelijking met hun mannen als in vergelijking met de vrouwen in het OMFI programma. 
In de ACSI regio was het vetmesten van vee een belangrijke economische activiteit, die 
traditioneel vooral vrouwelijke arbeid vraagt. Mannen werken hier over het algemeen op 
het ver af gelegen land terwijl de stallen dichtbij huis liggen. In de OMFI regio besteedden 
vrouwen meer tijd aan marktactiviteiten, ver weg van huis. Deze vrouwen hadden daarom 
weinig tijd voor het vetmesten van vee. Hoewel de mannen over het algemeen ook in deze 
regio op het land werken, is dit eenvoudig te combineren met het vetmesten van vee, 
aangezien het land zich in de buurt van de boerderij en de stallen bevindt.  
 
Doel van het onderzoek was ook om de effecten van HIV/AIDS infecties te onderzoeken. 
Om zowel ethische als praktische redenen richtte het onderzoek zich echter niet uitsluitend 
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op HIV/AIDS maar de effecten van chronische ziekten en sterfgevallen meer in het 
algemeen. De resultaten tonen aan dat mortaliteit en morbiditeit (onder andere veroorzaakt 
door HIV/AIDS) tot re-allocatie van huishoudelijke arbeid onder de gezonde leden van het 
huishouden leidde. Het veroorzaakte bovendien uitval van vrouwen uit kredietgroepen en 
de opgave van verplichtingen aangaande terugbetaling van de lening en verplicht sparen.  
 
Op basis van het onderzoek is het mogelijk om diverse aanbevelingen voor beleid en verder 
onderzoek te formuleren. Om de zelfbeschikking van vrouwen te bevorderen, en de 
verslechtering van de positie van vrouwen en meisjes te voorkomen, is het belangrijk dat 
beleidsmakers meer aandacht en middelen besteden aan de bevordering van 
ondernemersvaardigheden onder vrouwen en aan de beschikbaarheid van kinderopvang in 
landelijke gebieden. Daarnaast is het van belang dat microfinancieringsinstituten (a) 
leenproducten ontwikkelen die zijn afgestemd op de specifieke culturele en economische 
kenmerken van een regio, (b) strategieën ontwikkelen om de controle van vrouwen over de 
leningen zeker te stellen, (c ) de toegang van vrouwen tot markten te bevorderen, en (d) het 
effect van microfinanciering op de verhoudingen tussen mannen en vrouwen monitoren.  
 
Het is verder belangrijk om op de volgende terreinen nader onderzoek te verrichten (a) de 
impact van HIV/AIDS op de allocatie van arbeid, (b) de impact van microfinanciering op 
de verhoudingen tussen mannen en vrouwen in polygame huishoudens en (c ) de redenen 
voor uitval uit programma's. Daarbij is het aan te bevelen om kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve 
onderzoeksmethoden te combineren en de resultaten in verschillende groepen en gebieden 
met elkaar te vergelijken.  
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